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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
NASA NTRS2022

NASA Crew Transportation System Certification Plan

NASA Crew Transportation System (CTS) Certification is the authorization granted by the Agency that allows the use of a Commercial Provider’s CTS to transport NASA Crew to and from the ISS. The CTS Certification decision is made by the NASA Associate Administrator based on the comprehensive assessment of the Certification Review Board and recommendations from the CCP and ISS Program Managers and the NASA Associate Administrator of Space Operations Mission Directorate. The Commercial Provider is responsible for developing and executing its plan for certifying the CTS. The Commercial Crew Program (CCP) with the International Space Station (ISS) Program must substantiate the Commercial Provider’s certification assertion of compliance with NASA requirements and NASA Crew safety.

CCP↗
DOE OSTI2020

Application and Certification of Comparative Vacuum Monitoring Sensors for Structural Health Monitoring of 737 Wing Box Fittings

Multi-site fatigue damage, hidden cracks in hard-to-reach locations, disbonded joints, erosion, impact, and corrosion are among the major flaws encountered in today's extensive fleet of aging aircraft and space vehicles. The use of in-situ sensors for real-time health monitoring of aircraft structures are a viable option to overcome inspection impediments stemming from accessibility limitations, complex geometries, and the location and depth of hidden damage. Reliable, structural health monitoring systems can automatically process data, assess structural condition, and signal the need for human intervention. Prevention of unexpected flaw growth and structural failure can be improved if on-board health monitoring systems are used to continuously assess structural integrity. Such systems are able to detect incipient damage before catastrophic failures occurs. Condition-based maintenance practices could be substituted for the current time-based maintenance approach. Other advantages of on-board distributed sensor systems are that they can eliminate costly, and potentially damaging, disassembly, improve sensitivity by producing optimum placement of sensors and decrease maintenance costs by eliminating more time- consuming manual inspections. This report presents a Sandia Labs-aviation industry effort to move SHM into routine use for aircraft maintenance. This program addressed formal SHM technology validation and certification issues so that the full spectrum of concerns, including design, deployment, performance and certification were appropriately considered. The Airworthiness Assurance NDI Validation Center (AANC) at Sandia Labs, in conjunction with Boeing, Delta Air Lines, Structural Monitoring Systems Ltd., Anodyne Electronics Manufacturing Corp. and the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) carried out a certification program to formally introduce Comparative Vacuum Monitoring (CVM) as a structural health monitoring solution to a specific aircraft wing box application. Validation tasks were designed to address the SHM equipment, the health monitoring task, the resolution required, the sensor interrogation procedures, the conditions under which the monitoring will occur, the potential inspector population, adoption of CVM into an airline maintenance program and the document revisions necessary to allow for routine use of CVM as an alternate means of performing periodic structural inspects. To carry out the validation process, knowledge of aircraft maintenance practices was coupled with an unbiased, independent evaluation. Sandia Labs designed, implemented, and analyzed the results from a focused and statistically-relevant experimental effort to quantify the reliability of the CVM system applied to the Boeing 737 Wing Box fitting application. All factors that affect SHM sensitivity were included in this program: flaw size, shape, orientation and location relative to the sensors, as well as operational and environmental variables. Statistical methods were applied to performance data to derive Probability of Detection (POD) values for CVM sensors in a manner that agrees with current nondestructive inspection (NDI) validation requirements and also is acceptable to both the aviation industry and regulatory bodies. This report presents the use of several different statistical methods, some of them adapted from NDI performance assessments and some proposed to address the unique nature of damage detection via SHM systems, and discusses how they can converge to produce a confident quantification of SHM performance An important element in developing SHM validation processes is a clear understanding of the regulatory measures needed to adopt SHM solutions along with the knowledge of the structural and maintenance characteristics that may impact the operational performance of an SHM system. This report describes the major elements of an SHM validation approach and differentiates the SHM elements from those found in NDI validation. The activities conducted in this program demonstrated the feasibility of routine SHM usage in general and CVM in particular for the application selected. They also helped establish an optimum OEM-airline-regulator process and determined how to safely adopt SHM solutions. This formal SHM validation will allow aircraft manufacturers and airlines to confidently make informed decisions about the proper utilization of CVM technology. It will also streamline the regulatory actions and formal certification measures needed to assure the safe application of SHM solutions.

42 ENGINEERING↗
NASA NTRS1984

IMCS reflight certification requirements and design specifications

The requirements for reflight certification are established. Software requirements encompass the software programs that are resident in the PCC, DEP, PDSS, EC, or any related GSE. A design approach for the reflight software packages is recommended. These designs will be of sufficient detail to permit the implementation of reflight software. The PDSS/IMC Reflight Certification system provides the tools and mechanisms for the user to perform the reflight certification test procedures, test data capture, test data display, and test data analysis. The system as defined will be structured to permit maximum automation of reflight certification procedures and test data analysis.

Source record↗
NASA NTRS1988

Zero/zero rotorcraft certification issues. Volume 1: Executive summary

This report analyzes the Zero/Zero Rotorcraft Certification Issues from the perspectives of manufacturers, operators, researchers and the FAA. The basic premise behind this analysis is the zero/zero, or at least extremely low visibility, rotorcraft operations are feasible today from both a technological and an operational standpoint. The questions and issues that need to be resolved are: What certification requirements do we need to ensure safety. Can we develop procedures which capitalize on the performance and maneuvering capabilities unique to rotorcraft. Will exptremely low visibility operations be economically feasible. This is Volume 1 of three. It provides an overview of the Certification Issues Forum held in Phoenix, Arizona in August of 1987. It presents a consensus of 48 experts from government, manufacturer, and research communities on 50 specific Certification Issues. The topics of Operational Requirements, Procedures, Airworthiness, and Engineering Capabilities are discussed.

Adams, Richard J.↗
NASA NTRS1991

Space shuttle main engine: Certification for manned space flight

SSME requirements were identified in NASA approved documents. Design verification specifications (DVS) are used to define requirements and method of verification. Detailed and complete plans provide for verification of each requirement by lab tests, component tests, and engine tests. These tests are planned to expose problems early. The culmination of the development process is engine certification. The certification consists of two certification cycles on each of two engines. The certification cycle is made up of 10 tests and 5000 seconds.

Weesner, Ronald G.↗
NASA NTRS1991

Demonstration of rapid and sensitive module leak certification for Space Station Freedom

A leak detection and quantification demonstration using perflurocarbon tracer (PFT) technology was successfully performed at the NASA Marshall Space Flight Center on January 25, 1991. The real-time Dual Trap Analyzer (DTA) at one-half hour after the start of the first run gave an estimated leak rate of 0.7 mL/min. This has since been refined to be 1.15 (+ or -) 0.09 mL/min. The leak rates in the next three runs were determined to be 9.8 (+ or -) 0.7, -0.4 (+ or -) 0.3, and 76 (+ or -) 6 mL/min, respectively. The theory on leak quantification in the steady-state and time-dependent modes for a single zone test facility was developed and applied to the above determinations. The laboratory PFT analysis system gave a limit-of-detection (LOD) of 0.05 fL for ocPDCH. This is the tracer of choice and is about 100-fold better than that for the DTA. Applied to leak certification, the LOD is about 0.00002 mL/s (0.000075 L/h), a 5 order-of-magnitude improvement over the original leak certification specification. Furthermore, this limit can be attained in a measurement period of 3 to 4 hours instead of days, weeks, or months. A new Leak Certification Facility is also proposed to provide for zonal (three zones) determination of leak rates. The appropriate multizone equations, their solutions, and error analysis have already been derived. A new concept of seal-integrity certification has been demonstrated for a variety of controlled leaks in the range of module leak testing. High structural integrity leaks were shown to have a linear dependence of flow on (Delta)p. The rapid determination of leak rates at different pressures is proposed and is to be determined while subjecting the module to other external force-generating parameters such as vibration, torque, solar intensity, etc.

Dietz, R. N.↗
NASA NTRS1993

Certification trails and software design for testability

Design techniques which may be applied to make program testing easier were investigated. Methods for modifying a program to generate additional data which we refer to as a certification trail are presented. This additional data is designed to allow the program output to be checked more quickly and effectively. Certification trails were described primarily from a theoretical perspective. A comprehensive attempt to assess experimentally the performance and overall value of the certification trail method is reported. The method was applied to nine fundamental, well-known algorithms for the following problems: convex hull, sorting, huffman tree, shortest path, closest pair, line segment intersection, longest increasing subsequence, skyline, and voronoi diagram. Run-time performance data for each of these problems is given, and selected problems are described in more detail. Our results indicate that there are many cases in which certification trails allow for significantly faster overall program execution time than a 2-version programming approach, and also give further evidence of the breadth of applicability of this method.

Sullivan, Gregory F.↗
NASA NTRS1994

Experimental control in software reliability certification

There is growing interest in software 'certification', i.e., confirmation that software has performed satisfactorily under a defined certification protocol. Regulatory agencies, customers, and prospective reusers all want assurance that a defined product standard has been met. In other industries, products are typically certified under protocols in which random samples of the product are drawn, tests characteristic of operational use are applied, analytical or statistical inferences are made, and products meeting a standard are 'certified' as fit for use. A warranty statement is often issued upon satisfactory completion of a certification protocol. This paper outlines specific engineering practices that must be used to preserve the validity of the statistical certification testing protocol. The assumptions associated with a statistical experiment are given, and their implications for statistical testing of software are described.

Trammell, Carmen J.↗
NASA NTRS1994

Human factors certification in the development of future air traffic control systems

If human factors certification of aviation technologies aims to encompass the wide range of issues which need to be addressed for any new system, then human factors involvement must be present throughout the whole design process in a manner which relates to final certification. A certification process cannot simply be applied to the final product of design. Standards and guidelines will be required by designers at the outset of design for reference in preparing for certification. The most effective use of human factors principles, methods, and measures is made as part of an iterative design process, leading to a system which reflects these as far as possible. This particularly applies where the technology is complex and may be represented by a number of components or sub-systems. Some aspects of the system are best certified during early prototyping, when there is still scope to make changes to software or hardware. At this stage in design, financial and/or time pressures will not rule out the possibility of necessary changes, as may be the case later. Other aspects of the system will be best certified during the final phases of design when the system is in a more complete form and in a realistic environment.

Evans, Alyson E.↗
NASA NTRS1998

Midcourse Space Experiment Data Certification and Technology Transfer

The University of Alabama in Huntsville contributes to the Technical Management of the Midcourse Space Experiment Program, to the Certification of the Level 2 data produced by the Midcourse Space Experiment's suite of in-orbit imaging radiometers, imaging spectro-radiometers and an interferometer and to the Transfer of the Midcourse Space Experiment Technology to other Government Programs. The Technical Management of the Midcourse Space Experiment Program is expected to continue through out the spacecraft's useful life time. The Transfer of Midcourse Space Experiment Technology to other government elements is expected to be on a demand basis by the United States Government and other organizations. The University, of Alabama Huntsville' contribution specifically supports the Principal Investigator's Executive Committee, the Deputy Principal Investigator for Data Certification and Technology Transfer team, the nine Ultraviolet Visible Imagers and Spectrographic Imagers (UVISI) and the Pointing and Alignment of all eleven of the science instruments. The science instruments effectively cover the 0.1 to 28 micron spectral region. The Midcourse Space Experiment spacecraft, launched April 24, 1996, is expected to have a 5 year useful lifetime. The cryogenically cooled IR sensor, SPIRIT III, performed through February, 1997 when its cryogen expired. A pre-launch, ground based calibration of the instruments provided a basis for the pre-launch certification of the Level 2 data base these instruments produce. With the spacecraft in-orbit the certification of the instrument's Level 2 data base was extended to the in-orbit environment.

Pollock, David B.↗
NASA NTRS2003

Certification Processes for Safety-Critical and Mission-Critical Aerospace Software

This document is a quick reference guide with an overview of the processes required to certify safety-critical and mission-critical flight software at selected NASA centers and the FAA. Researchers and software developers can use this guide to jumpstart their understanding of how to get new or enhanced software onboard an aircraft or spacecraft. The introduction contains aerospace industry definitions of safety and safety-critical software, as well as, the current rationale for certification of safety-critical software. The Standards for Safety-Critical Aerospace Software section lists and describes current standards including NASA standards and RTCA DO-178B. The Mission-Critical versus Safety-Critical software section explains the difference between two important classes of software: safety-critical software involving the potential for loss of life due to software failure and mission-critical software involving the potential for aborting a mission due to software failure. The DO-178B Safety-critical Certification Requirements section describes special processes and methods required to obtain a safety-critical certification for aerospace software flying on vehicles under auspices of the FAA. The final two sections give an overview of the certification process used at Dryden Flight Research Center and the approval process at the Jet Propulsion Lab (JPL).

Nelson, Stacy↗
NASA NTRS2003

Certification Processes for Safety-Critical and Mission-Critical Aerospace Software

This document is a quick reference guide with an overview of the processes required to certify safety-critical and mission-critical flight software at selected NASA centers and the FAA. Researchers and software developers can use this guide to jumpstart their understanding of how to get new or enhanced software onboard an aircraft or spacecraft. The introduction contains aerospace industry definitions of safety and safety-critical software, as well as, the current rationale for certification of safety-critical software. The Standards for Safety-Critical Aerospace Software section lists and describes current standards including NASA standards and RTCA DO-178B. The Mission-Critical versus Safety-Critical software section explains the difference between two important classes of software: safety-critical software involving the potential for loss of life due to software failure and mission-critical software involving the potential for aborting a mission due to software failure. The DO-178B Safety-critical Certification Requirements section describes special processes and methods required to obtain a safety-critical certification for aerospace software flying on vehicles under auspices of the FAA. The final two sections give an overview of the certification process used at Dryden Flight Research Center and the approval process at the Jet Propulsion Lab (JPL).

Nelson, Stacy↗
NASA NTRS2004

Classification of Unmanned Aircraft Systems. UAS Classification/Categorization for Certification

Category, class, and type designations are primary means to identify appropriate aircraft certification basis, operating rules/limitations, and pilot qualifications to operate in the National Airspace System (NAS). The question is whether UAS fit into existing aircraft categories or classes, or are unique enough to justify the creation of a new category/class. In addition, the characteristics or capabilities, which define when an UAS becomes a regulated aircraft, must also be decided. This issue focuses on UAS classification for certification purposes. Several approaches have been considered for classifying UAS. They basically group into either using a weight/mass basis, or a safety risk basis, factoring in the performance of the UAS, including where the UAS would operate. Under existing standards, aircraft must have a Type Certificate and Certificate of Airworthiness, in order to be used for "compensation or hire", a major difference from model aircraft. Newer technologies may make it possible for very small UAS to conduct commercial services, but that is left for a future discussion to extend the regulated aircraft to a lower level. The Access 5 position is that UAS are aircraft and should be regulated above the weight threshold differentiating them from model airplanes. The recommended classification grouping is summarized in a chart.

Source record↗
NASA NTRS2005

Human Systems Integration: Unmanned Aircraft Control Station Certification Plan Guidance

This document provides guidance to the FAA on important human factors considerations that can be used to support the certification of a UAS Aircraft Control Station (ACS). This document provides a synopsis of the human factors analysis, design and test activities to be performed to provide a basis for FAA certification. The data from these analyses, design activities, and tests, along with data from certification/qualification tests of other key components should be used to establish the ACS certification basis. It is expected that this information will be useful to manufacturers in developing the ACS Certification Plan,, and in supporting the design of their ACS.

Source record↗
NASA NTRS2012

Certification of COTS Software in NASA Human Rated Flight Systems

Adoption of commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) products in safety critical systems has been seen as a promising acquisition strategy to improve mission affordability and, yet, has come with significant barriers and challenges. Attempts to integrate COTS software components into NASA human rated flight systems have been, for the most part, complicated by verification and validation (V&V) requirements necessary for flight certification per NASA s own standards. For software that is from COTS sources, and, in general from 3rd party sources, either commercial, government, modified or open source, the expectation is that it meets the same certification criteria as those used for in-house and that it does so as if it were built in-house. The latter is a critical and hidden issue. This paper examines the longstanding barriers and challenges in the use of 3rd party software in safety critical systems and cover recent efforts to use COTS software in NASA s Multi-Purpose Crew Vehicle (MPCV) project. It identifies some core artifacts that without them, the use of COTS and 3rd party software is, for all practical purposes, a nonstarter for affordable and timely insertion into flight critical systems. The paper covers the first use in a flight critical system by NASA of COTS software that has prior FAA certification heritage, which was shown to meet the RTCA-DO-178B standard, and how this certification may, in some cases, be leveraged to allow the use of analysis in lieu of testing. Finally, the paper proposes the establishment of an open source forum for development of safety critical 3rd party software.

Goforth, Andre↗
NASA NTRS2012

Certification of Safety-Critical Software Under DO-178C and DO-278A

The RTCA has recently released DO-178C and DO-278A as new certification guidance for the production of airborne and ground-based air traffic management software, respectively. Additionally, RTCA special committee SC-205 has also produced, at the same time, five other companion documents. These documents are RTCA DO-248C, DO-330, DO-331, DO- 332, and DO-333. These supplements address frequently asked questions about software certification, provide guidance on tool qualification requirements, and illustrate the modifications recommended to DO-178C when using model-based software design, object oriented programming, and formal methods. The objective of this paper is to first explain the relationship of DO-178C to the former DO-178B in order to give those familiar with DO- 178B an indication of what has been changed and what has not been changed. With this background, the relationship of DO-178C and DO-278 to the new DO-278A document for ground-based software development is shown. Last, an overview of the new guidance contained in the tool qualification document and the three new supplements to DO-178C and DO-278A is presented. For those unfamiliar with DO-178B, this paper serves to provide an entry point to this new certification guidance for airborne and ground-based CNS/ATM software certification.

Jacklin, Stephen A.↗
NASA NTRS2013

An Operational Safety and Certification Assessment of a TASAR EFB Application

This paper presents an overview of a Traffic Aware Strategic Aircrew Requests (TASAR) Electronic Flight Bag application intended to inform the pilot of trajectory improvement opportunities while en route that result in operational benefits. The results of safety analyses and a detailed review of Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) regulatory documents that establish certification and operational approval requirements are presented for TASAR. The safety analyses indicate that TASAR has a likely Failure Effects Classification of “No Effect,” and at most, is no worse than “Minor Effect.” Based on this safety assessment and the detailed review of FAA regulatory documents that determine certification and operational approval requirements, this study concludes that TASAR can be implemented in the flight deck as a Type B software application hosted on a Class 2 Portable Electronic Device (PED) Electronic Flight Bag (EFB). This implementation approach would provide a relatively low-cost path to certification and operational approval for both retrofit and forward fit implementation, while at the same time facilitating the business case for early ADS-B IN equipage. A preliminary review by FAA certification and operational approvers of the analyses presented here confirmed that the conclusions are appropriate and that TASAR will be considered a Type B application.

Koczo, Stefan↗
NASA NTRS2024

Recommendations on Evidence and Process for Certification of Learning-enabled Components in Aerospace Systems

This report primarily identifies a collection of relevant and necessary evidence for assurance of machine learnt components (MLCs)—also known as learning-enabled components—integrated into aircraft systems, and gives preliminary suggestions on the elements of a certification process that invoke the identified evidence. The main focus is on feedforward neural networks that are static and trained offline through supervised learning. A brief background on the generic elements of the lifecycle of an MLC is given to contextualize the assurance considerations and, consequently, the evidence that is relevant and necessary to support certification. At the level of an MLC, those considerations relate to: (i) the consistency and correctness of MLC contributions to system functions in the context of a validated functional intent; and (ii) the absence of MLC contributions to aircraft-level failure conditions. At an ML model level, confidence in model and data properties contribute to assurance of the containing MLC, in particular: (a) generalizability and robustness of models, in the presence of inputs not previously seen during training, disturbances to inputs, and unexpected inputs; and (b) valid data, i.e., data that are at least representative, relevant, complete, and accurate. Evidence for the above span the elements of the ML lifecycle, and includes, at a minimum, lifecycle artifacts that pertain to: (1) properties of requirements capturing functional intent, safety constraints, and aspects of the intended use and operating environment; (2) model performance, model complexity and design, and algorithm choice; (3) achievement of required performance at the levels of a trained model during model development, a trained model after model development is complete, and a trained model that is transformed into an executable equivalent; (4) model implementation aspects necessary for transforming a trained model into the executable equivalent; (5) integration of the executable trained model into the containing MLC, and eventually the larger system; and, (6) lastly, the verification and validation (V&V) of each of the above. Such V&V lifecycle artifacts themselves include: aspects of coverage, e.g., of various levels of requirements by the input space of the model and the data; traceability (where applicable); application of formal methods for property specification, analysis, and checking. Examples of evidence generation methods and tools further ground the discussion on what constitutes evidence, and the contribution to assurance during certification. The identified assurance considerations and supporting evidence is not a comprehensive set. Additionally, neither what should be considered as sufficient evidence relative to the assigned criticality of an MLC, nor how criticality ought to be determined and adjusted, have been considered in this report. However, suggestions are made for potential activities of the ML lifecycle that are aimed at providing confidence that an MLC can be relied upon when integrated into its containing (aircraft) system. Those activities are proposed as candidate elements of a certification process for MLCs. The main purpose of this report to inform regulatory guidance and consensus standards that may be used to meet the safety intent of the applicable regulations.

Aviation safety↗