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DOE OSTI2025

Utility-Scale Operational Consequences for Solar Grid Services

This report delves into the critical aspects of grid services provided by solar inverter-based resources (IBRs), with an emphasis on the evolving landscape of microgrids, virtual power plants (VPPs), aggregators, and distributed energy resource management systems (DERMS). As the energy sector undergoes a transformative shift towards more decentralized and resilient grid architectures, understanding the multifaceted risks associated with these technologies becomes paramount. The report categorizes these risks into organizational, technical, and procedural domains, providing a thorough risk assessment framework that stakeholders can utilize to anticipate and mitigate potential issues. In addressing the increasing complexity of grid interconnections, the report highlights the importance of Cyber-Informed Engineering (CIE). By embedding engineering controls and cybersecurity measures into the early stages of system design, this approach aims to fortify grid infrastructure against emerging cyber threats. The analysis includes an exploration of best practices and strategies for integrating CIE principles to enhance grid security and resilience. To provide practical insights, the report conducts a detailed consequence analysis of various grid services and cyber mitigations that can be applied through the interconnection process. This analysis evaluates the potential impacts of different failure modes and vulnerabilities, offering a clear understanding of the consequences that could arise from disruptions within the energy grid. The findings are further enriched by a series of case studies that illustrate real-world scenarios and lessons learned from past incidents. Through this comprehensive examination of grid services and their criticality, the report aims to prepare industry professionals with the knowledge and tools necessary to navigate the complexities of modern energy systems. By providing a comprehensive approach that includes risk assessment, cybersecurity, and consequence analysis, solar stakeholders can more effectively guarantee the reliability, efficiency, and security of the energy grid.

14 SOLAR ENERGY↗

DOE OSTI2025

IEEE PES GM Poster - Cyber-Informed Engineering Approach to Mitigating BESS Supply Chain Concerns

Battery energy storage systems (BESS) are increasingly important to meet the needs of grid resilience and reliability. BESS provide critical grid services, maintaining stability of the grid with increased variable conditions. However, there are significant geopolitical and security concerns regarding their operation in critical infrastructure, due to lack of a domestic supply chain and prevalence of foreign entity of concern (FEOC) components in BESS and associated inverter-based resources. The supply chain challenge is dually exacerbated by a lack of alternative suppliers who can meet the economic targets for energy delivery and a potentially adversarial supply chain. Solutions are needed to secure components, addressing mixed layers of risk and engineering controls. This paper presents a specific application of Cyber-Informed Engineering (CIE) principles for BESS and recommends an alternative strategy to blocking the supply chain, ensuring that grid modernization targets can be met despite lack of a validated or secure supply chain. This study focuses on the United State (U.S.) use case, but the process can be applied globally to address supply chain security challenges. CIE practices represent the next step in functional assurance and risk mitigation, ensuring optimal resource allocation and enhancing security measures to safeguard the future of energy in the U.S. and beyond.

25 - ENERGY STORAGE↗

DOE OSTI2026

Resonant scattering at the center of the galaxy cluster PKS 0745-191 with XRISM

We report evidence of the resonant scattering effect at the center of the galaxy cluster PKS 0745-191 with XRISM. We analyzed XRISM/Resolve commissioning-phase observations of the distant cluster PKS 0745-191 ($z = 0.103$) with a $54$ ks exposure. The gain drift was corrected using the onboard modulated X-ray source (MXS), and spectra were extracted from all the pixels that were well illuminated by MXS, the core region (four central pixels, $\sim$100 kpc), and the surrounding region. A single-temperature collisional ionization equilibrium (CIE) model fits the full field-of-view spectrum with $kT \approx 6$ keV and a turbulent velocity of ${\approx}120$ km s$^{-1}$. From the core ($r < 50$ kpc) spectrum, we detected a ${\approx}22\%$ suppression of the Fe xxv He$\alpha$ resonance (w) line relative to the CIE prediction. We performed a Monte Carlo simulation to calculate the resonant scattering (RS) effect using radial profiles from Chandra data. The RS-inferred turbulence agrees with that by Resolve line-broadening, demonstrating that RS provides an independent and consistent constraint on ICM turbulence. These results highlight XRISM/Resolve’s potential for turbulence studies in galaxy clusters.

Astronomy and AstroPhysics↗

DOE OSTI2025

Advanced Transmission Technologies (ATTs) Supplier Cohort Workshops Cohort Summary [Slides]

This Summary slide deck summarizes the key outcomes of the Advanced Transmission Technologies (ATTs) supplier cohort, part of Idaho National Laboratory’s (INL) Technical Assistance for Digital Assurance (TADA) program. The program aimed to strengthen grid resilience through cybersecurity controls, supply-chain security, and Cyber-Informed Engineering (CIE) for advanced transmission technologies. The cohort brought together vendors representing the full range of Grid-Enhancing Technologies (GETs), including providers of Dynamic Line Ratings (DLR), Advanced Power Flow Control (APFC), Transmission Topology Optimization (TTO), and High-Performance Conductors (HPCs). Discussions focused on institutional, integration, and operational barriers limiting GET adoption; cybersecurity risks at EMS/SCADA, cloud, and network integration points; and supply-chain transparency issues such as semiconductor dependence and SBOM/HBOM expectations. Participants also addressed operator trust, human-in-the-loop requirements, and challenges with utility adoption, while exploring how CIE can support secure deployment of GETs. This deck represents a consolidated summary of challenges and risks identified by vendors, cross-cutting themes and technology-specific insights from three cohort workshops, and actionable mitigations to guide utilities, vendors, and the Department of Energy in advancing secure, trusted deployment of GETs.

24 - POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

NASA NTRS1996

The Diffuse Extreme Ultraviolet Background

Observations of the diffuse EUV background towards 138 different directions using the spectrometers aboard the Extreme Ultraviolet Explorer satellite (EUVE) have been combined into a spectrum from 150A to 730A and represent an effective exposure of 18 million seconds. There is no significant evidence of any non-local line flux in the resultant spectrum such as that from a hot coronal plasma. These results are inconsistent with the Wisconsin C and B broad-band surveys assuming the source is a logT = 5.8 - 6.1 hot plasma in ionization equilibrium with solar abundances, confirming the previous result of Jelinksy, Vallerga and Edelstein) (hereafter Paper 1) using an observation along the ecliptic with the same instrument. To make these results consistent with the previous broad-band surveys, the plasma responsible for the emission must either be depleted in Fe by a factor of approximately 6, be behind an absorbing slab of neutral H with a column of 2 x 10(exp 19)/sq cm, or not be in collisional ionization equilibrium (CIE). One such non-CIE model (Breitswerdt and Schmutzier) that explains the soft x-ray results is also inconsistent with this EUV data.

Vallerga, John↗

NASA NTRS2020

The influence of assimilating leaf area index in a land surface model on global water fluxes and storages

Vegetation plays a fundamental role not only in theenergy and carbon cycles but also in the global water balanceby controlling surface evapotranspiration (ET). Thus, accu-rately estimating vegetation-related variables has the poten-tial to improve our understanding and estimation of the dy-namic interactions between the water, energy, and carbon cy-cles. This study aims to assess the extent to which a land sur-face model (LSM) can be optimized through the assimilationof leaf area index (LAI) observations at the global scale. Twoobserving system simulation experiments (OSSEs) are per-formed to evaluate the efficiency of assimilating LAI into anLSM through an ensemble Kalman filter (EnKF) to estimateLAI, ET, canopy-interception evaporation (CIE), canopy wa-ter storage (CWS), surface soil moisture (SSM), and terres-trial water storage (TWS). Results show that the LAI dataassimilation framework not only effectively reduces errorsin LAI model simulations but also improves all the modeledwater flux and storage variables considered in this study (ET,CIE, CWS, SSM, and TWS), even when the forcing pre-cipitation is strongly positively biased (extremely wet con-ditions). However, it tends to worsen some of the modeledwater-related variables (SSM and TWS) when the forcingprecipitation is affected by a dry bias. This is attributed tothe fact that the amount of water in the LSM is conservative,and the LAI assimilation introduces more vegetation, whichrequires more water than what is available within the soil

Terrestrial Vegetation↗

DOE OSTI2024

Engineering in Cyber Resilience with Cyber-Informed Engineering

Engineers have super powers to provide cybersecurity resilience with deterministic engineering solutions and to protect systems from the most catastrophic consequences that a cyber saboteur could cause. Come to this session to learn how to use engineering risk management skills to harden your engineered systems from cyberattacks. Objective 1 Identify what system functions could be digitally induced to cause undesired high-impact consequences. Objective 2 Analyze how loss or instability of digital controls in a subsystem could lead to high-impact consequences. Objective 3 Analyze how loss or instability in the digital connectivity between systems could lead to high-impact consequences. Objective 4 Identify engineering controls which could build resilience by eliminating digital loss or instability pathways or reduce the impact of digital loss or instability. This presentation will introduce Cyber-Informed Engineering, described below, and walk participants through specific engineering use cases to show how engineers can consider the potential for cyber sabotage in their existing system designs and enact deterministic engineering-based controls which eliminate pathways for attack or mitigate specific consequences. A wide variety of application use cases will be considered so that audience members can align the material with familiar engineering applications. CIE is an engineering approach that integrates cyber resilience into the conception, design, build, and operation of any physical system that has digital connectivity, sensors, monitoring, or control. CIE offers the opportunity to use engineering to eliminate or mitigate avenues for cyber attack—starting from the earliest stage of design and continuing throughout the system’s lifecycle. Today, engineers and industrial control system (ICS) technicians build engineered systems with specific goals for safety, reliability, and functionality. While systems engineering includes considerable safety and failure mode analysis, cybersecurity risks are often not specifically addressed—particularly the risks of intentional cyber compromise, exploitation, and misuse. Cyber-Informed Engineering pairs well with traditional cyber defenses and offers an extra designed-in protection to eliminate the most catastrophic consequences which can be realized by an adversary should traditional cyber defenses fail.

42 ENGINEERING↗

DOE OSTI2025

Cyber-Informed Engineering Briefing for ABET

Cyber-Informed Engineering (CIE) is an emerging method to integrate cybersecurity considerations into the conception, design, development, and operation of any physical system, energy or otherwise, to mitigate or even eliminate avenues for cyber-enabled attacks.?CIE concepts use design decisions and engineering controls to prioritize defense against the worst possible consequences of cyberattacks facing critical infrastructure systems and asset owners. These slides offer a deep dive into Cyber-Informed Engineering for engineering educators.

42 - ENGINEERING↗

DOE OSTI2025

BESS Digital Assurance, Supply Chain Risk Management, and Emerging Regulation Session One - Abridged

The TADA BESS Supply Chain Workshops are designed to equip participants with the knowledge and tools necessary to address the evolving challenges at the intersection of battery energy storage systems (BESS), cybersecurity, and supply chain vulnerabilities. The workshops emphasize the application of Cyber-Informed Engineering (CIE) principles using INL’s procurement guide and the CIE-BAT tool. Attendees will develop risk-based security strategies and actionable compliance roadmaps tailored to their BESS projects. Additionally, the program fosters a collaborative network of practitioners and provides guidance on navigating emerging regulatory requirements, including FEOC rules under the OBBB framework, to assess and enhance organizational readiness. This is Session 1 of 3.

25 - ENERGY STORAGE↗

DOE OSTI2025

BESS Digital Assurance, Supply Chain Risk Management, and Emerging Regulation Session Two

25 - ENERGY STORAGE↗

DOE OSTI2025

Data Centers and Digital Assurance Workshop 3 – Mitigations for Digital Assurance Risks

The third session of the TADA (Technical Assistance for Digital Assurance) Data Centers Cohort, held on November 18, 2025, focused on developing mitigation strategies for digital assurance risks identified in previous workshops. Hosted by Idaho National Laboratory (INL) and ScottMadden, the session emphasized the application of Cyber-Informed Engineering (CIE) to data center infrastructure, particularly at the utility–data center interface. Participants revisited and ranked key digital assurance risks, including architecture and interface weaknesses, governance gaps, and AI-enabled threats. The workshop introduced the 12 principles of CIE, advocating for consequence-focused design, engineered controls, and secure information architecture to proactively reduce cyber-physical vulnerabilities. These principles were applied to critical data center systems such as power distribution, UPS, cooling, SCADA/BMS, and grid-forming batteries. The session also addressed governance challenges at the interconnection boundary, highlighting the need for clear roles in telemetry sharing, firmware management, and trip settings. Special attention was given to emerging risks from behind-the-meter (BTM) generation, including reverse-power flow and the integration of small modular reactors (SMRs), which shift data centers from large loads to complex generation nodes. Participants explored how interconnection agreements can serve as enforceable instruments for digital assurance, and reviewed gaps in current standards such as NERC CIP, IEC 62443, and IEEE 1547. The workshop concluded with pathways to standardization, including model agreement language, state-level programs, and expanded NERC guidance. INL also presented tools and frameworks for secure procurement and supplier risk management, reinforcing the need for integrated engineering and policy solutions to secure the evolving data center–grid ecosystem. Session 3 of 3.

24 - POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

DOE OSTI2025

BESS Digital Assurance, Supply Chain Risk Management, and Emerging Regulation Session One

25 - ENERGY STORAGE↗

DOE OSTI2024

Cyber-Informed Engineering Research and Development Guide

This document provides guidance on incorporating Cyber Informed Engineering (CIE) principles into the research and development (R&D) of operational technology systems and tools, facilitating the creation and adoption of innovative technologies that are secure and resilient by design. As technological innovation and research are becoming pivotal for economic and national security, cybersecurity has emerged as a paramount concern across industries and sectors. The challenge of integrating robust cybersecurity measures is imperative to safeguard critical infrastructure, protect sensitive data, and preserve national security interests.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

DOE OSTI2024

Cyber Resilience and Social Equity: Twin Pillars of a Sustainable Energy Future

This paper examines the intersection of security and accessibility within energy systems amidst the rise of grid modernization and digitization, especially considering the regulatory changes and the imperatives of inclusive energy strategies. It addresses the dual need for secure, resilient infrastructure and a commitment to mitigate energy poverty while maintaining equitable access to energy. Amid escalating cybersecurity and physical threats, the paper advocates for sustainable energy delivery systems that ensure robust defenses without compromising the goals of reducing energy poverty and ensuring energy security. This paper identifies the pressing need for Cyber-Informed Engineering (CIE) and Secure-by-Design (SbD) principles, highlighting how these strategies can protect critical infrastructure and democratize access to secure energy, particularly for disadvantaged communities. The analysis underscores the challenges presented by the expansion of attack surfaces, interoperability requirements, and grid-edge analytics, offering innovative solutions that leverage advanced technologies and data-driven insights. Furthermore, this paper addresses the workforce development gap, emphasizing the necessity for public-private partnerships and vendor engagement in creating a skilled cybersecurity workforce. This paper has a dual focus on both the technological aspect of cybersecurity and the social dimension of equity within the context of sustainable energy development. It suggests a comprehensive examination of how these two critical elements interact and support the overarching goal of a sustainable energy future.

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗

DOE OSTI2025

Cyber Conservative Operations

In an era of increasingly sophisticated and pervasive cyber threats, robust cyber resilience strategies are more critical than ever. This paper introduces the concept of Cyber Conservative Operations, a proactive approach designed to assist critical infrastructure owners and operators in managing risk and maintaining resilience in the face of imminent, yet not occurring, cyber events. By leveraging the principles of Cyber-Informed Engineering (CIE) and the energy sector’s practice of conservative operations, Cyber Conservative Operations offer a framework for planning and executing coordinated active defense and resilience-oriented actions ahead of cyber events. This approach aims to minimize the consequences of digitally-enabled hazards and ensure swift recovery from anticipated cyber threats. Cyber Conservative Operations enhance the ability of owners and operators to execute pre-planned defense and resilience actions, thereby reducing the impact of digitally-enabled hazards. These operations are crucial for addressing impacts that cannot be precisely quantified or forecasted and for preparing organizations for rapid recovery from imminent digital threats. The paper begins with a discussion of conservative operations as applied to the bulk power system (BPS), a current mechanism allowing BPS entities to enact defensive operating plans to mitigate impending grid unreliability. Building on this model, we present a concept for implementing cyber conservative operations at asset owner facilities. The paper concludes with two case studies of cyber conservative operations drawn from high-profile cyber events, illustrating the practical application and benefits of this proactive approach.

42 - ENGINEERING↗

DOE OSTI2026

Cyber-Informed Engineering Power Generation Guide [Slides]

The CIE for Power Generation: Insights and Case Studies guide is being developed to assist engineers at utilities, asset owner-operators developers, and cybersecurity teams to build in robustness and cyber resiliency into their designs using cyber-informed engineering practices. This guide will break out these topics including use cases by chapters for areas such as Nuclear, IBRs, Geothermal, natural gas, etc.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

DOE OSTI2025

Securing the Modern Grid: Federal Investments, Digitization, and Supply Chain Strategy

Across the United States (U.S.) grid expansion and modernization is underway, paving the way for accelerated load growth and intelligent resource management. Digitization of the grid is supported by several state and federal programs, providing support for utilities installing advanced metering infrastructure (AMI), AI-powered analytics systems, battery energy storage systems (BESS), and distributed energy resource management systems (DERMS) to transform the grid from a one-way power delivery system into an intelligent, responsive network that will enable faster load growth and power expansion of data centers for advanced artificial intelligence (AI) applications. The digital transformation of America's grid presents opportunity for increased efficiency and resiliency but also introduces new digital risks that require careful management. Digital equipment often contains several vulnerabilities such as unencrypted communication protocols, and persistent remote access capabilities that could be exploited to manipulate device settings, coordinate service disruptions, or inject false data into grid operations. These digital risks become particularly important as the grid must rapidly scale to support AI-driven data centers, which the administration has identified as essential for maintaining U.S. technological leadership and economic competitiveness. These vulnerabilities are compounded by supply chain realities: Chinese manufacturers currently produce 70-90% of essential grid components including inverters, batteries, and control systems, with the U.S. lacking domestic manufacturing capacity for critical assets like extra-high voltage transformers. Recent federal legislation has established Foreign Entity of Concern (FEOC) restrictions to address these risks, requiring projects to achieve escalating thresholds of non-FEOC content to receive tax credits while utilities work to expand sourcing channels for their supply chains and strengthen security measures. These restrictions arrive precisely when utilities face unprecedented electricity demand growth driven by the rapid growth in data centers, creating a considerable challenge: rapidly expanding infrastructure while navigating complex compliance requirements while lacking viable alternatives for many critical components. Idaho National Laboratory (INL) and its partners have developed practical approaches to help utilities navigate these intersecting challenges as they leverage federal investment to strengthen and grow the grid. These solutions include Cyber-Informed Engineering (CIE) principles that build resilience directly into systems, the Cirrus tool for secure cloud migration, and enhanced procurement guidance that embeds security requirements throughout equipment lifecycles. Federal initiatives, such as the Technical Assistance for Digital Assurance (TADA) project, provide direct support to utilities implementing these approaches while facilitating knowledge sharing across the industry. While these tools and frameworks cannot eliminate all risks inherent in foreign supply chain dependencies, they offer pragmatic pathways for strengthening security posture without sacrificing the deployment momentum essential to meeting surging electricity demand. Ultimately, securing America's digital energy infrastructure demands dedicated coordination across multiple fronts: building domestic supply chains, implementing robust digital assurance practices, and maintaining the aggressive modernization timeline necessary for reliability, resilience, and energy independence.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

DOE OSTI2025

Engineering Out Industry 4.0 Cyber Risk Presentation for EnCyCriS

The increasing complexity and business requirements of operational technology (OT) devices is beginning to break the normal segmentation between information technology (IT) and OT networks. The introduction of industry 4.0 devices such as industrial internet of things (IIoT) and other intelligent industrial devices (IID), virtualized OT systems, OT cloud integration, and artificial intelligence (AI)-driven industrial control systems (ICS) has challenged traditional IT/OT cybersecurity strategies. Industry 4.0 devices are analyzed through the lens of well-regarded models such as the PERA model and confidentiality, integrity, and availability (CIA) security objectives, showing the division between what is needed and traditional cybersecurity countermeasures. In this paper, the practice of Cyber-Informed Engineering (CIE) is proposed to bridge the gap between IT/OT security, enhance the practice of cybersecurity in this modern age, and reduce the impacts of consequential events in OT.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗