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A safety systems effectiveness analysis is developed that considers the extent to which a system may be expected to achieve a set of stated system objectives by determining the interrelationships between reliability, maintainability, quality assurance, human factors, and value engineering.
Traditional systems engineering demonstrates the importance of customer needs in scoping and defining design requirements; yet, in practice, other human stakeholders are often absent from early lifecycle phases. Human factors are often omitted in practice when evaluating and down-selecting design options due to constraints such as time, money, access to user populations, or difficulty in proving system robustness through the inclusion of human behaviors. Advances in systems engineering increasingly include non-technical influences into the design, deployment, operations, and maintenance of interacting components to achieve common performance objectives. Furthermore, such advances highlight the need to better account for the various roles of human actors to achieve desired performance outcomes in complex systems. Many of these efforts seek to infuse lessons and concepts from human factors (enhanced decision-making through Crew Resource Management), systems safety (Rasmussen's “drift toward danger”) and organization science (Giddens' recurrent human acts leading to emergent behaviors) into systems engineering to better understand how socio-technical interactions impact emergent system performance. Safety and security are examples of complex system performance outcomes that are directly impacted by varying roles of human actors. Using security performance of high consequence facilities as a representative use case, this article will outline the System Context Lenses to understand how to include various roles of human actors into systems engineering design. Several exemplar applications of this organizing lenses will be summarized and used to highlight more generalized insights for the broader systems engineering community.
Development of methods for predicting operational readiness of complex systems based on probability theory is discussed. Operational readiness of systems is defined and mathematical relationships involved in determining readiness are presented. Example of reliability engineering and quality control is included.
While the causes of failures in complex engineered systems are often clear in hindsight, it can be challenging to predict failures proactively during the design of novel engineered products or systems. Identifying patterns can be useful for capturing common characteristics that may lead to failure. In this paper, we present a methodology for identifying patterns of failure from NASA’s publicly available Lessons Learned Information System (LLIS). We apply an ontology development and clustering approach to identify representative patterns leading to failures in historical lessons learned. A joint inductive-deductive approach reveals the key themes in lessons that lead to failure, which are formalized and recorded as an ontology of complex systems failure causes. Documents from the LLIS are manually tagged with relevant characteristics from the ontology. From the tagged set, clustering is used to capture co-occurring sets of characteristics that lead to failure. The primary contribution of this work is a method for extracting a set of generic failure patterns in complex engineered systems and characteristics for these patterns that can be identified at design time, knowledge of which can be used to plan mitigation strategies.
When the International Space Station (ISS) finally reached an operational state, many of the Payload Operations and Integration Facility (POIF) hardware components were reaching end of life, COTS product costs were soaring, and the ISS budget was becoming severely constrained. However, most requirement development was complete. In addition, the ISS program is a fully functioning program with at least fifteen years of operational life remaining. Therefore it is critical that any upgrades, refurbishments, or enhancements be accomplished in realtime with minimal disruptions to service. For these and other reasons, it was necessary to ensure the viability of the POIF. Due to the to the breadth of capability of the POIF (a NASA ground station), it is believed that the lessons to be learned by other complex systems are applicable and any solutions garnered by the POIF are applicable to other complex systems as well. With that in mind, a number of new approaches have been investigated to increase the portability of the POIF and reduce the cost of refurbishment, operations, and maintenance. These new approaches were directed at the Total Cost of Ownership (TCO); not only the refurbishment but also current operational difficulties, licensing, and anticipation of the next refurbishment. Our basic premise is that technology had evolved dramatically since the concept of the POIF ground system and we should leverage our experience on this new technological landscape. Fortunately, Moore's law and market forces have changed the landscape considerably. These changes are manifest in five (5) ways that are particularly relevant to POIF: 1. Complex Instruction Set Computing (CISC) processors have advanced to unprecedented levels of compute capacity with a dramatic cost break, 2. Linux has become a major operating system supported by most vendors on a broad range of platforms, 3. Windows(TradeMark) based desktops are pervasive in the office environment, 4. Stable and affordable WindowsTM development environments and tools are available and offer a rich set of capabilities, 5. The WindowsTM 2000 provides a stable client platform, Therefore, five studies were proposed, developed, and are in the current process of deployment which dramatically reduces the cost of operations, maintenance, refurbishment, and deployment of a ground system. Restating and refining the basic premise stated earlier, it is possible to enhance operations through the replacement of hardware and software components with commodity based items wherever applicable. This will dramatically reduce the overall lifecycle cost of the project. The first study leveraged the POIF S secure, three-tier, web architecture to replace the client workstations with lower cost PC platforms. A second study initiated a review of COTS products to examine the level of added value of each product. This study included replacement of some COTS products with custom code, deletions, substitutions, and consolidation of COTS products. Studies three and four reviewed the server architectures of the data distribution systems and Enhanced HOSC System (EHS) command and telemetry system to propose migration to new platforms, both software and hardware. The final study reviewed current IP communication technologies, developed an operational model for flight operations, and demonstrated that voice over IP was practical and could be integrated into operations.
An automatic method to schedule maintenance and repair of complex systems is produced based on a computational structure called the Informed Maintenance Grid (IMG). This method provides solutions to the two fundamental problems in autonomic logistics: (1) unambiguous detection of deterioration or impending loss of function and (2) determination of the time remaining to perform maintenance or other corrective action based upon information from the system. The IMG provides a health determination over the medium-to-longterm operation of the system, from one or more days to years of study. The IMG is especially applicable to spacecraft and both piloted and autonomous aircraft, or industrial control processes.
The presentation discusses application of model based approaches to complex systems. The model is composed of physics-derived and empirical equations, integrated with connected networks that are strategically placed within the model to substitute equations that are subject to large uncertainty. Polynomial fit driven by heuristics or empirical observations can be substituted by more flexible networks that can minimize the error between model predictions and observations without being restricted to a predefined functional form. This modeling strategy allows training of networks deep inside the model and unknown parameters in a single learning stage.
A fundamental cause of difficulty in larger engineering projects is their inherent complexity. An impression of complexity occurs if a system is simply difficult to understand, so that there is no obvious mental model that correctly predicts its behavior. Higher complexity is usually associated with higher cost and higher failure rate. Complexity is indicated by a system having more and diverse components, multiple interactions and feedback loops, transients and dynamic behavior, and often the emergence of unanticipated failure modes. Identifying and removing these signs of complexity should reduce complexity and improve performance. Here we limit complexity measurement to the number of components and their interactions. A System Complexity Metric (SCM) is defined as equal to the sum of the number of parts in a system, N, plus the sum of the one-way interconnections between them, I. SCM = N + I. The SCM is easily determined by direct inspection of system block diagrams. Previous work found that life support system cost was directly proportional to SCM and that failure rate increased faster than SCM squared. SCM can be used to compare systems or to guide their redesign to reduce cost and failure rate. Carbon dioxide removal systems will be analyzed using SCM, cost, and failure rate.
Representing complex systems as graphs enables use of mathematical tools to identify faults or predict failures. Graph nodes correspond to individual modules or subsystems, and edges link coupled system parts. ‘Probes’ measure the node outputs, monitoring the system health for unexpected behavior. Assuming one cannot probe every point, within a system, the fault correlates to a region—not necessarily the specific location. Bayesian networks trained to understand fault patterns can accurately identify the source. The diagnostic tool described aides debugging by pinpointing system failure causes. For predictive maintenance, probe data develop probability distribution functions describing subsystem mean time to failure. Unit lifetime can be estimated through these probability distributions. Two approaches include using Bayesian classifiers to infer the system failure source and developing maintenance schedules by treating systems as collections of random variables. When failure behavior does not follow a closed form function, use of similarity models is proposed.
This viewgraph presentation reviews the analysis of the architecture of complex systems and the development of a tool to assist in the analysis. The goal of the project was to research and develop a tool for architecture analysis of dynamic and static data. The new tool, Dyn-SAVE, was an extension of an already existing static tool, Software Architecture Visualization and Evaluation (SAVE).
Information theory and relevance to study of complex systems
Report presents results of research aimed at understanding causes of human error in such complex systems as aircraft, nuclear powerplants, and chemical processing plants. Research considered both slips (errors of action) and mistakes (errors of intention), and influence of workload on them. Results indicated that: humans respond to conditions in which errors expected by attempting to reduce incidence of errors; and adaptation to conditions potent influence on human behavior in discretionary situations.
Physics-based simulation codes are widely used in science and engineering to model complex systems that would be infeasible to study otherwise. Such codes provide the highest-fidelity representation of system behavior, but are often so slow to run that insight into the system is limited. For example, conducting an exhaustive sweep over a d-dimensional input parameter space with k-steps along each dimension requires k(sup d) simulation trials (translating into k(sup d) CPU-days for one of our current simulations). An alternative is directed exploration in which the next simulation trials are cleverly chosen at each step. Given the results of previous trials, supervised learning techniques (SVM, KDE, GP) are applied to build up simplified predictive models of system behavior. These models are then used within an active learning framework to identify the most valuable trials to run next. Several active learning strategies are examined including a recently-proposed information-theoretic approach. Performance is evaluated on a set of thirteen synthetic oracles, which serve as surrogates for the more expensive simulations and enable the experiments to be replicated by other researchers.
During 1997, a team from Hernandez Engineering, MSFC, Rocketdyne, Thiokol, Pratt & Whitney, and USBI completed the first phase of a two year Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA) of the Space Shuttle. The models for the Shuttle systems were entered and analyzed by a new QRA software package. This system, termed the Quantitative Risk Assessment System(QRAS), was designed by NASA and programmed by the University of Maryland. The software is a groundbreaking PC-based risk assessment package that allows the user to model complex systems in a hierarchical fashion. Features of the software include the ability to easily select quantifications of failure modes, draw Event Sequence Diagrams(ESDs) interactively, perform uncertainty and sensitivity analysis, and document the modeling. This paper illustrates both the approach used in modeling and the particular features of the software package. The software is general and can be used in a QRA of any complex engineered system. The author is the project lead for the modeling of the Space Shuttle Main Engines (SSMEs), and this paper focuses on the modeling completed for the SSMEs during 1997. In particular, the groundrules for the study, the databases used, the way in which ESDs were used to model catastrophic failure of the SSMES, the methods used to quantify the failure rates, and how QRAS was used in the modeling effort are discussed. Groundrules were necessary to limit the scope of such a complex study, especially with regard to a liquid rocket engine such as the SSME, which can be shut down after ignition either on the pad or in flight. The SSME was divided into its constituent components and subsystems. These were ranked on the basis of the possibility of being upgraded and risk of catastrophic failure. Once this was done the Shuttle program Hazard Analysis and Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) were used to create a list of potential failure modes to be modeled. The groundrules and other criteria were used to screen out the many failure modes that did not contribute significantly to the catastrophic risk. The Hazard Analysis and FMEA for the SSME were also used to build ESDs that show the chain of events leading from the failure mode occurence to one of the following end states: catastrophic failure, engine shutdown, or siccessful operation( successful with respect to the failure mode under consideration).
Canonical expansion and output event techniques for estimating component probability of failure in simple and complex systems
A new method of robust, autonomous real-time diagnosis of a time-varying complex system (e.g., a spacecraft, an advanced aircraft, or a process-control system) is presented here. It is based upon the characterization and comparison of (1) the execution of software, as reported by discrete data, and (2) data from sensors that monitor the physical state of the system, such as performance sensors or similar quantitative time-varying measurements. By taking account of the relationship between execution of, and the responses to, software commands, this method satisfies a key requirement for robust autonomous diagnosis, namely, ensuring that control is maintained and followed. Such monitoring of control software requires that estimates of the state of the system, as represented within the control software itself, are representative of the physical behavior of the system. In this method, data from sensors and discrete command data are analyzed simultaneously and compared to determine their correlation. If the sensed physical state of the system differs from the software estimate (see figure) or if the system fails to perform a transition as commanded by software, or such a transition occurs without the associated command, the system has experienced a control fault. This method provides a means of detecting such divergent behavior and automatically generating an appropriate warning.
Rigorous analytical technique, called criticality determination methodology /or CD technique/ determines the probability that a given complex system will successfully achieve stated objectives. The CD technique identifies critical elements of the system by a failure mode and effects analysis.
The objective is the development of methods, technology, and skills that will enable NASA to cost-effectively specify, build, and manage reliable software which can evolve and be maintained over an extended period. The need for such software is rooted in the increasing integration of software and computing components into NASA systems. Current NASA Software Engineering expertise was applied toward some of the largest reliable systems including: shuttle launch; ground support; shuttle simulation; minor control; satellite tracking; and scientific data systems. Unfortunately, no theory exists for reliable complex software systems. NASA is seeking to fill this theoretical gap through a number of approaches. One such approach is to conduct research on theoretical foundations for managing complex software systems. It includes: communication models, new and modified paradigms, and life-cycle models. Another approach is research in the theoretical foundations for reliable software development and validation. It focuses upon formal specifications, programming languages, software engineering systems, software reuse, formal verification, and software safety. Further approaches involve benchmarking a NASA software environment, experimentation within the NASA context, evolution of present NASA methodology, and transfer of technology to the space station software support environment.