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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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NASA NTRS2015

Orion Launch Abort System Performance on Exploration Flight Test 1

This paper will present an overview of the flight test objectives and performance of the Orion Launch Abort System during Exploration Flight Test-1. Exploration Flight Test-1, the first flight test of the Orion spacecraft, was managed and led by the Orion prime contractor, Lockheed Martin, and launched atop a United Launch Alliance Delta IV Heavy rocket. This flight test was a two-orbit, high-apogee, high-energy entry, low-inclination test mission used to validate and test systems critical to crew safety. This test included the first flight test of the Launch Abort System preforming Orion nominal flight mission critical objectives. NASA is currently designing and testing the Orion Multi-Purpose Crew Vehicle (MPCV). Orion will serve as NASA's new exploration vehicle to carry astronauts to deep space destinations and safely return them to earth. The Orion spacecraft is composed of four main elements: the Launch Abort System, the Crew Module, the Service Module, and the Spacecraft Adapter (Fig. 1). The Launch Abort System (LAS) provides two functions; during nominal launches, the LAS provides protection for the Crew Module from atmospheric loads and heating during first stage flight and during emergencies provides a reliable abort capability for aborts that occur within the atmosphere. The Orion Launch Abort System (LAS) consists of an Abort Motor to provide the abort separation from the Launch Vehicle, an Attitude Control Motor to provide attitude and rate control, and a Jettison Motor for crew module to LAS separation (Fig. 2). The jettison motor is used during a nominal launch to separate the LAS from the Launch Vehicle (LV) early in the flight of the second stage when it is no longer needed for aborts and at the end of an LAS abort sequence to enable deployment of the crew module's Landing Recovery System. The LAS also provides a Boost Protective Cover fairing that shields the crew module from debris and the aero-thermal environment during ascent. Although the Orion Program has tested a number of the critical systems of the Orion spacecraft on the ground, the launch environment cannot be replicated completely on Earth. A number of flight tests have been conducted and are planned to demonstrate the performance and enable certification of the Orion Spacecraft. Exploration Flight Test 1, the first flight test of the Orion spacecraft, was successfully flown on December 5, 2014 from Cape Canaveral Air Force Station's Space Launch Complex 37. Orion's first flight was a two-orbit, high-apogee, high-energy entry, low-inclination test mission used to validate and test systems critical to crew safety, such as heat shield performance, separation events, avionics and software performance, attitude control and guidance, parachute deployment and recovery operations. One of the key separation events tested during this flight was the nominal jettison of the LAS. Data from this flight will be used to verify the function of the jettison motor to separate the Launch Abort System from the crew module so it can continue on with the mission. The LAS nominal jettison event on Exploration Flight Test 1 occurred at six minutes and twenty seconds after liftoff (See Fig. 3). The abort motor and attitude control motors were inert for Exploration Flight Test 1, since the mission did not require abort capabilities. A suite of developmental flight instrumentation was included on the flight test to provide data on spacecraft subsystems and separation events. This paper will focus on the flight test objectives and performance of the LAS during ascent and nominal jettison. Selected LAS subsystem flight test data will be presented and discussed in the paper. Exploration Flight Test -1 will provide critical data that will enable engineering to improve Orion's design and reduce risk for the astronauts it will protect as NASA continues to move forward on its human journey to Mars. The lessons learned from Exploration Flight Test 1 and the other Flight Test Vehicles will certainly contribute to the vehicle architecture of a human-rated space launch vehicle.

McCauley, R.↗
NASA NTRS2025

Identifying Cognitive Capabilities Required for Optimal Exploration EVA Performance: A Cognitive Task Analysis

BACKGROUND Extravehicular activity (EVA) is one of the most dangerous and cognitively demanding actions that astronauts can execute, and the cognitive demands associated with future exploration EVA on the Moon and Mars are expected to be higher compared to EVA currently conducted from the International Space Station (ISS). Decrements in cognitive performance present an important risk to crew safety during exploration mission class EVA. Yet there is currently insufficient characterization of the cognitive capabilities required prior to, during, and following EVA. Furthermore, it is unclear which cognitive domains are most important for conducting mission critical decisions with crew safety implications. To address this gap, we conducted a cognitive task analysis of exploration EVA to characterize the cognitive capabilities, critical safety decisions, and contributing factors (e.g., lunar communications delay) important to monitor for optimal performance in future exploration EVA. This cognitive task analysis was conducted through interviews with astronauts and subject matter experts in EVA research and operations. Interviews focused on exploration EVA and elicited feedback on the cognitive capabilities required for specific EVA tasks and subtasks. The information from this cognitive task analysis will help close the gap in our understanding of the key cognitive capabilities required for safe decision-making during exploration mission class EVA on the Moon and Mars. METHOD We used an applied cognitive task analysis method1 over the course of interviews with a total of 15 NASA astronauts and subject matter experts in EVA. Each interview was led by a scientist with expertise in cognitive neuroscience from the Behavioral Health & Performance (BHP) Laboratory at NASA Johnson Space Center. Notes were taken by a research coordinator in the BHP Laboratory and interviews were recorded on Microsoft Teams to ensure the accuracy of notetaking. In the first interview protocol, participants were asked about the specific tasks and cognitive demands associated with EVA. This provided a high-level overview of the steps involved in the major tasks conducted during exploration EVA, as well as which of the steps require the most cognitive skill. Next, participants completed a knowledge audit, which employs a set of probes designed to describe types of domain knowledge of skill and elicit appropriate examples. In the second interview protocol, completed with a separate set of subject matter experts, interviewees were asked to complete a simulated incapacitated crew rescue (ICR) scenario2, which provided specific context that allowed probing around relevant issues such as situational awareness and potential errors. Experts were then asked to identify the knowledge, skills, and abilities (KSAs) underlying each EVA task and to provide ratings on the importance and cognitive demand of each KSA. Finally, participants also described the most likely and consequential critical safety incidents related to decrements in cognitive performance during exploration EVA and assessed the impact of lunar communication delay on cognitive performance. RESULTS & DISCUSSION Interviews for this cognitive task analysis are nearly complete and results will be presented in full at IWS 2025. Results will include a summary of all expert ratings of EVA tasks and subtasks, qualitative summaries of content from each interview part, and a discussion of future directions for products addressing cognitive performance monitoring and cognitive domain mapping in exploration EVA.

S R Anderson↗
NASA NTRS2024

Ensuring Safe Decision-Making on the Moon and Mars: Cognitive Performance Assessment for Exploration Class Mission EVA

Extravehicular activity (EVA) is one of the most dangerous and cognitively demanding actions that astronauts can execute, and the cognitive demands associated with future partial gravity EVA on the Moon and Mars are expected to be higher compared to microgravity EVA currently conducted from the International Space Station (ISS). Decrements in cognitive performance present an important risk to crew safety during exploration mission class EVA. Yet there is currently insufficient data to characterize cognitive performance prior to, during, and following EVA. Furthermore, it is still unclear which cognitive domains are most important for conducting mission critical decisions with crew safety implications. To address this gap, we conducted a cognitive task analysis (CTA) of EVA to characterize the procedures, the cognitive demands required, and the critical safety decisions associated with decrements in cognitive performance. We used the applied cognitive task analysis method as outlined by Militello and Hutton (1998) and conducted interviews with subject matter experts (SMEs) in EVA at NASA Johnson Space Center in summer 2024. Interviews focused on exploration EVA and elicited feedback from SMEs on the cognitive skills required for specific EVA tasks including cognitive strategies, critical cues, and decision-making strategies. A cognitive demands table was assembled to consolidate and synthesize the information from all interviews. The information from this cognitive task analysis will inform ongoing work to identify the key cognitive domains for safe decision-making during exploration mission class EVA on the Moon and Mars. This work will importantly provide a link between cognitive domains identified in the cognitive task analysis and operationally-relevant performance metrics collected during spaceflight and simulation EVA that can be tracked and assessed by NASA mission operations. Ultimately, this work will aid in the development and application of exploration class cognitive performance monitoring capabilities to improve safe decision-making and inform EVA planning on future spaceflight missions to the Moon and Mars.

Steven R Anderson↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Ensuring Safe Decision-Making on the Moon and Mars: Cognitive Performance Assessment for Exploration Class Mission EVA

Extravehicular activity (EVA) is one of the most dangerous and cognitively demanding actions that astronauts can execute, and the cognitive demands associated with future partial gravity EVAs on the Moon and Mars are expected to be higher compared to microgravity EVAs currently conducted from the International Space Station. Decrements in cognitive performance present an important risk to crew safety during exploration mission class EVA. Yet there is currently insufficient data to characterize cognitive performance prior to, during, and following EVA. Furthermore, it is still unclear which cognitive domains are most important for conducting mission critical decisions with crew safety implications. To address this gap, we conducted a cognitive task analysis (CTA) of EVA to characterize the procedures, the cognitive demands required, and the critical safety decisions associated with decrements in cognitive performance. We conducted a cognitive task analysis with 15 astronauts and subject matter experts in EVA operations and research. Interviews focused on surface exploration EVA and elicited feedback from experts on the cognitive skills required for specific EVA tasks, including cognitive strategies, critical cues, and decision-making strategies. A cognitive demands table was assembled to consolidate and synthesize the information from all interviews. The information from this cognitive task analysis informs ongoing exploration EVA for Moon to Mars. This work identifies the specific cognitive challenges that astronauts are likely to encounter during surface exploration EVA, and provides the foundation for: (1) prioritized and targeted cognitive performance measurement and functional performance tests, (2) EVA simulation design at varying levels of cognitive workload, and (3) the development of training and other technologies that can improve safe decision-making and inform EVA planning on future spaceflight missions to the Moon and Mars.

Steven R Anderson↗
NASA NTRS1966

Calculations of reliability predictions for the Apollo spacecraft

A new method of reliability prediction for complex systems is defined. Calculation of both upper and lower bounds are involved, and a procedure for combining the two to yield an approximately true prediction value is presented. Both mission success and crew safety predictions can be calculated, and success probabilities can be obtained for individual mission phases or subsystems. Primary consideration is given to evaluating cases involving zero or one failure per subsystem, and the results of these evaluations are then used for analyzing multiple failure cases. Extensive development is provided for the overall mission success and crew safety equations for both the upper and lower bounds.

Amstadter, B. L.↗
NASA NTRS2010

Contingency Operations of Americas Next Moon Rocket, Ares V

America has begun the development of a new space vehicle system which will enable humans to return to the moon and reach even farther destinations. The system is called Constellation: it has 2 earth-launch vehicles, Ares I and Ares V; a crew module, Orion; and a lander, Altair with descent and ascent stages. Ares V will launch an Earth Departure Stage (EDS) and Altair into low earth orbit. Ares I will launch the Orion crew module into low earth orbit where it will rendezvous and dock with the Altair and EDS "stack". After rendezvous, the stack will contain four complete rocket systems, each capable of independent operations. Of course this multiplicity of vehicles provides a multiplicity of opportunities for off-nominal behavior and multiple mitigation options for each. Contingency operations are complicated by the issues of crew safety and the possibility of debris from the very large components impacting the ground. This paper examines contingency operations of the EDS in low earth orbit, during the boost to translunar orbit, and after the translunar boost. Contingency operations under these conditions have not been a consideration since the Apollo era and analysis of the possible contingencies and mitigations will take some time to evolve. Since the vehicle has not been designed, much less built, it is not possible to evaluate contingencies from a root-cause basis or from a probability basis; rather they are discussed at an effects level (such as the reaction control system is consuming propellant at a high rate). Mitigations for the contingencies are based on the severity of the off-nominal condition, the time of occurrence, recovery options, options for alternate missions, crew safety, evaluation of the condition (forensics) and future prevention. Some proposed mitigations reflect innovation in thinking and make use of the multiplicity of on-orbit resources including the crew; example: Orion could do a "fly around" to allow the crew to determine the condition and cause of a partially separated payload shroud. Other mitigations are really alternate missions; example, an engine out on during ascent resulted in insufficient propellant for the lunar mission, but the on-orbit vehicle stack is otherwise perfect and can pursue an alternate mission, such as a high ballistic trajectory to test the high-speed atmospheric reentry of Orion. Evaluation and presentation of contingency operations at this early stage of the development of the Ares V rocket will improve the design of the vehicle and lay the groundwork for the exhaustive contingency planning which must be done after the vehicle is built as preparations for operations.

Jaap, John↗
NASA NTRS2005

A Framework for Integration of IVHM Technologies for Intelligent Integration for Vehicle Management

As a part of the overall goal of developing Integrated Vehicle Health Management (IVHM) systems for aerospace vehicles, the NASA Faculty Fellowship Program (NFFP) at Marshall Space Flight Center has performed a pilot study on IVHM principals which integrates researched IVHM technologies in support of Integrated Intelligent Vehicle Management (IIVM). IVHM is the process of assessing, preserving, and restoring system functionality across flight and ground systems (NASA NGLT 2004). The framework presented in this paper integrates advanced computational techniques with sensor and communication technologies for spacecraft that can generate responses through detection, diagnosis, reasoning, and adapt to system faults in support of IIVM. These real-time responses allow the IIVM to modify the effected vehicle subsystem(s) prior to a catastrophic event. Furthermore, the objective of this pilot program is to develop and integrate technologies which can provide a continuous, intelligent, and adaptive health state of a vehicle and use this information to improve safety and reduce costs of operations. Recent investments in avionics, health management, and controls have been directed towards IIVM. As this concept has matured, it has become clear the IIVM requires the same sensors and processing capabilities as the real-time avionics functions to support diagnosis of subsystem problems. New sensors have been proposed, in addition, to augment the avionics sensors to support better system monitoring and diagnostics. As the designs have been considered, a synergy has been realized where the real-time avionics can utilize sensors proposed for diagnostics and prognostics to make better real-time decisions in response to detected failures. IIVM provides for a single system allowing modularity of functions and hardware across the vehicle. The framework that supports IIVM consists of 11 major on-board functions necessary to fully manage a space vehicle maintaining crew safety and mission objectives: Guidance and Navigation; Communications and Tracking; Vehicle Monitoring; Information Transport and Integration; Vehicle Diagnostics; Vehicle Prognostics; Vehicle mission Planning; Automated Repair and Replacement; Vehicle Control; Human Computer Interface; and Onboard Verification and Validation. Furthermore, the presented framework provides complete vehicle management which not only allows for increased crew safety and mission success through new intelligence capabilities, but also yields a mechanism for more efficient vehicle operations. The representative IVHM technologies for IIVH includes: 1) robust controllers for use in re-usable launch vehicles, 2) scaleable/flexible computer platform using heterogeneous communication, 3) coupled electromagnetic oscillators for enhanced communications, 4) Linux-based real-time systems, 5) genetic algorithms, 6) Bayesian Networks, 7) evolutionary algorithms, 8) dynamic systems control modeling, and 9) advanced sensing capabilities. This paper presents IVHM technologies developed under NASA's NFFP pilot project. The integration of these IVHM technologies forms the framework for IIVM.

Paris, Deidre E.↗
NASA NTRS2005

Intelligent Vehicle Health Management

As a part of the overall goal of developing Integrated Vehicle Health Management systems for aerospace vehicles, the NASA Faculty Fellowship Program (NFFP) at Marshall Space Flight Center has performed a pilot study on IVHM principals which integrates researched IVHM technologies in support of Integrated Intelligent Vehicle Management (IIVM). IVHM is the process of assessing, preserving, and restoring system functionality across flight and ground systems (NASA NGLT 2004). The framework presented in this paper integrates advanced computational techniques with sensor and communication technologies for spacecraft that can generate responses through detection, diagnosis, reasoning, and adapt to system faults in support of INM. These real-time responses allow the IIVM to modify the affected vehicle subsystem(s) prior to a catastrophic event. Furthermore, the objective of this pilot program is to develop and integrate technologies which can provide a continuous, intelligent, and adaptive health state of a vehicle and use this information to improve safety and reduce costs of operations. Recent investments in avionics, health management, and controls have been directed towards IIVM. As this concept has matured, it has become clear the INM requires the same sensors and processing capabilities as the real-time avionics functions to support diagnosis of subsystem problems. New sensors have been proposed, in addition, to augment the avionics sensors to support better system monitoring and diagnostics. As the designs have been considered, a synergy has been realized where the real-time avionics can utilize sensors proposed for diagnostics and prognostics to make better real-time decisions in response to detected failures. IIVM provides for a single system allowing modularity of functions and hardware across the vehicle. The framework that supports IIVM consists of 11 major on-board functions necessary to fully manage a space vehicle maintaining crew safety and mission objectives: Guidance and Navigation; Communications and Tracking; Vehicle Monitoring; Information Transport and Integration; Vehicle Diagnostics; Vehicle Prognostics; Vehicle mission Planning; Automated Repair and Replacement; Vehicle Control; Human Computer Interface; and Onboard Verification and Validation. Furthermore, the presented framework provides complete vehicle management which not only allows for increased crew safety and mission success through new intelligence capabilities, but also yields a mechanism for more efficient vehicle operations. The representative IVHM technologies for computer platform using heterogeneous communication, 3) coupled electromagnetic oscillators for enhanced communications, 4) Linux-based real-time systems, 5) genetic algorithms, 6) Bayesian Networks, 7) evolutionary algorithms, 8) dynamic systems control modeling, and 9) advanced sensing capabilities. This paper presents IVHM technologies developed under NASA's NFFP pilot project and the integration of these technologies forms the framework for IIVM.

Paris, Deidre E.↗
NASA NTRS2005

IVHM Framework for Intelligent Integration for Vehicle Health Management

Integrated Vehicle Health Management (IVHM) systems for aerospace vehicles, is the process of assessing, preserving, and restoring system functionality across flight and techniques with sensor and communication technologies for spacecraft that can generate responses through detection, diagnosis, reasoning, and adapt to system faults in support of Integrated Intelligent Vehicle Management (IIVM). These real-time responses allow the IIVM to modify the affected vehicle subsystem(s) prior to a catastrophic event. Furthermore, this framework integrates technologies which can provide a continuous, intelligent, and adaptive health state of a vehicle and use this information to improve safety and reduce costs of operations. Recent investments in avionics, health management, and controls have been directed towards IIVM. As this concept has matured, it has become clear that IIVM requires the same sensors and processing capabilities as the real-time avionics functions to support diagnosis of subsystem problems. New sensors have been proposed, in addition to augment the avionics sensors to support better system monitoring and diagnostics. As the designs have been considered, a synergy has been realized where the real-time avionics can utilize sensors proposed for diagnostics and prognostics to make better real-time decisions in response to detected failures. IIVM provides for a single system allowing modularity of functions and hardware across the vehicle. The framework that supports IIVM consists of 11 major on-board functions necessary to fully manage a space vehicle maintaining crew safety and mission objectives. These systems include the following: Guidance and Navigation; Communications and Tracking; Vehicle Monitoring; Information Transport and Integration; Vehicle Diagnostics; Vehicle Prognostics; Vehicle Mission Planning, Automated Repair and Replacement; Vehicle Control; Human Computer Interface; and Onboard Verification and Validation. Furthermore, the presented framework provides complete vehicle management which not only allows for increased crew safety and mission success through new intelligence capabilities, but also yields a mechanism for more efficient vehicle operations.

Paris, Deidre↗
NASA NTRS2018

Lunar and Mars Ascent and Descent/Entry Crew Abort Modes for the Hercules Single-Stage Reusable Vehicle

The Hercules single-stage reusable vehicle is designed to support crewed missions to both the lunar surface and Mars surface. The design maximizes crew safety by providing full coverage crew abort capability during ascent and entry/descent, either through abort-to-surface or abort-to-orbit. This paper outlines each of the abort modes and discuss the Hercules vehicle design along with the base and orbital infrastructure required to enable the full coverage abort capability. For each abort mode, trajectory simulations are flown that illustrate the requisite design capabilities and highlight the sensitivity to key design variables.

Komar, David R.↗
NASA NTRS2014

Application of Fault Management Theory to the Quantitative Selection of a Launch Vehicle Abort Trigger Suite

The theory of System Health Management (SHM) and of its operational subset Fault Management (FM) states that FM is implemented as a "meta" control loop, known as an FM Control Loop (FMCL). The FMCL detects that all or part of a system is now failed, or in the future will fail (that is, cannot be controlled within acceptable limits to achieve its objectives), and takes a control action (a response) to return the system to a controllable state. In terms of control theory, the effectiveness of each FMCL is estimated based on its ability to correctly estimate the system state, and on the speed of its response to the current or impending failure effects. This paper describes how this theory has been successfully applied on the National Aeronautics and Space Administration's (NASA) Space Launch System (SLS) Program to quantitatively estimate the effectiveness of proposed abort triggers so as to select the most effective suite to protect the astronauts from catastrophic failure of the SLS. The premise behind this process is to be able to quantitatively provide the value versus risk trade‐off for any given abort trigger, allowing decision makers to make more informed decisions. All current and planned crewed launch vehicles have some form of vehicle health management system integrated with an emergency launch abort system to ensure crew safety. While the design can vary, the underlying principle is the same: detect imminent catastrophic vehicle failure, initiate launch abort, and extract the crew to safety. Abort triggers are the detection mechanisms that identify that a catastrophic launch vehicle failure is occurring or is imminent and cause the initiation of a notification to the crew vehicle that the escape system must be activated. While ensuring that the abort triggers provide this function, designers must also ensure that the abort triggers do not signal that a catastrophic failure is imminent when in fact the launch vehicle can successfully achieve orbit. That is, the abort triggers must have low false negative rates to be sure that real crew‐threatening failures are detected, and also low false positive rates to ensure that the crew does not abort from non‐crew‐threatening launch vehicle behaviors. The analysis process described in this paper is a compilation of over six years of lessons learned and refinements from experiences developing abort triggers for NASA's Constellation Program (Ares I Project) and the SLS Program, as well as the simultaneous development of SHM/FM theory. The paper will describe the abort analysis concepts and process, developed in conjunction with SLS Safety and Mission Assurance (S&MA) to define a common set of mission phase, failure scenario, and Loss of Mission Environment (LOME) combinations upon which the SLS Loss of Mission (LOM) Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) models are built. This abort analysis also requires strong coordination with the Multi‐Purpose Crew Vehicle (MPCV) and SLS Structures and Environments (STE) to formulate a series of abortability tables that encapsulate explosion dynamics over the ascent mission phase. The design and assessment of abort conditions and triggers to estimate their Loss of Crew (LOC) Benefits also requires in‐depth integration with other groups, including Avionics, Guidance, Navigation and Control(GN&C), the Crew Office, Mission Operations, and Ground Systems. The outputs of this analysis are a critical input to SLS S&MA's LOC PRA models. The process described here may well be the first full quantitative application of SHM/FM theory to the selection of a sensor suite for any aerospace system.

Lo, Yunnhon↗
NASA NTRS1970

Apollo safety experience

Evolution and current status of Apollo crew safety, discussing hazard aspects, program approach and measures and activities incorporated in project

Mcguire, C. M.↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Fast Earth-Mars Roundtrip Trajectories to Reduce Health and Safety Risks for Crewed Missions

The extended mission duration of a crewed Mars mission compounds integrated risks to crew health and safety. Shortening mission duration would therefore have a direct impact on reducing many human health and performance risk factors. This paper describes trajectory feasibility analyses performed to examine trajectory options for a fast crewed mission to Mars. Studies were conducted to examine options with short overall mission durations (≤ 400-day roundtrip) and options that focus on minimizing astronaut time in deep space, while allowing for longer Mars surface stays. Trade studies were performed to determine ∆v requirements for a range of launch dates, Mars orbit periods, Mars stay times, and Earth-to-Mars flight time maxima. The implications of a Venus gravity assist are also described. The analyses presented here build on and specifically aim to optimize and address key concerns of assumptions made in previously published studies of fast crewed Mars missions.

Mars↗
NASA NTRS1990

Project EGRESS: Earthbound Guaranteed Reentry from Space Station. the Design of an Assured Crew Recovery Vehicle for the Space Station

Unlike previously designed space-based working environments, the shuttle orbiter servicing the space station will not remain docked the entire time the station is occupied. While an Apollo capsule was permanently available on Skylab, plans for Space Station Freedom call for a shuttle orbiter to be docked at the space station for no more than two weeks four times each year. Consideration of crew safety inspired the design of an Assured Crew Recovery Vehicle (ACRV). A conceptual design of an ACRV was developed. The system allows the escape of one or more crew members from Space Station Freedom in case of emergency. The design of the vehicle addresses propulsion, orbital operations, reentry, landing and recovery, power and communication, and life support. In light of recent modifications in space station design, Project EGRESS (Earthbound Guaranteed ReEntry from Space Station) pays particular attention to its impact on space station operations, interfaces and docking facilities, and maintenance needs. A water-landing medium-lift vehicle was found to best satisfy project goals of simplicity and cost efficiency without sacrificing safety and reliability requirements. One or more seriously injured crew members could be returned to an earth-based health facility with minimal pilot involvement. Since the craft is capable of returning up to five crew members, two such permanently docked vehicles would allow a full evacuation of the space station. The craft could be constructed entirely with available 1990 technology, and launched aboard a shuttle orbiter.

Source record↗
NASA NTRS2002

Agent Based Modeling of Collaboration and Work Practices Onboard the International Space Station

The International Space Station is one the most complex projects ever, with numerous interdependent constraints affecting productivity and crew safety. This requires planning years before crew expeditions, and the use of sophisticated scheduling tools. Human work practices, however, are difficult to study and represent within traditional planning tools. We present an agent-based model and simulation of the activities and work practices of astronauts onboard the ISS based on an agent-oriented approach. The model represents 'a day in the life' of the ISS crew and is developed in Brahms, an agent-oriented, activity-based language used to model knowledge in situated action and learning in human activities.

Acquisti, Alessandro↗
NASA NTRS2022

NASA Crew Transportation System Certification Plan

NASA Crew Transportation System (CTS) Certification is the authorization granted by the Agency that allows the use of a Commercial Provider’s CTS to transport NASA Crew to and from the ISS. The CTS Certification decision is made by the NASA Associate Administrator based on the comprehensive assessment of the Certification Review Board and recommendations from the CCP and ISS Program Managers and the NASA Associate Administrator of Space Operations Mission Directorate. The Commercial Provider is responsible for developing and executing its plan for certifying the CTS. The Commercial Crew Program (CCP) with the International Space Station (ISS) Program must substantiate the Commercial Provider’s certification assertion of compliance with NASA requirements and NASA Crew safety.

CCP↗
NASA NTRS1985

NASA space station automation: AI-based technology review

Research and Development projects in automation for the Space Station are discussed. Artificial Intelligence (AI) based automation technologies are planned to enhance crew safety through reduced need for EVA, increase crew productivity through the reduction of routine operations, increase space station autonomy, and augment space station capability through the use of teleoperation and robotics. AI technology will also be developed for the servicing of satellites at the Space Station, system monitoring and diagnosis, space manufacturing, and the assembly of large space structures.

Firschein, O.↗