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NASA NTRS2018

Predicting Crew Time Allocations for Lunar Orbital Missions Based on Historical ISS Operational Activities

As the National Aeronautics and Space Administration continues to define candidate architectures for the planned lunar “Gateway”, it will be necessary to have a detailed understanding of how the crew will inhabit, operate, and maintain the spacecraft. The nature of the Gateway vehicle systems configuration and operations will have a direct impact on the scope of work activities required of the crew. Crew work schedules are sensitive to variations in spacecraft architecture, visiting vehicle activities, and logistics operations – particularly within short duration missions as initially planned for the lunar Gateway. These system and operational configurations must be taken into account when planning for crew time availability to conduct science activities on Gateway missions. This paper presents a methodology that is used to predict crew time distributions for lunar Gateway missions, as applied in NASA’s Exploration Crew Time Model (ECTM). The process utilized for evaluating crew time distributions is based on the categorization of all crew activities into a standardized ontology. Historical ISS daily crew timeline data from July 20, 2011 (post STS retirement) to present day was captured via the Operational Planning Timeline Integration System (OPTimIS) database and characterized according to the standardized ontology. This process enabled correlation and statistical analysis of the ISS data according to common mission parameters such as crew size, ECLSS system design, vehicle traffic operations, and logistics delivery operations. The results of the statistical analysis are a set of crew time distributions for each activity category. These distributions are then utilized within the ECTM to examine crew time allocations based on mission parameter inputs, which serve to characterize the Gateway mission configurations. Results for predicted crew time allocations for representative short duration Gateway missions are presented. These results can be used to evaluate crew schedule availability for science and utilization activities. Variations in expected mission architectures and mission operations are accounted for to correct crew time predictions. The analysis is being leveraged to plan utilization capability objectives that are achievable on the Gateway missions, as well as inform the viability of various mission architecture options.

Stromgren, Chel↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Manual Crew Override of Vehicle Landings Following G-Transitions

BACKGROUND Manual control during exploration spaceflight consists of both planned automated supervisory control and unplanned crew override. This crew override capability is critical to enable overall mission success during landing contingencies. However, the introduction of manual override capabilities must be implemented to enable crews to mitigate risks introduced by human error. Adaptive changes in the sensorimotor system can manifest during g-transitions as spatial disorientation. While training and landing aids enable successful landing through disorientation, these adaptive changes may increase cognitive demand that needs to be accounted for in the manual control strategy. It is important to characterize these effects as soon as possible following the G-transition to develop appropriate countermeasures. METHODS In this study, we will examine operational piloting tasks following International Space Station (ISS) missions in a simulated lunar landing using a six-degree-of-freedom (6DOF) motion base. The motion-based simulation will be implemented in our laboratory at the Johnson Space Center (JSC) and will be available within hours following the return from commercial crew landings. The primary goals of this study are (1) to understand the impact of spaceflight on crew ability to perform manual crew override tasks, (2) to examine how adaptive changes in vestibular and cognitive function relate to changes in manual crew override proficiency, and (3) compare performance during late “just-in-time” on-board training with early post-flight crew performance. The impact of spaceflight on piloting capability will be assessed from pre- versus post-flight changes in crewmembers assigned to either short duration (< 30 day) or long duration (~6- month) missions to the International Space Station (ISS). Individual differences in post-flight vestibular and cognitive changes include motion sickness reports, measures of tilt motion perception accuracy and precision, and dual-task tracking. During the 6DOF lunar simulation, the crew will manually takeover attitude and rate-of-descent to the nominal or re-designated landing aim point during the approach phase. The outcome measures for the lunar crew override tasks will be the percent time maintaining actual vehicle states, e.g., attitude and rate-of-descent, within recommended guidance during the landing approach, number and maximum deviation outside limits, and root mean square error (RMSE). Given that “just-in-time” (JIT) training is an operational expectation for the Human Landing System (HLS) program, all participants will perform late inflight JIT training for each manual crew override task in which they will participate. Crew proficiency will be captured inflight during JIT training that will be implemented on a laptop with hand controllers to allow the crewmember to practice the landing task procedures like the approach implemented for JIT training with Shuttle landing and ISS telerobotic tasks. COUNTERMEASURE UPDATES The lunar lander simulation has been implemented onto a two-laptop display system where subjects select from alternative landing points, based upon avoiding hazards that the on-board system identifies during the landing. The subject makes inputs using a rotational hand controller (i.e., joystick) and a translational hand controller, which are processed by simulated vehicle dynamics to update the vehicle attitude and rate of descent. Subjects will utilize a combination of flight, situation, and status displays to monitor the state of the simulated vehicle. The simulation exports tilt and translation movements to a 6DOF motion base synced to visual movements and provides representative vestibular cues to the subject while performing the task inside an enclosed cabin featuring a simulated lunar out-the-window view and a heads-down lander cockpit view. RELEVANCE This project will deliver an operational demonstration of crew override capability following spaceflight and identify potential deficits that may require remediation. Comparison of individual vestibular and cognitive changes with crew override performance will help better characterize the manual control risks associated with sensorimotor alterations. The inclusion of “just-in-time” on-board training will ensure we are characterizing changes in override proficiency with this expected countermeasure in place. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS: The authors acknowledge contributions from Draper, HLS Joint Test Panel, Crew HLS Interfaces for Piloting Working Group, and Dynamic Skills Trainer (DST) Lab toward the development of the lunar landing simulation. This project is funded by the Human Health Countermeasures Element.

Austin M Bollinger↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Assessment of Crew Time for Maintenance and Repairs Activities for Lunar Surface Missions

NASA is currently evaluating different methods to predict how much time crewmembers will spend conducting repair and maintenance activities on future space missions. As mission scope and spacecraft architectures change, it will be necessary to understand how crew repair and maintenance timelines are impacted by mission operations and technology changes. Past work has been done using historical ISS data to accurately predict crew habitation and operation timelines, resulting in the development of NASA’s Exploration Crew Time Model (ECTM). However, understanding crew maintenance and repair requirements has posed a unique challenge due to the complexity of available datasets, the probabilistic nature of sub-system failures, and the impacts of reliability growth on failure rates. This paper presents a methodology to collect and condition empirical repair and maintenance time data from available data sets, to extrapolate from that data to estimate projected maintenance and repair times for a lunar Surface Habitat, and to assess how uncertainty in repair time could impact utilization time on the lunar surface. NASA International Space Station (ISS) maintenance and crew time data are logged into two central databases, the Maintenance Data Collection (MDC) and the Operations Planning Timeline Integration System (OPTimIS) respectively. Separately, each of these two datasets capture only portions of the complete set of data required to generate an accurate assessment of crew time spent on maintenance activities at a sub-system level. MDC provides a detailed catalog of failure events and an overview of the failure’s required maintenance and OPTimIS provides a description of crew activities and crew time durations dedicated to maintenance. To create a more useful crew time estimate for maintenance timelines, the authors developed a methodology to capture relevant data from each set and combine and utilize that data by linking crew time requirements to specific components. The authors compare the failure logs in the MDC to crew activity logs pulled from OPTimIS and then process the data to estimate required repair times for each failure event. Data is also classified by the outcome of each repair event, whether the failed component was replaced or whether it was repaired in place. The entire maintenance activity dataset is then categorized based on the class of failed component to allow for a statistically significant sample size for each class and to provide accurate crew time estimates for any components lacking relevant data. This resultant component repair time data can be used in the future to generate Mean Time To Repair (MTTR) estimates and confidence intervals for each class of component based on a probabilistic distribution of documented maintenance events. These improved MTTR values can then be applied to candidate element sub-system architectures, along with component Mean Time Between Failure (MTBF) data to generate distributions for potential required system crew repair time estimates for a given mission. Repair time distributions can then be used to develop more accurate crew schedules and to assess potential available utilization time.

Crew Time↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Crew Performance Support System to Aid in Anomaly Resolution: Concept of Operations

As missions progress into deep space, communication delays and disruptions will disenable the crew’s reliance on Earth experts. There are also limitations in the amount of data that can be downlinked to the ground. It is prudent to assume that critical, complex vehicle or habitat sub-systems will malfunction at a time when a lunar or Mars’ crew cannot rely on the Earth-Support team to detect, diagnose and resolve the problem and it is impractical to expect a small crew to step-in with the same level of expertise as 50+ authorities. The crew will need novel processes and advanced technological support to independently identify and resolve safety- and time-critical anomalies. That a self-reliant crew is unable to respond appropriately to time-critical anomalies is a significant risk to crew safety and mission success. This risk is driven by several factors; novel and unanticipated anomalies would not have been trained pre-flight, the crew could forget their pre-flight training or spaceflight stressors could impair the crew’s problem-solving ability. At last year’s IWS, Beard reported that a single spaceflight stressor (elevated CO2) could undermine the crew’s ability to independently respond to emergencies. Concept of Operations (ConOps) provide a common view of future system functions to all stakeholders. For the current project, a ConOps was developed that describes the operational processes, practices and capabilities needed by a crew of astronauts on deep space missions to autonomously respond to anticipated and unanticipated anomalies. It is crucial to recognize that, as of August 2018 existing technologies are unable to effectively support crew anomaly response to unanticipated events. “Intelligent technology” has not reached a maturity level that permits generalizing a solution to novel situations. For example, to train intelligent technology requires volumes of data that do not exist. The complexities involved in a manned mission to Mars cannot be compared to sending rovers to Mars using scripted software. This ConOps proposes a Crew Performance Support System (CPSS) that will push NASA and its industry partners toward what will be required for a safe and successful manned mission to Mars. Anomaly resolution during a deep space mission will take place within a dynamic, or changing, context. The figure to the left shows five broad contextual variables: the organizational culture, mission context, system characteristics, team characteristics and individual characteristics. The yellow arrow indicates that spaceflight and task-related stressors can affect system, team and individual crewmember characteristics and therefore anomaly response potential. The figure depicts a protective umbrella of Human-System Integration (HSI) principles that should be instituted during CPSS development including a balanced workload, shared situation awareness and building an appropriate level of trust in the automation. The figure also depicts two interrelated and cooperative components, an HSI Data System and other Enabling Capabilities will be required to support crew anomaly response and Earth-Support situation awareness. As we journey from ISS to Gateway to Mars, multiple, simultaneous and integrated research and development efforts (i.e., support systems co-evolution) must be implemented to meet the problem-solving challenges a self-reliant crew will face on a Mars’ mission. The crossovers between the capabilities are just as important as the discrete capabilities themselves. As the capabilities mature, the lines between the support subdomains will blur and an integrated system will emerge. The ConOps summarizes current knowledge about how highly trained people solve anomalies in safety- and time-critical situations, describes a group of capabilities that could help to reduce the extant risk and documents requirements levied on additional systems that provides critical inputs to the CPSS. Scenarios are used to promote a shared understanding of processes, practices and technological goals needed for safe and productive manned missions beyond LEO.

HSIA risk↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Manual Crew Override of Vehicle Landings Following G-Transitions

BACKGROUND Manual control during exploration spaceflight consists of both planned automated supervisory control and unplanned crew override. This crew override capability is critical to enable overall mission success during landing contingencies. However, the introduction of manual override capabilities must be implemented to enable crews to mitigate risks introduced by human error. Adaptive changes in the sensorimotor system can manifest during g-transitions as spatial disorientation. While training and landing aids enable successful landing through disorientation, these adaptive changes may increase cognitive demand that needs to be accounted for in the manual control strategy. It is important to characterize these effects as soon as possible following the G-transition to develop appropriate countermeasures. METHODS The following study seeks to inform the risk associated with altered sensorimotor and vestibular function impacting critical mission tasks. We aim to characterize the effects of short and long-duration weightlessness on manual control following G-transitions using simulated lunar landing on a six-degree-of-freedom (6DOF) motion base, a fixed base simulation, and a supervisory control tablet task. The primary goal is to understand the impact of spaceflight on crew ability to perform manual crew override and supervisory control. This aim will be assessed by comparing pre- versus postflight simulation performance in crewmembers assigned to either short duration (< 30 day) or long duration (~6- month) missions to the International Space Station (ISS). We hypothesize there will be postflight increases in the percent time that pilots are outside of the acceptable range for recommended vehicle state parameters and the reaction time for secondary cognitive tasks. Ground-based control subjects, who are demographically matched to the crew considering age (± 5 years) and gender, will undergo the same testing schedule as the crew to examine the effects of flight phase independent of microgravity exposure. The second aim is to examine how adaptive changes in vestibular and cognitive function relate to changes in manual crew override proficiency. Crew performance for a sensorimotor perceptual test battery will evaluate motion perception tracking, roll nulling, and/or vection sensitivity using the 6DOF motion base. We hypothesize that a higher severity of vestibular alterations will be associated with increased percent time outside of guidance limits. Motion sickness severity and sleepiness will also be evaluated. To determine the impact of “just-in-time” training, the third aim seeks to compare performance during on-board lunar landing tasks conducted late in-flight to early postflight. We hypothesize that proficiency on the “just-in-time” laptop trainer late in mission will be positively correlated with early postflight proficiency on the same task. The final aim will establish assessments of performance, training protocols, and the learning progression in a ground-control cohort of first-time users. RESULTS The assessment of the learning progression associated with the piloting task on the motion base system with thirty ground subjects will be reported. Learning curves will be established across four distinct sessions and within session considering trial difficulty. The difficulty of the landing task can be modulated with the landing divert distance and cross or downrange difficulty. Results may include changes in performance across multiple trials of a multi-attribute lunar tablet supervisory control task. Preliminary investigations of eighteen subjects who completed vestibular threshold and motion perception tasks offer expected performance ranges for upcoming preflight crew evaluations. The results yielded an average roll threshold of 0.46 ± 0.30 deg/s and an average roll nulling root mean square error performance of 2.52 ± 0.52 deg/s. RELEVANCE This project will deliver an operational demonstration of crew monitoring capability following spaceflight and identify potential deficits that may require remediation. Comparison of individual vestibular and cognitive changes with crew performance will help better characterize the manual control risks associated with sensorimotor alterations. Ground testing will evaluate learning progression, refine training protocols, and serve as a control cohort for comparisons to crew performance. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS: The authors acknowledge contributions from Draper, the Dynamic Skills Trainer (DST) Lab, and the Software, Robotics, and Simulation Division toward the development of the lunar landing simulation platforms. This project is funded by the Human Health Countermeasures Element.

Hannah M. Weiss↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Viability of Small Dimension Crew Quarters for Surface Habitation

During early planning for the Artemis program’s sustained phase of lunar activity, NASA planners have been held to work towards a NASA reference lunar lander concept. With this activity taking place prior to the awarding of a lander contract, NASA planners cannot assume which of several potential landers will be available. This has limited habitation team engineers to a 12-metric ton mass limit for the reference concept of the lunar Surface Habitat. Consequently, minimal approaches have been applied to many habitat systems and it is important to determine acceptable volume for crew quarters. A number of both NASA and non-NASA surface habitat concepts have proposed relatively small crew quarters due to this constraint. Consequently, there is a need to collect objective test data to confirm or refute the validity of small crew quarters. NASA-STD-3001 is looked to for guidance in its many standards but offers little to no help. While prior versions called for private habitation, the current version – Revision B – calls for “individual privacy” to “accommodate social retreat.” Proposed Revision C modifications change the language slightly to “accommodate sleep and social retreat.” This is not enough guidance to determine the size of a crew quarters or even its capabilities. Unfortunately, only a small number of US spacecraft have included crew quarters, primarily the International Space Station and the Skylab Space Station. The space shuttle orbiter sometimes flew a set of private bunks that some might consider a crew quarters. All of these are dramatically smaller than US standards for minimum jail cells. The first opportunity for NASA to test a small crew quarters in a surface habitat application has been created through the Exploration Atmospheres test series, which is evaluating human performance under reduced cabin pressures. The test is converting the 20-Foot Vacuum Chamber at Johnson Space Center into a habitat, with the lower level outfitted as an EVA test area and the upper two levels for human habitation. The test will place eight people (six test subjects and two technicians) inside the chamber for eleven days. All eight will sleep in private quarters during the test. Volume limitations in the chamber forced extremely small crew quarters, measuring approximately 2 meters in length, 0.85 meters in height, and 0.9 meters in width. The test cabin pressure of 8.2 psi and elevated oxygen also introduces significant material limitations, limiting outfitting options. Nonetheless, the crew quarters design requirements were to accommodate visual separation, auditory separation, olfactory separation, tactile separation, air flow control, lighting control, single person personal computing, physical work surface access, sleep accommodations, non-sleep rest/relaxation, meditation, stretching, two-person meetings, snacking, changing clothes, viewing appearance, video communication, and audio communication. This paper will detail the acceptability of the crew quarters as measured in the October 2021 Exploration Atmosphere test. Based on this data, the viability of the type of crew quarters used in the 20 Foot Chamber will be assessed. Design recommendations for a 30-60-day Surface Habitat crew quarters will be provided, along with recommendations for future testing.

Crew Quarters↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Viability of Small Dimension Crew Quarters for Surface Habitation

It is possible that in the next twenty years NASA may fly crew quarters on twice as many spacecraft as it has in the past fifty years. In short, US experience with spacecraft crew quarters is limited and with few available standards to guide their design there is significant uncertainty facing spacecraft currently in development, several of which are also subject to substantial mass and volume challenges. Those spacecraft developments will face considerable pressure to minimize crew quarters size, including those intended for use on the lunar surface. Given that a crew quarters is the only space a crew member can call his or her own during missions that can last weeks to years in duration, providing an appropriate volume is especially important. This is even more critical when one considers the reality that all crew quarters flown to date have been smaller than minimum standards for US jail cells. This research will categorize functional capabilities of crew quarters and explore physical and virtual prototypes of small crew quarters that have attempted to include these capabilities. The Exploration Atmospheres Test at NASA Johnson Space Center represents the first opportunity to collect multi-day test data on crew quarters of this size in a gravitational environment. Intended to validate exploration prebreathe protocols, this test will house eight people inside a vacuum chamber that has been outfitted as a habitat prototype for twelve days. In addition to their other test activity, the crew will evaluate the acceptability of their crew quarters. This data will aid in establishing design guidelines for crew quarters in both short and long duration missions beyond low Earth orbit.

Crew Quarters↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Overview of Crew Operations for Transit to Mars

Crewed Mars missions are estimated to be 700-1,200 days in length which is two to three times longer than any continuous human spaceflight mission to date. When architecting a Mars mission there are numerous resources that must be considered, evaluated, and planned for, including—but not limited to—mass, cost, performance, and risk. Crew time is a limited resource that will need to be appropriately allocated during future Mars missions. NASA’s “Moon to Mars Objectives” specifically recognizes as Recurring Tenets the need to return crews safely to Earth while mitigating adverse impacts to crew health and maximizing crew time available for science and engineering activities within planned mission durations. Crew operations and the crew time allocation for a Mars missions will likely be different than current operational planning aboard the ISS due to communication delays, crew health and performance needs, transportation system needs, potential vehicle dormancy, and mass ejection. Crew will need to operate much more Earth independently and potentially be responsible for more operations since traditional Earth ground support will be delayed. Incidents requiring immediate crew action will therefore either be the responsibility of the crew or an automated feature of the transit vehicle. This paper discusses the operational challenges of a Mars transit mission and the associated activities that will need to take place during each operational phase of transit to and from Mars.

Crew Time↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Overview of Crew Operations for Transit to Mars

Crew Time↗

NASA NTRS2017

An Alternative Approach to Human Servicing of Crewed Earth Orbiting Spacecraft

As crewed spacecraft have grown larger and more complex, they have come to rely on spacewalks, or Extravehicular Activities (EVA), for assembly and to assure mission success. Typically, these spacecraft maintain all of the hardware and trained personnel needed to perform an EVA on-board at all times. Maintaining this capability requires up-mass, volume for storage of EVA hardware, crew time for ground and on-orbit training, and on-orbit maintenance of EVA hardware. This paper proposes an alternative methodology, utilizing either launch-on-need hardware and crew or regularly scheduled missions to provide EVA capability for space stations in low Earth orbit after assembly complete. Much the same way that one would call a repairman to fix something at their home these EVAs are dedicated to maintenance and upgrades of the orbiting station. For crew safety contingencies it is assumed the station would be designed such the crew could either solve those issues from inside the spacecraft or use the docked Earth to Orbit vehicles as a return lifeboat, in the same manner as the International Space Station (ISS) which does not rely on EVA for crew safety related contingencies. This approach would reduce ground training requirements for long duration crews, save Intravehicular Activity (IVA) crew time in the form of EVA hardware maintenance and on-orbit training, and lead to more efficient EVAs because they would be performed by specialists with detailed knowledge and training stemming from their direct involvement in the development of the EVA. The on-orbit crew would then be available to focus on the immediate response to any failures such as IVA systems reconfiguration or jumper installation as well as the day-to-day operations of the spacecraft and payloads. This paper will look at how current unplanned EVAs are conducted on ISS, including the time required for preparation, and offer an alternative for future spacecraft. As this methodology relies on the on-time and on-need launch of spacecraft, any space station that utilized this approach would need a robust transportation system, possibly including more than one launch vehicle capable of carrying crew. In addition, the fault tolerance of the future space station would be an important consideration in how much time was available for EVA preparation after the failure. Ideally the fault tolerance of the station would allow for the maintenance tasks to be grouped such that they could be handled by regularly scheduled maintenance visits and not contingency launches. Each future program would have to weigh the risk of on-time launch against the increase in available crew time for the main objective of the spacecraft. This is only one of several ideas that could be used to reduce or eliminate a station's reliance on rapid turnaround EVAs using on-board crew. Others could include having shirt-sleeve access to critical systems or utilizing low pressure temporarily pressurized equipment bays.

Mularski, John R.↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

NASA Commercial Crew Program and Medical Operational Challenges

This abstract is submitted as part of the USSPACECOM Command Surgeon’s panel demonstrating the medical capabilities and challenges involved in human space flight support operations. BACKGROUND: NASA embarked on the Commercial Crew Program to launch astronauts into low-earth orbit from US soil and dock with the International Space Station (ISS). The eventual industry providers selected were SpaceX (SpX) and Boeing. These commercial transportation systems are vital to ensure crew availability on ISS for research and discovery. OVERVIEW: NASA/SpaceX Demo-2 (DM2) mission launched from the Kennedy Space Center in 2020 as the historic first crewed test-flight of the Crew Dragon spacecraft with two NASA Astronauts onboard. DM2 represented the first flight in 9-years from US soil since STS-135 in 2011. The 63-day mission ended with splashdown in the Gulf of Mexico, the first US water recovery in 45-years since Apollo-Soyuz. Validation of system hardware and operations allowed four-person crews to launch on subsequently missions (Crew-1, Crew-2, Crew-3, Crew-4, Crew-5 to date), which included International Partner crewmembers. DISCUSSION: A multitude of operational, training, medical, and technical issues needed to be addressed between NASA Medical Operations, the commercial provider SpaceX, and the Department of Defense. These included Flight rule development, occupant protection, pressurized suit testing, communication plans during mission phases, and emergency simulations for supporting Flight Surgeons and Biomedical Engineers. In providing crew experience with expected launch and entry G-force profile, Centrifuge training was established. Preventive health measures via the Health Stabilization Program were especially vital during the global COVID-19 pandemic. Unique aspects arise for SpX Dragon parachute splashdown and shipboard recovery operations in the Atlantic Ocean and Gulf of Mexico. The new Commercial Crew Program is indeed a wonderfully challenging and exciting era for human spaceflight.

Joseph Dervay↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

NASA Commercial Crew Program and Medical Operational Challenges

BACKGROUND: NASA embarked on the Commercial Crew Program to launch astronauts into low-earth orbit from US soil and dock with the International Space Station (ISS). The eventual industry providers selected were SpaceX (SpX) and Boeing. These commercial transportation systems are vital to ensure crew availability on ISS for research and discovery. OVERVIEW: NASA/SpaceX Demo-2 (DM2) mission launched from the Kennedy Space Center in 2020 as the historic first crewed test-flight of the Crew Dragon spacecraft with two NASA Astronauts onboard. DM2 represented the first flight in 9-years from US soil since STS-135 in 2011. The 63-day mission ended with splashdown in the Gulf of Mexico, the first US water recovery in 45-years since Apollo-Soyuz. Validation of system hardware and operations allowed four-person crews to launch on subsequently missions (Crew-1, Crew-2, Crew-3, Crew-4, Crew-5 to date), which included International Partner crewmembers. DISCUSSION: A multitude of operational, training, medical, and technical issues needed to be addressed between NASA Medical Operations, the commercial provider SpaceX, and the Department of Defense. These included Flight rule development, occupant protection, pressurized suit testing, communication plans during mission phases, and emergency simulations for supporting Flight Surgeons and Biomedical Engineers. In providing crew experience with expected launch and entry G-force profile, Centrifuge training was established. Preventive health measures via the Health Stabilization Program were especially vital during the global COVID-19 pandemic. Unique aspects arise for SpX Dragon parachute splashdown and shipboard recovery operations in the Atlantic Ocean and Gulf of Mexico. The new Commercial Crew Program is indeed a wonderfully challenging and exciting era for human spaceflight.

Joseph P Dervay↗

NASA NTRS2007

In-Space Crew-Collaborative Task Scheduling

For all past and current human space missions, the final scheduling of tasks to be done in space has been devoid of crew control, flexibility, and insight. Ground controllers, with minimal input from the crew, schedule the tasks and uplink the timeline to the crew or uplink the command sequences to the hardware. Prior to the International Space Station (ISS), the crew could make requests about tomorrow s timeline, they could omit a task, or they could request that something in the timeline be delayed. This lack of control over one's own schedule has had negative consequences. There is anecdotal consensus among astronauts that control over their own schedules will mitigate the stresses of long duration missions. On ISS, a modicum of crew control is provided by the job jar. Ground controllers prepare a task list (a.k.a. "job jar") of non-conflicting tasks from which jobs can be chosen by the in space crew. Because there is little free time and few interesting non-conflicting activities, the task-list approach provides little relief from the tedium of being micro-managed by the timeline. Scheduling for space missions is a complex and laborious undertaking which usually requires a large cadre of trained specialists and suites of complex software tools. It is a giant leap from today s ground prepared timeline (with a job jar) to full crew control of the timeline. However, technological advances, currently in-work or proposed, make it reasonable to consider scheduling a collaborative effort by the ground-based teams and the in-space crew. Collaboration would allow the crew to make minor adjustments, add tasks according to their preferences, understand the reasons for the placement of tasks on the timeline, and provide them a sense of control. In foreseeable but extraordinary situations, such as a quick response to anomalies and extended or unexpected loss of signal, the crew should have the autonomous ability to make appropriate modifications to the timeline, extend the timeline, or even start over with a new timeline. The Vision for Space Exploration (VSE), currently being pursued by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), will send humans to Mars in a few decades. Stresses on the human mind will be exacerbated by the longer durations and greater distances, and it will be imperative to implement stress-reducing innovations such as giving the crew control of their daily activities.

Jaap, John↗

NASA NTRS2015

Developing a Crew Time Model for Human Exploration Missions to Mars

Candidate human missions to Mars require mission lengths that could extend beyond those that have previously been demonstrated during crewed Lunar (Apollo) and International Space Station (ISS) missions. The nature of the architectures required for deep space human exploration will likely necessitate major changes in how crews operate and maintain the spacecraft. The uncertainties associated with these shifts in mission constructs - including changes to habitation systems, transit durations, and system operations - raise concerns as to the ability of the crew to complete required overhead activities while still having time to conduct a set of robust exploration activities. This paper will present an initial assessment of crew operational requirements for human missions to the Mars surface. The presented results integrate assessments of crew habitation, system maintenance, and utilization to present a comprehensive analysis of potential crew time usage. Destination operations were assessed for a short (approx. 50 day) and long duration (approx. 500 day) surface habitation case. Crew time allocations are broken out by mission segment, and the availability of utilization opportunities was evaluated throughout the entire mission progression. To support this assessment, the integrated crew operations model (ICOM) was developed. ICOM was used to parse overhead, maintenance and system repair, and destination operations requirements within each mission segment - outbound transit, Mars surface duration, and return transit - to develop a comprehensive estimation of exploration crew time allocations. Overhead operational requirements included daily crew operations, health maintenance activities, and down time. Maintenance and repair operational allocations are derived using the Exploration Maintainability and Analysis Tool (EMAT) to develop a probabilistic estimation of crew repair time necessary to maintain systems functionality throughout the mission.

Battfeld, Bryan↗

NASA NTRS2019

ISEP: A Joint SRAG/CCMC Collaboration to Improve Mitigation of Space Weather Effects on Crew Health in the Exo-LEO Era

The Space Radiation Analysis Group (SRAG) at Johnson Space Center (JSC) is tasked with monitoring changes to space weather and mitigating any resultant impacts to crew health and safety. As human spaceflight goals extend from Low-Earth Orbit (LEO) missions like the International Space Station (ISS) to the moon, Mars and beyond, SRAG will need to update their current approach for crew monitoring of and protection from radiation exposure due to energetic Solar Particle Events (ESPEs). Challenges faced in planning exo-LEO missions include the lack of protection from the Earth’s geomagnetic field employed by the ISS in addition to limited communication capability between the crew and the ground. In the event of an ESPE, the current ISS trajectory ensures that the vehicle is only traveling through fields of higher radiation exposure for a brief period of time; the Earth’s geomagnetic field prevents the penetration of the high-energy particles of concern throughout the majority of the orbit. Exo-LEO missions, on the other hand, require that the vehicle travel through free space, exposing vehicle and crew to the full impact of the ESPE. NASA has combined multiple approaches to resolve this radiation exposure issue. New vehicles are designed to take advantage of advances in particle transport modeling capabilities and shielding technology, allowing redistribution of mass throughout the vehicle to areas of thinner shielding when the energetic particle flux has increased to levels of concern. Although vehicle shielding is an important aspect of radiation exposure protection, there is a continued requirement to monitor and predict the space weather environment. To this end, SRAG maintains a console position in Mission Control with 24/7 mission support capability. In the event of increased solar activity, SRAG collaborates with the Flight Control Team (FCT) to determine if crew action (i.e., shelter) is required. During any increase in solar activity, the FCT needs three pieces of information to effectively decide the crew response in light of other required mission tasks: if an event (ESPE) will occur, how ‘intense’ an observed event will be, and how long will an observed event will last. An ideal alert system limits false alarms, therefore causing the crew to take action unnecessarily, without ignoring events that pose a hazard to the crew. SRAG’s current operational concept for ISS missions focuses on short-term forecasts, best described as ‘now-casting’. Console operators are in daily communication with the Space Weather Prediction Center (SWPC) for situational awareness purposes. When conditions exist that may lead to increased solar activity, operators receive notifications from SWPC. In the case of a well-connected ESPE, the console operator may only have on the order of minutes to several hours to notify the FCT of the event and provide a recommendation for crew action. As NASA shifts to exo-LEO missions, the increased time in free space as well as the reduced ability to communicate with the crew will force a transition in crew protection strategy that emphasizes improvments to both the accuracy and the lead time in forecasting capabilities.

Barzilla, Janet E.↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

A Historical Review of Logistics Mass and Crew Time Demands for ISS Operations

Following over 20 years of continuously crewed operations on the International Space Station (ISS), NASA is planning to return to the Moon and eventually send humans to Mars. ISS operations provide vital data to inform mission analysts as NASA prepares for longer and more complex missions with increased mission endurance. Endurance, defined as crewed operating time between cargo deliveries (or crew launch and return to Earth), is an important metric when analyzing mission needs. NASA is developing architectures to support sustained deep-space habitats in cislunar space, the lunar surface, Mars transit, and the surface of Mars. Unlike the ISS, these systems will not be continuously crewed, and unlike the Space Shuttle, these systems will not return to Earth for regular refurbishment between missions. Lunar systems will routinely go through long uncrewed periods between crewed missions. The systems on board will need to survive these dormancy periods with no crew present to provide maintenance. Mars systems will experience significantly longer endurance than past experience. Additionally, the inability to have quick aborts to return to Earth increases the need for system reliability, redundancy, and maintainability, as well as plans for contingency operations. This paper examines the historical logistics and crew time demand for ISS operations and mission objectives and provides an overview of missions to the ISS over its operating history, the mass and items delivered with the missions, and the crew time spent during missions. These parameters provide insight and valuable data to inform logistics and crew time estimates for future long-endurance crewed exploration missions.

Crew Logistics↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

A Historical Review of Logistics Mass and Crew Time Demands for ISS Operations

Crew Logistics↗

NASA NTRS1986

Crew factors in flight operations. Part 3: The operational significance of exposure to short-haul air transport operations

Excessive flightcrew fatigue has potentially serious safety consequences. Laboratory studies have implicated fatigue as a causal factor associated with varying levels of performance deterioration depending on the amount of fatigue and the type of measure utilized in assessing performance. These studies have been of limited utility because of the difficulty of relating laboratory task performance to the demands associated with the operation of a complex aircraft. The performance of 20 volunteer twin-jet transport crews is examined in a full-mission simulator scenario that included most aspects of an actual line operation. The scenario included both routine flight operations and an unexpected mechanical abnormality which resulted in a high level of crew workload. Half of the crews flew the simulation within two to three hours after completing a three-day, high-density, short-haul duty cycle (Post-Duty condition). The other half flew the scenario after a minimum of three days off duty (Pre-Duty) condition). The results revealed that, not surprisingly, Post-Duty crews were significantly more fatigued than Pre-Duty crews. However, a somewhat counter-intuitive pattern of results emerged on the crew performancemeasures. In general, the performance of Post-Duty crews was significantly better than that of Pre-Duty crews, as rated by an expert observer on a number of dimensions relevant to flight safety. Analyses of the flightcrew communication patterns revealed that Post-Duty crews communicated significantly more overall, suggesting, as has previous research, that communication is a good predictor of overall crew performance.

Foushee, H. C.↗