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All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2024

Cyber-Informed Engineering Research and Development Guide

This document provides guidance on incorporating Cyber Informed Engineering (CIE) principles into the research and development (R&D) of operational technology systems and tools, facilitating the creation and adoption of innovative technologies that are secure and resilient by design. As technological innovation and research are becoming pivotal for economic and national security, cybersecurity has emerged as a paramount concern across industries and sectors. The challenge of integrating robust cybersecurity measures is imperative to safeguard critical infrastructure, protect sensitive data, and preserve national security interests.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
DOE OSTI2025

Building Cybersecurity Educational Materials for Students: The Windfarm Capture-The-Flag Exercise

Securing and protecting critical infrastructure in an increasingly digital world is vital but it is all too often an afterthought. It is especially important that students become aware of internet safety and security at an early age. However, the availability of interactive and educational cybersecurity material targeted toward students is minimal in the United States. Here we show an example of interactive cyber security educational material that an educator can use in their classroom to encourage students to think about the interaction between real-world physical objects, cyber security, and information security. By putting together a “capture-the-flag” exercise, students can see in real time how hackers and cybercriminals exploit vulnerabilities and gain access information. The students try to “capture” the “flag” (i.e., information) in the wind farm by looking for oddities in the code or by taking advantage of weaknesses in everyday protocols. Students can also see how cybersecurity interacts with the power grid through the wind farm project scenario and how a hacker could cause serious problems to a critical infrastructure sector. Our goal for the project is getting students interested in cybersecurity and help them develop an awareness of how important having robust security systems is. We also hope that this project demonstrates the importance of introducing these concepts early and inspires others to create similar projects geared toward students.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
DOE OSTI2025

Primer to SWIFt 2.0 Technical Information Sheets

More than 16,000 publicly owned municipal wastewater treatment plants (WWTPs) in the U.S. treat a wide range of wastewater (WW) flows ranging from <0.5 to >200 MGD. Municipal WWTPs act as the last barrier before exposure to water-borne diseases and contaminants, thus serving as a critical infrastructure protecting human health and the environment. A recent survey by the American Society of Civil Engineers assigned the U.S.’s WW infrastructure a grade of D+ because of the number of improvements needed for end-of-life infrastructure with operating conditions being over or under design capacities. With increasing population growth and urbanization, the municipal WW sector needs to grow resiliently and sustainably to accommodate increasing sewer flows in the wake of new infrastructure needs and global priorities. In addition, this growth will be affected by rising concerns over constrained resources (e.g., electricity, energy, and water) and regulations. This necessitates molding the WW sector toward sustainability- and resiliency-related planning and innovations to address current and future needs while simultaneously producing profitable by-products.

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗
DOE OSTI2025

Securing Grid Communications Infrastructure: Addressing Gaps Beyond NERC CIP Facility Perimeters

The North American electric grid relies on a complex communications infrastructure that extends beyond facility perimeters traditionally covered by NERC Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP) standards. While CIP requirements have significantly strengthened cybersecurity within Electronic Security Perimeters, many operational communications—such as those between control centers, substations, and third-party networks—fall outside current regulatory scope. As grid modernization introduces new technologies and connectivity models, these external pathways present evolving security challenges. This brief explores the nature of these challenges, including emerging attack vectors and supply chain considerations, and highlights how ongoing grid transformation increases exposure to sophisticated threats. It outlines practical strategies and policy options to complement existing standards, such as expanding secure communications practices, enhancing supply chain transparency, and fostering collaboration among federal, state, and industry stakeholders. Near-term actions like encryption, authentication, and contractual safeguards can help reduce risk while longer-term frameworks are developed to ensure resilient and secure grid operations.

24 - POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
DOE OSTI2017

Space Weather Data Drop

Space weather data collected via instruments on GPS satellites has been made available to researchers for the first time. The instruments were developed at Los Alamos National Laboratory and ride aboard 23 of the nation’s more than 30 on-orbit GPS satellites. When you multiply the number of satellites collecting data with the number of years they’ve been doing it, it totals more than 167 years. This data gives researchers a treasure trove of measurements that they can use to better understand how space weather works and how best to protect critical infrastructure, such as the nation’s satellites, aircraft, communications networks, navigation systems, and the electric power grid.

58 GEOSCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2016

The effect of the NERC CIP standards on the reliability of the North American Bulk Electric System

Considerable money and effort has been expended by generation, transmission, and distribution entities in North America to implement the North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP) standards for the bulk electric system. Assumptions have been made that as a result of the implementation of the standards, the grid is more cyber secure than it was pre-NERC CIP, but are there data supporting these claims, or only speculation? Has the implementation of the standards had an effect on the grid? Furthermore, developing a research study to address these and other questions provided surprising results.

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗
DOE OSTI2017

A Methodology for Dynamic Security Risk Quantification and Optimal Resource Allocation of Security Assets

In this presentation we overview a methodology for dynamic security risk quantification and optimal resource allocation of security assets for high profile venues. This methodology is especially applicable to venues that require security screening operations such as mass transit (e.g., train or airport terminals), critical infrastructure protection (e.g., government buildings), and largescale public events (e.g., concerts or professional sports). The method starts by decomposing the three core components of risk -- threat, vulnerability, and consequence -- into their various subcomponents. For instance, vulnerability can be decomposed into availability, accessibility, organic security, and target hardness and each of these can be evaluated against the potential threats of interest for the given venue. Once evaluated, these subcomponents are rolled back up to compute the specific value for the vulnerability core risk component. Likewise, the same is done for consequence and threat, and then risk is computed as the product of these three components. A key aspect of our methodology is dynamically quantifying risk. That is, we incorporate the ability to uniquely allow the subcomponents and core components, and in turn, risk, to be quantified as a continuous function of time throughout the day, week, month, or year as appropriate.

Brigantic, Robert T.↗
DOE OSTI2021

Personal Resiliency Index

A plethora of information exists in literature focusing on different aspects of personal resilience. There are a number of questionnaires available to measure resilience in different aspects of an individual’s life, such as mental health. However, there is a lack of comprehensive information on the subject of personal resilience to natural and man-made disasters. A Personal Resiliency Index identifying four key areas of resilience related to natural and man-made disasters will help fill this gap by providing individuals an idea of where the stand comparatively to their peers on this topics. As an increasing amount of man-made disasters, natural disasters and pandemics occur, we realize that preparation is key.?“Crisis can be experienced at individual, group and mass levels and at local, regional, national or supra-national levels.” 1? Dr. Ron Fisher, the principal investigator has over 20 years’ critical infrastructure protection including developing vulnerability assessment methodology, risk and resiliency analyses and infrastructure interdependencies. Dr. Fisher and his team will research and develop a voluntary survey which evaluates the user’s personal resilience level to natural and man-made disasters. The research team is focusing on 4 main categories:? financial resilience, cyber security, physical and mental health, and emergency preparedness.?The web based application will?provide a resilience score for each of the categories and also a comprehensive personal resiliency score based on the voluntary survey. The application will also provide feedback to the user on actions to take to become more resilient to natural and man-made disasters. Through this effort, we will also be able to identify the areas where participants are excelling as well as opportunities for improvement in terms of resilience. This information will provide insight into areas of further investigation and identify potential areas of support needed for the general public to adopt strategies to become more resilient. 1 Lynott, William. “Surviving a Natural (or Man-Made) Disaster: How to Prepare for and Bounce Back? from a Crisis in Your Business | 2018-02-01 | NOLN.” Home Page, NOLN, 1 Feb. 2018, https://www.noln.net/articles/2683-surviving-a-natural-or-man-made-disaster-how-to-prepare-for-and-bounce-back-from-a-crisis-in-your-business.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗
DOE OSTI2022

Advanced Technology and a Resilient Electric Grid

Making the electric grid cleaner and more resilient will require investing in a variety of new and emerging technologies. Advanced technologies including hydrogen, small modular nuclear reactors, and energy storage will all have a role to play in modernizing the electric grid. A diverse energy supply helps to keep the lights on and protects critical infrastructure, however it will also be important to assess the potential vulnerabilities and risks that come with unfamiliar and new technologies. This webinar will feature experts on resilience planning around advanced technologies from multiple sectors and share resources for states as they seek to modernize and decarbonize their electric grid.

advanced technology↗
DOE OSTI2024

Water Security: Trends, Capabilities, and Research Directions to Secure Water Infrastructure

Water and wastewater sector is target rich and resource poor ~153k water utilities, serve 80% of US population ~16k publicly-owned wastewater systems in the US serve 75% of the population Need scalable solutions to fit small and medium to large systems Federal attention to critical infrastructure continues to grow – particularly in the water sector Increase in water sector incidents and threats for large scale disruption – particularly by nation-state actors and their proxies EPA is the SRMA DHS CISA focuses on critical infrastructure protection across sectors They must work together to secure WWW systems Research capabilities to enable secure water systems Current and future threats Resilience – natural disasters, accidents, cyber-physical attacks

99 - GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗
DOE OSTI2024

Synergies Between Nuclear Security and Critical Infrastructure: National Legal and Regulatory Frameworks

Nuclear reactors and other nuclear facilities are part of a nation's critical infrastructure assets. Key cross-sector interdependencies, in relation to energy, transportation systems, communications, emergency services, water, information technologies and others, result in inevitable synergies between legal frameworks for the security of nuclear facilities and legal frameworks for the protection of critical infrastructure. The protection of nuclear facilities against sabotage and other malicious acts is paramount in ensuring energy security and thus ensuring uninterrupted energy supply. The protection of other sectors, such as uninterrupted communications, secure water supply, and others, supports a safe and secure operation of nuclear facilities. Some countries rely on broader critical infrastructure frameworks to impose security requirements on nuclear facilities, or to achieve robust cybersecurity systems. This paper will analyze the interdependencies and synergies between the legal and regulatory frameworks for critical infrastructure protection and nuclear facilities' security by comparing various national frameworks. The paper will also propose modalities to leverage the best practices and requirements from each framework towards energy security goals and stronger national nuclear security regimes.

Man, Madalina-Anca↗
DOE OSTI2024

Long-Range Biometric Identification in Real World Scenarios: A Comprehensive Evaluation Framework Based on Missions

The considerable body of data available for evaluating biometric recognition systems in Research and Development (R&D) environments has contributed to the increasingly common problem of target performance mismatch. Biometric algorithms are frequently tested against data that may not reflect the real world applications they target. From a Testing and Evaluation (T&E) standpoint, this domain mismatch causes difficulty assessing when improvements in State-of-the-Art (SOTA) research actually translate to improved applied outcomes. This problem can be addressed with thoughtful preparation of data and experimental methods to reflect specific use-cases and scenarios.To that end, this paper evaluates research solutions for identifying individuals at ranges and altitudes, which could support various application areas such as counterterrorism, protection of critical infrastructure facilities, military force protection, and border security. We address challenges including image quality issues and reliance on face recognition as the sole biometric modality. By fusing face and body features, we propose developing robust biometric systems for effective long-range identification from both the ground and steep pitch angles. Preliminary results show promising progress in whole-body recognition. This paper presents these early findings and discusses potential future directions for advancing long-range biometric identification systems based on mission-driven metrics.

Aykac, Deniz↗
DOE OSTI2016

Consequence-driven cyber-informed engineering (CCE)

The Idaho National Lab (INL) is leading a high-impact, national security-level initiative to reprioritize the way the nation looks at high-consequence risk within the industrial control systems (ICS) environment of the country’s most critical infrastructure and other national assets. The Consequence-driven Cyber-informed Engineering (CCE) effort provides both private and public organizations with the steps required to examine their own environments for high-impact events/risks; identify implementation of key devices and components that facilitate that risk; illuminate specific, plausible cyber attack paths to manipulate these devices; and develop concrete mitigations, protections, and tripwires to address the high-consequence risk. The ultimate goal of the CCE effort is to help organizations take the steps necessary to thwart cyber attacks from even top-tier, highly resourced adversaries that would result in a catastrophic physical effect. CCE participants are encouraged to work collaboratively with each other and with key U.S. Government (USG) contributors to establish a coalition, maximizing the positive effect of lessons-learned and further contributing to the protection of critical infrastructure and other national assets.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
DOE OSTI2020

Systems Theory Principles and Complex Systems Engineering Concepts for Protection and Resilience in Critical Infrastructure: Lessons from the Nuclear Sector

Part of the Presidential Policy Directive 21 (PPD-21) (PPD 2013) mandate includes evaluating safety, security, and safeguards (or nonproliferation) mechanisms traditionally implemented within the nuclear reactors, materials, and waste sector of critical infrastructure—including a complex, dynamic set of risks and threats within an all-hazards approach. In response, research out of Sandia National Laboratories (Sandia) explores the ability of systems theory principles (hierarchy and emergence) and complex systems engineering concepts (multidomain interdependence) to better understand and address these risks and threats. Herein, this Sandia research explores the safety, safeguards, and security risks of three different nuclear sector-related activities—spent nuclear fuel transportation, small modular reactors, and portable nuclear power reactors—to investigate the complex and dynamic risk related to the PPD-21-mandated all-hazards approach. This research showed that a systems-theoretic approach can better identify inter-dependencies, conflicts, gaps, and leverage points across traditional safety, security, and safeguards hazard mitigation strategies in the nuclear reactors, materials, and waste sector. Resulting from this, mitigation strategies from applying systems theoretic principles and complex systems engineering concepts can be (1) designed to better capture interdependencies, (2) implemented to better align with real-world operational uncertainties, and (3) evaluated as a systems-level whole to better identify, characterize, and manage PPD-21's all hazards strategies.

42 ENGINEERING↗
DOE OSTI2024

Evaluating a Commercial Dynamic Line Rating Software with the National PMU Dataset

To accelerate the development of data-driven applications for power systems, the Department of Energy (DOE) supported the collection and curation of a synchrophasor dataset spanning two years of observations from transmission utilities across the US. This National PMU Dataset (NPDS) was anonymized and distributed to awardees of a DOE research grant under nondisclosure agreements (NDAs) but has also been retained at PNNL to enable further research. Agreements with data contributors prevent the data from being shared outside the organization. However, establishing a blind research validation methodology is envisioned to maximize the value proposition of the NPDS. In this validation strategy, researchers may share algorithms/software (potentially as executables to protect intellectual property) with PNNL, and PNNL will share feedback about the software’s performance on subsets of the NPDS. Such a blind methodology ensures that sensitive information about critical infrastructure remains protected, but the value of the NPDS can be extended to research beyond PNNL. Through iterative feedback, the algorithms may be tweaked to address real-world artifacts. As the NPDS data is temporally and geographically diverse, it may capture features absent in smaller datasets used during the development of the algorithm under test. This report presents lessons learned from applying the blind validation methodology to LineID™, a synchrophasor-based dynamic line rating software developed by Topolonet Corporation. Improvements made to the software through iterative feedback, limitations of the validation methodology, as well as how the limitations of the NPDS affected the evaluation process are discussed. Observations indicate that the proposed validation methodology can be valuable for evaluating other tools in the future.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
DOE OSTI2022

UAS Activity Profile Survey

Commercial vendors, trying to tap into the physical protection of critical infrastructure, are offering nuclear facilities the opportunity to borrow detection counter-unmanned aircraft systems (CUAS) equipment to survey the airspace over and around the facility. However, using one vendor or method of detection (e.g., radio frequency [RF], radar, acoustic, visual) will not necessarily provide a complete airspace profile since no single method can detect all UAS threats. Using several detection technologies, the unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) Team, who supports the U.S. National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) Office of International Nuclear Security (INS), would like to offer partners a comprehensive airspace profile of the types and frequency of UAS that fly within and around critical infrastructure. Improved UAS awareness will aid in the risk assessment process.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗
DOE OSTI2018

Insider Threat Cybersecurity Framework Webtool & Methodology: Defending Against Complex Cyber-Physical Threats

The paper demonstrates how the Insider Threat Cybersecurity Framework (ITCF) web tool and methodology help provide a more dynamic, defense-in-depth security posture against insider cyber-physical threats. ITCF includes over 30 cyber-physical security best practices to help organizations identify, protect, detect, respond and recover to sophisticated insider threats and vulnerabilities. The following paper tests the efficacy of this approach and helps validate and verify ITCF’s capabilities and features through various insider attacks use-cases. Three different investment scenarios and explored to determine how an organization can most efficiently leverage ICTF to increase their overall security posture against insider attacks. ITCF also facilitates implementation of the goals outlined in Presidential Executive Order (EO) on Strengthening the Cybersecurity of Federal Networks and Critical Infrastructure (May 2017): To help owners and operators of critical infrastructure identify, protect, detect, respond, and recover cyber threats. ITCF helps organizations with the following features: provides an easy to use rapid assessment tool to perform an insider threat self-assessment; determines the current insider threat cybersecurity posture; defines investment based goals to achieve a target state; connects the cybersecurity posture with business processes, functions, and continuity; and finally, helps develop plans to answer critical organizational cybersecurity questions. In this paper, the webtool and its core capabilities are depicted by performing an extensive comparative assessment over two different high-profile insider threat incidents.

Mylrea, Michael E.↗