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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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At least 55 records · Page 3
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2022

ROTOR: Research to Operations and Operations to Research

PNNL’s Research to Operations/Operations to Research (ROTOR) Program fosters a cybersecurity operations to researcher collaboration, identifying hard problems and challenges for cyber defenders and bringing researcher science disciplines to these challenges. ROTOR allows PNNL’s cyber defenders to better protect the laboratory but also fosters innovation and incubation of solutions for our sponsor missions across DOE, DOD, DHS and the intelligence community. Our sponsors and their missions are faced with many of the same cyber defense challenges that PNNL faces. By using our own laboratory security operations environment as an innovation generator and testing ground, allowing research to be tested and tried, our sponsors are directly benefitted. PNNL is in a unique position to combine our world class research organization with enterprise cybersecurity operations. ROTOR is taking advantage of this to bring PNNL cybersecurity research projects into an operational environment within PNNL’s Cyber Security Operations Center. With ROTOR, PNNL researchers gain the advantage of operational experience and expertise and have an avenue for showcasing research in an operational environment. This helps to advance PNNL research, prove operability of PNNL projects to its sponsors, and provide real-world insight to real-world problems for our cybersecurity research agenda. ROTOR is the conduit for PNNL cybersecurity research to find its way to operational use. PNNL researchers and engineers are informed by real-world operations and operations has access to current PNNL research and engineering capabilities. All of this leads to improved reputation for PNNL as a provider of national security solutions that are tried and tested. To date, ROTOR has collaborated with six projects, enabling each to conduct operational work within the CSOC.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
DOE OSTI2021

On Self-Security of Grid-Interactive Smart Inverters

The capability to exchange information with utility operators, aggregators, and nearby smart devices can make a grid-interactive inverter an intelligent cyber-physical device. However, the capability of exchanging information can also put the inverters at the risk of insecure operation. In this paper, possible software manipulations into the inverters are studied to understand their vulnerability to cyberattacks. Moreover, the state-of-the-art system-level and device-level cyber-defense measures are discussed, and advantages and drawbacks of each technique are provided. Studies show that a reference model can be implemented in device-level security to effectively examine incoming setpoints for detecting and preventing malicious or harmful actions. This paper particularly underlines the significance of device-level self-security and its advantages for grid-interactive inverters. Finally, recommendations for future studies are provided.

Gursoy, Mehmetcan↗
DOE OSTI2024

Cyberwheel

Cyberwheel is a high fidelity training environment for autonomous cyber defense agents that includes both simulation and emulation capabilities. Cyberwheel simplifies customization of the training network and easily allows redefining the agent’s reward function, observation space, and action space to support rapid experimentation of novel approaches to agent design. It also provides visibility into agent behaviors necessary for agent evaluation and sufficient documentation and examples to lower the barrier to entry.

Oesch, TimothySean [Oak Ridge National Laboratory ↗
DOE OSTI2020

Potential Academic Research Topics of National Security Relevance

Since even before its establishment as an independent national security laboratory in 1949, Sandia has been devoted to an overarching mission of developing advanced technologies for global peace. These technologies have taken a variety of forms, and they exist in and must address an ever-changing global security environment. An understanding of that global security environment and its possible or likely evolution is therefore critical to ensuring that Sandia can maintain its focus on strategic technology investments that will benefit the nation in the next 20- 30 years. Sandia sustains multiple Systems Analysis organizations whose responsibility includes maintaining an understanding of the global security environment as it applies across multiple mission domains. The topics below include two from Sandia's emerging threats and biodefense mission, three with relevance to Sandia's cyber defense mission, and four of particular but not exclusive relevance to Sandia's nuclear deterrence mission. All are intended to spur independent academic thought that could assist Sandia as well as the broader national security community in anticipating and adapting to a continually changing world. Sandia anticipates periodic interactions between Sandia Systems Analysis staff and SciPol Scholars Program faculty and students who choose to expand upon these topics in order to provide opportunities for feedback and communication throughout 2020-2021.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2025

Securing Solar for the Grid (S2G) (Final Project Report) [Slides]

This is the final technical report for the SETO-funded project Securing Solar for the Grid (S2G) from FY22-24. The project scope included development and dissemination of standards' requirements, best practices, equipment testing procedures, assessment tools, as well as education and training materials for cyber defense, posture and maturity tailored to solar technologies. The outcomes for this work include: co-led the development of cybersecurity certification standard (UL2941), co-led the development of cybersecurity guide (IEEE1547.3), development of recommendations for supply chain cybersecurity, and development of cybersecurity risk profiles and recommendations for DERMS.

14 SOLAR ENERGY↗
DOE OSTI2021

Review of internal cyber attacks in nuclear facilities and an artificial neural network model for implementing internal cyberforensics

Deployment of digital technologies within a modern shift in cyber defense systems is essential for protecting the energy production units. One of the important components of defense is cyberforensics: once an attack has been detected to locate its origin. In this paper, a review of well-known cyberattacks in nuclear facilities is provided, with the lessons learned leading to the development of a machine learning approach implementing identification of internal at- tacks in the facility's data networks. Our approach may be seen as one of the layers in a defense-in-depth strategy that identifies if the attack comes from inside, which may result in identifying faster the attacker's origin. The presented model exploits network packet examination to cast accurate predictions on detailing the origin of malicious network connections. The approach fuses multiple mathematical functions within an artificial neural network to provide a response in the form of 0/1, i. e., whether the attack is identified as internal or not. The utilization of a variety of test cases is developed to explore the relevance and validity of the predictive approach. The proposed implementation is examined with network data packet variance, and the results obtained exhibit a highly accurate detection rate.

Nuclear Science & Technology↗
DOE OSTI2025

Secure State Estimation with Asynchronous Measurements for Coordinated Cyber Attack Detection in Active Distribution Systems

Coordinated cyber attacks tamper with measurement data to disrupt the situational awareness of active distribution systems. Various sensors report measurements asynchronously at different rates, which introduces challenges during state estimation. In addition, this forces cyber intruders to exert greater effort to compromise multiple communication channels and launch coordinated attacks. Therefore, multi-channel and asynchronous measurements could be harnessed to develop more secure cyber defense strategies. In this paper, a prediction-correction-based multi-rate observer is designed to exploit the value of asynchronous measurements for the detection of coordinated false data injection (FDI) attacks. First, a time-function-dependent prediction-correction strategy is proposed to adjust the sampling interval for each sensor’s measurement. Then, an observer is designed based on the trade-off between estimation error and the optimal period of the most recent sampling instant, with the convergence of estimation error with the maximum permitted sampling interval. Moreover, the conditions for exponential stability are developed using the Lyapunov–Krasovskii functional technique. Next, a coordinated FDI attack detection strategy is developed based on the dual nonlinear minimization problem. The proposed attack detection and secure state estimation strategies are tested on the IEEE 13-node system. Simulation results show that these schemes are effective in enhancing attack detection based on asynchronous measurements or compromised data.

asynchronous measurements↗
DOE OSTI2021

What Clinical Trials Can Teach Us About the Development of More Resilient AI for Cybersecurity

Policy-mandated, rigorously administered scientific testing is needed to provide transparency into the efficacy of artificial intelligence-–based (AI-based) cyber defense tools for consumers and to prioritize future research and development. In this work, we propose a model that is informed by our experience, urged forward by massive-scale cyberattacks, and inspired by parallel developments in the biomedical field and the unprecedentedly fast development of new vaccines to combat global pathogens.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
DOE OSTI2024

Field Programmable Gate Array Data Capture for Control Systems

Some Industrial Control Systems (ICS) networks are based on protocols such as Serial and Industrial Ethernet. These protocols currently have no existing cybersecurity monitoring tools, leaving a large gap in the cyber defense of critical infrastructure. In order to analyze such ICS traffic, it is first necessary to implement methods of capturing the ICS data. Whereas traditional methods of analyzing data would use microprocessors, the nature of high-speed analog data can be difficult to implement on such a versatile processor, as they are rather inefficient for doing a single task. Whereas Field Programmable Gate Arrays (FPGAs) provide an adequate tool in analyzing high speed data, as despite the lack of program versatility, Programmable Logic can implement a solution with minimal clock cycles, allowing time for each new packet of data to be captured before a new data sample is taken.

42 ENGINEERING↗
DOE OSTI2021

Assessment of the High Flux Isotope Reactor Cybersecurity Initiative

Recent cyber-attacks on industrial control systems, and inadvertent exposure of nuclear plant systems to cyber-exploits underscore the need for plant operators to adopt and deploy cyber-security defense solutions made for industrial control systems. Of increasing concern is the fact that international cyber hackers are beginning to target critical infrastructure, and because these more modern controls systems depend on advanced use of digital systems, they are more vulnerable than ever before to cyber-attacks. Traditional cyber defense strategies and products that have been available for decades are tailored for use on IT or corporate networks but can cause interruptions and catastrophic damage when deployed on industrial control system networks. The Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Nuclear Energy established the Gateway for Accelerated Innovation in Nuclear (GAIN) program to provide private companies pursuing innovative nuclear energy technologies with access to the technical support necessary to move toward commercialization. One of these GAIN small business vouchers was awarded to Dragos, Inc. to enable collaboration with Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) to evaluate the Dragos Platform on a production nuclear reactor test bed, hence laying the path for future commercial adoption. The vision was to provide a guide for industrial operators on implementing an industrial monitoring solution and to show how these solutions can be deployed without causing safety and reliability issues. This report documents the results of the collaboration between ORNL and Dragos, Inc.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗
DOE OSTI2024

A Privacy-Preserving Cyber Threat Intelligence Sharing System

Cyber Threat Intelligence (CTI) is a key resource for developing defensive strategies against potential cyber adversaries. Entities typically access CTI through open-source platforms, national agencies, or specialized commercial services. However, the bi-directional exchange of CTI is hindered by organizational trust boundaries, which complicate the sharing processes between entities and CTI providers. Centralized CTI services benefit from receiving suspicious cyber observables such as IP addresses, domain names, and email addresses from various entities. The aggregation allows for the correlation of widespread adversarial activities to enhance the alert and response mechanisms across the network of involved parties. Despite these benefits, openly sharing such observables incurs potential legal, regulatory, and reputational risks for the disclosing entities.This paper introduces a system designed to facilitate the secure exchange of cyber observables across trust boundaries without compromising the anonymity of the sharing entities. Here, we propose an architecture that leverages common web protocols alongside zero-knowledge proofs to authenticate members while maintaining anonymity. Additionally, we outline a privacy model tailored for STIX (Structured Threat Information eXpression) cyber observables to minimize the risk of inadvertently disclosing private information. Through our threat models, we assess the privacy implications of our proposed system and demonstrate its potential to enhance collaborative cyber defense efforts without exposing entities to undue risk.

BBS+ Signatures↗
DOE OSTI2023

A critical review of cyber-physical security for building automation systems

Modern Building Automation Systems (BASs), as the brain that enable the smartness of a smart building, often require increased connectivity both among system components as well as with outside entities, such as the cloud, to enable low-cost remote management, optimized automation via outsourced cloud analytics, and increased building-grid integrations. As smart buildings move towards open communication technologies, providing access to BASs through the building's intranet, or even remotely through the Internet, has become a common practice. However, increased connectivity and accessibility come with increased cyber security threats. BASs were historically developed as closed environments with limited cyber-security considerations. As a result, BASs in many buildings are vulnerable to cyber-attacks that may cause adverse consequences, such as occupant discomfort, excessive energy usage, and unexpected equipment downtime. Therefore, there is a strong need to advance the state-of-the-art in cyber-physical security for BASs and provide practical solutions for attack mitigation in buildings. However, an inclusive and systematic review of BAS vulnerabilities, potential cyber-attacks with impact assessment, detection & defense approaches, and cyber resilient control strategies is currently lacking in the literature. This review paper fills the gap by providing a comprehensive up-to-date review of cyber-physical security for BASs at three levels in commercial buildings: management level, automation level, and field level. The general BASs vulnerabilities and protocol-specific vulnerabilities for the four dominant BAS protocols (i.e., BACnet, KNX, LonWorks, and Modbus) are reviewed, followed by a discussion on four attack targets and seven potential attack scenarios. Furthermore, the impact of cyber-attacks on BASs is summarized as signal corruption, signal delaying, and signal blocking. The typical cyber-attack detection and defense approaches are identified at the three levels. Cyber resilient control strategies for BASs under attack are categorized into passive and active resilient control schemes. Open challenges and future opportunities are finally discussed.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
DOE OSTI2025

Secure and Resilient Operations Using Open-Source Distributed Systems Platform (OpenDSP)

The goal of this project is to identify and address cybersecurity gaps by developing a multi-layer multi-channel cyber-physical defense and survival mechanism for operating distribution networks with high penetration of solar / inverter-based resource (IBR) / distributed energy resource (DER). The proposed security enhancements are built upon the distributed framework and solution architecture for both information technology (IT) and operational technology (OT) systems. The technical solutions consist of two composite functionalities and six layers: proactive defense (vulnerability assessment, communication protection, and attack detection, as layers 1-3), and adaptive self-healing (attack-resilient control, adaptive recovery, and resilient survival, as layers 4-6). These layers, built on and extended from DHS CISA Cyber Framework, establish an integrated and robust cybersecurity framework for operating large-scale distribution networks.

14 SOLAR ENERGY↗
DOE OSTI2021

Directional Laplacian Centrality for Cyber Situational Awareness

Cyber operations is drowning in diverse, high-volume, multi-source data. To get a full picture of current operations and identify malicious events and actors, analysts must see through data generated by a mix of human activity and benign automated processes. Although many monitoring and alert systems exist, they typically use signature-based detection methods. We introduce a general method rooted in spectral graph theory to discover patterns and anomalies without a priori knowledge of signatures. We derive and propose a new graph-theoretic centrality measure based on the derivative of the graph Laplacian matrix in the direction of a vertex. To build intuition about our measure, we show how it identifies the most central vertices in standard network datasets and compare to other graph centrality measures. Finally, we focus our attention on studying its effectiveness in identifying important IP addresses in network flow data. Using both real and synthetic network flow data, we conduct several experiments to test our measure’s sensitivity to two types of injected attack profiles and show that vertices participating in injected attack profiles exhibit noticeable changes in our centrality measures, even when the injected anomalies are relatively small, and in the presence of simulated network dynamics.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
DOE OSTI2020

Cyber Threat Dictionary Using MITRE ATT&CK Matrix and NIST Cybersecurity Framework Mapping

Cyber-attack and defense frameworks offer numerous ways to protect systems and networks from threats. However, only a few of these numerous attack and defense frameworks provide countermeasures by linking multiple frameworks. Due to the lack of attack-defense mapped frameworks, a number of cyber security practitioners are often puzzled how to cope with cyber-attacks when it occurs. The objective of this paper is to present a tool called the “Cyber Threat Dictionary” to solve the problem . Cyber Threat Dictionary offers approaches and practical solutions to the threats by mapping MITRE ATT&CK Matrix to the NIST Cybersecurity Framework. By providing immediate solutions to cyber security practitioners, Cyber Threat Dictionary enables effective responses against cyber-attacks.

MITRE ATT&CK MATRIX, NIST Cybersecurity Framework,↗