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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2025

Resilient State Recovery Using Prior Measurement Support Information

Resilient state recovery of cyber-physical systems has attracted much research attention due to the unique challenges posed by the tight coupling between communication, computation, and the underlying physics of such systems. By modeling attacks as additive adversary signals to a sparse subset of measurements, this resilient recovery problem can be formulated as an error correction problem. To achieve exact state recovery, most existing results require less than 50% of the measurement nodes to be compromised, which limits the resiliency of the estimators. In this paper, we show that observer resiliency can be further improved by incorporating data-driven prior information. Here, we provide an analytical bridge between the precision of prior information and the resiliency of the estimator. By quantifying the relationship between the estimation error of the weighted ℓ 1 observer and the precision of the support prior, this quantified relationship provides guidance for the estimator’s weight design to achieve optimal resiliency. Several numerical simulations and an application case study are presented to validate the theoretical claims.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
DOE OSTI2023

Toward a Resilient Cybersecure Hydropower Fleet: Cybersecurity Landscape and Roadmap 2021

With this roadmap, Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) hopes to assist the U.S. Department of Energy’s (DOE’s) Water Power Technologies Office (WPTO) in improving the cybersecurity of hydropower plants across the nation. This effort draws upon collected data from the dams sector, from industrial control system cybersecurity threat reports, from similar work focused on neighboring sectors, and from frank discussions with owners, operators, and vendors. While remaining tightly focused on the needs of hydropower projects, during this landscape study and development of the resulting roadmap, the research team sought to remain informed by the larger energy sector’s vision and direction so that the topics and milestones may fit within a larger vision common to the whole.

13 HYDRO ENERGY↗
DOE OSTI2020

Accessible Real-Time Surveillance Radar System for Object Detection

As unmanned ground and aerial vehicles become more accessible and their usage covers a wider area of application, including for threatening purposes which can cause connected catastrophe, a surveillance system for the public places is being considered more essential to respond to those possible threats. We propose an inexpensive, lighter, safer, and smaller radar system than military-grade radar systems while keeping reasonable capability for use in monitoring public places. The paper details the iterative process on the system design and improvements with experiments to realize the system used for surveillance. The experiments show the practical use of the system and configuration for a better understanding of using the system. Cyber-physical systems for outdoor environments can benefit from the system as a sensor for sensing objects as well as monitoring.

47 OTHER INSTRUMENTATION↗
DOE OSTI2021

Hydropower Cyber-Physical Configurations

The U.S. Department of Energy’s Water Power Technologies Office funded Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, Argonne National Laboratory, and the National Renewable Energy Laboratory to develop a typology to characterize the variety and pervasiveness of cyber-physical configurations across the nation’s hydropower fleet. Outreach to owners and operators returned configurations for 275 hydropower plants or approximately 12% of the fleet. Components (OT and IT), systems, and connections among systems differed among plants according to function, age, position in the river cascade, and many other factors. Seven cyber-physical configuration types labeled A through I, included from 2 to dozens of plants. They were differentiated by how pervasive data and control connections were among cyber-physical components and how frequently control signals paired with data signals in a feedback loop. The flow of data and control within each type implies what cybersecurity vulnerabilities may exist, and what mitigation actions may be most effective. A self-assessment approach allows plant operators to identify the configuration type similar to their plant and link to the lessons learned and best practices information. The cyber-physical typology reinforces the idea that hydropower facilities vary widely, but it also identifies groups that highlight similarities in how their cyber-physical components interact. This helps address fleetwide cybersecurity needs by identifying a reasonable number of configuration types that share risks, vulnerabilities, and potential mitigations.

13 HYDRO ENERGY↗
DOE OSTI2021

Data-driven model generation for deception defence of cyber-physical environments

Cyber-physical systems have the potential to greatly improve both the economic and the environmental efficiency of our current infrastructure. However, the necessary fusing of the cyber world with the physical world that results from these technologies also creates a host of new attack opportunities. In this work, we discuss how deception can be employed to effectively defend these systems.

Nowak, Kathleen E.↗
DOE OSTI2020

Cyber Resilience as a Deterrence Strategy

This paper was written by the Cyber Deterrence and Resilience Strategic Initiative in partnership with the Resilience Energy Systems Strategic Initiative. Resilience and deterrence are both part of a comprehensive cyber strategy where tactics may overlap across defense, resilience, deterrence, and other strategic spaces. This paper explores how building resiliency in cyberspace can not only serve to strengthen the defender's posture and capabilities in a general sense but also deter adversaries from attacking.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
DOE OSTI2023

AI ATAC 1: An Evaluation of Prominent Commercial Malware Detectors

This work presents an evaluation of six prominent commercial endpoint malware detectors, a network malware detector, and a file-conviction algorithm from a cyber technology vendor. The evaluation was administered as the first of the Artificial I ntelligence Applications t o Autonomous Cybersecurity (AI ATAC) prize challenges, funded by / completed in service of the US Navy. The experiment employed 100K files (50/50% benign/malicious) with a stratified distribution of file types, including ~1K zero-day program executables (increasing experiment size two orders of magnitude over previous work). We present an evaluation process of delivering a file to a fresh virtual machine donning the detection technology, waiting 90s to allow static detection, then executing the file and waiting another period for dynamic detection; this allows greater fidelity in the observational data than previous experiments, in particular, resource and time-to-detection statistics. To execute all 800K trials (100K files × 8 tools), a software framework is designed to choreograph the experiment into an automated, time-synced, and reproducible workflow with substantial parallelization. Software with base classes for this framework are provided. A cost-benefit model was configured to integrate the tools’ detection statistics into a comparable quantity by simulating costs of use. This provides a ranking methodology for cyber competitions and a lens for reasoning about the varied statistical results. The results provide insights on state of commercial malware detection.

Bridges, Robert↗
DOE OSTI2022

Operational Technology Behavioral Analytics (OTBA) (Final Technical Report DE-FE0031640)

This final report provides a summary of the methodology, findings, lessons learned, and insights from an investigation into the feasibility of the Operational Technology Behavioral Analytics (OTBA) cybersecurity approach. The concept was evaluated with data from the National Carbon Capture Center (NCCC) – a U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) funded facility that is managed and operated by Southern Company Services, Inc. at Alabama Power Company’s E. C. Gaston generating power plant in Wilsonville, Alabama. Appropriate data sources for the post-combustion carbon capture system were identified. Infrastructure was deployed to monitor, capture and archive data for the system. Critical parameters for each subsystem were identified and analyzed. Machine-learning algorithms were used to establish and characterize normal operations and subsequently identify anomalies. This effort yielded valuable insights and formed the basis of a data-centric strategy for detecting cyber-attacks along with a coordinated response philosophy. A significant takeaway is that the OTBA cybersecurity approach is quite portable; it can be applied to other critical infrastructure beyond fossil power generation.

20 FOSSIL-FUELED POWER PLANTS↗
DOE OSTI2022

OPERATIONAL TECHNOLOGY BEHAVIORAL ANALYTICS (OTBA) – A DATA-CENTRIC APPROACH FOR REDUCING CYBERSECURITY RISK

This paper provides a summary of the methodology, findings, lessons learned, and insights from an investigation into the feasibility of the Operational Technology Behavioral Analytics (OTBA) cybersecurity approach. The concept was evaluated with data from the National Carbon Capture Center (NCCC) – a U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) funded facility that is managed and operated by Southern Company at Alabama Power’s E. C. Gaston generating power plant in Wilsonville, Alabama. Appropriate data sources for the post-combustion carbon capture system were identified. Infrastructure was deployed to monitor, capture and archive data for the system. Critical parameters for each subsystem were identified and analyzed. Machine-learning algorithms were used to establish and characterize normal operations and subsequently identify anomalies. This effort yielded valuable insights and formed the basis of a data-centric strategy for detecting cyber-attacks along with a coordinated response philosophy. A significant takeaway is that the OTBA cybersecurity approach is quite portable; it can be applied to other critical infrastructure beyond fossil power generation.

Black, Clifton↗
DOE OSTI2020

Net Load Redistribution Attacks on Nodal Voltage Magnitude Estimation in AC Distribution Networks

A high penetration level of smart devices and communication networks increases the threat of cyber-attacks in the distribution system. In this paper, we model a hidden, coordinated, net load redistribution attack (NLRA) in an AC distribution system. Based on local information of an attack region, the attacker’s goal is to create violations in nodal voltage magnitude estimation. Acting as a system operator equipped with global AC state estimation and bad data detection, we validate the stealthiness of the hidden NLRA in multiple attack cases. Simulation results on a modified PG&E 69-node distribution system show the validity of the proposed NLRA. The influence of NLRA on the distribution system is assessed and the impact of attack regions, attack timing, and system observability is also revealed.

Zhang, Hang↗
DOE OSTI2023

Systems and methods for control system security

A component security device may be disposed at an interface between a component and a cyber-physical system. The disclosed component security device may be physically and/or electrically coupled between the component and infrastructure of the cyber-physical system, such as a backplane, bus, and/or the like. The component security device may be configured to monitor the component, and selectively isolate the component from the cyber-physical system. Since the component security device is interposed at the interface of the component, the component security device may be capable of isolating the component regardless of whether the component has been compromised (e.g., regardless of whether the component is capable of complying with system commands).

Rieger, Craig G.↗
DOE OSTI2024

Risk Analysis for Remote Operation of Microreactors

Microreactors are a subset of advanced nuclear reactors that can be factory fabricated, transportable, and self-regulating. They have the potential to be used in microgrids, rural and remote areas, or emergency response applications, replacing fossil fuel sources like diesel generators and enabling sustainable energy generation. In order to make microreactor operation cost-effective, it is likely that remote communications will be needed to reduce the number of personnel required to be on site. While remote operation of energy generation and other industrial control systems is common in other industries, it is not yet adopted in the nuclear community and has many perceived and actual risks. In this paper, the severity of the risks introduced by remote operations for microreactors are explored. The primary changes in the operations involve the addition of a remote communications network and a certification system for data and controls. These changes lend themselves to considerations of cyber risks, whether unintentional or adversarial, but the assessment considers not just cyber risks introduced, but also how physical and human factors-based risks will impact the remote operations system and change the overall risk profile. This initial assessment indicates that there are standard cyber and mitigation measures that can be put in place so the risk of doing remote operations does not dramatically increase compared to local operations. This evaluation is a critical step in the process of evaluating if remote operations of microreactors is a suitable solution to meet future sustainable grid needs

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗
DOE OSTI2022

Assurance by Design for Cyber Physical Data-Driven Systems

Currently, Cyber Physical Data-Driven Systems (CPDDS) employ machine learning for the classification, data fusion, and control of our nation’s infrastructure, such as the power grid, transportation networks (e.g., fuel distribution, air traffic control), and DoD long-duration collaborative autonomous platforms including unmanned underwater, ground, surface, space, and aerial systems. Many CPDDSs are system-of-systems that should be designed to communicate over disadvantaged networks. It is important to assure that the CPDDSs are resilient against physical and cyber threats by design. Additionally, their design should tolerate misclassification errors resulting from natural and/or adversarial distribution shifts within their data driven components. The all-domain nature of the problem of assuring the design of CPDDSs requires a multi-disciplinary perspective as outlined in this chapter.

Chikkagoudar, Satish↗
DOE OSTI2024

Self-Aware Local Autonomous and Semi-Cooperative Control for Cross-Layered Resilience (SLAC3R)

The objective of this work is to develop and demonstrate novel, adaptive, lightweight algorithms that enable the decision-making agents in a large cyber-physical network to act both autonomously and in collaborative harmony to enforce assured resilience across spatiotemporal layers, even under unforeseen adversarial scenarios (e.g., high- impact-low-probability events). Towards this end, the proposed solution will serve as minimally invasive add-on layers that bridge the existing (faster, reactive) local myopic controls and (slower, predictive) centralized optimization. Importantly, the proposed algorithms will enable the multi-agent network to autonomously and collaboratively enforce resilient operation under no or limited communication environment typical of severe cyber- physical adversarial events. The expected outcome of this effort is a suite of prototype, open-source, software algorithms for safety-aware local autonomous and semi-cooperative control (SLAC3R), demonstrated on networked microgrids (via RD2C/Thrust-1 OPAL-RT testbed).

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
DOE OSTI2023

High-fidelity model-driven deception platform for cyber-physical systems

Methods are described for protecting a cyber-physical system against a potential attacker of the system. The methods include a method of generating a plurality of examples for a training data set and training a system model using the training data set to generate a decoy configured to generate a synthetic output that mimics historical outputs generated by the system for a given historical system context. Also described is a method including receiving a system context of a cyber-physical system; receiving an inquiry into the system by a potential attacker; applying a system model to the system context and the inquiry; obtaining from the system model a synthetic output that mimics how a component of the system would respond to the inquiry given the system context; and providing the synthetic output to the potential attacker.

Edgar, Thomas W.↗
DOE OSTI2022

FIC Threat Profile: Provided by Shamrock Cyber

The FIC team has engaged with PNNL’s Shamrock Cyber Team to produce this Threat Profile. The Threat Profile provides the foundation for a thorough understanding of threats for development teams and stakeholders, and users of the system. The Threat Profile can be used as is, or as content to inform other reports tailored to a specific audience. It is intended to enable decision makers at all levels to improve the security posture of the system.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
DOE OSTI2020

Attack Scenarios Relating to Army Facility-Related Control Systems: Quantifying the Cost to Secure and Cost Savings of the Army’s FRCS Program

Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) analyzed the cyber-threat environment to U.S. Army facilities. This report describes three key factors in securing Army-owned facility-related control systems (FRCS). First, Section 1.0 provides background information about the project. Section 2.0 describes the various types of cyber-attacks. Section 3.0 provides a series of attack scenarios from real-world use cases are described in Section 3. These examples are relevant to the Army because the targeted systems or operating environments are like those used at Army installations. An estimated range for the cost to secure these systems is described in Section 4.0. Finally, the cost savings of preventing these kinds of attacks are described in Section 5.0.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗