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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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At least 55 records · Page 3

Monocrystalline CdSeTe/MgCdTe Double‐Heterostructure Solar Cells

This article reports monocrystalline CdSeTe/MgCdTe double‐heterostructure (DH) solar cells with varying Se compositions in the absorber layers that are grown on InSb substrates by using molecular beam epitaxy. The Se composition in the samples studied is determined to be 4%–11% through high‐resolution X‐ray diffraction (XRD) and photoluminescence measurements. Increased Se incorporation induces higher defect density attributed to increased lattice mismatch, and mixed‐phase formation due to the small difference in formation energies between the wurtzite and zinc blende phases of CdSe, which causes stacking faults and grain boundaries. Devices are fabricated by directly depositing an n‐type indium tin oxide (ITO) layer on the CdSeTe/MgCdTe DHs followed by Ag metal contacts. Reduced bandgap is observed in solar cells with increased Se composition. The devices with an absorber containing 4% Se exhibit an average open‐circuit voltage ( V OC ) of 0.925 V, a short‐circuit current density ( J SC ) of 23.4 mA/cm 2 , a fill factor ( FF ) of 0.650 and an efficiency of 14.1% without anti‐reflection coating. Absorbers with higher Se compositions result in poor device performance, mainly attributed to high defect density in the materials.

Ju, Zheng [Center for Photonics Innovation Arizona↗

Black hole horizon edge partition functions

We extend a formula for 1-loop black hole determinants by Denef, Hartnoll, and Sachdev (DHS) to spinning fields on any (d + 1)-dimensional static spherically symmetric black hole. By carefully analyzing the regularity condition imposed on the Euclidean eigenfunctions, we reveal an unambiguous bulk-edge split in the 1-loop Euclidean partition function for tensor fields of arbitrary integer spin: the bulk part captures the “renormalized” thermal canonical partition function recently discussed in [1]; the edge part is related to quasinormal modes (QNMs) that fail to analytically continue to a subset of Euclidean modes with enhanced fall-offs near the origin. Since the edge part takes the form of a path integral on S d–1 , this suggests that these are associated with degrees of freedom living on the bifurcation surface in the Lorentzian two-sided black hole geometry. For massive higher spin on static BTZ and massive vector on Nariai black holes, we find that the edge partition function is related to the QNMs with lowest overtone numbers.

79 ASTRONOMY AND ASTROPHYSICS↗

National Critical Minerals Data Dashboard

The Critical Minerals (CM) Data Dashboard provides data-driven insights to help unlock the potential of conventional and unconventional CM resources in the United States. The dashboard focuses on 12 CM essential for producing zero-emission transportation and clean power technology. More information about these CM and potential resources is available in our CM Story Map. Dashboard data sets can be filtered geographically using the options provided along the top of the dashboard. Data sets can also be filtered by various attributes using the options in the expandable side panel on the left side of the screen. The data sets in this dashboard were compiled from multiple sources including the USGS, USEPA, OSMRE, and DHS., Users are encouraged to provide feedback/suggestions on the function and content of the dashboard, as well as any issues that may arise.

Conventional Resources↗

Evolution and Trends of Industrial Control System Cyber Incidents since 2017

The industrial control systems (ICSs) that manage our critical infrastructure are increasingly converging with corporate networks and the Internet as technology and businesses prioritize digital connectivity. These connections make them more vulnerable and available to malicious cyber actors who traditionally targeted the companies’ more public-facing information technology (IT) networks. This paper will review select publicly reported cyber incidents to highlight the continued and growing threat to ICS devices and operational technology (OT) environments. It will summarize the incident and when available, will provide information on the cyber actors, the vulnerabilities they exploited, and any publications the U.S. Government (USG) provided in response. Data belonging to the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) will be used to highlight quantitative trends concerning ICS incidents. This paper builds on “History of Industrial Control System Cyber Incidents” (Hemsley & Fisher 2018), a paper that highlighted select noteworthy threats and incidents to ICS systems up to 2017. This paper will similarly review select incidents occurring after the last previously reviewed incident, Triton/HatMan, December 2017, and will note ICS incident trends including IT/OT convergence and advances in cyber-threat actors’ capabilities in observed in the examined incidents.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Sequim Campus Master Plan

Based in Richland, Washington, Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) is one of ten U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Science (SC) national laboratories. PNNL is DOE’s premier chemistry, earth sciences, and data analytics laboratory, delivering vital mission impacts in energy resiliency and national security. PNNL has 19 core capabilities, each a powerful combination of world-class staff, state-of-the- art equipment, and mission-ready facilities. These capabilities represent a collective set of skills and a body of world-leading scientific and engineering work that provides exceptional value and mission delivery to DOE, the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and other federal agencies and industry through strategic partnership projects on a not-to-interfere basis. Currently operated by Battelle Memorial Institute, PNNL occupies more than 2.3 million gross square feet (GSF) of buildings and employs approximately 4,700 staff members. PNNL has implemented a rolling 10-year campus strategy, initiated in fiscal year 2013, designed to deliver the foundation for the multidisciplinary science and engineering expertise, equipment, instrumentation, facilities, and infrastructure required to continue providing exceptional value and mission delivery. This strategy is incorporated into PNNL’s annual Laboratory Plan, which serves as DOE-SC’s equivalent of the Five- Year Site Plan required by DOE Order 430.1C Chg. 1, Real Property Asset Management. The PNNL Sequim Campus is located in Clallam County, just outside of Sequim, Washington. PNNL Sequim builds upon a rich history of research related to marine and coastal resources, environmental chemistry, water resources modeling, ecotoxicology, biotechnology, and national security. Facilities at the PNNL Sequim Campus were designed to take advantage of two unique locational assets: the pristine coastal ocean water in Sequim Bay and the region’s exceptionally clean air. Research facilities on the waterfront are supplied with up to 200 gallons per minute (gpm) of seawater and/or groundwater that enables research on aquatic systems ranging from fully seawater to fresh water, with an onsite water treatment system that removes all biological and hazardous chemical residues prior to discharge. Multiple large seawater tanks outside the waterfront laboratories, along with a boat ramp, pier, and floating dock, enable lab-to-field research. The uplands facility takes advantage of the amazing air quality and is built and operated to enable ultratrace chemical/radiological analytical chemistry. This combination of capabilities is not available at any other marine laboratory in the nation.

37 INORGANIC, ORGANIC, PHYSICAL, AND ANALYTICAL CH↗

Automated Threat Recognition For Aviation Security Applications

We have developed a framework for automated threat recognition (ATR) of explosive threat materials for both single-energy and dual-energy X-ray CT systems. Under this framework, two different types of ATR have been developed. The first type of ATR employs supervised machine learning with statistical characterization of target materials for threat identification training. The reliance only on statistical characterization information for threat training uniquely enables this style of ATR to adapt quickly to evolving threats. The second type of ATR employs deep learning through convolutional neural networks. Convolutional neural networks are attractive due to their human-like capacity for learning and strong ability to identify trends and patterns. Although this method is more powerful than the first type, it requires large amounts of training data and therefore is less agile. Each ATR performs threat characterization at the voxel neighborhood level. This approach avoids the use of threat shape as a detection criterion, which is prohibited by DHS and TSA guidelines.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

System-Independent X-Ray Characterization

We have developed a method for image reconstruction and analysis of dual-energy X-ray scans that has been demonstrated to yield a physically intuitive characterization of materials (by electron density and effective atomic number) in a system-independent way. Our methodology stands in contrast to common practice of reconstructing images to yield linear attenuation coefficients, which depend strongly on system spectral response. At the core of our method, a technique called dual-energy decomposition is used to generate spectral energy-independent characterizations of the attenuation properties of a material. Inputs to this decomposition include system spectral response estimates and dual-energy X-ray projection data. X-ray cross-section tables are used to convert decomposition results to physical feature estimates (electron density, effective atomic number). Our method currently works best for materials with atomic numbers below 22 (titanium). In prior work for DHS, we demonstrated in a controlled, no-clutter environment that the decomposition technique could be applied to scans of a well-characterized materials on multiple systems with different X-ray spectral responses. In cases where LAC values showed a standard deviation of as much as 20% of mean value, application of our method yielded results with standard deviations as low as 1–3% of mean value.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

CUAS Regulatory Authority in the United States [Slides]

Slides describing: (1) How the United States (U.S.) Passes Federal Laws, (2) Initial Actions in Regulatory Space for CUAS, (3) Department of Justice (DOJ): Flow-down Authority, (4) Department of Homeland Security (DHS): Flow-down Authority, (5) CUAS Authority Granting Timeline, (6) CUAS Regulations, (7) Defining UAS Threats, (8) CUAS actions permitted pursuant to 50 USC 2661 for the Department of Energy, (9) Penalties

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗

Resilient U.S. Land Ports of Entry

The continued operation of Land Ports of Entry (LPOE), managed by the Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and General Services Administration% is vital to the U.S. economy and security. Border faculties are included in the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Government Facilities Sector2, one of the 16 critical infrastructures "whose assets, systems, and networks, whether physical or virtual, are considered so vital to the United States that their incapacitation or destruction would have a debilitating effect on security, national economic security, national public health or safety, or any combination thereof.'" Specifically, disruptions to the flow of border crossing traffic, in the form of closures or increased border crossing wait times, impact the economy and security of all countries involved. This paper describes a process for analyzing and improving the resilience of U.S. Land Ports of Entry. For LPOE, the team believes that energy resilience is the primary objective due to the complete reliance on the e-manifest system and the increasing use of Multi-Energy Portals (MEPs). Emanifests are part of CPB's Automated Commercial Environment (ACE). They document several key pieces of information about cargo vehicles wishing to cross the border into the United States and are submitted before arriving at the port. Vehicles can be flagged for more invasive inspection based on the content of the e-manifest. MEPs are a non-intrusive inspection (NII) technology used to scan the contents of the cargo. Together MEPs and ACE serve an important role in aiding CBP with their mission to protect "the public from dangerous people and materials", and "enabling legitimate trade and travel.'" To analyze resilience of a port, the team would need to understand the port's current energy usage, which systems depend on energy and what backup systems exist, and any emergency operation plans that dictate how systems are operated in the event of a power outage. The team would also need to determine the design basis threats (DBTs) for the LPOE which could include natural disasters, manmade events, and accidents. The magnitudes of the DBTs are calculated and are then translated to expected impacts on the infrastructure and systems at the port. With this information gathered, existing LPOE models developed here at Sandia National Laboratories could be extended to support decisions about resilience. Current models are implemented in FlexSim, a 3rd party discrete event simulator. FlexSim provides 3-D visuals of physical layout that can reveal valuable insights, allows input to be variable (e.g. time it takes to interact with the CBP officer at primary inspection can vary) so that a whole range of possibilities can be captured in the results, and can be used to collect user-defined output metrics. Current LPOE models focus on cargo vehicle traffic, and process changes caused by the installation of new drive-through MEPs. Extending them to address resilience questions would require the addition of key pieces of information learned during the resilience analysis including critical systems, failure rates, and process changes for when failures occur. The primary output metric for current models is border crossing wait time. Additional metrics would also be added to the model to gain a more complete understanding of impacts related to resilience, for example, MEP scan rate. Once complete, the model could be used to analyze the effectiveness of mitigation strategies representing some future state.

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗

Bridge Seismic Screening Tool (BSST), Version 2.0

The Regional Resiliency Assessment Program (RRAP) is a cooperative assessment of specific critical infrastructure within a designated geographic area and a regional analysis of the surrounding infrastructure that addresses a range of infrastructure resilience issues that could have regionally and nationally significant consequences. In 2018, DHS’s Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) sponsored the Oregon Transportation Systems RRAP project in coordination with the Office of the Governor (under the oversight of the state resilience officer), the Oregon Office of Emergency Management (OEM), the Oregon Department of Transportation (ODOT), and other regional stakeholders (CISA 2021). This project focuses on assessing the impacts of a Cascadia Subduction Zone (CSZ) earthquake on state transportation systems and, in particular, how those impacts may affect the ability of emergency response efforts to move supplies into the region. The intended outcome of this analysis is the prioritization of transportation routes and modes for additional planning, investment, hardening, or other activities to enhance their resilience—and therefore, to enhance their ability to support response and recovery efforts following a CSZ earthquake. An important part of this transportation system-level assessment has been to assess the seismic vulnerability of the state highway system. In doing so, the RRAP project team used the Bridge Seismic Screening Tool (BSST) to assess, at a system-level, the potential impacts that a CSZ earthquake could have on state highway bridges (Bergerson et al. 2019).1 Argonne National Laboratory (Argonne), in collaboration with the Washington State Department of Transportation (WSDOT), originally developed the BSST as part of the 2017 Washington State Transportation Systems RRAP project, a sister project to the 2018 Oregon Transportation Systems RRAP project. Argonne updated the BSST during this more recent project in Oregon based on feedback from stakeholders and subject matter experts (SMEs) on the original version of the tool. The first step in the BSST is to assess the seismic vulnerability of roadway bridges following a CSZ earthquake to determine a projected or potential damage state. Damage states then help determine approximate reopening times for bridge crossings.2 This document provides details on the BSST methodology, the implementation of that tool to analyze the projected damage incurred in a CSZ earthquake scenario, and the determination of corresponding reopening times of interstate, state highway, and local bridges following such an event.

58 GEOSCIENCES↗

Oregon Rivers Characterization Tool

DHS’s Regional Resiliency Assessment Program (RRAP) undertook the Oregon State Transportation Systems RRAP project between 2018-2021 to assess the seismic vulnerabilities of the state’s transportation system to a Cascadia Subduction Zone (CSZ) earthquake (CISA 2021). The project primarily focused on the effects of a CSZ earthquake on the mobility of emergency response efforts into the region. In the event that bridges located at crucial river crossings fail during a CSZ earthquake, rivers will become natural barriers affecting the ability to support response and recovery efforts. The characteristics of rivers (e.g., width, depth, and flow) are critical data to inform planning for the recovery of transportation systems across river barriers and determine reopening times following a CSZ earthquake. As part of the transportation system assessment, an Argonne National Laboratory (Argonne) project team developed a River Characterization Tool (RCT) to quantify the physical characteristics of the river system in Oregon, which can be used to inform a system-level analysis of transportation recovery and reopening times. This report mainly discusses approaches, methods, development, and applications of the RCT. The use of the river data generated from this tool for a system-level analysis of transportation recovery is discussed in the Oregon Transportation Systems RRAP Resiliency Assessment report (CISA 2021). The primary goal of the RCT is to generate statewide dataset of widths, depths, and flows for all rivers across Oregon to assess the effects of river barriers on emergency response and recovery efforts following a CSZ earthquake. The RCT leverages remote sensing data that multispectral sensors collect from satellites, employs a deep learning model to characterize river predictions, and computes river channel geometric dimensions with hydraulic relationships and river predictions. The entire process of river characterization is automated and implemented through the RCT.

58 GEOSCIENCES↗

Recommendations for Radiological Data Assessment Implementation

Since thorough verification, validation, and data quality assessment (DQA) processes may delay incident commanders and elected and appointed officials from making key decisions, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) National Urban Security Technology Laboratory (NUSTL) tasked Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) to develop tools and guidance for the federal, state, local, tribal, and territorial (FSLTT) responders using research, discussions with select FSLTT responders, and the experiences of subject matter experts in incident response. This report provides NUSTL with recommendations on best practices for verification, validation, and data quality assessment for the data collected by responders during a radiological or nuclear event. The purpose of this report is to inform the development of a DQA toolkit aimed at the needs of data assessors during the response to a radiological incident.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

A new TEVA-DGA chromatography procedure to separate Pu, Am, and Np from bulk U materials

Trace actinides present within uranium (U) material are diagnostic signatures of U processing history. For example, the emplacement of U material within the high neutron-flux environment of a nuclear reactor can cause neutron capture of U to form 241-plutonium ( 241 Pu). Plutonium-241 then decays to progeny isotopes 241-americium ( 241 Am) and 237-neptunium ( 237 Np); therefore, the presence and relative abundances of these trace actinides is indicative of the material’s production history and intended employment (Mayer et al., 2013). During a pre-detonation nuclear forensics investigation, measurement of trace actinide 241 Pu, 241 Am, and 237 Np concentrations by an analytical laboratory may be requested. However, chemically purifying these elements from bulk U is a challenging and involved procedure requiring several sequential chromatography columns across 4+ days. To expedite Pu-Am-Np separation from bulk U material, and to improve the yield recovery of these elements, this DHS Postdoc Fellowship has worked to create a new chromatography separation chemistry.

38 RADIATION CHEMISTRY, RADIOCHEMISTRY, AND NUCLEA↗

Triage Exam, August 2006 (V.2.2)

The following questions test knowledge relevant to the DOE Radiological Triage and DHS Secondary Reachback programs. There is no time limit, and you may use any reference materials you like. Each question has only one best answer. There are 20 questions, and a score of 80% is required to pass.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗

Domestic Extremism: Countering the Threat Posed to Critical Assets

Domestic extremism has been a growing concern in the United States in recent months, as illustrated in multiple bulletins from the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) warning law enforcement partners of the heightened threat. As concerns about these actors grows, it is important that facilities in the U.S. and internationally that protect critical assets, such as sensitive information, hazardous materials, or critical infrastructure, have effective methods in place to secure those assets. DE has challenged security systems through the threat of insider attack and violence, creating a new threat to be countered in the Office of Radiological Security’s radiological source security mission. In this effort, we used a literature review and focus group discussions with experts in critical asset security and extremism to understand the nature of the domestic extremist threat, to identify best practices in securing assets, recognize potential gaps in security measures to be corrected, and recommend actions and next steps. Twenty-two subject matter experts participated in a series of five focus group sessions. Questions focused on definitions of domestic extremism, potential changes in the threat, best practices in securing facilities, assets, and personnel, and any perceived gaps. Upon completion of the focus groups, notes were analyzed thematically to identify any recurring patterns in the results. In addition, a review of academic, industry, and government literature was conducted to understand the threat, describe the process of radicalization to extremism, and to identify empirically informed practices in prevention and response. Results of this project demonstrated that further work is needed to define domestic extremism in law, regulation, and policy, to help the U.S. develop a consistent response to the threat within organizations. This is especially important, as SMEs emphasized the need for early intervention in prevention efforts, noting that organizations need clear guidance on when and how to intervene. In addition, the need for social media monitoring was discussed, although challenges remain to do so with appropriate respect for privacy and civil liberties concerns.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

ROTOR: Research to Operations and Operations to Research

PNNL’s Research to Operations/Operations to Research (ROTOR) Program fosters a cybersecurity operations to researcher collaboration, identifying hard problems and challenges for cyber defenders and bringing researcher science disciplines to these challenges. ROTOR allows PNNL’s cyber defenders to better protect the laboratory but also fosters innovation and incubation of solutions for our sponsor missions across DOE, DOD, DHS and the intelligence community. Our sponsors and their missions are faced with many of the same cyber defense challenges that PNNL faces. By using our own laboratory security operations environment as an innovation generator and testing ground, allowing research to be tested and tried, our sponsors are directly benefitted. PNNL is in a unique position to combine our world class research organization with enterprise cybersecurity operations. ROTOR is taking advantage of this to bring PNNL cybersecurity research projects into an operational environment within PNNL’s Cyber Security Operations Center. With ROTOR, PNNL researchers gain the advantage of operational experience and expertise and have an avenue for showcasing research in an operational environment. This helps to advance PNNL research, prove operability of PNNL projects to its sponsors, and provide real-world insight to real-world problems for our cybersecurity research agenda. ROTOR is the conduit for PNNL cybersecurity research to find its way to operational use. PNNL researchers and engineers are informed by real-world operations and operations has access to current PNNL research and engineering capabilities. All of this leads to improved reputation for PNNL as a provider of national security solutions that are tried and tested. To date, ROTOR has collaborated with six projects, enabling each to conduct operational work within the CSOC.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Domestic Extremism (Executive Summary)

Domestic extremism (DE) has been a growing concern in the U.S. in recent months, as illustrated in multiple bulletins from the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) warning law enforcement partners of the heightened threat. As concerns about these actors grows, it is important that facilities in the U.S. and internationally that protect critical assets, such as sensitive information, hazardous materials, or critical infrastructure, have effective methods in place to secure those assets. DE has challenged security systems through the danger of insider attack and violence, creating a new threat to be countered. In this effort, therefore, we used a literature review and focus group discussions with experts in critical asset security and extremism to understand the nature of the domestic extremist threat, to identify best practices in securing assets, recognize potential gaps in security measures to be corrected, and recommend actions for the Office of Radiological Security (ORS) to address DE with its partners.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

PRIMED for the Future: Purposing Raw Intake for Machine Learning-Enabled Detection (Final Report)

The COVID-19 pandemic demonstrated how a novel, elusive, and diffuse biological threat can engender uncertainty and misinformation, and it underscored the need for flexible analytical modalities agnostic to the identity of biological material. Yet even before the pandemic, recognition of the limitations of the current, list-based approach, which focuses on known pathogens and biotoxins, and of the importance of agent-agnostic biodetection was growing within the biosecurity community. In a 2018 report on “Biodefense in the Age of Synthetic Biology,” for example, the National Academy of Sciences stated that “an overreliance on the Select Agent List is a systematic weakness affecting many aspects of the United States’ current biodefense mitigation capability”. More recently, a group of biodefense researchers proposed the identification and adoption of “bioagent-agnostic signatures (BASs)” as a way of detecting and characterizing not only existing agents but also novel ones, an approach they believe will “enable a more flexible and resilient biodefense posture”. Indeed, the future of biodetection requires us to begin developing novel analytics that can identify anomalies and/or characteristics that indicate a potential threat, whether known or unknown, without looking for a specific signature that has been identified previously. To assess potential threats more rapidly, it is critical to develop agnostic artificial intelligence (AI)/machine learning (ML) systems that can be employed for real-time assessment of the nature and source of a perturbation. Such systems should be multi scale and multi-dimensional, integrating sensor data from a range of biological, chemical, and physical application spaces. Emerging deep learning (DL) models demonstrate exceptional promise for identification of discriminatory features within multi-dimensional datasets. DL models have the capacity to recognize and encode highly complex patterns in a wide range of input data modalities, including images, text, and biological/chemical/physical spectra. As such, they can execute a wide range of assessments and determinations that have traditionally required a human operator. The promise of advances in DL is apparent in the realm of human health and medicine. DL models have been validated for evaluating a variety of clinical threats to human health in a range of contexts, including infection and cancer, and they demonstrated improved performance in predicting stroke relative to human neurologists in some categories of data. Continuously evolving advances in AI/ML are expected to support more efficient evaluation of raw sequence, spectroscopy, and spectrometry data. For instance, recent advances and deployment of large language models (LLM) such as Generative Pre training Transformer (GPT) and Bidirectional Encoder Representations from Transformers (BERT) have already motivated application of these models for biological function prediction. As frameworks such as LLMs become larger and more complex in their representations, their capacity to serve as pre-trained models that can be fine-tuned for biological/biodetection purposes will similarly be amplified. While existing and emerging AI/ML have found broad applicability and use cases in the clinical sciences, development for environmental evaluation and biodetection has been limited. Functionalizing such capabilities for this purpose requires an understanding of the existing technical landscape and how the respective tools and algorithms are currently being employed. This landscape awareness then allows an assessment of the current practical capabilities of existing models and the anticipated requirements and development efforts that will be needed to adapt available algorithms for biodetection applications relevant to DHS. Leveraging expertise in biodetection, ML, and operational biodetection, the effort described in this report is comprised of a systematic landscape assessment (Subtask 2.1), comparative evaluation (Subtask 2.2), and formulation of a value proposition (Subtask 2.3) for the prospect of ML-enabled, agnostic biodetection from raw, or minimally-processed, datasets.

59 BASIC BIOLOGICAL SCIENCES↗