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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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At least 55 records · Page 3

Oregon Rivers Characterization Tool

DHS’s Regional Resiliency Assessment Program (RRAP) undertook the Oregon State Transportation Systems RRAP project between 2018-2021 to assess the seismic vulnerabilities of the state’s transportation system to a Cascadia Subduction Zone (CSZ) earthquake (CISA 2021). The project primarily focused on the effects of a CSZ earthquake on the mobility of emergency response efforts into the region. In the event that bridges located at crucial river crossings fail during a CSZ earthquake, rivers will become natural barriers affecting the ability to support response and recovery efforts. The characteristics of rivers (e.g., width, depth, and flow) are critical data to inform planning for the recovery of transportation systems across river barriers and determine reopening times following a CSZ earthquake. As part of the transportation system assessment, an Argonne National Laboratory (Argonne) project team developed a River Characterization Tool (RCT) to quantify the physical characteristics of the river system in Oregon, which can be used to inform a system-level analysis of transportation recovery and reopening times. This report mainly discusses approaches, methods, development, and applications of the RCT. The use of the river data generated from this tool for a system-level analysis of transportation recovery is discussed in the Oregon Transportation Systems RRAP Resiliency Assessment report (CISA 2021). The primary goal of the RCT is to generate statewide dataset of widths, depths, and flows for all rivers across Oregon to assess the effects of river barriers on emergency response and recovery efforts following a CSZ earthquake. The RCT leverages remote sensing data that multispectral sensors collect from satellites, employs a deep learning model to characterize river predictions, and computes river channel geometric dimensions with hydraulic relationships and river predictions. The entire process of river characterization is automated and implemented through the RCT.

58 GEOSCIENCES↗

Recommendations for Radiological Data Assessment Implementation

Since thorough verification, validation, and data quality assessment (DQA) processes may delay incident commanders and elected and appointed officials from making key decisions, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) National Urban Security Technology Laboratory (NUSTL) tasked Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) to develop tools and guidance for the federal, state, local, tribal, and territorial (FSLTT) responders using research, discussions with select FSLTT responders, and the experiences of subject matter experts in incident response. This report provides NUSTL with recommendations on best practices for verification, validation, and data quality assessment for the data collected by responders during a radiological or nuclear event. The purpose of this report is to inform the development of a DQA toolkit aimed at the needs of data assessors during the response to a radiological incident.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

A new TEVA-DGA chromatography procedure to separate Pu, Am, and Np from bulk U materials

Trace actinides present within uranium (U) material are diagnostic signatures of U processing history. For example, the emplacement of U material within the high neutron-flux environment of a nuclear reactor can cause neutron capture of U to form 241-plutonium ( 241 Pu). Plutonium-241 then decays to progeny isotopes 241-americium ( 241 Am) and 237-neptunium ( 237 Np); therefore, the presence and relative abundances of these trace actinides is indicative of the material’s production history and intended employment (Mayer et al., 2013). During a pre-detonation nuclear forensics investigation, measurement of trace actinide 241 Pu, 241 Am, and 237 Np concentrations by an analytical laboratory may be requested. However, chemically purifying these elements from bulk U is a challenging and involved procedure requiring several sequential chromatography columns across 4+ days. To expedite Pu-Am-Np separation from bulk U material, and to improve the yield recovery of these elements, this DHS Postdoc Fellowship has worked to create a new chromatography separation chemistry.

38 RADIATION CHEMISTRY, RADIOCHEMISTRY, AND NUCLEA↗

Triage Exam, August 2006 (V.2.2)

The following questions test knowledge relevant to the DOE Radiological Triage and DHS Secondary Reachback programs. There is no time limit, and you may use any reference materials you like. Each question has only one best answer. There are 20 questions, and a score of 80% is required to pass.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗

Domestic Extremism: Countering the Threat Posed to Critical Assets

Domestic extremism has been a growing concern in the United States in recent months, as illustrated in multiple bulletins from the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) warning law enforcement partners of the heightened threat. As concerns about these actors grows, it is important that facilities in the U.S. and internationally that protect critical assets, such as sensitive information, hazardous materials, or critical infrastructure, have effective methods in place to secure those assets. DE has challenged security systems through the threat of insider attack and violence, creating a new threat to be countered in the Office of Radiological Security’s radiological source security mission. In this effort, we used a literature review and focus group discussions with experts in critical asset security and extremism to understand the nature of the domestic extremist threat, to identify best practices in securing assets, recognize potential gaps in security measures to be corrected, and recommend actions and next steps. Twenty-two subject matter experts participated in a series of five focus group sessions. Questions focused on definitions of domestic extremism, potential changes in the threat, best practices in securing facilities, assets, and personnel, and any perceived gaps. Upon completion of the focus groups, notes were analyzed thematically to identify any recurring patterns in the results. In addition, a review of academic, industry, and government literature was conducted to understand the threat, describe the process of radicalization to extremism, and to identify empirically informed practices in prevention and response. Results of this project demonstrated that further work is needed to define domestic extremism in law, regulation, and policy, to help the U.S. develop a consistent response to the threat within organizations. This is especially important, as SMEs emphasized the need for early intervention in prevention efforts, noting that organizations need clear guidance on when and how to intervene. In addition, the need for social media monitoring was discussed, although challenges remain to do so with appropriate respect for privacy and civil liberties concerns.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

ROTOR: Research to Operations and Operations to Research

PNNL’s Research to Operations/Operations to Research (ROTOR) Program fosters a cybersecurity operations to researcher collaboration, identifying hard problems and challenges for cyber defenders and bringing researcher science disciplines to these challenges. ROTOR allows PNNL’s cyber defenders to better protect the laboratory but also fosters innovation and incubation of solutions for our sponsor missions across DOE, DOD, DHS and the intelligence community. Our sponsors and their missions are faced with many of the same cyber defense challenges that PNNL faces. By using our own laboratory security operations environment as an innovation generator and testing ground, allowing research to be tested and tried, our sponsors are directly benefitted. PNNL is in a unique position to combine our world class research organization with enterprise cybersecurity operations. ROTOR is taking advantage of this to bring PNNL cybersecurity research projects into an operational environment within PNNL’s Cyber Security Operations Center. With ROTOR, PNNL researchers gain the advantage of operational experience and expertise and have an avenue for showcasing research in an operational environment. This helps to advance PNNL research, prove operability of PNNL projects to its sponsors, and provide real-world insight to real-world problems for our cybersecurity research agenda. ROTOR is the conduit for PNNL cybersecurity research to find its way to operational use. PNNL researchers and engineers are informed by real-world operations and operations has access to current PNNL research and engineering capabilities. All of this leads to improved reputation for PNNL as a provider of national security solutions that are tried and tested. To date, ROTOR has collaborated with six projects, enabling each to conduct operational work within the CSOC.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Domestic Extremism (Executive Summary)

Domestic extremism (DE) has been a growing concern in the U.S. in recent months, as illustrated in multiple bulletins from the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) warning law enforcement partners of the heightened threat. As concerns about these actors grows, it is important that facilities in the U.S. and internationally that protect critical assets, such as sensitive information, hazardous materials, or critical infrastructure, have effective methods in place to secure those assets. DE has challenged security systems through the danger of insider attack and violence, creating a new threat to be countered. In this effort, therefore, we used a literature review and focus group discussions with experts in critical asset security and extremism to understand the nature of the domestic extremist threat, to identify best practices in securing assets, recognize potential gaps in security measures to be corrected, and recommend actions for the Office of Radiological Security (ORS) to address DE with its partners.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

PRIMED for the Future: Purposing Raw Intake for Machine Learning-Enabled Detection (Final Report)

The COVID-19 pandemic demonstrated how a novel, elusive, and diffuse biological threat can engender uncertainty and misinformation, and it underscored the need for flexible analytical modalities agnostic to the identity of biological material. Yet even before the pandemic, recognition of the limitations of the current, list-based approach, which focuses on known pathogens and biotoxins, and of the importance of agent-agnostic biodetection was growing within the biosecurity community. In a 2018 report on “Biodefense in the Age of Synthetic Biology,” for example, the National Academy of Sciences stated that “an overreliance on the Select Agent List is a systematic weakness affecting many aspects of the United States’ current biodefense mitigation capability”. More recently, a group of biodefense researchers proposed the identification and adoption of “bioagent-agnostic signatures (BASs)” as a way of detecting and characterizing not only existing agents but also novel ones, an approach they believe will “enable a more flexible and resilient biodefense posture”. Indeed, the future of biodetection requires us to begin developing novel analytics that can identify anomalies and/or characteristics that indicate a potential threat, whether known or unknown, without looking for a specific signature that has been identified previously. To assess potential threats more rapidly, it is critical to develop agnostic artificial intelligence (AI)/machine learning (ML) systems that can be employed for real-time assessment of the nature and source of a perturbation. Such systems should be multi scale and multi-dimensional, integrating sensor data from a range of biological, chemical, and physical application spaces. Emerging deep learning (DL) models demonstrate exceptional promise for identification of discriminatory features within multi-dimensional datasets. DL models have the capacity to recognize and encode highly complex patterns in a wide range of input data modalities, including images, text, and biological/chemical/physical spectra. As such, they can execute a wide range of assessments and determinations that have traditionally required a human operator. The promise of advances in DL is apparent in the realm of human health and medicine. DL models have been validated for evaluating a variety of clinical threats to human health in a range of contexts, including infection and cancer, and they demonstrated improved performance in predicting stroke relative to human neurologists in some categories of data. Continuously evolving advances in AI/ML are expected to support more efficient evaluation of raw sequence, spectroscopy, and spectrometry data. For instance, recent advances and deployment of large language models (LLM) such as Generative Pre training Transformer (GPT) and Bidirectional Encoder Representations from Transformers (BERT) have already motivated application of these models for biological function prediction. As frameworks such as LLMs become larger and more complex in their representations, their capacity to serve as pre-trained models that can be fine-tuned for biological/biodetection purposes will similarly be amplified. While existing and emerging AI/ML have found broad applicability and use cases in the clinical sciences, development for environmental evaluation and biodetection has been limited. Functionalizing such capabilities for this purpose requires an understanding of the existing technical landscape and how the respective tools and algorithms are currently being employed. This landscape awareness then allows an assessment of the current practical capabilities of existing models and the anticipated requirements and development efforts that will be needed to adapt available algorithms for biodetection applications relevant to DHS. Leveraging expertise in biodetection, ML, and operational biodetection, the effort described in this report is comprised of a systematic landscape assessment (Subtask 2.1), comparative evaluation (Subtask 2.2), and formulation of a value proposition (Subtask 2.3) for the prospect of ML-enabled, agnostic biodetection from raw, or minimally-processed, datasets.

59 BASIC BIOLOGICAL SCIENCES↗

Nuctech-SOP-Image_Reconstruction (includes signatures)

This Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) describes the steps to reconstruct x-ray projection images from Nuctech LS1516BS data captured at facilities operating in cooperation with the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Explosives Threat Assessment Program (ETA). This document also provides the steps for evaluating and approving the quality of the reconstructed images.

42 ENGINEERING↗

Plant Disease Detection Technology Assessment

Visual inspections by US Customs and Border Protection agriculture specialists have identified approximately 20,000 regulated, quarantined pests each year in agricultural products entering the United States. Most of these pests identified in the Agriculture Quarantine and Inspection (AQI) program are insects. Many pathogens are difficult to detect in agricultural products, particularly in early stages of infection. New technologies can help to detect plant pathogens and the diseases that they cause. This technology assessment was performed for the US Department of Homeland Security Science and Technology Directorate (DHS S&T) through the Food, Agriculture, and Veterinary Defense (FAV-D) program to identify emerging technologies that could address this hard problem. These emerging technologies differ in their diagnostic sensitivities and specificities, as well as in their measurement time and training requirements. New instruments that detect volatile organic compounds characteristic of plant disease or pathogens could provide a less invasive inspection method. Dogs, which can successfully detect many concealed agricultural products, have also been trained to detect some plant pests and pathogens. Simple immunological tests offer sensitive and specific detection of many pathogens at the point of use. Advanced imaging methods that use AI to sort fruits and vegetables and recognize anomalies at high speeds could be used in cooperation with exporters to improve food quality and reduce pests. Advances in nucleic acid–based detection methods that have become gold standards for confirmatory diagnostics are now making those methods available for faster, point-of-use detection. These new methods should be developed in the context of AQI operational requirements, which apply risk-based sampling protocols to protect agriculture and facilitate commerce and passenger transit.

59 BASIC BIOLOGICAL SCIENCES↗

Consequence Management Cobalt Magnet 2022 Laboratory Analysis: After Action Report

On May 16-20, 2022, federal mission partners (e.g., DOE Consequence Management, CDC, FDA, FBI, DHS) as well as integrated state, local, tribal, and territorial governments took part in Cobalt Magnet 22 (CM22), a large-scale, week-long radiological incident exercise in Austin, Texas, that linked several important national assets (National Search Program, Radiological Assistance Program, and Consequence Management [CM] personnel) into a single response effort. The exercise had nine (9) overarching Objectives and an additional 162 associated Critical Tasks for all the participating organizations. In total, 13 National Core Capabilities spanning 5 Mission Areas were represented in the final exercise. This exercise enabled a full range of capabilities to be fielded together and examine the operational connection between major assets, discover any resource shortages associated with conducting multiple mission areas simultaneously or in close succession, and identify any challenges related to leadership. This report summarizes nearly 100 successes and observations provided from players and controllers supporting the LA Division, Fly Away Laboratory (FAL) and Gamma Spectroscopist operations. The observations were categorized to align with the FRMAC programmatic functional areas to consider for future improvements: Logistics, CBRN Responder, Laboratory Analysis, Sampling and Monitoring, Health and Safety, Gamma Spectroscopist Operations, Fly Away Laboratory, and the FRMAC Interdivision Interoperability Group (FIIG).

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Zero Trust Strategies for Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Detection Systems: D.1 Cyber Scenarios

The evolving landscape of cybersecurity necessitates a paradigm shift to a Zero Trust (ZT) model, which assumes breaches and continuously verifies trust. This approach reshapes how trust boundaries are established, focusing on identities, devices, networks, applications, and data, rather than solely relying on perimeter defenses such as firewalls. Central to this transformation is the National Institute of Standards and Technology's (NIST) Special Publication 800-207, outlining the Zero Trust Architecture (ZTA), along with Executive Order 14028, which mandates federal agencies to adopt ZT principles. Complementary to these efforts, the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) developed the Zero Trust Maturity Model (ZTMM), providing a framework with five pillars and three cross-cutting capabilities to guide agencies toward enhanced cybersecurity maturity. In support of these initiatives, the DHS Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Office (CWMD) is applying ZT principles to secure Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) detection systems. Recognizing the diverse deployment models and network connectivity of these systems—from stationary, non-networked units to mobile, cloud-connected devices—the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) is developing cybersecurity scenarios specifically for CBRN environments. These scenarios examine various configurations and technological capabilities, offering insights into the application of ZTMM pillars in enhancing the security postures of CBRN devices. The cybersecurity scenarios presented by PNNL are hypothetical, crafted to explore theoretical situations and stimulate discussion on the potential use or compromise of CBRN detection systems in varied contexts. These narratives are illustrative and do not reference any real events or actual networks. Instead, they employ generalized reference models to highlight concepts and potential issues within CBRN security, focusing on how Zero Trust strategies can be adapted to address these challenges effectively.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

FRMAC Laboratory Analysis Manual Volume 1, Revision 0

The Federal Radiological Monitoring and Assessment Center (FRMAC) is an operational center, available on request by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to respond to nuclear and radiological incidents as described in the National Response Framework (NRF). Under the Federal Interagency Operational Plan for Response and Recovery’s Nuclear/Radiological Annex, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) has the responsibility to maintain the operational readiness of the FRMAC during the emergency phase of an event. FRMAC is initially established and managed by the Nuclear Emergency Support Team (NEST) and serves as an interagency operations center with representatives from various federal, state, and local radiological response organizations. The purpose of the FRMAC is to assist state, local, tribal, and territorial governments (SLTT) in their mission to protect the health and well-being of their citizens with: • Verified radiation measurements. • Interpretations of radiation distributions based on Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), Food and Drug Administration (FDA), or local Protective Action Guidelines (PAGs). • Characterization of overall radiological conditions. Once a declaration to respond to a radiological emergency has been made, the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) Headquarters will coordinate the response in consultation with the cognizant NNSA Regional Coordinating Office (RCO). Each of the eight RCOs maintain a 24-hour response capability for radiological emergencies that may occur in states served by its region. When a FRMAC is established, it operates under the parameters of the Incident Command System (ICS), as defined in the National Incident Management Systems (NIMS) construct. The Consequence Management Home Team (CMHT) will be activated immediately during normal business hours (Pacific Time Zone), and within two hours otherwise. The Consequence Management Response Team (CMRT) is prepared for deployment within six hours after activation. Along with the assets, FRMAC provides an operational framework for coordinating of all federal off-site radiological monitoring and assessment activities during a response to a radiological emergency to support the coordinating agency and SLTT governments. Potential radiological emergencies that fall within FRMAC vary widely in terms of the area affected, the nature of the contamination, and the scope of the government’s response. Detonation of a nuclear device, accidental release of radiation from a nuclear power plant, and a terrorist threat are just a few of the many possible scenarios FRMAC must be prepared to address. Through all this, supporting the state, local, and tribal organizations in the protection of the public remains the primary goal of the federal response.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Surveillance & Detection (CRADA 567 Final Report)

This Cooperative Research and Development Agreement (CRADA) Final Report covers the work achieved by PNNL and it's commercial partner (Consolidated Resource Imaging, LLC) on video analytics for the DHS S&T Surveillance & Detection project. This project has been focused on development of the next-generation camera system (Guardian iiS) with extremely high resolution and video analytics specifically designed for crowded urban environments and congested transportation hubs.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

Secure and Resilient Operations Using Open-Source Distributed Systems Platform (OpenDSP)

The goal of this project is to identify and address cybersecurity gaps by developing a multi-layer multi-channel cyber-physical defense and survival mechanism for operating distribution networks with high penetration of solar / inverter-based resource (IBR) / distributed energy resource (DER). The proposed security enhancements are built upon the distributed framework and solution architecture for both information technology (IT) and operational technology (OT) systems. The technical solutions consist of two composite functionalities and six layers: proactive defense (vulnerability assessment, communication protection, and attack detection, as layers 1-3), and adaptive self-healing (attack-resilient control, adaptive recovery, and resilient survival, as layers 4-6). These layers, built on and extended from DHS CISA Cyber Framework, establish an integrated and robust cybersecurity framework for operating large-scale distribution networks.

14 SOLAR ENERGY↗

Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction (CWMD) Zero Trust Framework: CWMD Zero Trust Principles Model

The research focuses on the critical need for enhanced cybersecurity within the Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction (CWMD) Office, specifically targeting Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear devices. Traditional perimeter-based security models are insufficient against modern cyber threats, prompting a shift toward Zero Trust principles (ZTP) that emphasize continuous verification and stringent security for all devices. Federal directives mandate the adoption of Zero Trust (ZT) across agencies, supported by guidelines from National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) and National Security Agency (NSA). The research involved mapping ZT guidance from these agencies to develop tailored CWMD ZTP. The study identified gaps and areas for improvement, including clear transitional guidance from traditional to ZT architectures and the focus on explicit cross cutting capabilities. Design improvements are recommended to ensure increased comprehensive protection and resilience against sophisticated cyber threats for Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) devices. Collaborative efforts among federal agencies are essential for the successful deployment of an optimized ZT guidance.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

Myriad World Baseline: Global Geodemographic Estimates

The LandScan Myriad World Baseline (MWB) method produces global, residential (nighttime/home-location) gridded geodemographic estimates based on 5-year age/gender cohorts—at 30-arcsecond (≈1 km) resolution. MWB is designed to fill gaps where detailed, georeferenced survey data (e.g., Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS)) are missing or outdated, and to provide a baseline that can support human security analysis, including consequence assessment, “patterns of life” modeling, and scenario-based population futures. MWB’s workflow spatializes household-level age/gender characteristics from the GLOPOP-S dataset by conflating household and gridded expected relative wealth adapted from Global Gridded Relative Deprivation Index (GRDI), then adjusts them to a target year of interest. Age/gender estimates are then applied to harmonize lowest-administrative-level statistics with LandScan residential counts, yielding final geodemographic estimates. Two validation case studies are presented: Ghana (2021) and Tokyo/Kanagawa, Japan (2020), illustrating spatial variability in demographic cohorts and comparing MWB outputs to official gridded statistics. Results show close overall alignment relative to validation criteria including population pyramids and age-dependency ratios.

Tuccillo, Joe [ORNL] (ORCID:0000000259300943)↗

Proteomic Determinants of Variation in Cholesterol Efflux: Observations from the Dallas Heart Study

High-density lipoproteins (HDLs) are promising targets for predicting and treating atherosclerotic cardiovascular disease (ASCVD), as they mediate removal of excess cholesterol from lipid-laden macrophages that accumulate in the vasculature. This functional property of HDLs, termed cholesterol efflux capacity (CEC), is inversely associated with ASCVD. HDLs are compositionally diverse, associating with >250 different proteins, but their relative contribution to CEC remains poorly understood. Our goal was to identify and define key HDL-associated proteins that modulate CEC in humans. The proteomic signature of plasma HDL was quantified in 36 individuals in the multi-ethnic population-based Dallas Heart Study (DHS) cohort that exhibited persistent extremely high (>=90th%) or extremely low CEC (<=10th%) over 15 years. Levels of apolipoprotein (Apo)A-I associated ApoC-II, ApoC-III, and ApoA-IV were differentially correlated with CEC in high (r = 0.49, 0.41, and —0.21 respectively) and low (r = —0.46, —0.41, and 0.66 respectively) CEC groups (p for heterogeneity (pHet) = 0.03, 0.04, and 0.003 respectively). Further, we observed that levels of ApoA-I with ApoC-III, complement C3 (CO3), ApoE, and plasminogen (PLMG) were inversely associated with CEC in individuals within the low CEC group (r = —0.11 to —0.25 for subspecies with these proteins vs. r = 0.58 to 0.65 for subspecies lacking these proteins; p < 0.05 for heterogeneity). These findings suggest that enrichment of specific proteins on HDLs and, thus, different subspecies of HDLs, differentially modulate the removal of cholesterol from the vasculature.

60 APPLIED LIFE SCIENCES↗