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At least 55 records · Page 3

Model-OA wind turbine generator - Failure modes and effects analysis

The results failure modes and effects analysis (FMEA) conducted for wind-turbine generators are presented. The FMEA was performed for the functional modes of each system, subsystem, or component. The single-point failures were eliminated for most of the systems. The blade system was the only exception. The qualitative probability of a blade separating was estimated at level D-remote. Many changes were made to the hardware as a result of this analysis. The most significant change was the addition of the safety system. Operational experience and need to improve machine availability have resulted in subsequent changes to the various systems, which are also reflected in this FMEA.

Klein, William E.↗

Ground Operations Autonomous Control and Integrated Health Management

An intelligent autonomous control capability has been developed and is currently being validated in ground cryogenic fluid management operations. The capability embodies a physical architecture consistent with typical launch infrastructure and control systems, augmented by a higher level autonomous control (AC) system enabled to make knowledge-based decisions. The AC system is supported by an integrated system health management (ISHM) capability that detects anomalies, diagnoses causes, determines effects, and could predict future anomalies. AC is implemented using the concept of programmed sequences that could be considered to be building blocks of more generic mission plans. A sequence is a series of steps, and each executes actions once conditions for the step are met (e.g. desired temperatures or fluid state are achieved). For autonomous capability, conditions must consider also health management outcomes, as they will determine whether or not an action is executed, or how an action may be executed, or if an alternative action is executed instead. Aside from health, higher level objectives can also drive how a mission is carried out. The capability was developed using the G2 software environment (www.gensym.com) augmented by a NASA Toolkit that significantly shortens time to deployment. G2 is a commercial product to develop intelligent applications. It is fully object oriented. The core of the capability is a Domain Model of the system where all elements of the system are represented as objects (sensors, instruments, components, pipes, etc.). Reasoning and decision making can be done with all elements in the domain model. The toolkit also enables implementation of failure modes and effects analysis (FMEA), which are represented as root cause trees. FMEA's are programmed graphically, they are reusable, as they address generic FMEA referring to classes of subsystems or objects and their functional relationships. User interfaces for integrated awareness by operators have been created.

Figueroa, Fernando↗

What Went Wrong: A Survey of Wildfire UAS Mishaps through Named Entity Recognition

Increasingly, unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) are being applied to wildfire incidents for tasks such as mapping, aerial ignition, and delivery. As a result, incident reporting systems for wildfires are beginning to accumulate data related to UAS mishaps in wildfire response. In this research, we apply state-of-the-art natural language processing (NLP) techniques to develop a custom Named Entity Recognition (NER) model which extracts a Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA)-style survey of wildfire UAS mishaps reported in SAFECOM. The custom NER model is built by fine-tuning an existing (BERT) model, resulting in a generalizable NER model that can extract engineering relevant entities including failure modes, causes, effects, control processes, and recommendations from any failure-relevant text. Similar mishaps are clustered and reported as single rows within the FMEA. For each cluster, frequency, severity, and overall risk are computed. The methodology can be applied as part of a broader safety management system to track trends in mishaps and discover knowledge that can be utilized to improve safety outcomes and system performance.

Machine Learning↗

What Went Wrong: A Survey of Wildfire UAS Mishaps through Named Entity Recognition

Increasingly, unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) are being applied to wildfire incidents for tasks such as mapping, aerial ignition, and delivery. As a result, aviation incident reporting systems for wildfires are beginning to accumulate data related to UAS mishaps in wildfire response. In this research, we apply state-of-the-art natural language processing (NLP) techniques to develop a custom Named Entity Recognition (NER) model which extracts entities relevant to safety analysts. The custom NER model is built by fine-tuning an existing Bidirectional Encoder Representations from Transformers (BERT) model, resulting in a generalizable NER model that can extract engineering relevant entities including failure modes, causes, effects, control processes, and recommendations from failure-relevant text. This model performs passably, with a weighted average f1 score of 0.33 across entity types, indicating more labeled training data is needed. Extracted entities are used to form a Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA)-style survey of wildfire UAS mishaps reported using the SAFECOM system. Similar mishaps are manually clustered and reported as single rows within an FMEA. Foreach cluster, we compute frequency, severity, and overall riskin accordance with FAA standards. This methodology can beapplied as part of a broader safety management system totrack trends in mishaps (e.g., likelihood, severity) and discoverknowledge (e.g., causes, effects) that can be utilized to improvesafety outcomes and system performance.

Machine Learning↗

What Went Wrong: A Survey of Wildfire UAS Mishaps through Named Entity Recognition

Increasingly, unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) are being applied to wildfire incidents for tasks such as mapping, aerial ignition, and delivery. As a result, incident reporting systems for wildfires are beginning to accumulate data related to UAS mishaps in wildfire response. In this research, we apply state-of-the-art natural language processing (NLP) techniques to develop a custom Named Entity Recognition (NER) model which extracts a Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA)-style survey of wildfire UAS mishaps reported in SAFECOM. The custom NER model is built by fine-tuning an existing (BERT) model, resulting in a generalizable NER model that can extract engineering relevant entities including failure modes, causes, effects, control processes, and recommendations from any failure-relevant text. Similar mishaps are clustered and reported as single rows within the FMEA. For each cluster, frequency, severity, and overall risk are computed. The methodology can be applied as part of a broader safety management system to track trends in mishaps and discover knowledge that can be utilized to improve safety outcomes and system performance.

Machine Learning↗

Risk Assessment of EIC Central Detector (ePIC) Solenoid Magnet (MARCO)

As part of the BNL-JLab-CEA Electron Ion Collider (EIC) collaboration, the design of a 2 T, 2.8 m bore diameter, 3.8 m long conduction cooled superconducting detector magnet design is completed. Such magnet will be employed at the interaction region of ePIC for physics experiment. The magnet is a passive shielded solenoidal magnet system consisting of 3 coils wound with specially designed conductor using NbTi Rutherford type cable in copper stabilized channel. This paper describes the risk analysis as the part of Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) that was carried out as a team to identify their various failure modes and risks associated with the magnets system. In conclusion, this FMEA is intended to become the content of the designed document as an integral part of the engineering assessment and the statement of work for the potential vendors towards design and built.

Ghoshal, Probir K. [Thomas Jefferson National Acce↗

Hazard and risk analysis framework for nuclear power plant–based integrated energy systems

Employing integrated energy systems (IESs) with nuclear power plants (NPPs) can improve NPP utilization by leveraging dedicated thermal and electric power delivery, but it may also increase operational safety risks. This paper presents a framework to identify and quantify hazards and risks for such IESs. The framework combines accidentology to review past industrial accidents with failure modes and effects analysis (FMEA) to identify potential future incidents. Hydrogen explosion and toxic chemical release hazards are of particular concern. Explosion consequences are quantified using the Bauwens-Dorofeev (Bauwens) and trinitrotoluene equivalent mass (TNT-EM) methods, while chemical release consequences are computed using the Gaussian atmospheric dispersion method. Operational disturbances from direct electrical and thermal integration that may affect NPP safety are modeled using probabilistic risk analysis (PRA). Hazards and risks are then evaluated for regulatory compliance. The framework is applied to IESs comprising pressurized or boiling water reactors supplying three levels of thermal and electrical power to industrial customers. Case studies include high-temperature steam electrolysis hydrogen plants of varying capacities and a synthetic fuel production plant. Sensitivity analysis examines piping component failures in the PRA model as a precursor to cost estimation for thermal extraction line design. Additionally, Fussel-Vessely (FV) and risk increase importance (RII) measures identify risk-informed design improvements for the thermal extraction system. FMEA highlights hazards such as loss of offsite power, prompt loss of electrical load, loss of thermal output, and immediate steam diversion, in addition to hydrogen explosions and toxic chemical releases. Both Bauwens and TNT-EM methods suggest maintaining several hundred meters of separation between the NPP and hydrogen facility to mitigate explosion risks. PRA results show a maximum initiating event frequency increase of 1.15% and an overall risk increase of 0.28%. Importance measure analysis identifies upstream pipe leak isolation components as critical. Evaluating the results against safety regulations, it is concluded that hazards and risks can be managed to comply with regulations through risk-informed thermal and electrical connection designs, component selection, maintenance programs, and safe separation distances between NPPs and integrated industrial facilities.

08 - HYDROGEN↗

Liquid Hydrogen Heavy-Duty Vehicle Safety Review and Refueling Facility Design

Liquid hydrogen (LH 2 ) used as a fuel onboard a heavy-duty vehicle can result in increased storage capacity and faster refueling relative to compressed gas. However, there are concerns about hydrogen losses from boil-off, potential safety issues, gaps in codes and standards for cryogenic hydrogen fuel, and technical challenges with LH 2 systems for widespread transportation applications. A failure modes and effects analysis (FMEA), a safety codes and standards review, and a design review of the onboard liquid hydrogen system for a heavy-duty vehicle identified some of these potential safety issues and gaps in the codes and standards. The FMEA identified some medium and low risk failure points of the conceptual design, and the design review identified how carefully pressure relief needs to be considered for LH 2 systems. In addition, a conceptual design for a LH 2 refueling station was developed. Rough capital costs for the refueling station design were $\$1 million$ and the layout occupied approximately 13,000 ft 2 . These results can be used to inform future designs and analyses for LH 2 heavy-duty vehicles.

08 HYDROGEN↗

Recommended Actions to Improve Adapter Safety

With the rapid advancement and acceleration in the electric vehicle (EV) industry within the United States, major automakers and EV charging companies are increasingly adopting the North American Charging Standard (NACS) connector style, now officially known as J3400. This shift is expected to enhance charging infrastructure, providing a better customer experience by making it easier for all EV drivers to access a wider network of direct-current (DC) fast chargers (DCFCs). However, the adoption of the J3400 standard presents challenges for many EVs already on the roads and some currently coming off production lines that are equipped with the Combined Charging System (CCS) connector, which this report will refer to as the North American standard, CCS1. These vehicles will need adapters to use new or existing J3400 infrastructure. During this transition, several issues have emerged. Firstly, there is a need to standardize the new connector type to ensure it is interoperable, safe, and reliable. Second, existing CCS EV drivers need a way to access the J3400 network, which will require electric vehicle supply equipment (EVSE) or sites with both connector types, driver-provided adapters to physically convert from CCS to J3400, or EVSE with retained adapters designed for use with the EVSE. Third, adapter standards will need to be written to specify how they will be designed and what evaluations will be needed to ensure safe and reliable performance. To address these challenges, adapters that support different types of charging connectors will be essential. These adapters will play a crucial role in supporting the transition and ensuring continued service for legacy EVs with CCS inlets as the J3400 standard becomes the predominant one in the United States. Consequently, the National Charging Experience (ChargeX) Consortium has investigated and performed a teardown analysis on the different adapter versions on the market. The aim is to create a failure mode and effects analysis (FMEA) on what are expected to be the most common adapter types used in this transition. In order to support this work, we executed an FMEA exercise with the main goal of identifying gaps in the existing adapters' performance and conformance to the most common safety requirements of high-power and high-voltage devices. This effort focused on adapters provided by the driver, as these may present the highest safety and reliability risks. The recommendations made here apply to both retained and driver-provided adapters.

25 ENERGY STORAGE↗

Analyzing Potential Failures and Effects in a Pilot-Scale Biomass Preprocessing Facility for Improved Reliability

This study demonstrates a failure identification methodology applied to a preprocessing facility generating conversion-ready feedstocks from biomass meeting conversion process critical quality attribute (CQA) specifications. Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) was used as an industrially relevant risk analysis approach to evaluate a logging residue preprocessing system to prepare feedstock for pyrolysis conversion. Risk evaluations considered both system-level and operation unit-level assessments considering process efficiency, product quality, cost, sustainability, and safety. Key outputs included estimations of semi-quantitative risk scores for each failure, identification of the failure impacts, identification of failure causes associated with material attributes and process parameters, ranking success rates of failure detection methods, and speculation of potential mitigation strategies for decreasing failure risk scores. Results showed that deviations from moisture specifications had cascading consequences for other CQAs along with process safety implications. Failures linked to fixed carbon specifications carried the highest risk scores for product quality and process efficiency impacts. As increased throughput can be inversely related to meeting product quality specifications; achieving throughput and other material-based CQAs simultaneously will likely require system optimization or prioritization based on system economics. Ultimately, this work successfully demonstrates FMEA as a risk analysis approach for other bioenergy process systems.

09 BIOMASS FUELS↗

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Assessment of the extravehicular mobility unit, volume 2

The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA effort performed an independent analysis of the Extravehicular Mobility Unit (EMU) hardware and system, generating draft failure modes criticalities and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. The IOA results were then compared to the most recent proposed Post 51-L NASA FMEA/CIL baseline. A resolution of each discrepancy from the comparison was provided through additional analysis as required. This report documents the results of that comparison for the Orbiter EMU hardware. Volume 2 continues the presentation of IOA analysis worksheets and contains the potential critical items list and NASA FMEA to IOA worksheet cross references and recommendations.

Raffaelli, Gary G.↗

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Assessment of the mechanical actuation subsystem, volume 1

The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA approach features a top-down analysis of the hardware to determine draft failure modes, criticality, and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. The IOA results were then compared to the proposed Post 51-L NASA FMEA/CIL baseline that was available. A resolution of each discrepancy from the comparison was provided through additional analysis as required. These discrepancies were flagged as issues, and recommendations were made based on the FMEA data available at the time. This report documents the results of that comparison for the Orbiter Mechanical Actuation System (MAS) hardware. Specifically, the MAS hardware consists of the following components: Air Data Probe (ADP); Elevon Seal Panel (ESP); External Tank Umbilical (ETU); Ku-Band Deploy (KBD); Payload Bay Doors (PBD); Payload Bay Radiators (PBR); Personnel Hatches (PH); Vent Door Mechanism (VDM); and Startracker Door Mechanism (SDM). Criticality was assigned based upon the severity of the effect for each failure mode.

Bradway, M. W.↗

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Assessment of the mechanical actuation subsystem, volume 2

The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA approach features a top-down analysis of the hardware to determine draft failure modes, criticality, and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. The IOA results were then compared to the proposed Post 51-L NASA FMEA/CIL baseline that was available. A resolution of each discrepancy from the comparison was provided through additional analysis as required. These discrepancies were flagged as issues, and recommendations were made based on the FMEA data available at the time. This report documents the results of that comparison for the Orbiter Mechanical Actuation System (MAS) hardware. Specifically, the MAS hardware consists of the following components: Air Data Probe (ADP); Elevon Seal Panel (ESP); External Tank Umbilical (ETU); Ku-Band Deploy (KBD); Payload Bay Doors (PBD); Payload Bay Radiators (PBR); Personnel Hatches (PH); Vent Door Mechanism (VDM); and Startracker Door Mechanism (SDM). Criticality was assigned based upon the severity of the effect for each failure mode. Volume 2 continues the presentation of IOA analysis worksheets and contains the potential critical items list, detailed analysis, and NASA FMEA/CIL to IOA worksheet cross reference and recommendations.

Bradway, M. W.↗

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Assessment of the atmospheric revitalization pressure control subsystem FMEA/CIL

The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA effort first completed an analysis of the atmospheric Revitalization Pressure Control Subsystem (ARPCS) hardware, generating draft failure modes and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. The IOA results were then compared to the NASA FMEA/CIL proposed Post 51-L updates based upon the CCB/PRCB presentations and an informal criticality summary listing. A discussion of each discrepancy from the comparison is provided through additional analysis as required. These discrepancies were flagged as issues, and recommendations were made based on the FMEA data available at the time. This report documents the results of that comparison for the Orbiter ARPCS hardware.

Saiidi, M. J.↗

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): FMEA/CIL assessment

The McDonnell Douglas Astronautics Company (MDAC) was selected to perform an Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL). Direction was given by the Orbiter and GFE Projects Office to perform the hardware analysis and assessment using the instructions and ground rules defined in NSTS 22206. The IOA analysis featured a top-down approach to determine hardware failure modes, criticality, and potential critical items. To preserve independence, the analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA and Prime Contractor FMEA/CIL documentation. The assessment process compared the independently derived failure modes and criticality assignments to the proposed NASA post 51-L FMEA/CIL documentation. When possible, assessment issues were discussed and resolved with the NASA subsystem managers. Unresolved issues were elevated to the Orbiter and GFE Projects Office manager, Configuration Control Board (CCB), or Program Requirements Control Board (PRCB) for further resolution. The most important Orbiter assessment finding was the previously unknown stuck autopilot push-button criticality 1/1 failure mode. The worst case effect could cause loss of crew/vehicle when the microwave landing system is not active. It is concluded that NASA and Prime Contractor Post 51-L FMEA/CIL documentation assessed by IOA is believed to be technically accurate and complete. All CIL issues were resolved. No FMEA issues remain that have safety implications. Consideration should be given, however, to upgrading NSTS 22206 with definitive ground rules which more clearly spell out the limits of redundancy.

Hinsdale, L. W.↗

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Assessment of the EPD and C/remote manipulator system FMEA/CIL

The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA effort first completed an analysis of the Electrical Power Distribution and Control (EPD and C)/Remote Manipulator System (RMS) hardware, generating draft failure modes and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. The IOA analysis of the EPD and C/RMS hardware initially generated 345 failure mode worksheets and identified 117 Potential Critical Items (PCIs) before starting the assessment process. These analysis results were compared to the proposed NASA Post 51-L baseline of 132 FMEAs and 66 CIL items.

Robinson, W. W.↗

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Assessment of the crew equipment subsystem

The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA effort first completed an analysis of the Crew Equipment hardware, generating draft failure modes and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. The IOA results were then compared to the NASA FMEA/CIL baseline with proposed Post 51-L updates included. A resolution of each discrepancy from the comparison is provided through additional analysis as required. This report documents the results of that comparison for the Orbiter Crew Equipment hardware. The IOA product for the Crew Equipment analysis consisted of 352 failure mode worksheets that resulted in 78 potential critical items being identified. Comparison was made to the NASA baseline which consisted of 351 FMEAs and 82 CIL items.

Saxon, H.↗

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Assessment of the backup flight system FMEA/CIL

The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA effort first completed an analysis of the Backup Flight System (BFS) hardware, generating draft failure modes and Potential Critical Items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. The IOA results were then compared to the proposed NASA Post 51-L FMEA/CIL baseline. A resolution of each discrepancy from the comparison is provided through additional analysis as required. This report documents the results of that comparison for the Orbiter BFS hardware. The IOA product for the BFS analysis consisted of 29 failure mode worksheets that resulted in 21 Potential Critical Items (PCI) being identified. This product was originally compared with the proposed NASA BFS baseline and subsequently compared with the applicable Data Processing System (DPS), Electrical Power Distribution and Control (EPD and C), and Displays and Controls NASA CIL items. The comparisons determined if there were any results which had been found by the IOA but were not in the NASA baseline. The original assessment determined there were numerous failure modes and potential critical items in the IOA analysis that were not contained in the NASA BFS baseline. Conversely, the NASA baseline contained three FMEAs (IMU, ADTA, and Air Data Probe) for CIL items that were not identified in the IOA product.

Prust, E. E.↗