Results for “FMEA/” — Page 3

NASA NTRS1988

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): FMEA/CIL assessment

The McDonnell Douglas Astronautics Company (MDAC) was selected to perform an Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL). Direction was given by the Orbiter and GFE Projects Office to perform the hardware analysis and assessment using the instructions and ground rules defined in NSTS 22206. The IOA analysis featured a top-down approach to determine hardware failure modes, criticality, and potential critical items. To preserve independence, the analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA and Prime Contractor FMEA/CIL documentation. The assessment process compared the independently derived failure modes and criticality assignments to the proposed NASA post 51-L FMEA/CIL documentation. When possible, assessment issues were discussed and resolved with the NASA subsystem managers. Unresolved issues were elevated to the Orbiter and GFE Projects Office manager, Configuration Control Board (CCB), or Program Requirements Control Board (PRCB) for further resolution. The most important Orbiter assessment finding was the previously unknown stuck autopilot push-button criticality 1/1 failure mode. The worst case effect could cause loss of crew/vehicle when the microwave landing system is not active. It is concluded that NASA and Prime Contractor Post 51-L FMEA/CIL documentation assessed by IOA is believed to be technically accurate and complete. All CIL issues were resolved. No FMEA issues remain that have safety implications. Consideration should be given, however, to upgrading NSTS 22206 with definitive ground rules which more clearly spell out the limits of redundancy.

Hinsdale, L. W.↗

NASA NTRS1988

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Assessment of the EPD and C/remote manipulator system FMEA/CIL

The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA effort first completed an analysis of the Electrical Power Distribution and Control (EPD and C)/Remote Manipulator System (RMS) hardware, generating draft failure modes and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. The IOA analysis of the EPD and C/RMS hardware initially generated 345 failure mode worksheets and identified 117 Potential Critical Items (PCIs) before starting the assessment process. These analysis results were compared to the proposed NASA Post 51-L baseline of 132 FMEAs and 66 CIL items.

Robinson, W. W.↗

NASA NTRS1988

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Assessment of the crew equipment subsystem

The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA effort first completed an analysis of the Crew Equipment hardware, generating draft failure modes and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. The IOA results were then compared to the NASA FMEA/CIL baseline with proposed Post 51-L updates included. A resolution of each discrepancy from the comparison is provided through additional analysis as required. This report documents the results of that comparison for the Orbiter Crew Equipment hardware. The IOA product for the Crew Equipment analysis consisted of 352 failure mode worksheets that resulted in 78 potential critical items being identified. Comparison was made to the NASA baseline which consisted of 351 FMEAs and 82 CIL items.

Saxon, H.↗

NASA NTRS1988

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Assessment of the backup flight system FMEA/CIL

The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA effort first completed an analysis of the Backup Flight System (BFS) hardware, generating draft failure modes and Potential Critical Items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. The IOA results were then compared to the proposed NASA Post 51-L FMEA/CIL baseline. A resolution of each discrepancy from the comparison is provided through additional analysis as required. This report documents the results of that comparison for the Orbiter BFS hardware. The IOA product for the BFS analysis consisted of 29 failure mode worksheets that resulted in 21 Potential Critical Items (PCI) being identified. This product was originally compared with the proposed NASA BFS baseline and subsequently compared with the applicable Data Processing System (DPS), Electrical Power Distribution and Control (EPD and C), and Displays and Controls NASA CIL items. The comparisons determined if there were any results which had been found by the IOA but were not in the NASA baseline. The original assessment determined there were numerous failure modes and potential critical items in the IOA analysis that were not contained in the NASA BFS baseline. Conversely, the NASA baseline contained three FMEAs (IMU, ADTA, and Air Data Probe) for CIL items that were not identified in the IOA product.

Prust, E. E.↗

NASA NTRS1988

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Assessment of the auxiliary power unit

The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA effort first completed an analysis of the Auxiliary Power Unit (APU) hardware, generating draft failure modes and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. The IOA results were then compared to the NASA FMEA/CIL baseline with proposed Post 51-L updates included. A resolution of each discrepancy from the comparison is provided through additional analysis as required. This report documents the results of that comparison for the Orbiter APU hardware. The IOA product for the APU analysis, covering both APU hardware and APU electrical components, consisted of 344 failure mode worksheets that resulted in 178 potential critical items being identified. A comparison was made of the IOA product to the NASA APU hardware FMEA/CIL baseline which consisted of 184 FMEAs and 57 CIL items. The comparison identified 72 discrepancies.

Barnes, J. E.↗

NASA NTRS1988

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Assessment of the life support and airlock support systems, volume 2

The McDonnell Douglas Astronautics Company (MDAC) was selected in June 1986 to perform an Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL). The IOA effort first completed an analysis of the Life Support and Airlock Support Systems (LSS and ALSS) hardware, generating draft failure modes and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. The IOA results were then compared to the NASA FMEA/CIL baseline with proposed Post 51-L updates included. The discrepancies were flagged for potential future resolution. This report documents the results of that comparison for the Orbiter LSS and ALSS hardware. Volume 2 continues the presentation of IOA worksheets and contains the critical items list and NASA FMEA to IOA worksheet cross reference and recommendations.

Barickman, K.↗

NASA NTRS1988

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Assessment of the active thermal control system

The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA effort first completed an analysis of the Active Thermal Control System (ATCS) hardware, generating draft failure modes and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. The IOA results were then compared to the available NASA FMEA/CIL data. Discrepancies from the comparison were documented, and where enough information was available, recommendations for resolution of the discrepancies were made. This report documents the results of that comparison for the Orbiter ATCS hardware. The IOA product for the ATCS independent analysis consisted of 310 failure mode worksheets that resulted in 101 potential critical items (PCI) being identified. A comparison was made to the available NASA data which consisted of 252 FMEAs and 109 CIL items.

Sinclair, S. K.↗

NASA NTRS1988

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Assessment of the main propulsion subsystem FMEA/CIL, volume 4

The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA effort first completed an analysis of the Main Propulsion System (MPS) hardware, generating draft failure modes and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. The IOA results were than compared to available data from the Rockwell Downey/NASA JSC FMEA/CIL review. Volume 4 contains the IOA analysis worksheets and the NASA FMEA to IOA worksheet cross reference and recommendations.

Slaughter, B. C.↗

NASA NTRS1988

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Assessment of the electrical power distribution and control subsystem, volume 1

The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA first completed an analysis of the Electrical Power Distribution and Control (EPD and C) hardware, generating draft failure modes and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. The IOA results were then compared to the NASA FMEA/CIL baseline with proposed Post 51-L updates included. A resolution of each discrepancy from the comparison is provided through additional analysis as required. This report documents the results of that comparison for the Orbiter EPD and C hardware. The IOA product for the EPD and C analysis consisted of 1671 failure mode analysis worksheets that resulted in 468 potential critical items being identified. Comparison was made to the proposed NASA Post 51-L baseline which consisted of FMEAs and 158 CIL items. Volume 1 contains the EPD and C subsystem description, analysis results, ground rules and assumptions, and some of the IOA worksheets.

Schmeckpeper, K. R.↗

NASA NTRS1988

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Assessment of the electrical power distribution and control subsystem, volume 3

The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA first completed an analysis of the Electrical Power Distribution and Control (EPD and C) hardware, generating draft failure modes and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. The IOA results were then compared to the NASA FMEA/CIL baseline with proposed Post 51-L updates included. A resolution of each discrepancy from the comparison is provided through additional analysis as required. This report documents the results of that comparison for the Orbiter EPD and C hardware. Volume 3 continues the presentation of IOA worksheets and contains the potential critical items list and the NASA FMEA to IOA worksheet cross reference and recommendations.

Schmeckpeper, K. R.↗

NASA NTRS1988

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Assessment of the Electrical Power Distribution and Control/Electrical Power Generation (EPD and C/EPG) FMEA/CIL

The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA effort first completed an analysis of the Electrical Power Distribution and Control/Electrical Power Generation (EPD and C/EPG) hardware, generating draft failure modes and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. The IOA results were then compared to the NASA FMEA/CIL baseline with proposed Post 51-L updates included. A resolution of each discrepancy from the comparison was provided through additional analysis as required. The results of that comparison is documented for the Orbiter EPD and C/EPG hardware. The IOA product for the EPD and C/EPG analysis consisted of 263 failure mode worksheets that resulted in 42 potential critical items being identified. Comparison was made to the NASA baseline which consisted of 211 FMEA and 47 CIL items.

Mccants, C. N.↗

NASA NTRS1988

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Assessment of the orbital maneuvering subsystem, volume 2

The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA effort first completed an analysis of the Orbital Maneuvering System (OMS) hardware and electrical power distribution and control (EPD and C), generating draft failure modes and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. The IOA results were then compared to the proposed Post 51-L NASA FMEA/CIL baseline. This report documents the results of that comparison for the Orbiter OMS hardware and EPD and C systems. Volume 2 continues the presentation of IOA worksheets and contains the critical items list and the NASA FMEA to IOA worksheet cross reference and recommendations.

Haufler, W. A.↗

NASA NTRS1988

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Assessment of the communication and tracking subsystem, volume 3

The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA effort first completed and analysis of the Communication and Tracking hardware, generating draft failure modes and potential critical items. The IOA results were then compared to the NASA FMEA/CIL baseline. A resolution of each discrepancy from the comparison is provided through additional analysis as required. This report documents the results of that comparison for the Orbiter Communication and Tracking hardware. Volume 3 continues the presentation of IOA worksheets and contains the potential critical items list, detailed analysis, and the NASA FMEA to IOA worksheet cross reference and recommendations.

Long, W. C.↗

NASA NTRS1988

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Assessment of the reaction control system, volume 5

The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA effort first completed an analysis of the aft and forward Reaction Control System (RCS) hardware and Electrical Power Distribution and Control (EPD and C), generating draft failure modes and potential critical items. The IOA results were then compared to the proposed Post 51-L NASA FMEA/CIL baseline. This report documents the results of that comparison for the Orbiter RCS hardware and EPD and C systems. Volume 5 contains detailed analysis and superseded analysis worksheets and the NASA FMEA to IOA worksheet cross reference and recommendations.

Prust, Chet D.↗

NASA NTRS1998

Space Shuttle Main Engine Quantitative Risk Assessment: Illustrating Modeling of a Complex System with a New QRA Software Package

During 1997, a team from Hernandez Engineering, MSFC, Rocketdyne, Thiokol, Pratt & Whitney, and USBI completed the first phase of a two year Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA) of the Space Shuttle. The models for the Shuttle systems were entered and analyzed by a new QRA software package. This system, termed the Quantitative Risk Assessment System(QRAS), was designed by NASA and programmed by the University of Maryland. The software is a groundbreaking PC-based risk assessment package that allows the user to model complex systems in a hierarchical fashion. Features of the software include the ability to easily select quantifications of failure modes, draw Event Sequence Diagrams(ESDs) interactively, perform uncertainty and sensitivity analysis, and document the modeling. This paper illustrates both the approach used in modeling and the particular features of the software package. The software is general and can be used in a QRA of any complex engineered system. The author is the project lead for the modeling of the Space Shuttle Main Engines (SSMEs), and this paper focuses on the modeling completed for the SSMEs during 1997. In particular, the groundrules for the study, the databases used, the way in which ESDs were used to model catastrophic failure of the SSMES, the methods used to quantify the failure rates, and how QRAS was used in the modeling effort are discussed. Groundrules were necessary to limit the scope of such a complex study, especially with regard to a liquid rocket engine such as the SSME, which can be shut down after ignition either on the pad or in flight. The SSME was divided into its constituent components and subsystems. These were ranked on the basis of the possibility of being upgraded and risk of catastrophic failure. Once this was done the Shuttle program Hazard Analysis and Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) were used to create a list of potential failure modes to be modeled. The groundrules and other criteria were used to screen out the many failure modes that did not contribute significantly to the catastrophic risk. The Hazard Analysis and FMEA for the SSME were also used to build ESDs that show the chain of events leading from the failure mode occurence to one of the following end states: catastrophic failure, engine shutdown, or siccessful operation( successful with respect to the failure mode under consideration).

Smart, Christian↗

NASA NTRS2002

A Framework for Creating a Function-based Design Tool for Failure Mode Identification

Knowledge of potential failure modes during design is critical for prevention of failures. Currently industries use procedures such as Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA), Fault Tree analysis, or Failure Modes, Effects and Criticality analysis (FMECA), as well as knowledge and experience, to determine potential failure modes. When new products are being developed there is often a lack of sufficient knowledge of potential failure mode and/or a lack of sufficient experience to identify all failure modes. This gives rise to a situation in which engineers are unable to extract maximum benefits from the above procedures. This work describes a function-based failure identification methodology, which would act as a storehouse of information and experience, providing useful information about the potential failure modes for the design under consideration, as well as enhancing the usefulness of procedures like FMEA. As an example, the method is applied to fifteen products and the benefits are illustrated.

Arunajadai, Srikesh G.↗

NASA NTRS2008

Integrated System Health Management (ISHM) for Test Stand and J-2X Engine: Core Implementation

ISHM capability enables a system to detect anomalies, determine causes and effects, predict future anomalies, and provides an integrated awareness of the health of the system to users (operators, customers, management, etc.). NASA Stennis Space Center, NASA Ames Research Center, and Pratt & Whitney Rocketdyne have implemented a core ISHM capability that encompasses the A1 Test Stand and the J-2X Engine. The implementation incorporates all aspects of ISHM; from anomaly detection (e.g. leaks) to root-cause-analysis based on failure mode and effects analysis (FMEA), to a user interface for an integrated visualization of the health of the system (Test Stand and Engine). The implementation provides a low functional capability level (FCL) in that it is populated with few algorithms and approaches for anomaly detection, and root-cause trees from a limited FMEA effort. However, it is a demonstration of a credible ISHM capability, and it is inherently designed for continuous and systematic augmentation of the capability. The ISHM capability is grounded on an integrating software environment used to create an ISHM model of the system. The ISHM model follows an object-oriented approach: includes all elements of the system (from schematics) and provides for compartmentalized storage of information associated with each element. For instance, a sensor object contains a transducer electronic data sheet (TEDS) with information that might be used by algorithms and approaches for anomaly detection, diagnostics, etc. Similarly, a component, such as a tank, contains a Component Electronic Data Sheet (CEDS). Each element also includes a Health Electronic Data Sheet (HEDS) that contains health-related information such as anomalies and health state. Some practical aspects of the implementation include: (1) near real-time data flow from the test stand data acquisition system through the ISHM model, for near real-time detection of anomalies and diagnostics, (2) insertion of the J-2X predictive model providing predicted sensor values for comparison with measured values and use in anomaly detection and diagnostics, and (3) insertion of third-party anomaly detection algorithms into the integrated ISHM model.

Figueroa, Jorge F.↗

NASA NTRS2012

Modeling Off-Nominal Behavior in SysML

Fault Management is an essential part of the system engineering process that is limited in its effectiveness by the ad hoc nature of the applied approaches and methods. Providing a rigorous way to develop and describe off-nominal behavior is a necessary step in the improvement of fault management, and as a result, will enable safe, reliable and available systems even as system complexity increases... The basic concepts described in this paper provide a foundation to build a larger set of necessary concepts and relationships for precise modeling of off-nominal behavior, and a basis for incorporating these ideas into the overall systems engineering process.. The simple FMEA example provided applies the modeling patterns we have developed and illustrates how the information in the model can be used to reason about the system and derive typical fault management artifacts.. A key insight from the FMEA work was the utility of defining failure modes as the "inverse of intent", and deriving this from the behavior models.. Additional work is planned to extend these ideas and capabilities to other types of relevant information and additional products.

Soil Moisture Active-Passive (SMAP) Mission↗