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Presented is a training handbook for Mix/Cast Contamination Control; a part of a series of training courses to qualify access to Mix/Cast facilities. Contents: List Contamination Control Requirements; Identify foreign objects debris (FOD), Control Areas and their guidelines; Describe environmental monitoring; List Contamination Control Initiatives; Describe concern for Controlled Materials; Identify FOD Controlled Areas in Mix/Cast.
Foreign object damage (FOD) behavior of AS800 silicon nitride was determined using four different projectile materials at ambient temperature. The target test specimens rigidly supported were impacted at their centers by spherical projectiles with a diameter of 1.59 mm. Four different types of projectiles were used including hardened steel balls, annealed steel balls, silicon nitride balls, and brass balls. Post-impact strength of each target specimen impacted was determined as a function of impact velocity to better understand the severity of local impact damage. The critical impact velocity where target specimens fail upon impact was highest with brass balls, lowest with ceramic ball, and intermediate with annealed and hardened steel balls. Degree of strength degradation upon impact followed the same order as in the critical impact velocity with respect to projectile materials. For steel balls, hardened projectiles yielded more significant impact damage than annealed counterparts. The most important material parameter affecting FOD was identified as hardness of projectiles and was correlated in terms of critical impact velocity, impact deformation, and impact load.
Assessments of foreign object damage (FOD) of a commercial, gas-turbine grade, in situ toughened silicon nitride ceramic (AS800, Honeywell Ceramics Components) were made using four different projectile materials at ambient temperature. AS800 flexure target specimens rigidly supported were impacted at their centers in a velocity range from 50 to 450 m/s by spherical projectiles with a diameter of 1.59 mm. Four different projectile materials were used including hardened steel, annealed steel, silicon nitride ceramic, and brass. Post-impact strength of each target specimen impacted was determined as a function of impact velocity to appraise the severity of local impact damage. For a given impact velocity, the degree of strength degradation was greatest for ceramic balls, least for brass balls, and intermediate for annealed and hardened steel balls. For steel balls, hardened projectiles yielded more significant impact damage than annealed counterparts. The most important material parameter affecting FOD was identified as hardness of projectiles. Impact load as a function of impact velocity was quasi-statically estimated based on both impact and static indentation associated data.
The Contamination Control Team of Marshall Space Flight Center's Materials and Processes Laboratory supports many Programs/ Projects that design, manufacture, and test a wide range of hardware types that are sensitive to contamination and foreign object damage (FOD). Examples where contamination/FOD concerns arise include sensitive structural bondline failure, critical orifice blockage, seal leakage, and reactive fluid compatibility (liquid oxygen, hydrazine) as well as performance degradation of sensitive instruments or spacecraft surfaces such as optical elements and thermal control systems. During the design phase, determination of the sensitivity of a hardware system to different types or levels of contamination/FOD is essential. A contamination control and FOD control plan must then be developed and implemented through all phases of ground processing, and, sometimes, on-orbit use, recovery, and refurbishment. Implementation of proper controls prevents cost and schedule impacts due to hardware damage or rework and helps assure mission success. Current capabilities are being used to support recent and on-going activities for multiple Mission Directorates / Programs such as International Space Station (ISS), James Webb Space Telescope (JWST), Space Launch System (SLS) elements (tanks, engines, booster), etc. The team also advances Green Technology initiatives and addresses materials obsolescence issues for NASA and external customers, most notably in the area of solvent replacement (e.g. aqueous cleaners containing hexavalent chrome, ozone depleting chemicals (CFC s and HCFC's), suspect carcinogens). The team evaluates new surface cleanliness inspection and cleaning technologies (e.g. plasma cleaning), and maintains databases for processing support materials as well as outgassing and optical compatibility test results for spaceflight environments.
For the first time in over 50 years, NASA scientists are training astronauts assigned to lunar missions. The successful Artemis 1 test flight in 2022 set the stage for future human missions to the Moon. The Artemis II mission will send astronauts to fly by the Moon, providing the first opportunity since Apollo for humans to directly observe and document the lunar surface from a few thousand kilometers, including the lunar far side. Artemis III will be the first human mission to land and explore the Moon’s surface near the lunar South Pole. To prepare for Artemis exploration, geology training for the Artemis II crew and detailed training plans for Artemis III and beyond are in full swing. NASA scientists have been working for several years with the Flight Operations Directorate (FOD) at the Johnson Space Center on a progressive geology training program that starts with incoming astronaut classes, offers opportunities to maintain the geology proficiency between flight assignments, and trains the broader engineering-operations-management community in geology and field operations. In the spring of 2023, our team developed an introductory week-long class called Lunar Fundamentals and delivered this content to the Artemis II crew, as well as key NASA Flight Control Team members. The Lunar Fundamentals curriculum combines basic geographic and geologic information about the Moon; includes detailed content on major geologic processes, the lunar environment, lunar volatiles, and sample science; provides historical context of our growing knowledge about the Moon; and introduces new lunar data sets and tools for exploring the lunar surface. With the Lunar Fundamentals foundation, we continue development of the advanced planetary science classroom content for the Artemis III crew, together with field training science objectives and plans. Partnering with our FOD colleagues, we are building an integrated training plan for lunar science, exploration field methods, and operational skills to ensure that the Artemis astronauts exploring the Moon will have the necessary foundation in geology and lunar science to achieve mission success.
Composite spar-shell fan blades for a 1.83 meter (6 feet) diameter fan stage were fabricated and tested in a whirling arm facility to evaluate foreign object damage (FOD) resistance. The blades were made by adhesively bonding boron-epoxy shells on titanium spars and then adhesively bonding an Inconel 625 sheath on the leading edge. The rotating blades were individually tested at a tip speed of 800 feet per second. Impacting media used were gravel, rivets, bolt, nut, ice balls, simulated birds, and a real bird. Incidence angles were typical of those which might be experienced by STOL aircraft. The tests showed that blades of the design tested in this program have satisfactory impact resistance to small objects such as gravel, rivets, nuts, bolts, and two inch diameter ice balls. The blades suffered nominal damage when impacted with one-pound birds (9 to 10 ounce slice size). However, the shell was removed from the spar for a larger slice size.
Processing procedures were developed to enhance boron/aluminum bond behavior and foreign object damage (FOD) tolerance. Design and analysis indicated that the J101 Stage 1 fan blade meets the required frequencies without a midspan shroud. The fabricability of full size J101 blades was assessed, while six blades were fabricated and finished machined.
Two classes of fan blade fragments were considered in an analysis of blade fragment energy. The first, of relatively small size (.15 pound) and energy, tends to rebound from the fan and case when liberated in an FOD encounter. These small fragments have relatively low secondary damage potential and are less demanding in terms of protection. The larger fan blade fragments are ejected in a more direct release trajectory with higher energy and hence can represent a higher potential hazard. Simplified analytical methods were used to describe blade fragment energy transfer kinematics, establish fragment energy levels, evaluate damage potential and configure protection. The approach, methodology, and application are discussed as a possible building block for other applications. Development of effective local protection using Kevlar is also discussed. Analysis methods developed and applied to the rebound fragment problem and to the large direct release fragment problem are described.
The use of superhybrid materials in the manufacture and testing of large fan blades is analyzed. The FOD resistance of large metal spar/superhybrid fan blades is investigated. The technical effort reported was comprised of: (1) preliminary blade design; (2) detailed analysis of two selected superhybrid blade designs; (3) manufacture of two process evaluation blades and destructive evaluation; and (4) manufacture and whirligig testing of six prototype superhybrid blades.
In a closed loop icing wind tunnel the icing cloud is simulated by introducing tiny water droplets through an array of nozzles upstream of the test section. This cloud will form ice on all tunnel components (e.g., turning vanes, inlet guide vanes, fan blades, and the heat exchanger) as the cloud flows around the tunnel. These components must have the capacity to handle their icing loads without causing significant tunnel performance degradation during the course of an evening's run. To aid in the design of these components for the proposed Altitude Wind Tunnel (AWT) at NASA Lewis Research Center the existing Icing Research Tunnel (IRT) is used to measure icing characteristics of the IRT's components. The results from the IRT are scaled to the AWT to account for the AWT's larger components and higher velocities. The results show that from 90 to 45 percent of the total spray cloud froze out on the heat exchanger. Furthermore, the first set of turning vanes downstream of the test section, the FOD screen and the fan blades show significant ice formation. The scaling shows that the same results would occur in the AWT.
In a closed loop icing wind tunnel the icing cloud is simulated by introducing tiny water droplets through an array of nozzles upstream of the test section. This cloud will form ice on all tunnel components (e.g., turning vanes, inlet guide vanes, fan blades, and the heat exchanger) as the cloud flows around the tunnel. These components must have the capacity to handle their icing loads without causing significant tunnel performance degradation during the course of an evening's run. To aid in the design of these components for the proposed Altitude Wind Tunnel (AWT) at NASA Lewis Research Center the existing Icing Research Tunnel (IRT) is used to measure icing characteristics of the IRT's components. The results from the IRT are scaled to the AWT to account for the AWT's larger components and higher velocities. The results show that from 90 to 45 percent of the total spray cloud froze out on the heat exchanger. Furthermore, the first set of turning vanes downstream of the test section, the FOD screen and the fan blades show significant ice formation. The scaling shows that the same results would occur in the AWT.
The objective of this program is to develop an integrated life prediction model accounting for all potential life-limiting Thermal Barrier Coating (TBC) degradation and failure modes including spallation resulting from cyclic thermal stress, oxidative degradation, hot corrosion, erosion, and foreign object damage (FOD). The mechanisms and relative importance of the various degradation and failure modes will be determined, and the methodology to predict predominant mode failure life in turbine airfoil application will be developed and verified. An empirically based correlative model relating coating life to parametrically expressed driving forces such as temperature and stress will be employed. The two-layer TBC system being investigated, designated PWA264, currently is in commercial aircraft revenue service. It consists of an inner low pressure chamber plasma-sprayed NiCoCrAlY metallic bond coat underlayer (4 to 6 mils) and an outer air plasma-sprayed 7 w/o Y2O3-ZrO2 (8 to 12 mils) ceramic top layer.
The objectives and initial results of a Thermal Barrier Coating (TBC) Life Prediction Model Development Program are described. The goals of this program are to: identify and understand TBC failure modes; generate quantitative TBC life data; and develop and verify a TBC life prediction model. The coating being studied is a two layer thermal barrier system incorporating a nominal ten mil outer layer of seven percent yttria partially stabilized zirconia plasma deposited over an inner layer of highly oxidation resistant low pressure plasma sprayed NiCrAlY bond coating. This coating currently is in flight service on turbine vane platforms in the JT-9D and PW2037 engines and is bill-of- material on turbine vane airfoils in the advanced PW4000 and IAE V2500 engines. Effort currently is in progress on the first task, which involves the identification and understanding of TBC failures. Five modes of coating damage were considered: thermomechanical ceramic failure; oxidative bond coat failure; hot corrosion; foreign object damage (FOD); and erosion.
The paper presents a foreign-object damage (FOD) assessment of the engine inlet region of a high-velocity aircraft design. Of particular interest is the potential for damage to the active cooling system, which is an integral part of the external skin. A variety of impactors is considered, including hailstones, birds, and rocks of various sizes. An explicit finite element solution, which permits detailed modeling of inelastic material behavior and other nonlinearities, is used for the simulations. The paper also discusses some general aspects of foreign object impact modeling and explicit solution techniques.
The purpose of this presentation is to highlight the issues affecting the development of engine air inlets for the HSCT. The Propulsion Airframe Integration Technology (PAIT) contract sponsored by NASA LeRC is an important element in the evolution of the propulsion system that will eventually power the HSCT. Most of the material presented here is based on work performed by The Boeing Company under Task 1 and 2 of PAIT. From the propulsion perspective, the premier technology issues associated with the HSCT are airport noise and high altitude emissions. The sources are the nozzle and combustor, respectively. For the inlet the most challenging issues are associated with integration. Among the issues are the following: integration with the main landing gear--protection from FOD and water and slush ingestion from the runway; integration with the engine--ensuring engine/inlet airflow matching, normal shock stability during engine airflow transients, and keeping total pressure distortion within acceptable limits; integration with the wing--minimizing nacelle/wing interference drag and inlet flowfield velocity distortion.
The Space Shuttle vehicle (SSV) is connected to the mobile launch platform (MLP) by four aft skirt hold down studs on each solid rocket booster (SRB). Prior to lift-off, the frangible nuts inside the aft skirt blast containers (BC) are severed into two nut halves by two pyrotechnic booster cartridges. This action releases the SSV and allows the hold down studs to eject through the aft skirt bore and then down into the MLP. USBI has been tasked to upgrade the BC for two specific reasons; 1. to eliminate lead for environmental concerns, and 2. to reduce the chance of nut recontact with the holddown stud. Nut recontact with the stud has been identified as a likely contributor to stud hangups. This upgrade will replace the lead liner with an aluminum foam material. The aluminum foam used as a energy absorber is a proven design in many other aerospace/defense applications. Additional benefits of using the open cell, energy absorbent aluminum foam in place of the solid lead liner are: A. Lead handling/ exposure, and possible contamination, along with hazardous waste disposal will be eliminated; B. Approximately 200 lbs. weight savings will be contributed to each Space Shuttle flight by using aluminum foam over lead; C. The new aluminum liner is designed to catch all shrapnel from frangible nuts thus virtually eliminating chance of foreign object debris (FOD) exiting the HDP, and causing potential damage to the vehicle; D. Potential of using the lighter aluminum liner over lead, allows for easier assembly and disassembly of blast container elements, also allowing for improvements in safety, operator handling, and efficiency of operations. Six BC firing tests will be required to determine if the new liner material will perform in a way to decrease the chance of stud hangups and enhance the ability of the BC to retain blast debris. Testing will be performed at the Kennedy Space Center (KSC) facility known as the Launch Equipment Test Facility (LETF), and will simulate the SRB hold- down post, with actual BC hardware and pyrotechnics assembled, and then test fired. Initial testing was performed in 1997 using a frangible nut in a static drop test over lead and aluminum foam sheet materials. The aluminum foam showed a dramatic improvement of energy absorption over the lead liner material. Proof-of-Principle testing at the KSC-LETF commenced in May, 1998, and is expected to be completed by June, 1998.
The X-33 liquid hydrogen tank failure investigation found the following: (1) The inner skin microcracked and hydrogen infiltrated into it; (2) The cracks grew larger under pressure; (3) When pressure was removed, the cracks closed slightly; (4) When the tank was drained and warmed, the cracks closed and blocked the leak path; (5) Foreign object debris (FOD) and debond areas provided an opportunity for a leak path; and (6) There is still hydrogen in the other three lobes today.
This viewgraph presentation gives an overview of the X-33 LH2 tank failure investigation findings. The conclusions of the investigation include the following: (1) the inner skin microcracked and hydrogen infiltrated; (2) the cracks grew larger under pressure; (3) when pressure was removed, the cracks closed slightly; (4) when the tank was drained and warmed, the cracks closed and blocked the leak path; (5) FOD and debond areas provided an opportunity for a leak path; and (6) there is still hydrogen in the the other three lobes today.