Specification 02516 Flushing and Disinfection of Underground Water Lines For Domestic and Fire Protection Systems.
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The purpose of this project is to design the demolition and installation of a deluge valve swap from a DV-5 to a DV-5A valve.
In June 2004 the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) amended its fire protection requirements to permit existing nuclear power reactor licensees to voluntarily adopt fire protection requirements contained in National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) Standard 805. NFPA 805 is a performance-based standard for nuclear power plant fire protection that is an alternative to the deterministic, prescriptive fire protection requirements, such as 10 CFR 50 Appendix R, that was issued in 1980. One aspect of implementing NFPA 805 is that the licensee adopts the performance goals, objectives, and criteria for nuclear safety specified in the Standard. These goals, objectives, and criteria can be met through the implementation of deterministic approaches or performance-based approaches, including engineering analyses, probabilistic risk assessment, and fire modeling. Licensees voluntarily adopting the fire protection requirements in NFPA 805 must submit a license amendment request (LAR) to the NRC. The LAR provides the new proposed fire protection licensing basis, including the methodology and results of required evaluations and analyses that show how the NFPA 805 performance criteria are met. As of August 2014, licensees have submitted LARs for 26 nuclear power plants, representing 42 nuclear reactor units. Of these, 7 nuclear power plants, representing 10 nuclear reactor units, have been issued a safety evaluation (SE) by the NRC approving transition of their fire protection licensing basis to one that complies with NFPA 805. Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) supports the NRC staff’s technical review of the LARs in the areas of fundamental fire protection, safe shutdown analysis, and Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA). PNNL, of course, cannot speak for the nuclear industry and its choice of implementation strategies or the NRC staff’s assessment of the approaches being taken to adopt NFPA 805. However, as a reviewer of the technical details of these submittals, PNNL is in a position to observe the array of implementation tactics taken in these submittals, and observe different ways licensees are making the NFPA 805 process work. For example, we see differences in how fire areas are being transitioned, the kinds of plant modifications being implemented, the changes being made to plant procedures, the number and types of recovery actions being credited, and the kinds and extent of detailed modeling being performed in support of the Fire PRAs. As a caveat, we note that it is probably too early to comment on the overall success or limitations of the NFPA 805 process or provide lessons learned for the future. Furthermore, it is not our intention to endorse any particular approach taken in a submittal over another or to critique the industry or the regulator. Rather our goal in this paper is to summarize a set of interesting and useful differences across submittals that may provide context for further future discussions about what we (i.e., reviewers, industry, and regulators) have learned in being part of the NFPA process; and how to best use that information to inform future NFPA 805 activities or other risk-informed endeavors.
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission's (NRC) current fire protection regulatory framework was initiated in response to a cable fire that occurred at the Browns Ferry Nuclear Power Station in 1975. Following the issuance of several guidance documents, in 1981 the Commission codified deterministic requirements to provide reasonable assurance that fire would not jeopardize reactor safety (10 CFR 50.48 "Fire Protection" and Appendix R to 10 CFR 50). Since then, the results of plant operating experience, NRC inspection activities and cable fire testing programs have served to clarify the application of these requirements. In 2004, the NRC amended 10 CFR Part 50.48 to add a new subsection, 10 CFR 50.48(c), that endorses, with exceptions, the National Fire Protection Association's 805, "Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactor Electric Generating Plants — 2001 Edition," as a voluntary alternative for demonstrating compliance with Appendix R. To date, approximately half of all operating plants have transitioned to a risk-informed approach under 10 CFR 50.48(c). Regardless of the selected approach, each operating nuclear power plant should establish a comprehensive fire protection program that includes features needed to minimize the likelihood and consequence of firesl. To achieve this objective, fire protection programs integrate the NRC's long-held safety concept of defense-in-depth (DID) by providing multiple barriers against potentially unacceptable consequences of fire. To minimize the frequency and size of fires, the first lines of defense include controls for fire prevention, such as controlling combustibles and ignition sources and fire mitigation features, such as fire detection and suppression systems. In the unlikely event that a fire should start and continue to grow in spite of these features, appropriate fire protection features, such as fire-rated barriers are provided as necessary to ensure the accomplishment of essential shutdown functions. This handbook was specifically developed for NRC inspectors that may be assigned to perform elements of Inspection Procedure (IP) 71111.05T, "Fire Protection (Triennial)," including, (a) "Protection of Safe Shutdown Capabilities," (e) "Alternative Shutdown Capability," and (f) "Circuit Analyses." Thus, the document concentrates solely on the final element of defense-in-depth— ensuring reactor safety will not be compromised in the event of a serious fire. In addition to describing how the NRC's regulatory framework has evolved since the Browns Ferry Fire, the handbook illustrates the content and scope of various analyses typically referenced in a plant's fire protection licensing basis and includes techniques and insights for assessing the plant's conformance to those criteria.
This revision of the LLNL Fire Protection Baseline Needs Assessment (BNA) was prepared by John A. Sharry, LLNL Fire Marshal and LLNL Division Leader for Fire Protection and reviewed by Martin Gresho, Sandia/CA Fire Marshal. The document follows and expands upon the format and contents of the DOE Model Fire Protection Baseline Capabilities Assessment document contained on the DOE Fire Protection Web Site, but only address emergency response. The original LLNL BNA was created on April 23, 1997 as a means of collecting all requirements concerning emergency response capabilities at LLNL (including response to emergencies at Sandia/CA) into one BNA document. The original BNA documented the basis for emergency response, emergency personnel staffing, and emergency response equipment over the years. The BNA has been updated and reissued five times since in 1998, 1999, 2000, 2002, and 2004. A significant format change was performed in the 2004 update of the BNA in that it was 'zero based.' Starting with the requirement documents, the 2004 BNA evaluated the requirements, and determined minimum needs without regard to previous evaluations. This 2010 update maintains the same basic format and requirements as the 2004 BNA. In this 2010 BNA, as in the previous BNA, the document has been intentionally divided into two separate documents - the needs assessment (1) and the compliance assessment (2). The needs assessment will be referred to as the BNA and the compliance assessment will be referred to as the BNA Compliance Assessment. The primary driver for separation is that the needs assessment identifies the detailed applicable regulations (primarily NFPA Standards) for emergency response capabilities based on the hazards present at LLNL and Sandia/CA and the geographical location of the facilities. The needs assessment also identifies areas where the modification of the requirements in the applicable NFPA standards is appropriate, due to the improved fire protection provided, the remote location and low population density of some the facilities. As such, the needs assessment contains equivalencies to the applicable requirements. The compliance assessment contains no such equivalencies and simply assesses the existing emergency response resources to the requirements of the BNA and can be updated as compliance changes independent of the BNA update schedule. There are numerous NFPA codes and standards and other requirements and guidance documents that address the subject of emergency response. These requirements documents are not always well coordinated and may contain duplicative or conflicting requirements or even coverage gaps. Left unaddressed, this regulatory situation results in frequent interpretation of requirements documents. Different interpretations can then lead to inconsistent implementation. This BNA addresses this situation by compiling applicable requirements from all identified sources (see Section 5) and analyzing them collectively to address conflict and overlap as applicable to the hazards presented by the LLNL and Sandia/CA sites (see Section 7). The BNA also generates requirements when needed to fill any identified gaps in regulatory coverage. Finally, the BNA produces a customized simple set of requirements, appropriate for the DOE protection goals, such as those defined in DOE O 420.1B, the hazard level, the population density, the topography, and the site layout at LLNL and Sandia/CA that will be used as the baseline requirements set - the 'baseline needs' - for emergency response at LLNL and Sandia/CA. A template approach is utilized to accomplish this evaluation for each of the nine topical areas that comprise the baseline needs for emergency response. The basis for conclusions reached in determining the baseline needs for each of the topical areas is presented in Sections 7.1 through 7.9. This BNA identifies only mandatory requirements and establishes the minimum performance criteria. The minimum performance criteria may not be the level of performance desired Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory or Sandia/CA. Performance at levels greater than those established by this document will provide a higher level of fire safety, fire protection, or loss control and is encouraged. In Section 7, Determination of Baseline Needs, a standard template was used to describe the process used that involves separating basic emergency response needs into nine separate services. Each service being evaluated contains a determination of minimum requirements, an analysis of the requirements, a statement of minimum performance, and finally a summary of the minimum performance. The requirement documents, listed in Section 5, are those laws, regulations, DOE Directives, contractual obligations, or LLNL policies that establish service levels. The determination of minimum requirements section explains the rationale or method used to determine the minimum requirements.
To ensure the safety of personnel and facilities, vehicle maintenance facilities are required by law and by guidelines of the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) and the International Fire Code (IFC) to exhibit certain design features. They are also required to be fitted with certain fire protection equipment and devices because of the potential for fire or explosion in the event of fuel leakage or spills. All fuels have an explosion or fire potential if specific conditions are present. The hazard presented by liquid fuels, such as gasoline and diesel, results from the spillage of these liquids and subsequent ignition of vapors, causing a fire or explosion. Facilities that maintain liquid-fueled vehicles and implement appropriate safety measures are protected with ventilation systems designed to capture liquid fuel vapors at or near floor level. To minimize the potential for ignition in the event of a spill, receptacles, electrical fixtures, and hot-work operations, such as welding, are located outside of these areas. Compressed natural gas (CNG) is composed of methane with slight amounts of heavier simple hydrocarbons. Maintenance facilities that maintain CNG vehicles indoors must be protected against fire and explosion. However, the means of ensuring safety are different from those employed for liquid fuels because of the gaseous nature of methane and the fact that it is lighter than air. Because CNG is lighter than air, a release will rise to the ceiling of the maintenance facility and quickly dissipate rather than remaining at or near floor level like liquid fuel vapors. Although some of the means of protection for CNG vehicle maintenance facilities are similar to those used for liquid-fueled vehicles (ventilation and elimination of ignition sources), the types and placement of the protection equipment are different because of the behavior of the different fuels. The nature of gaseous methane may also require additional safeguards, such as combustible gas detectors and control systems, or specialized space heating, which are not needed in facilities servicing liquid-fuel vehicles. This handbook covers maintenance facilities that service CNG-fueled vehicles. Although similar requirements are mandated for liquefied natural gas (LNG) or liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) fueled vehicles, LNG and LPG are not covered in this handbook.
To ensure the safety of personnel and facilities, vehicle maintenance facilities are required by law and by guidelines of the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) and the International Fire Code (IFC) to exhibit certain design features. They are also required to be fitted with certain fire protection equipment and devices because of the potential for fire or explosion in the event of fuel leakage or spills. All fuels have an explosion or fire potential if specific conditions are present. This handbook covers the primary elements that must be considered when developing a CNG vehicle maintenance facility design that will protect against the ignition of natural gas releases. It also discusses specific protocols and training needed to ensure safety.
This document was prepared by John A. Sharry, LLNL Fire Marshal and Division Leader for Fire Protection and was reviewed by Sandia/CA Fire Marshal, Martin Gresho. This document is the second of a two-part analysis of Emergency Response Capabilities of Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. The first part, 2009 Baseline Needs Assessment Requirements Document established the minimum performance criteria necessary to meet mandatory requirements. This second part analyses the performance of Lawrence Livermore Laboratory Emergency Management Department to the contents of the Requirements Document. The document was prepared based on an extensive review of information contained in the 2004 BNA, a review of Emergency Planning Hazards Assessments, a review of building construction, occupancy, fire protection features, dispatch records, LLNL alarm system records, fire department training records, and fire department policies and procedures. On October 1, 2007, LLNL contracted with the Alameda County Fire Department to provide emergency response services. The level of service called for in that contract is the same level of service as was provided by the LLNL Fire Department prior to that date. This Compliance Assessment will evaluate fire department services beginning October 1, 2008 as provided by the Alameda County Fire Department.
This document was prepared by John A. Sharry, LLNL Fire Marshal and LLNL Division Leader for Fire Protection and reviewed by LLNL Emergency Management Department Head James Colson. The document follows and expands upon the format and contents of the DOE Model Fire Protection Baseline Capabilities Assessment document contained on the DOE Fire Protection Web Site, but only address emergency response.
This document was prepared by John A. Sharry, LLNL Fire Marshal and LLNL Division Leader for Fire Protection and reviewed by LLNL Emergency Management Department Head James Colson. The document follows and expands upon the format and contents of the DOE Model Fire Protection Baseline Capabilities Assessment document contained on the DOE Fire Protection Web Site, but only addresses emergency response.
Ceramicrete™, a chemically bonded phosphate ceramic, was developed for nuclear waste immobilization and nuclear radiation shielding. Ceramicrete products are fabricated by an acid–base reaction between magnesium oxide and mono potassium phosphate. Fillers are used to impart desired properties to the product. Ceramicrete’s tailored compositions have resulted in several commercial structural products, including corrosion- and fire-protection coatings. Their borated version, called Borobond™, has been studied for its neutron shielding capabilities and is being used in structures built for storage of nuclear materials. This investigation assesses the durability and shielding performance of borated Ceramicrete coatings when exposed to gamma and beta radiations to predict the composition needed for optimal shielding performance in a realistic nuclear radiation field. Investigations were conducted using experimental data coupled with predictive Monte Carlo computer model. The results show that it is possible to produce products for simultaneous shielding of all three types of nuclear radiations, viz., neutrons, gamma-, and beta-rays. Additionally, because sprayable Ceramicrete coatings exhibit excellent corrosionand fire-protection characteristics on steel, this research also establishes an opportunity to produce thick coatings to enhance the shielding performance of corrosion and fire protection coatings for use in high radiation environment in nuclear industry.
This white paper describes the work performed by Sandia National Laboratories in the New Mexico Small Business Agreement with BayoTech. BayoTech is a hydrogen generation and distribution company that is located in Albuquerque, NM. Their goal is to distribute hydrogen via their hydrogen systems which utilize the core design that was developed by Sandia. However, because the hydrogen economy is in its nascency, the safety and operation of the generating systems require independent validation. Additionally, in their pursuit of permitting at various locations around the nation, they require fire protection engineering support in discussions with local fire marshals and neighboring industrial entities. Sandia National Laboratories has subject matter expertise in hydrogen risk modeling of consequence (overpressure and dispersion) as well as fire protection engineering. Throughout this project, Sandia has worked with BayoTech to provide our expertise in these subject areas to facilitate the market entry of their hydrogen generation project to address the dire need for decarbonization due to climate change. The general approach of the support by Sandia is outlined in the main body, while the location specific evaluation for the Port of Stockton is contained in Appendix A.
Department of Energy (DOE) Orders and National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) Codes and Standards require fire suppression in gloveboxes. Several potential solutions have been and are currently being considered at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL). The objective is to provide reliable, minimally invasive, and seismically robust fire suppression capable of extinguishing Class A, B, and C fires; achieve compliance with DOE and NFPA requirements; and provide value-added improvements to fire safety in gloveboxes. This report provides a brief summary of current approaches and also documents the successful fire tests conducted to prove that one approach, specifically Fire Foe{trademark} tubes, is capable of achieving the requirement to provide reliable fire protection in gloveboxes in a cost-effective manner.
The manufacturers of Nationally Recognized Testing Laboratory (NRTL) listed, switch-rated, plug and receptacle combinations tout their convenience, reliability, efficiency, and compliance with both the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) 70®, National Electric Code (NEC), and National Fire Protection Association 70E®, The Standard for Electrical Safety in the Workplace, as advantages to using these products in lieu of traditional metal-enclosed disconnect switches. The purpose of this paper is to raise awareness of several unintended consequences that can result when replacement involves high energy cord and plug connected equipment. This paper describes several possible issues in complying with the NFPA 70 Articles 110 and 400 and NFPA 70E Articles 110 and 130 that should be considered when using load rated plug/receptacle combinations. This paper is intended to address high energy circuits typically associated with 480 volt pin and sleeve type connections in applications where incident energy levels may exceed 1.2 calories/centimeter² (cal/cm²).
A Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) task group was established to discuss and evaluate a candidate fire suppression system (FSS) for gloveboxes (GB) and dropboxes (DB, for brevity, this report will simply refer to gloveboxes). Suitability criteria include compliance, compatibility, and capability. LANL contracted with New Mexico Tech (NMT) to quantitatively evaluate the perfor mance of one of those systems including its ability to extinguish GB fires, limit over-pressurization of the GB, etc. Additionally, the results of these experiments provide data points that could be used when fire hazard evaluations (FHEs) are conducted for determining when to require a fire suppres sion system installation within a GB (as required by NFPA 801, Standard for Facilities Handling Radioactive Materials, DOE Standard 1066-2012 Fire Protection, and AGS-G010-2011 Standard of Practice for Glovebox Fire Protection).