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The computer based approach used by United Airlines for flight training is discussed. The human factors involved in specific aircraft accidents are addressed. Flight crew interaction and communication as they relate to training and flight safety are considered.
Outline: Background; Terrestrial experience -Initial investigation into MSK (MusculoSKeletal) injuries -MSK Medicine Program -Training injuries -NBL (Neutral Buoyancy Laboratory) EMU (Extravehicular activity Mobility Unit) Work Hardening Program -Return to duty -Post-flight reconditioning program; Inflight musculoskeletal conditions; Lunar Surface Operations; Post-flight injuries.
The need for flight leadership training for flight deck crewmembers is addressed. A management grid is also described which provides a quantitative management language against which any number of management behaviors can be measured.
This paper will summarize the thirty-year history of Space Shuttle operations from the perspective of training in NASA Johnson Space Center's Mission Control Center. It will focus on training and development of flight controllers and instructors, and how training practices have evolved over the years as flight experience was gained, new technologies developed, and programmatic needs changed. Operations of human spaceflight systems is extremely complex, therefore the training and certification of operations personnel is a critical piece of ensuring mission success. Mission Control Center (MCC-H), at the Lyndon B. Johnson Space Center, in Houston, Texas manages mission operations for the Space Shuttle Program, including the training and certification of the astronauts and flight control teams. This paper will give an overview of a flight control team s makeup and responsibilities during a flight, and details on how those teams are trained and certified. The training methodology for developing flight controllers has evolved significantly over the last thirty years, while the core goals and competencies have remained the same. In addition, the facilities and tools used in the control center have evolved. These changes have been driven by many factors including lessons learned, technology, shuttle accidents, shifts in risk posture, and generational differences. Flight controllers will share their experiences in training and operating the Space Shuttle throughout the Program s history. A primary method used for training Space Shuttle flight control teams is by running mission simulations of the orbit, ascent, and entry phases, to truly "train like you fly." The audience will learn what it is like to perform a simulation as a shuttle flight controller. Finally, we will reflect on the lessons learned in training for the shuttle program, and how those could be applied to future human spaceflight endeavors.
NASA is developing and validating technology to incorporate aircraft icing effects into a flight training device concept demonstrator. Flight simulation models of a DHC-6 Twin Otter were developed from wind tunnel data using a subscale, complete aircraft model with and without simulated ice, and from previously acquired flight data. The validation of the simulation models required additional aircraft response time histories of the airplane configured with simulated ice similar to the subscale model testing. Therefore, a flight test was conducted using the NASA Twin Otter Icing Research Aircraft. Over 500 maneuvers of various types were conducted in this flight test. The validation data consisted of aircraft state parameters, pilot inputs, propulsion, weight, center of gravity, and moments of inertia with the airplane configured with different amounts of simulated ice. Emphasis was made to acquire data at wing stall and tailplane stall since these events are of primary interest to model accurately in the flight training device. Analyses of several datasets are described regarding wing and tailplane stall. Key findings from these analyses are that the simulated wing ice shapes significantly reduced the C , max, while the simulated tail ice caused elevator control force anomalies and tailplane stall when flaps were deflected 30 deg or greater. This effectively reduced the safe operating margins between iced wing and iced tail stall as flap deflection and thrust were increased. This flight test demonstrated that the critical aspects to be modeled in the icing effects flight training device include: iced wing and tail stall speeds, flap and thrust effects, control forces, and control effectiveness.
Training activities for flights of the Space Shuttle Orbiter are performed in the most complicated flight simulation facility yet assembled. The Shuttle Mission Simulator (SMS) provides training for the entire mission from prelaunch to postlanding. An extensive pilot-cues environment is provided in which visual, aural, and motion cues are presented. The planning and execution of training on the simulator must take into account the complexity of the Shuttle systems, the complexity of the procedures and crew interface on the Shuttle, and the complexity of the mission, itself. The major points of this training program are highlighted.
Operations of human spaceflight systems is extremely complex, therefore the training and certification of operations personnel is a critical piece of ensuring mission success. Mission Control Center (MCC-H), at the Lyndon B. Johnson Space Center, in Houston, Texas manages mission operations for the Space Shuttle Program, including the training and certification of the astronauts and flight control teams. As the space shuttle program ends in 2011, a review of how training for STS-1 was conducted compared to STS-134 will show multiple changes in training of shuttle flight controller over a thirty year period. This paper will additionally give an overview of a flight control team s makeup and responsibilities during a flight, and details on how those teams have been trained certified over the life span of the space shuttle. The training methods for developing flight controllers have evolved significantly over the last thirty years, while the core goals and competencies have remained the same. In addition, the facilities and tools used in the control center have evolved. These changes have been driven by many factors including lessons learned, technology, shuttle accidents, shifts in risk posture, and generational differences. A primary method used for training Space Shuttle flight control teams is by running mission simulations of the orbit, ascent, and entry phases, to truly "train like you fly." The reader will learn what it is like to perform a simulation as a shuttle flight controller. Finally, the paper will reflect on the lessons learned in training for the shuttle program, and how those could be applied to future human spaceflight endeavors.
Operations of human spaceflight systems is extremely complex, therefore the training and certification of operations personnel is a critical piece of ensuring mission success. Mission Control Center (MCC-H), at the Lyndon B. Johnson Space Center, in Houston, Texas manages mission operations for the Space Shuttle Program, including the training and certification of the astronauts and flight control teams. This paper will give an overview of a flight control team s makeup and responsibilities during a flight, and details on how those teams are trained and certified. The training methodology for developing flight controllers has evolved significantly over the last thirty years, while the core goals and competencies have remained the same. In addition, the facilities and tools used in the control center have evolved. These changes have been driven by many factors including lessons learned, technology, shuttle accidents, shifts in risk posture, and generational differences. Flight controllers will share their experiences in training and operating the Space Shuttle throughout the Program s history. A primary method used for training Space Shuttle flight control teams is by running mission simulations of the orbit, ascent, and entry phases, to truly "train like you fly." The reader will learn what it is like to perform a simulation as a shuttle flight controller. Finally, the paper will reflect on the lessons learned in training for the shuttle program, and how those could be applied to future human spaceflight endeavors. These endeavors could range from going to the moon or to Mars. The lessons learned from operating the space shuttle for over thirty years will help the space industry build the next human transport space vehicle and inspire the next generation of space explorers.
Operations of human spaceflight systems is extremely complex; therefore, the training and certification of operations personnel is a critical piece of ensuring mission success. Mission Control Center (MCC-H), at the Lyndon B. Johnson Space Center in Houston, Texas, manages mission operations for the Space Shuttle Program, including the training and certification of the astronauts and flight control teams. An overview of a flight control team s makeup and responsibilities during a flight, and details on how those teams are trained and certified, reveals that while the training methodology for developing flight controllers has evolved significantly over the last thirty years the core goals and competencies have remained the same. In addition, the facilities and tools used in the control center have evolved. Changes in methodology and tools have been driven by many factors, including lessons learned, technology, shuttle accidents, shifts in risk posture, and generational differences. Flight controllers share their experiences in training and operating the space shuttle. The primary training method throughout the program has been mission simulations of the orbit, ascent, and entry phases, to truly train like you fly. A review of lessons learned from flight controller training suggests how they could be applied to future human spaceflight endeavors, including missions to the moon or to Mars. The lessons learned from operating the space shuttle for over thirty years will help the space industry build the next human transport space vehicle.
Prior to the successful flight test validation of a new avionics prototype, participants from Boeing, Honeywell, and United Airlines underwent group training at NASA Langley Research Center. New prototype software for an algorithm which enables greater efficiency in high-density airspace, called Interval Management, was to be incorporated into Electronic Flight Bags and placed in the cockpit for pilot usage. The goals of the training were to teach the flight test pilots how to operate the new software, establish techniques to simultaneously position three aircraft prior to each test scenario, and ensure a common communication protocol among team members when coordinating the position of aircraft for the next scenario. The multi-tiered interactive training regimen consisted of a process that continually built upon previous foundational material. The primary learning elements were 1) a portable computer-based trainer that was provided to the pilots prior to classroom training sessions, 2) classroom learning, 3) full mock-up simulator training, and 4) refresher training just prior to the flight test. Each part of the regimen was designed to repeat and build upon the previous element. The purpose of this Technical Memorandum is to inform the aviation industry how flight training for Interval Management was conducted at Langley Research Center in order to reduce overall development costs of future Interval Management training programs. Secondly, the paper provides insight regarding the decision-making process when attempting to conduct a flight test.
Landings by experienced airline pilots transitioning to the DC-10, performed in flight and on a simulator, were analyzed and compared using a pilot-in-the-loop model of the landing maneuver. By solving for the effective feedback gains and pilot compensation which described landing technique, it was possible to discern fundamental differences in pilot behavior between the actual aircraft and the simulator. These differences were then used to infer simulator fidelity in terms of specific deficiencies and to quantify the effectiveness of training on the simulator as compared to training in flight. While training on the simulator, pilots exhibited larger effective lag in commanding the flare. The inability to compensate adequately for this lag was associated with hard or inconsistent landings. To some degree this deficiency was carried into flight, thus resulting in a slightly different and inferior landing technique than exhibited by pilots trained exclusively on the actual aircraft.
The Johnson Space Center s (JSC) International Space Station (ISS) Space Flight Resource Management (SFRM) training program is designed to teach the team skills required to be an effective flight controller. It was adapted from the SFRM training given to Shuttle flight controllers to fit the needs of a "24 hours a day/365 days a year" flight controller. More recently, the length reduction of technical training flows for ISS flight controllers impacted the number of opportunities for fully integrated team scenario based training, where most SFRM training occurred. Thus, the ISS SFRM training program is evolving yet again, using a new approach of teaching and evaluating SFRM alongside of technical materials. Because there are very few models in other industries that have successfully tied team and technical skills together, challenges are arising. Despite this, the Mission Operations Directorate of NASA s JSC is committed to implementing this integrated training approach because of the anticipated benefits.
Training includes both SFRM-dedicated lessons and SFRM training embedded into technical lessons. Goal is to reduce certification times by 50% and integrated simulations by 75-90%. SFRM is practiced, evaluated and debriefed in part task trainers and full-task simulation lessons. SFRM model and training are constantly being evaluated against student/management feedback, best practices from industry/ military, and latest research.
An emphasis is placed on developing a mathematical model in order to identify useful metrics, quantify piloting technique, and define simulator fidelity. On the basis of DC-10 flight measurements recorded for 32 pilots, 13 flight-trained and the remainder simulator trained, a revised model of the landing flare is hypothesized which accounts for reduction of sink rate and perference for touchdown point along the runway. The flare maneuver and touchdown point adjustment can be described by a pitch attitude command pilot guidance law consisting of altitude and vertical velocity feedbacks. In flight pilots exhibit a significant vertical velocity feedback which is essential for well controlled sink rate reduction at the desired level of response (bandwidth). In the simulator, however, the vertical velocity feedback appears ineffectual and leads to substantially inferior landing performance.
The range of number of annual STS flights with 4- and 5-orbiter fleets was estimated and an overview of capabilities needed to support annual rates of 24 and up with a survey of known constraints and emphasis on External Tank (ET) production requirements was provided. Facility capability estimates are provided for ground turnaround, cargo handling, flight training and flight operations. Emphasizing the complexity of the STS systems and the R&D nature of present flight experience, it is concluded that the most prominent constraints in the early growth of the STS as an operational system may manifest themselves not as shortages of investment items such as the ET or SRB, but as inability to provide timely repairs or replacement of flight system components needed to sustain launch rates.
The purpose was to examine, jointly, cockpit automation and social processes. Automation was varied by the choice of two radically different versions of the DC-9 series aircraft, the traditional DC-9-30, and the glass cockpit derivative, the MD-88. Airline pilot volunteers flew a mission in the simulator for these aircraft. Results show that the performance differences between the crews of the two aircraft were generally small, but where there were differences, they favored the DC-9. There were no criteria on which the MD-88 crews performed better than the DC-9 crews. Furthermore, DC-9 crews rated their own workload as lower than did the MD-88 pilots. There were no significant differences between the two aircraft types with respect to the severity of errors committed during the Line-Oriented Flight Training (LOFT) flight. The attitude questionnaires provided some interesting insights, but failed to distinguish between DC-9 and MD-88 crews.
Fatal loss-of-control accidents have been directly related to in-flight airframe icing. The prototype system presented in this report directly addresses the need for real-time onboard envelope protection in icing conditions. The combination of prior information and real-time aerodynamic parameter estimations are shown to provide sufficient information for determining safe limits of the flight envelope during inflight icing encounters. The Icing Contamination Envelope Protection (ICEPro) system was designed and implemented to identify degradations in airplane performance and flying qualities resulting from ice contamination and provide safe flight-envelope cues to the pilot. The utility of the ICEPro system for mitigating a potentially hazardous icing condition was evaluated by 29 pilots using the NASA Ice Contamination Effects Flight Training Device. Results showed that real time assessment cues were effective in reducing the number of potentially hazardous upset events and in lessening exposure to loss of control following an incipient upset condition. Pilot workload with the added ICEPro displays was not measurably affected, but pilot opinion surveys showed that real time cueing greatly improved their awareness of a hazardous aircraft state. The performance of ICEPro system was further evaluated by various levels of sensor noise and atmospheric turbulence.
Line Oriented Flight Training (LOFT) for United Airlines started in 1976. At that time it was basically no more than a line-simulated training function conducted in a full-mission simulator with no attention or stress on its human factor content. Very soon after the implementation of the LOFT program concerns were voiced about certain crew behavioral situations they were observing in the flight crew's execution of cockpit duties. These duties involved emergency procedures as well as irregular and normal procedures and situations. It was evident that new information was surfacing concerning crew interaction, or its lack thereof, in the cockpit and its effect on satisfactory performance. These observations naturally raised the question of how this information translated into the safety of aircraft operations. A training system had to be repetitive, the crew interactive, and the training had to be conducted under the crew concept. The foundation had to have two other factors: (1) it was necessary to have adequate human factor content, and (2) an advanced state-of-the-art simulator and appropriate electronic devices were required. These concepts are further discussed.