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Solar coronal mass ejections (CMEs) can cause hazadous high-energy particles and geomagnetic storms that, in the more serious instances, can disrupt Earth power grids, communications, and satellites.
MMS Overview Recall from Conrads presentation earlier today MMS launch: March 13, 2015 on an Atlas V from Space Launch Complex 40, Cape Canaveral, Florida MMS Observatory Separation: five minute intervals spinning at 3 rpm approximately 1.5 hours after launch MMS Science Goals: study magnetospheric plasma physics and understand the processes that cause power grids, communication disruptions and Aurora formation Mission: 4 identical spacecraft in tetrahedral formation with variable size1.2 x 12 RE in Phase 1, with apogee on dayside to observe bow shock1.2 x 25 RE in Phase 2, with apogee on night side to observe magneto tail Challenges Tight attitude control box, orbit and formation maintenance requirements Maneuvers on thrusters every two weeks Delta-H Spin axis direction and spin rate maintenance Delta-V Orbit and Formation maintenance Mission phase transitions AGS support Smart targeting prediction of Spin-Axis attitude in the presence of environmental torques to stay within the science attitude Determination of the spacecraft attitude and spin rate (sensitive to knowledge of inertia tensor)Calibrations to improve attitude determination results and improve orbit maneuvers Mass properties (Center of Mass, and inertia tensor for nutation and coning) Accelerometer bias (sensitive to the accuracy of the rate estimates) Sensor alignments.
Computational grids may include many machines located in a number of sites. For efficient use of the grid we need to have an ability to estimate the time it takes to communicate data between the machines. For dynamic distributed grids it is unrealistic to know exact parameters of the communication hardware and the current communication traffic and we should rely on a model of the network performance to estimate the message delivery time. Our approach to a construction of such a model is based on observation of the messages delivery time with various message sizes and time scales. We record these observations in a database and use them to build a model of the message delivery time. Our experiments show presence of multiple bands in the logarithm of the message delivery times. These multiple bands represent multiple paths messages travel between the grid machines and are incorporated in our multiband model.
Network communication is crucial in the Energy Grid of Things (EGoT). Without a network connection, the energy grid becomes just a power grid where the energy resources are available to the customer uni-directionally. A mechanism to analyze and optimize the energy usage of the grid can only happen through a medium, a communications network, that enables information exchange between the grid participants and the service provider. Security implementers of EGoT network communication take extraordinary measures to ensure the safety of the energy grid, a critical infrastructure, as well as the safety and privacy of the grid participants. With the dynamic nature of network communication of the EGoT, the information provided by the customer or the service provider can be falsified by a malicious attacker. Therefore, a trust model is necessary to monitor any abnormal activities. This paper describes a distributed trust model system that meets the need of the EGoT. This paper describes methods for evaluating and improving the distributed trust model using standard hypothesis testing metrics such as true positive, false positive, true negative, false negative, equal error rate, and F1 score. Example calculations are shown based on generated sample data.
Grid-interactive efficient buildings (GEBs) have recently been used to enhance the reliability and stability of the electric grid through demand response (DR) programs. However, most existing DR control strategies require accurate modeling of the various building thermostatically controlled loads (TCLs) and are computationally expensive. To address these challenges, a model-free control (MFC)-based strategy has recently been introduced for coordinating and controlling GEBs. MFC is a data-enabled control strategy that is computationally efficient and does not require the analytical models of the various building equipment. In this paper, we numerically investigate the impact of communication time delays on the performance of MFC in maintaining the TCLs' temperatures within the desired comfort levels while meeting the assigned power allocation constraint.
In recent years, critical infrastructure and power grids have experienced a series of cyber-attacks, leading to temporary, widespread blackouts of considerable magnitude. Since most substations are unmanned and have limited physical security protection, cyber breaches into power grid substations present a risk. Nowadays, the susceptibility of SDN architecture to cyber-attacks has exhibited a notable increase in recent years, as indicated by research findings. This suggests a growing concern regarding the potential for cybersecurity breaches within the SDN framework. In this paper, we propose a hybrid intrusion detection system (IDS)-integrated SDN architecture for detecting and preventing the injection of malicious IEC 61850-based generic object-oriented system event (GOOSE) messages in a digital substation. Additionally, this program locates the fault’s location and, as a form of mitigation, disables a certain port. Furthermore, implementation examples are demonstrated and verified using a hardware-in-the-loop (HIL) testbed that mimics the functioning of a digital substation.
Increasing penetration levels of inverter-based distributed energy resources (DERs) in distribution systems are creating challenges in system operation. Currently, wired or proprietary wireless communications are used by advanced distribution management systems (ADMS) to detect the state of the system and control the DERs for optimal operation. Wireless communications are an alternative solution that can enable connectivity between the dispersed assets used in distribution system applications. As demand for the seamless integration of distributed energy resources (DERs) continues to increase, proper networking and communications systems are becoming important to support the DER infrastructure. This report summarizes validation of a private wireless LTE network in a laboratory environment. The purpose of this work is to 1) demonstrate the effectiveness of private wireless LTE communication for grid applications and 2) provide a means of evaluating latency and overall performance of wireless communication in grid applications. First, private wireless LTE communication was validated in a direct transfer trip relaying scenario as an example of one-way communications using grid equipment. This study provided a baseline understanding of the variation in latency for seven different kinds of wireless scenarios shown in Figure A below. As expected, weak (attenuated) wireless signal-based communication yielded the widest ranges in latency. When higher priority was set for the trip signal communication, this resulted in lower latency in communication timing. In the final phase of this project, the private wireless LTE network was validated using two-way communications in an advanced distribution management system (ADMS) testbed which was developed in the ESIF at NREL. The purpose of this was to study the impact of wireless communication on grid performance.
The fifth-generation mobile communication (5G) technology offers the opportunities to enhance the grid real-time monitoring. The 5G-enabled phasor measurement units (PMUs) features flexible positioning and cost-effective long-term maintenance, without constraints of fixing wire. This paper is the first to demonstrate the applicability of 5G in PMU communication, and the experiment was carried out at Verizon non-standalone testbed at Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) Advanced Wireless Communication lab. The performance of 5G-enabled PMU communication setup is reviewed and discussed in this paper, and the paper presents a real-time dynamic linear model (DML) based synchrophasor data anomaly detection application. Last but not least, the practicability of implementing 5G for wide-area protection strategies is explored and discussed by analyzing the experimental results.
The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Data Assimilation Office (DAO) at the Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC) has developed the GEOS DAS, a data assimilation system that provides production support for NASA missions and will support NASA's Earth Observing System (EOS) in the coming years. The GEOS DAS will be used to provide background fields of meteorological quantities to EOS satellite instrument teams for use in their data algorithms as well as providing assimilated data sets for climate studies on decadal time scales. The DAO has been involved in prototyping parallel implementations of the GEOS DAS for a number of years and is now embarking on an effort to convert the production version from shared-memory parallelism to distributed-memory parallelism using the portable Message-Passing Interface (MPI). The GEOS DAS consists of two main components, an atmospheric General Circulation Model (GCM) and a Physical-space Statistical Analysis System (PSAS). The GCM operates on data that are stored on a regular grid while PSAS works with observational data that are scattered irregularly throughout the atmosphere. As a result, the two components have different data decompositions. The GCM is decomposed horizontally as a checkerboard with all vertical levels of each box existing on the same processing element(PE). The dynamical core of the GCM can also operate on a rotated grid, which requires communication-intensive grid transformations during GCM integration. PSAS groups observations on PEs in a more irregular and dynamic fashion.
Today’s power distribution system is changing to a power-electronics-enabled distribution system, especially with the increasing penetration of distributed energy resources (DERs). To monitor and manage those electronic devices and DERs at the grid edge, the advanced metering infrastructure (AMI) with two-way communications presents great potential. At present, extensive research explores the upstream communication from smart meters to electric utilities (e.g., meter reading) but few examine the downstream communication from the utilities to smart meters (e.g., meter pinging). This article discusses the AMI two-way communication and its recent industrial practice in the U.S., especially for applying the smart meter pinging functionality to monitor grid-edge devices and DERs. This paper then develops the two-way communication model and the network calculus method to quantify the impact of the two-way communication on the AMI network. In the end, the proposed method is validated with ns-3 simulation using the modified 13-node test feeder and real-world feeder systems.
This report provides an introduction to selected graph theoretic topics with pertinence to the structural analysis of electric power grid and communication systems. We focus on methodologies for defining, scoring, and identifying connectivity, spectral, and bottleneckeness properties in graphs, as well as vertex and edge importance measures such as centrality. We apply these measures to power systems and communications graph data, discuss and visualize the results, and comment on computational aspects of these methods. We show that graph theoretic methods can provide useful insights into grid and communication network structure, leading to tools and methods that could be used by electric utility engineers to improve key grid and communication network characteristics, such as resilience and scalability.
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The global trend towards the integration of distributed energy resources is opening the doors to advanced, complex, and distributedmarketplaces. Such advanced ecosystems, where utility-owned and non utility-owned assets can contribute towards grid operations,generally require distributed communication and grid architectures, which can be supported by Distributed Ledger Technologies(DLTs). However, the potential of DLTs for long-term scalable solutions in operational technology applications has not been fullyutilized, partly due to the lack of standardization across and between different DLTs, as well as other supporting building blocks(e.g., communication protocols). This paper attempts to address this gap by proposing a DLT cybersecurity stack specificallydesigned for researchers, DLT technology developers, and end users (such as utilities). The DLT cybersecurity stack has beennotionally mapped to related cybersecurity components, namely: the Open Systems Interconnection (OSI) model, the TransmissionControl Protocol/Internet Protocol (TCP/IP) suite, and existing Smart Grid architecture frameworks. In addition, the paper discussesseveral cybersecurity implications, and demonstrates the potential uses of the DLT stack through multiple power and energy usecases. It is important to note that the stack can be also applied to the DLT use cases that are outside the power and energy domain.This work has been performed by the Cybersecurity Task Force under the IEEE P2418.5 Blockchain for Energy Standard workinggroup that is stationed under the IEEE Power and Energy Society’s Smart Buildings, Loads, and Customer Systems (SBLC)technical committee.
Utility procedures for power system blackstart and restoration typically assume that energization decisions can be reliably communicated across the grid. In reality, the communications and control network would likely also be affected in power outages, such as those caused by extreme weather events or cyber-attacks. This paper studies the effect of damage to the power system communications and control infrastructure on restoration operations following a blackout. We model the communications infrastructure as a graph, overlaying the power grid, and imposing the requirement that every energized element in the power grid be observable from a control center. We expand on a specialized branch-and-bound algorithm from the literature to optimize the restoration process and devise an initialization heuristic and a rounding heuristic to improve solution speed. We perform numerical experiments on synthetic systems for Illinois and Texas with outages based on a solar flare or hurricane. We compare the results of our specialized branch-and-bound algorithm to the results from (i) the initialization heuristic alone, (ii) a variation of this heuristic that we use as a baseline, and (iii) the restoration optimization for the power system without communications constraints. Here, we find that damage to the communications infrastructure significantly increases the time required to re-energize the grid. Moreover, by simultaneously optimizing communications repairs and grid energization decisions, we are able to re-energize the grid significantly faster than if communications repairs and energization decisions were made independently or with partial coordination, motivating improvements to current industry practice.
The new reality of exascale computing faces many challenges in achieving optimal performance on large numbers of nodes. A key challenge is the efficient utilization of the message-passing interface (MPI), a critical component for process communication. This paper explores communication optimization strategies to harness the GPU-accelerated architectures of these supercomputers. We focus on MPI applications where processors form a two-dimensional process grid, a common arrangement in applications involving dense matrix operations. This configuration offers a unique opportunity to implement innovative strategies to improve performance and maintain effective load distribution. We study two applications— Dist-FW (Apsp:all-pair-shortest-path) and HPL-MxP (LU factorization with Mixed precision)—on two accelerated systems: Summit (IBM Power and NVIDIA V100) and Frontier (AMD EPYC and MI250X). These supercomputers are operated by the Oak Ridge Leadership Computing Facility (OLCF) and are currently ranked #1 and #5 on the Top500 list. We show how to scale up both applications to exascale levels and tackle the MPI challenges related to implementation, synchronization, and performance. We also compare the performance of several communication strategies at an unprecedented scale. Accurately predicting application performance becomes crucial for cost reduction as the computational scale grows. To address this, we suggest a hyperbolic model as a better alternative to the traditional one-sided asymptotic model for predicting future application performance at such large scales.
In the effort of decarbonization and evolution of the modern electrical grid, electric vehicles (EVs) play a key part to transform the grid. However, due to the rapid adoption of EVs and the demand of the charging infrastructure required to power said EVs, risk of a cyber-attack may impose serious consequences. There is a need to analyze and protect the charging ecosystem infrastructure from cyber threats before it reaches wide-scale deployment. In an effort to secure vehicle to grid (V2G) communications, standardization is necessary for continued reliable system operation. The protocol ISO 15118 outlines controls and practices that should be implemented for secure vehicle to grid (V2G) communications. The standard is gaining momentum for American markets as the demand for EV infrastructure grows. The adoption of ISO 15118 in American markets poses several challenges: the deployment of a public key infrastructure (PKI) as outlined within the standard, interoperability of charging different EVs with chargers from different manufactures using the PKI, and scaling the ecosystem to meet the demand while managing risks. This project was created to understand potential cyber and scaling challenges of PKI for EV infrastructure through utilizing a series of emulated components mapping to what exists in the EV ecosystem today, and the components of the PKI that are under development. The key nodes within the emulation that are under development are: electric vehicle (EV), electric vehicle supply equipment (EVSE), charge network operator (CNO), certificate authority (CA), and online certificate status protocol (OCSP) that must all interact using secure and trusted communications. With these emulated components and utilizing orchestration methods to rapidly deploy and scale the components, the ability to analyze risks of the ecosystem and address gaps before the PKI ecosystem is fully deployed to production should yield a more robust and mature production charging infrastructure. Our approach will use a modular architecture of virtual machines within an orchestration platform and will target scales of 100s, 1000s, and 10,000s of entities interacting. The core research questions trying to be answered with this scope of work are: what are the impacts of a rogue CA, what are the risks of certificate revocation list (CRL) management, what is the value of OCSP stapling, what components are vulnerable to DOS attacks, and what test effective payloads may impact the components.
Electric Vehicles (EVs) adoption rate has been steadily increasing in the US leading to a growing number of charging stations including faster DC (Direct Current) chargers and slower Level 1 and Level 2 AC (Alternating Current) chargers. This increase in demand for electricity is further exacerbated by recent developments in Artificial Intelligence (AI) technology, advanced manufacturing, and digitization. These factors will require electric utilities to upgrade their infrastructure to keep up with the increasing electrical demand (especially during peak hours). An easy way to counteract the need for these upgrades is to shift a major chunk of active charge sessions (durations where there is energy transfer from charger to EV's propulsion battery) to off-peak hours thereby flattening the load curve and making the infrastructure more resilient. This concept is known as Smart Charge Management (SCM). EV owners also benefit from SCM since it lowers their charging costs and consequently their transportation costs by prioritizing charging during off-peak hours. SCM takes advantage of EV's capability to act as a controllable load or DER (Distributed Energy Resource). This report summarizes the reliability analysis performed on the communication required for two of these SCM use-cases. This analysis only focuses on SCM strategies for unidirectional charging (energy transfer from EVSE to EV or V1G) and not bidirectional charging.
Bidirectional wireless communication is employed in various smart grid components such as smart meters and control and monitoring applications where security is vital. The Trusted Third Party (TTP) and wireless connectivity between the smart meter and the third party in the key management-based encryption techniques for the smart grid are expected to be totally trustworthy and dependable. In a wired/wireless medium, however, a man-in-the-middle may seek to disrupt, monitor and manipulate the network, or simply execute a replay attack, revealing its vulnerability. Recognizing this, this study presents a novel authentication management (model) comprised of two layer security schema. The first layer implements an efficient novel encryption method for secure data exchange between meters and control center with the help of two partially trusted simple servers (constitutes the TTP). In this setting, one server handles the data encryption between the meter and control center/central database, and the other server administers the random sequence of data transmission. The second layer monitors and verifies exchanged data packets among smart meters. It detects abnormal packets from suspicious sources. To implement this node-to-node authentication, One class support vector machine algorithm is proposed which takes advantages of the location information as well as the data transmission history (node identification, packet size, and data transmission frequency). This schema secures data communication, and imposes a comprehensive privacy throughout the system without considerably extending the complexity of the conventional key management scheme.