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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
NASA NTRS2005

Failure Assessment

Three questions to which software developers want accurate, precise answers are "How can the software system fail?", "mat bad things will happen if the software fails?t', and "How many failures will the software experience?". Numerous techniques have been devised to answer these questions; three of the best known are: 1) Software Fault Tree Analysis (SFTA) 2) Software Failure Modes, Effects, and Criticality Analysis (SFMECA 3) Software Fault/Failure Modeling. SFTA and SFMECA have been successfully used to analyze the flight software for a number of robotic planetary exploration missions, including Galileo, Cassini, and Deep Space 1. Given the increasing interest in reusing software components from mission to mission, one of us has developed techniques for reusing the corresponding portions of the SFTA and SFMECA, reducing the effort required to conduct these analyses. SFTA has also been shown to be effective in analyzing the security aspects of software systems; intrusion mechanisms and effects can easily be modeled using these techniques. The Bi- Directional Safety Analysis (BDSA) method combines a forward search (similar to SFMECA) from potential failure modes to their effects, with a backward search (similar to SFTA) from feasible hazards to the contributing causes of each hazard. BDSA offers an efficient way to identify latent failures. Recent work has extended BDSA to product-line applications such as flight-instrumentation displays and developed tool support for the reuse of the failure-analysis artifacts within a product line. BDSA has also been streamlined to support those projects having tight cost and/or schedule constraints for their failure analysis efforts. We discuss lessons learned from practice, describe available tools, and identi@ some future directions for the topic. A substantial amount of research has been devoted to estimating the number of failures that a software system will experience during test and operations, as well as the number of faults that have been inserted into that system during its development. One of us has found that the amount of structural change to a system during its development is strongly related to the number of faults inserted into it. Using techniques requiring no additional effort on the part of the development organization, the required measurements of structural evolution can be easily obtained from a development effort's configuration management system and readily transformed into an estimate of fault content. So far, structure-fault relationships have been identified for source code; current work seeks to examine artifacts available earlier in the lifecycle to determine if similar relationships between structure and fault content can be found. In particular, relationships between requirements change requests and the number of faults inserted into the implemented system would provide a significant improvement in our ability to control software quality during the early development phases.

fault tree↗
DOE OSTI2020

A spatial-statistical investigation of surface expressions associated with cyclic steaming in the Midway-Sunset Oil Field, California

In the Midway Sunset Oil Field in Central California, operators inject steam into the shallow diatomite formation to enhance heavy oil recovery through imbibition, wettability alteration, and viscosity reduction, among other mechanisms. The injected steam, however, does not always remain in the reservoir or return through the wells. In two zones in the study area, the steam comes out at the surface, creating sinkholes, seeps, and steam outlets. These phenomena, called “surface expressions,” pose safety and environmental hazards. Even though these surface expressions are a widespread problem in Central California, they are not well documented and understood. Possible causes of the surface expressions include: high injection pressure, structurally controlled flow patterns, leakage of steam through old improperly abandoned wells, high injection volumes, or flow along naturally occurring faults, among other possible factors. This work examines attributes of the zones with surface expressions in order to determine factors that may contribute to their occurrence. Spatial statistical analysis using logistic regression, random forests, and classification trees is used to explore the relationship between the surface expressions and geological and production-related attributes. The results point to a significant spatial correlation between the surface expressions and two predictors: concentration of plugged wells and geologic seal thickness. The results guide follow-up studies to further investigate the role of well abandonment and seal thickness in the occurrence of surface expressions.

02 PETROLEUM↗
NASA NTRS2011

Probabilistic Risk Assessment Procedures Guide for NASA Managers and Practitioners (Second Edition)

Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) is a comprehensive, structured, and logical analysis method aimed at identifying and assessing risks in complex technological systems for the purpose of cost-effectively improving their safety and performance. NASA's objective is to better understand and effectively manage risk, and thus more effectively ensure mission and programmatic success, and to achieve and maintain high safety standards at NASA. NASA intends to use risk assessment in its programs and projects to support optimal management decision making for the improvement of safety and program performance. In addition to using quantitative/probabilistic risk assessment to improve safety and enhance the safety decision process, NASA has incorporated quantitative risk assessment into its system safety assessment process, which until now has relied primarily on a qualitative representation of risk. Also, NASA has recently adopted the Risk-Informed Decision Making (RIDM) process [1-1] as a valuable addition to supplement existing deterministic and experience-based engineering methods and tools. Over the years, NASA has been a leader in most of the technologies it has employed in its programs. One would think that PRA should be no exception. In fact, it would be natural for NASA to be a leader in PRA because, as a technology pioneer, NASA uses risk assessment and management implicitly or explicitly on a daily basis. NASA has probabilistic safety requirements (thresholds and goals) for crew transportation system missions to the International Space Station (ISS) [1-2]. NASA intends to have probabilistic requirements for any new human spaceflight transportation system acquisition. Methods to perform risk and reliability assessment in the early 1960s originated in U.S. aerospace and missile programs. Fault tree analysis (FTA) is an example. It would have been a reasonable extrapolation to expect that NASA would also become the world leader in the application of PRA. That was, however, not to happen. Early in the Apollo program, estimates of the probability for a successful roundtrip human mission to the moon yielded disappointingly low (and suspect) values and NASA became discouraged from further performing quantitative risk analyses until some two decades later when the methods were more refined, rigorous, and repeatable. Instead, NASA decided to rely primarily on the Hazard Analysis (HA) and Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) methods for system safety assessment.

Stamatelatos,Michael↗
NASA NTRS1992

Fault detection and fault tolerance in robotics

Robots are used in inaccessible or hazardous environments in order to alleviate some of the time, cost and risk involved in preparing men to endure these conditions. In order to perform their expected tasks, the robots are often quite complex, thus increasing their potential for failures. If men must be sent into these environments to repair each component failure in the robot, the advantages of using the robot are quickly lost. Fault tolerant robots are needed which can effectively cope with failures and continue their tasks until repairs can be realistically scheduled. Before fault tolerant capabilities can be created, methods of detecting and pinpointing failures must be perfected. This paper develops a basic fault tree analysis of a robot in order to obtain a better understanding of where failures can occur and how they contribute to other failures in the robot. The resulting failure flow chart can also be used to analyze the resiliency of the robot in the presence of specific faults. By simulating robot failures and fault detection schemes, the problems involved in detecting failures for robots are explored in more depth.

Visinsky, Monica↗
NASA NTRS2019

Model Based Engineering for Software Assurance

NASA's successful development of next generation space vehicles, habitats, and robotic systems will require reliable hardware and software systems. The aim of this initiative is to develop modeling methodology and tools to support Model-Based Systems Engineering (MBSE) for software assurance and reliability analysis. This effort expands the Unified Modeling Language (UML) software design models to include fault data for the extraction of Failure Modes and Effects Criticality Analysis (FMECA) and Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) for software. We explored different modeling approaches to integrate the UML software design models with the Systems Modeling Language (SysML) system models to generate an integrated model and reliability tools that take into account software and hardware interfaces.The benefits of this concept directly affect the safety community with quick turnarounds to produce software assurance and reliability analysis artifacts and the ability to visualize failure effects, both hardware and software. The result is enhanced system design integrity and early identification of system risks. This initiative will enable software assurance activities early in the system design lifecycle, facilitating the discovery of design weaknesses and enhancing the capability to produce safe, hazard-free systems

Wang, Lui↗
NASA NTRS2021

Data-driven landslide nowcasting at the global scale

Landslides affect nearly every country in the world each year. To better understand this global hazard, the Landslide Hazard Assessment for Situational Awareness (LHASA) model was developed previously. LHASA version 1 combines satellite precipitation estimates with a global landslide susceptibility map to produce a gridded map of potentially hazardous areas from 60° North-South every 3 h. LHASA version 1 categorizes the world’s land surface into three ratings: high, moderate, and low hazard with a single decision tree that first determines if the last seven days of rainfall were intense, then evaluates landslide susceptibility. LHASA version 2 has been developed with a data-driven approach. The global susceptibility map was replaced with a collection of explanatory variables, and two new dynamically varying quantities were added: snow and soil moisture. Along with antecedent rainfall, these variables modulated the response to current daily rainfall. In addition, the Global Landslide Catalog (GLC) was supplemented with several inventories of rainfall-triggered landslide events. These factors were incorporated into the machine-learning framework XGBoost, which was trained to predict the presence or absence of landslides over the period 2015–2018, with the years 2019–2020 reserved for model evaluation. As a result of these improvements, the new global landslide nowcast was twice as likely to predict the occurrence of historical landslides as LHASA version 1, given the same global false positive rate. Furthermore, the shift to probabilistic outputs allows users to directly manage the trade-off between false negatives and false positives, which should make the nowcast useful for a greater variety of geographic settings and applications. In a retrospective analysis, the trained model ran over a global domain for 5 years, and results for LHASA version 1 and version 2 were compared. Due to the importance of rainfall and faults in LHASA version 2, nowcasts would be issued more frequently in some tropical countries, such as Colombia and Papua New Guinea; at the same time, the new version placed less emphasis on arid regions and areas far from the Pacific Rim. LHASA version 2 provides a nearly real-time view of global landslide hazard for a variety of stakeholders.

XGBoos↗
DOE OSTI2026

Probability of Hydrogen Ignition: A Landscape Review and Gaps Assessment

The primary hazard of a leak from a hydrogen system is due to the immediate or delayed ignition of the fuel leading to a jet flame or explosion. Therefore, understanding the hydrogen ignition probability is critical for analyzing the risk of hydrogen systems. This report reviews the current understanding of hydrogen ignition mechanisms and methods for modeling their probability. The stoichiometry, ignition strength, and ignition source temperature are all important characteristics that can affect both the probability of ignition and the outcome of the subsequent combustion event. A brief review of diffusion ignition demonstrates that ignition probability models must account for seemingly spontaneous ignition of hydrogen in addition to scenarios where the ignition source is readily identified. State-of-the art models for both immediate and delayed ignition probabilities are presented, including different physical aspects of the scenarios (e.g., flow rate, ignition source characteristics) that are considered in the different modeling approaches. Current models often fail to account for the unique properties of hydrogen compared to other fuels, and most lack rigorous validation with hydrogen as a fuel. A fault tree framework is proposed to systematically evaluate the probability of ignition by integrating various ignition mechanisms and their uncertainties. Furthermore, this type of framework could enable additional insights into the most important mechanisms and would enable uncertainty quantification in risk assessment modeling. Recommendations for future research include the need for experimental validation of ignition models and the development of comprehensive methodologies that incorporate the specifics of hydrogen behavior in real-world scenarios.

hydrogen↗
DOE OSTI2025

Quantitative Risk Assessment for Fuel Cell Electric Bus Hydrogen Storage and Refueling Facility

It is necessary to understand the safety implications and risk mitigation options for fuel cell electric bus fleet deployment, especially for related facilities responsible for operations such as production, storage, compression, and dispensing of hydrogen for use by the buses. In this report, we present a quantitative risk assessment for a potential fuel cell electric bus fleet that was motivated by efforts to improve resilience at the Portland International Airport but can be applicable to a range of hydrogen case studies and use cases. We estimated risk for a facility that produces, stores, compresses, and dispenses hydrogen for the fleet of buses, with a focus on individual risk to people in terms of annual frequency of fatality. We considered the frequency of hydrogen leaks that could result in harmful physical outcomes like jet fires or explosions, and the consequences of those outcomes for people. We created customized fault trees to calculate the frequencies of different sizes of leaks and event sequence diagrams to calculate ignition probabilities for the various leak sizes. We also leveraged the HyRAM+ toolkit to use these inputs to calculate overall risk for the facility, which we separated into one section responsible for producing, storing, and compressing hydrogen, and one section responsible for dispensing the hydrogen to the buses. We found that the dispensing area seemed to have a higher risk than the production/storage/compression area of the facility, largely because of the inclusion of a component with a high leak frequency (the heat exchanger used to cool the hydrogen before entering the vehicle, to prevent overheating and expansion of hydrogen in the onboard tank). For the example production and refueling facility we evaluated and the data we used for the analysis, the leak frequency had a larger impact on the risk differences between the two sections on the facility, compared to the physical outcome consequence, which was slightly different due to the varying fuel conditions, but not substantially different. Actions can be taken to prevent these hazards (e.g., lowering leak frequencies in system components) or to mitigate the consequences if they do occur (e.g., installing barriers to protect people if ignition events occur). The choice of which actions to take depends not only on safety considerations but also on space, time, staffing, feasibility, and financial constraints. Therefore, the quantitative risk assessment approach can help understand relative risk contributions from different components, leak sizes, consequences, and human actions, to prioritize risk reduction strategies and balance these parameters. The outcomes of this report may be useful for a variety of stakeholders working in the hydrogen, transportation, vehicle, and aviation sector, including those responsible for aspects like facility design, operations, and regulations. There is not a single value of risk that determines whether a hypothetical system is “safe” or not. The insights about risk mitigations may be leveraged, and the quantitative risk assessment approach can be applied to other case studies to understand risk priorities and contributions specific to different FCEB and hydrogen facility uses.

08 HYDROGEN↗