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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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167 records · Page 3
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
NASA NTRS1984

Nickel-iron battery system safety

The generated flow rates of gaseous hydrogen and gaseous oxygen from an electrical vehicle nickel-iron battery system were determined and used to evaluate the flame quenching capabilities of several candidate devices to prevent flame propagation within batteries having central watering/venting systems. The battery generated hydrogen and oxygen gases were measured for a complete charge and discharge cycle. The data correlates well with accepted theory during strong overcharge conditions indicating that the measurements are valid for other portions of the cycle. Tests confirm that the gas mixture in the cells is always flammable regardless of the battery status. The literature indicated that a conventional flame arrestor would not be effective over the broad spectrum of gassing conditions presented by a nickel-iron battery. Four different types of protective devices were evaluated. A foam-metal arrestor design was successful in quenching gaseous hydrogen and gaseous oxygen flames, however; the application of this flame arrestor to individual cell or module protection in a battery is problematic. A possible rearrangement of the watering/venting system to accept the partial protection of simple one-way valves is presented which, in combination with the successful foam-metal arrestor as main vent protection, could result in a significant improvement in battery protection.

Saltat, R. C.↗
NASA NTRS1991

NASA. Johnson Space Center primary battery applications

The role of the Power Branch/EP5 of JSC in primary battery applications is to support those JSC organizations having direct application responsibility with trade studies, battery selection recommendations, and with development, qualification, and provisioning of primary batteries. Battery subsystem management is provided. Payload hazard report preparation is supported, as is the review and comment of such reports for the JSC Payload Safety Panel, who approves the flight safety for all Orbiter payloads. JSC battery users are provided with safety analysis and test support to achieve safety approval. Finally, it is the responsibility of the Power Branch to define and maintain battery safety requirement documentation for JSC.

Bragg, Bob J.↗
NASA NTRS2024

Ejecta Management in a Safe Lithium Ion Battery Design

As lithium-ion battery energy densities continue to rise, managing the heat and pressure generated during failure events has become increasingly critical. Safety systems must effectively relieve pressure without releasing sparks, flames, or particulate matter, requiring robust filtration solutions. The challenge is compounded by the reduced free volume available for gas expansion in high-density designs, which increases the demands on these filters. While significant progress has been made through experimental studies and modeling efforts to understand the behavior of ejecta during battery failures, there remains a pressing need for practical, rule-of-thumb sizing parameters. These parameters would help correlate high-energy waste streams with appropriate filter design, ensuring reliable containment and safety. This talk will explore recent experimental findings in this area and discuss the potential pathways for developing these essential sizing guidelines.

Ejecta Management↗
NASA NTRS2014

Crewed Space Vehicle Battery Safety Requirements

This requirements document is applicable to all batteries on crewed spacecraft, including vehicle, payload, and crew equipment batteries. It defines the specific provisions required to design a battery that is safe for ground personnel and crew members to handle and/or operate during all applicable phases of crewed missions, safe for use in the enclosed environment of a crewed space vehicle, and safe for use in launch vehicles, as well as in unpressurized spaces adjacent to the habitable portion of a space vehicle. The required provisions encompass hazard controls, design evaluation, and verification. The extent of the hazard controls and verification required depends on the applicability and credibility of the hazard to the specific battery design and applicable missions under review. Evaluation of the design and verification program results shall be completed prior to certification for flight and ground operations. This requirements document is geared toward the designers of battery systems to be used in crewed vehicles, crew equipment, crew suits, or batteries to be used in crewed vehicle systems and payloads (or experiments). This requirements document also applies to ground handling and testing of flight batteries. Specific design and verification requirements for a battery are dependent upon the battery chemistry, capacity, complexity, charging, environment, and application. The variety of battery chemistries available, combined with the variety of battery-powered applications, results in each battery application having specific, unique requirements pertinent to the specific battery application. However, there are basic requirements for all battery designs and applications, which are listed in section 4. Section 5 includes a description of hazards and controls and also includes requirements.

Jeevarajan, Judith A.↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Revisiting the Soyuz-1 Parachute Failure in the Context of Safety in the Modern Era

The Soyuz‑1 accident remains one of the most consequential parachute related failures in human spaceflight history and provides enduring lessons for modern Entry, Descent, and Landing (EDL) system design. Occurring during the height of the Cold War and the Space Race, the mission unfolded under extraordinary political and schedule pressure as the Soviet Union sought to maintain its early leadership in space achievements following the death of chief designer Sergei Korolev. Despite unresolved propulsion, electrical, and parachute system deficiencies, Soyuz‑1 proceeded to launch and immediately encountered critical inflight anomalies, including a failed solar panel deployment, attitude control issues, and communication dropouts. Upon reentry, a malfunction in the parachute system, driven by a primary main canopy that failed to deploy, and subsequent entanglement of the reserve main canopy with the primary drogue parachute, resulted in insufficient deceleration and the fatal crash of cosmonaut Vladimir Komarov. Subsequent investigations revealed deep rooted cultural and organizational issues within the Soviet space program, including inadequate testing, suppression of dissent, undocumented last minute design changes, and the absence of integrated parachute system verification. More than 200 design flaws were identified after the accident, and firsthand accounts, including those from Yuri Gagarin, highlighted widespread concern prior to launch. Over time, the Soviet program implemented substantial reforms: systematic design corrections, rigorous process documentation, and an extensive series of drop tests that ultimately transformed the Soyuz system into one of the world’s most reliable human-rated return vehicles. This paper examines the technical architecture of the Soyuz‑1 parachute system, reconstructs the likely deployment sequence and failure mechanism, and analyzes the cultural contributors that shaped the accident. The study draws parallels to modern spacecraft parachute development, emphasizing the critical importance of integrated system testing, transparent engineering culture, and continuous hardware surveillance. These lessons remain directly relevant to today’s NASA and Commercial Crew Programs (CCP), where the Government continues to refine its understanding of aggregate risk and strengthen overall astronaut safety in the face of increasingly complex parachute systems.

Aaron L Morris↗
NASA NTRS1983

The Galileo probe Li/SO2 battery: The safest battery on Jupiter

The unique power requirement of NASA's Galileo Jupiter Probe are most readily met by a Li/SO2 battery; however, because this battery system is not space flight proven, extensive effort was required to qualify this device from the stand point of performance and safety. Due to the rather checkered safety record of the Li/SO2 system, safety has been foremost among the design considerations and has been addressed at the cell, battery and system level. The mission requirements which led to the choice of the Li/SO2 battery and the safety engineering which went into the battery and power system design are described.

Marcoux, L. S.↗
NASA NTRS1990

Development of nickel hydrogen battery expert system

The Hubble Telescope Battery Testbed employs the nickel-cadmium battery expert system (NICBES-2) which supports the evaluation of performances of Hubble Telescope spacecraft batteries and provides alarm diagnosis and action advice. NICBES-2 also provides a reasoning system along with a battery domain knowledge base to achieve this battery health management function. An effort to modify NICBES-2 to accommodate nickel-hydrogen battery environment in testbed is described.

Shiva, Sajjan G.↗
NASA NTRS2006

Data Mining for ISHM of Liquid Rocket Propulsion Status Update

This document consists of presentation slides that review the current status of data mining to support the work with the Integrated Systems Health Management (ISHM) for the systems associated with Liquid Rocket Propulsion. The aim of this project is to have test stand data from Rocketdyne to design algorithms that will aid in the early detection of impending failures during operation. These methods will be extended and improved for future platforms (i.e., CEV/CLV).

Ashok Srivastava↗
NASA NTRS2005

Introduction to Flight Test Engineering [Introduction Aux Techniques Des Essais En Vol]

Flight test is at the core of what organizations must do in order to validate the operation and systems on an aircraft. While the AGARDograph series 300 and 160 series deal with aspects of this testing, this volume pulls it all together as an introduction to the process required to do effective flight test engineering. This volume was originally published in 1995. Its utility has been proven in that many flight test organizations and universities have requested copies for their engineers and students. It was felt that re-issuing it in a new format designed for electronic publication would be valuable to the community. This second printing changes none of the text, but rather reformats it. All the original references to AGARD (instead of RTO) are left in place so that none of the flavor of the original publication is lost. This is the Introductory Volume to the Flight Test Techniques Series. It is a general introduction to the various activities and aspects of Flight Test Engineering that must be considered when planning, conducting, and reporting a flight test program. Its main intent is to provide a broad overview to the novice engineer or to other people who have a need to interface with specialists within the flight test community. The first two Sections provide some insight into the question of why flight test and give a short history of flight test engineering. Sections 3 through 10 deal with the preparation for flight testing. They provide guidance on the preliminary factors that must be considered; the composition of the test team; the logistic support requirements; the instrumentation and data processing requirements; the flight test plan; the associated preliminary ground tests; and last, but by no means least, discuss safety aspects. Sections 11 through 27 describe the various types of flight tests that are usually conducted during the development and certification of a new or modified aircraft type. Each Section offers a brief introduction to the topic under consideration, and the nature and the objectives of the tests to be conducted. It lists the test instrumentation (and, where appropriate, other test equipment and facilities) required, describes the test maneuvers to be executed, and indicates the way in which the test data is selected, analyzed, and presented. The various activities that should take place between test flights are presented next. Items that are covered are: who to debrief; what type of reports to send where: types of data analysis required for next flight; review of test data to make a comparison to predicted data and some courses of action if there is not good agreement; and comments on selecting the next test flight. The activities that must take place upon completion of the test program are presented. The types of reports and briefings that should take place and a discussion of some of the uses of the flight test data are covered. A brief forecast is presented of where present trends may be leading.

Test facilities↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Standards Roadmapping for Mission Assurance in Commercial Spaceflight

This paper explores the application of established roadmapping approaches in standards planning and roadmap development to support mission assurance objectives. Mission assurance requires proactive planning across multiple domains including technical, schedule, cost, organizational, and policy. The intersection of these domains happens at the enterprise level, and enterprise systems engineering processes can systematically guide mission assurance activities, including development of standards roadmaps. Standards planning and development is a critical contributor to an effective mission assurance strategy, although standards are often developed and adopted reactively. Technology and standards planning is a key Enterprise Process Management activity, as identified by the Systems Engineering Body of Knowledge, and technology and standards roadmaps are strategic tools used to enable that process. Technology roadmapping has proven effective in guiding enterprise architecture and concept design, and standards planning supports enterprise requirements definition and management. However, there are limited methodologies to guide such standards planning activities. The application of technology roadmapping principles to standards planning formalizes the process and establishes a repeatable framework for standards development and integration. The framework development described in this paper fills a methodological gap by adapting proven roadmapping techniques to standards planning. Through a comparison of roadmapping methodologies and a case study analysis, this approach outlines a systematic process for anticipating and planning standards needs. In the case of developing a standards integration roadmap for NASA’s Office of Safety and Mission Assurance (OSMA), technology roadmapping principles were adapted to develop a roadmap framework to allow NASA and OSMA to define an agency-wide standards integration plan for commercial and industry safety and mission assurance standards. The outcome highlights key adaptations required for roadmapping in a standards context and describes the process steps to formalize a standards planning activity. The roadmapping framework adapted for standards development and integration enables more strategic, forward-looking standards planning and allows for better alignment between evolving capabilities and mission assurance requirements. Beyond its application to mission assurance, this methodology can be transferred to other domains requiring standards development, providing a systematic approach that integrates systems engineering principles into policy strategy and decision-making processes.

Enterprise Systems Engineering↗
NASA NTRS2002

Research Reports: 2001 NASA/ASEE Summer Faculty Fellowship Program

For the thirty-seventh consecutive year, a NASA/ASEE (American Society for Engineering Education) Summer Faculty Fellowship Program was conducted at Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC). The program was conducted by The University of Alabama in Huntsville and MSFC during the period May 29 - August 3, 2001. Operated under the auspices of the American Society for Engineering Education, the MSFC program, as well as those at other NASA Centers, was sponsored by the University Affairs Office, NASA Headquarters, Washington, DC. The basic objectives of the programs, which are in the thirty-seventh year of operation nationally, are (1) to further the professional knowledge of qualified engineering and science faculty members; (2) to stimulate an exchange of ideas between participants and NASA; (3) to enrich and refresh the research and teaching activities of the participants' institutions; and (4) to contribute to the research objectives of the NASA Centers. The Faculty Fellows spent ten weeks at MSFC engaged in a research project compatible with their interests and background and worked in collaboration with a NASA MSFC colleague. This document is a compilation of Fellows' reports on their research during the summer of 2001.

Avionics↗
NASA NTRS2008

An Investigation of State-Space Model Fidelity for SSME Data

In previous studies, a variety of unsupervised anomaly detection techniques for anomaly detection were applied to SSME (Space Shuttle Main Engine) data. The observed results indicated that the identification of certain anomalies were specific to the algorithmic method under consideration. This is the reason why one of the follow-on goals of these previous investigations was to build an architecture to support the best capabilities of all algorithms. We appeal to that goal here by investigating a cascade, serial architecture for the best performing and most suitable candidates from previous studies. As a precursor to a formal ROC (Receiver Operating Characteristic) curve analysis for validation of resulting anomaly detection algorithms, our primary focus here is to investigate the model fidelity as measured by variants of the AIC (Akaike Information Criterion) for state-space based models. We show that placing constraints on a state-space model during or after the training of the model introduces a modest level of suboptimality. Furthermore, we compare the fidelity of all candidate models including those embodying the cascade, serial architecture. We make recommendations on the most suitable candidates for application to subsequent anomaly detection studies as measured by AIC-based criteria.

Space Shuttles↗
NASA NTRS2003

Columbia Accident Investigation Board Report: Volume One

The Columbia Accident Investigation Board's independent investigation into the February 1, 2003, loss of the Space Shuttle Columbia and its seven-member crew lasted nearly seven months. A staff of more than 120, along with some 400 NASA engineers, supported the Board's 13 members. Investigators examined more than 30,000 documents, conducted more than 200 formal interviews, heard testimony from dozens of expert witnesses, and reviewed more than 3,000 inputs from the general public. In addition, more than 25,000 searchers combed vast stretches of the Western United States to retrieve the spacecraft's debris. In the process, Columbia's tragedy was compounded when two debris searchers with the U.S. Forest Service perished in a helicopter accident. This report discusses the attributes of an organization that could more safely and reliably operate the inherently risky Space Shuttle, but does not provide a detailed organizational prescription. Among those attributes are: a robust and independent program technical authority that has complete control over specifications and requirements, and waivers to them; an independent safety assurance organization with line authority over all levels of safety oversight; and an organizational culture that reflects the best characteristics of a learning organization. This report concludes with recommendations, some of which are specifically identified and prefaced as "before return to flight." These recommendations are largely related to the physical cause of the accident, and include preventing the loss of foam, improved imaging of the Space Shuttle stack from liftoff through separation of the External Tank, and on-orbit inspection and repair of the Thermal Protection System. The remaining recommendations, for the most part, stem from the Board's findings on organizational cause factors. While they are not "before return to flight" recommendations, they can be viewed as "continuing to fly" recommendations, as they capture the Board's thinking on what changes are necessary to operate the Shuttle and future spacecraft safely in the mid- to long-term.

CAIB↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Fire-Resistant Textile Development for Exploration Vehicles With Enriched-Oxygen Cabin Environments

Material selection is a key part of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) spacecraft fire safety management plan. Non-flammable textiles are necessary to ensure large-scale flame propagation events do not occur inside a spacecraft. An increased use of textiles and other softgood material is crucial to the pursuit of exploration spaceflight to reduce mass and volume. Exploration spaceflight missions benefit from enriched oxygen cabin environments (>21% O2) by allowing a reduced prebreathe protocol before Extravehicular Activity (EVA). However, materials become exponentially more flammable the higher the O2 levels become. Recent testing within the agency has revealed the lack of commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) materials that can meet safety requirements in oxygen-enriched environments. Most of the fibers and textiles developed during Apollo (100% O2 cabin environment) and Skylab (>70% O2 cabin environment) are no longer commercially available due to those Programs ending and the discontinuation of raw materials or closure of the original manufacturers. As NASA returns to higher oxygen concentrations inside spacecraft, non-flammable textile development efforts have begun to meet the agency’s needs. This paper discusses those efforts including overall fire safety approach, state-of-the-art textile review and testing, an agency-wide assessment of textile needs performed by the NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC), the textile development strategy and expected challenges.

Mary Walker↗
NASA NTRS2014

Online Prediction of Battery Discharge and Estimation of Parasitic Loads for an Electric Aircraft

Predicting whether or not vehicle batteries contain sufficient charge to support operations over the remainder of a given flight plan is critical for electric aircraft. This paper describes an approach for identifying upper and lower uncertainty bounds on predictions that aircraft batteries will continue to meet output power and voltage requirements over the remainder of a flight plan. Battery discharge prediction is considered here in terms of the following components; (i) online battery state of charge estimation; (ii) prediction of future battery power demand as a function of an aircraft flight plan; (iii) online estimation of additional parasitic battery loads; and finally, (iv) estimation of flight plan safety. Substantial uncertainty is considered to be an irremovable part of the battery discharge prediction problem. However, high-confidence estimates of flight plan safety or lack of safety are shown to be generated from even highly uncertain prognostic predictions.

Battery Discharge Prediction↗
NASA NTRS2003

Columbia Accident Investigation Board Report: Volume Four

Volume IV of the Report contains appendices that were not cited in Volume I. These consist of documents produced by NASA and other organizations, which were provided to the Columbia Accident Investigation Board in support of its inquiry into the February 1, 2003 destruction of the Space Shuttle Columbia. The documents are compiled in this volume in the interest of establishing a complete record, but they do not necessarily represent the views of the Board. Volume I contains the Board's findings, analysis, and recommendations. The documents in Volume III through V are also contained in their original color format on the DVD disc in the back of Volume II. Volumes II – VI contain a number of conclusions and recommendations, several of which were adopted by the Board in Volume I. The other conclusions and recommendations drawn in Volumes II – VI do not necessarily reflect the opinion of the Board, but are included for the record. When there is conflict, Volume I takes precedence.

NASA↗
NASA NTRS2013

Battery Fault Detection with Saturating Transformers

A battery monitoring system utilizes a plurality of transformers interconnected with a battery having a plurality of battery cells. Windings of the transformers are driven with an excitation waveform whereupon signals are responsively detected, which indicate a health of the battery. In one embodiment, excitation windings and sense windings are separately provided for the plurality of transformers such that the excitation waveform is applied to the excitation windings and the signals are detected on the sense windings. In one embodiment, the number of sense windings and/or excitation windings is varied to permit location of underperforming battery cells utilizing a peak voltage detector.

Davies, Francis J.↗
NASA NTRS2008

NASA Battery Working Group - 2007-2008: Battery Task Summary Report

This presentation provides a summary of the 2007-2008 NASA Battery Working Group efforts completed in support of the NASA Engineering Safety Center (NESC). The effort covered a series of pro-active tasks that address the following: Binding Procurements -- guidelines related to requirements for the battery system that should be considered at the time of contract award Wet Life of Ni-H2 Batteries -- issues/strategies for effective storage and impact of long-term storage on performance and life Generic Guidelines for Lithium-ion Safety, Handling and Qualification -- Standardized approaches developed and risk assessments (1) Lithium-ion Performance Assessment -- survey of manufacturers and capabilities to meet mission needs. Guidelines document generated (2) Conditions Required for using Pouch Cells in Aerospace Missions -- focus on corrosion, thermal excursions and long-term performance issues. Document defining requirements to maintain performance and life (3) High Voltage Risk Assessment -- focus on safety and abuse tolerance of battery module assemblies. Recommendations of features required for safe implementation (4) Procedure for Determination of Safe Charge Rates -- evaluation of various cell chemistries and recommendation of safe operating regimes for specific cell designs

Manzo, Michelle↗