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Human Health Countermeasures (HHC) Element Management Plan: Human Research Program

NASA s Human Research Program (HRP) is an applied research and technology program within the Human Exploration and Operations Mission Directorate (HEOMD) that addresses human health and performance risk mitigation strategies in support of exploration missions. The HRP research and technology development is focused on the highest priority risks to crew health and safety with the goal of ensuring mission success and maintaining long-term crew health. Crew health and performance standards, defined by the NASA Chief Health and Medical Officer (CHMO), set the acceptable risk level for exploration missions. The HRP conducts research to inform these standards as well as provide deliverables, such as countermeasures, that ensure standards can be met to maximize human performance and mission success. The Human Health Countermeasures (HHC) Element was formed as part of the HRP to develop a scientifically-based, integrated approach to understanding and mitigating the health risks associated with human spaceflight. These health risks have been organized into four research portfolios that group similar or related risks. A fifth portfolio exists for managing technology developments and infrastructure projects. The HHC Element portfolios consist of: a) Vision and Cardiovascular; b) Exercise and Performance; c) Multisystem; d) Bone; and e) Technology and Infrastructure. The HHC identifies gaps associated with the health risks and plans human physiology research that will result in knowledge required to more fully understand risks and will result in validated countermeasures to mitigate risks.

Norsk, Peter

And the Humans Save the Day or Maybe They Ruin It: The Importance of Humans in the Loop

Flying a mission in space requires a massive commitment of resources, and without the talent and commitment of the people involved in this effort we would never leave the atmosphere of Earth. When we use the phrase "humans in the loop", it could apply to almost any endeavor since everything starts with humans developing a concept, completing the design process, building or implementing a product and using the product to achieve a goal or purpose. Narrowing the focus to spaceflights, there are a variety of individuals involved throughout the preparations for flight and the flight itself. All of the humans involved add value and support for program success. The purpose of this paper focuses on how a Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) accounts for the human in the loop for potential missions using a technique called Human Reliability Analysis (HRA). Human actions can increase or decrease the overall risk via initiating events or mitigating them, thus removing the human from the loop doesn't always lower the risk.

DeMott, Diana

Landing Humans and Human-Class Cargo on the Moon and Mars

For more than a decade, efforts have been ongoing at NASA’s Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) in Huntsville, Alabama, to land humans and large, human-rated cargo on planetary bodies like the Moon and Mars. This work continues today under the Center’s Lander Programs (LP) office. Recognizing MSFC’s heritage, NASA stood up the Human Landing System program at the Center in August 2019 to be responsible for spacecrafts that will land the next American astronauts on the Moon under Artemis. With work well underway for the historic Artemis III mission to land the first woman and first person of color on the lunar surface through the Appendix H Option A contract with SpaceX, LP is focused on the development of landers that will support the Agency’s long-term Artemis efforts at the Moon and NASA’s future at Mars. In March 2022, NASA announced its plan to solicit a second industry provider in addition to SpaceX to develop and demonstrate a lander that meets the program’s extended set of requirements for missions beyond Artemis III. Under the umbrella of Sustaining Lunar Development, these requirements will meet NASA’s needs for recurring, long-term access to the lunar surface, such as accommodating an increased crew size and delivering more mass to the surface. Additionally, NASA plans to leverage crewed lander development activities to procure and certify the design of landers capable of human-class cargo delivery. This paper will examine how the Lander Program office at MSFC is bridging from the initial demonstration phase of development for the Human Landing System program to the Sustaining Lunar Development phase and feeding forward to Mars. The requirements and lines of effort for landing humans and human class cargo will be discussed, as well as near-term and future milestones for the program.

Lemuel Carpenter

Human Error Analysis for Human-Rated Space Systems

Humans bring unique capabilities to space systems and contribute to mission success in a manner that cannot be matched by machines. Nevertheless, from time to time, human error can present a threat to system performance, and system designers must anticipate and manage this risk. NASA’s Human-Rating Requirements for Space Systems call for program managers to conduct a human error analysis (HEA) during system development but does not specify how to do this. In 2018, NASA’s Engineering and Safety Center asked the authors to develop a guidance document on HEA. The resulting position paper outlines a suggested method for HEA and makes it clear that error analysis is about identifying and mitigating problems at a system level, and not about finding fault with individuals. Error management strategies must be directed at error-producing conditions, thereby reducing the likelihood of human error, while retaining the positive contribution that humans make to system operations.

human error human-rated space

Human-centered design of human-computer-human dialogs in aerospace systems

The second six months of this grant saw further development of GT-CATS, the Georgia Tech Crew Activity Tracking System, and progress on research exploring tutoring concepts for tutors for mode management. The latter included data analysis and a preliminary paper summarizing the development and evaluation of the VNAV Tutor. A follow-on to the VNAV Tutor is planned. Research in this direction will examine the use of OFMspert and GT-CATS to create an 'intelligent' tutor for mode management, a more extensive domain of application than only vertical navigation, and alternative pedagogy, such as substituting focused 'cases' of reported mode management situations rather than lessons defined by full LOFT scenarios.

Mitchell, Christine M.

Human-Centered Design of Human-Computer-Human Dialogs in Aerospace Systems

A series of ongoing research programs at Georgia Tech established a need for a simulation support tool for aircraft computer-based aids. This led to the design and development of the Georgia Tech Electronic Flight Instrument Research Tool (GT-EFIRT). GT-EFIRT is a part-task flight simulator specifically designed to study aircraft display design and single pilot interaction. ne simulator, using commercially available graphics and Unix workstations, replicates to a high level of fidelity the Electronic Flight Instrument Systems (EFIS), Flight Management Computer (FMC) and Auto Flight Director System (AFDS) of the Boeing 757/767 aircraft. The simulator can be configured to present information using conventional looking B757n67 displays or next generation Primary Flight Displays (PFD) such as found on the Beech Starship and MD-11.

Mitchell, Christine M.

Expert systems should be more accurate than human experts - Evaluation procedures from human judgment and decisionmaking

Two procedures for the evaluation of the performance of expert systems are illustrated: one procedure evaluates predictive accuracy; the other procedure is complementary in that it uncovers the factors that contribute to predictive accuracy. Using these procedures, it is argued that expert systems should be more accurate than human experts in two senses. One sense is that expert systems must be more accurate to be cost-effective. Previous research is reviewed and original results are presented which show that simple statistical models typically perform better than human experts for the task of combining evidence from a given set of information sources. The results also suggest the second sense in which expert systems should be more accurate than human experts. They reveal that expert systems should share factors that contribute to human accuracy, but not factors that detract from human accuracy. Thus the thesis is that one should both require and expect systems to be more accurate than humans.

Levi, Keith

Issues on combining human and non-human intelligence

The purpose here is to call attention to some of the issues confronting the designer of a system that combines human and non-human intelligence. We do not know how to design a non-human intelligence in such a way that it will fit naturally into a human organization. The author's concern is that, without adequate understanding and consideration of the behavioral and psychological limitations and requirements of the human member(s) of the system, the introduction of artificial intelligence (AI) subsystems can exacerbate operational problems. We have seen that, when these technologies are not properly applied, an overall degradation of performance at the system level can occur. Only by understanding how human and automated systems work together can we be sure that the problems introduced by automation are not more serious than the problems solved.

Statler, Irving C.

Human Factors in Human-Systems Integration

Any large organization whose mission is to design and develop systems for humans, and train humans needs a well-developed integration and process plan to deal with the challenges that arise from managing multiple subsystems. Human capabilities, skills, and needs must be considered early in the design and development process, and must be continuously considered throughout the development lifecycle. This integration of human needs within system design is typically formalized through a Human-Systems Integration (HSI) program. By having an HSI program, an institution or organization can reduce lifecycle costs and increase the efficiency, usability, and quality of its products because human needs have been considered from the beginning.

Fitts, David J.

Deep Space Human-Systems Research Recommendations for Future Human-Automation/Robotic Integration

Appropriate integration between automation and robotics systems and their human operators is essential for future space exploration. The Human Factors and Behavioral Performance Element of NASA’s Human Research Program requires a systematic understanding of the critical human-automation/robotic (HAR) integration, or HARI, design challenges for future space exploration. This document reports the results of a systematic assessment of the spaceflight-relevant HARI technologies and research topics addressing critical gaps in spaceflight-relevant HARI knowledge, and prioritizes research required for successful human performance and HAR integration. We reviewed relevant literature across the past ten years and interviewed ten subject matter experts to investigate the current state of HARI technology, challenges facing development, the state of HARI research across a wide range of fields, and opportunities for advancing the state of the art through directed research. This information was used to identify relevant HARI technologies and research topics, as well as factors to assess relative priority of HARI technologies. We worked with NASA stakeholders to weight the factors relevant to assessing HARI specific technologies. A multi-dimensional trade analysis was performed to objectively score HARI research topics and specific technologies to recommended investment priorities for NASA.

human-automation interaction

Where is the Human in the Loop? Human Factors Analysis of Extended Visual Line of Sight Unmanned Aerial System Operations within a Remote Operations Environment

Many envisioned technological and conceptual innovations focus on allocating more functions to automation, relegating the human as an afterthought if not a nuisance. Yet, until complete autonomy is realized, the human will remain “in the loop”. The National Aeronautics and Space Administration is supporting research for the development and maturation of automated technologies and architectures for the future of advanced air mobility. Standing up a remote operations center used to control, manage, and monitor multiple highly automated vehicles is an important step towards realizing the advanced air mobility vision. At the National Aeronautics and Space Administration’s Langley Research Center, a remote operation center exists and has been tested using humans piloting simulated vehicles. In this paper, we explore the human element within live flight operations that rely on increasingly automated technologies. Four ground control station operators performed multiple live flight operations. We employed a naturalistic approach and relied on qualitative data such as interviews and discussions with subject matter experts to help facilitate discovery. The present work evaluates the functions that the human and the automation had during the live operations, lists psychological constructs that may have promoted or reduced task performance, and provides recommendations on design of the remote operations environment and training of future ground control station operators.

Advanced Air Mobility

Where is the Human in the Loop? Human Factors Analysis of Extended Visual Line of Sight Unmanned Aerial System Operations within a Remote Operations Environment

Many envisioned technological and conceptual innovations focus on allocating more functions to automation, relegating the human as an afterthought if not a nuisance. Yet, until complete autonomy is realized, the human will remain “in the loop”. The National Aeronautics and Space Administration is supporting research for the development and maturation of automated technologies and architectures for the future of advanced air mobility. Standing up a remote operations center used to control, manage, and monitor multiple highly automated vehicles is an important step towards realizing the advanced air mobility vision. At the National Aeronautics and Space Administration’s Langley Research Center, a remote operation center exists and has been tested using humans piloting simulated vehicles. In this paper, we explore the human element within live flight operations that rely on increasingly automated technologies. Four ground control station operators performed multiple live flight operations. We employed a naturalistic approach and relied on qualitative data such as interviews and discussions with subject matter experts to help facilitate discovery. The present work evaluates the functions that the human and the automation had during the live operations, lists psychological constructs that may have promoted or reduced task performance, and provides recommendations on design of the remote operations environment and training of future ground control station operators.

Advanced Air Mobility

Csa-19, a radiation-responsive human gene, identified by an unbiased two-gel cDNA library screening method in human cancer cells

A novel polymerase chain reaction (PCR)-based method was used to identify candidate genes whose expression is altered in cancer cells by ionizing radiation. Transcriptional induction of randomly selected genes in control versus irradiated human HL60 cells was compared. Among several complementary DNA (cDNA) clones recovered by this approach, one cDNA clone (CL68-5) was downregulated in X-irradiated HL60 cells but unaffected by 12-O-tetradecanoyl phorbol-13-acetate, forskolin, or cyclosporin-A. DNA sequencing of the CL68-5 cDNA revealed 100% nucleotide sequence homology to the reported human Csa-19 gene. Northern blot analysis of RNA from control and irradiated cells revealed the expression of a single 0.7-kilobase (kb) messenger RNA (mRNA) transcript. This 0.7-kb Csa-19 mRNA transcript was also expressed in a variety of human adult and corresponding fetal normal tissues. Moreover, when the effect of X- or fission neutron-irradiation on Csa-19 mRNA was compared in cultured human cells differing in p53 gene status (p53-/- versus p53+/+), downregulation of Csa-19 by X-rays or fission neutrons was similar in p53-wild type and p53-null cell lines. Our results provide the first known example of a radiation-responsive gene in human cancer cells whose expression is not associated with p53, adenylate cyclase or protein kinase C.

NASA Discipline Radiation Health

The human role in space. Volume 3: Generalizations on human roles in space

The human role in space was studied. The role and the degree of direct involvement of humans that will be required in future space missions, was investigated. Valid criteria for allocating functional activities between humans and machines were established. The technology requirements, ecnomics, and benefits of the human presence in space were examined. Factors which affect crew productivity include: internal architecture; crew support; crew activities; LVA systems; IVA/EVA interfaces; and remote systems management. The accomplished work is reported and the data and analyses from which the study results are derived are included. The results provide information and guidelines to enable NASA program managers and decision makers to establish, early in the design process, the most cost effective design approach for future space programs, through the optimal application of unique human skills and capabilities in space.

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Human Research Program Space Human Factors Engineering (SHFE) Standing Review Panel (SRP)

The Space Human Factors Engineering (SHFE) Standing Review Panel (SRP) evaluated 22 gaps and 39 tasks in the three risk areas assigned to the SHFE Project. The area where tasks were best designed to close the gaps and the fewest gaps were left out was the Risk of Reduced Safety and Efficiency dire to Inadequate Design of Vehicle, Environment, Tools or Equipment. The areas where there were more issues with gaps and tasks, including poor or inadequate fit of tasks to gaps and missing gaps, were Risk of Errors due to Poor Task Design and Risk of Error due to Inadequate Information. One risk, the Risk of Errors due to Inappropriate Levels of Trust in Automation, should be added. If astronauts trust automation too much in areas where it should not be trusted, but rather tempered with human judgment and decision making, they will incur errors. Conversely, if they do not trust automation when it should be trusted, as in cases where it can sense aspects of the environment such as radiation levels or distances in space, they will also incur errors. This will be a larger risk when astronauts are less able to rely on human mission control experts and are out of touch, far away, and on their own. The SRP also identified 11 new gaps and five new tasks. Although the SRP had an extremely large quantity of reading material prior to and during the meeting, we still did not feel we had an overview of the activities and tasks the astronauts would be performing in exploration missions. Without a detailed task analysis and taxonomy of activities the humans would be engaged in, we felt it was impossible to know whether the gaps and tasks were really sufficient to insure human safety, performance, and comfort in the exploration missions. The SRP had difficulty evaluating many of the gaps and tasks that were not as quantitative as those related to concrete physical danger such as excessive noise and vibration. Often the research tasks for cognitive risks that accompany poor task or information design addressed only part, but not all, of the gaps they were programmed to fill. In fact the tasks outlined will not close the gap but only scratch the surface in many cases. In other cases, the gap was written too broadly, and really should be restated in a more constrained way that can be addressed by a well-organized and complementary set of tasks. In many cases, the research results should be turned into guidelines for design. However, it was not clear whether the researchers or another group would construct and deliver these guidelines.

Wichansky, Anna

Human Modeling For Ground Processing Human Factors Engineering Analysis

There have been many advancements and accomplishments over that last few years using human modeling for human factors engineering analysis for design of spacecraft and launch vehicles. The key methods used for this are motion capture and computer generated human models. The focus of this paper is to explain the different types of human modeling used currently and in the past at Kennedy Space Center (KSC) currently, and to explain the future plans for human modeling for future spacecraft designs.

Tran, Donald

The Exploration of Mars by Humans: Why Mars? Why Humans?

As we commemorate the 50th anniversary of Yuri Gagarin's historic flight in 1961, the first flight of a human in space, plans are underway for another historic human mission. Plans are being developed for a human mission to Mars. Once we reach Mars, the human species will become the first two-planet species. Both the Bush Administration (in 2004) and the Obama Administration (in 2010) proposed a human mission to Mars as a national goal of the United States.

Levine, Joel S.

Human Modeling for Ground Processing Human Factors Engineering Analysis

There have been many advancements and accomplishments over the last few years using human modeling for human factors engineering analysis for design of spacecraft. The key methods used for this are motion capture and computer generated human models. The focus of this paper is to explain the human modeling currently used at Kennedy Space Center (KSC), and to explain the future plans for human modeling for future spacecraft designs

Stambolian, Damon B.