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DOE OSTI2025

Detecting Masquerade Attacks in Controller Area Networks Using Graph Machine Learning

Modern vehicles rely on a myriad of electronic control units (ECUs) interconnected via controller area networks (CANs) for critical operations. Despite their ubiquitous use and reliability, CANs are susceptible to sophisticated cyberattacks, particularly masquerade attacks, which inject false data that mimic legitimate messages at the expected frequency. These attacks pose severe risks such as unintended acceleration, brake deactivation, and rogue steering. Traditional intrusion detection systems (IDS) often struggle to detect these subtle intrusions due to their seamless integration into normal traffic. This paper introduces a novel framework for detecting masquerade attacks in the CAN bus using graph machine learning (ML). We hypothesize that the integration of shallow graph embeddings with time series features derived from CAN frames enhances the detection of masquerade attacks. We show that by representing CAN bus frames as message sequence graphs (MSGs) and enriching each node with contextual statistical attributes from time series, we can enhance detection capabilities across various attack patterns compared to using graph-based features only. Our method ensures a comprehensive and dynamic analysis of CAN frame interactions, improving robustness and efficiency. Extensive experiments on the ROAD dataset validate the effectiveness of our approach, demonstrating statistically significant improvements in the detection rates of masquerade attacks compared to a baseline that uses graph-based features only as confirmed by Mann-Whitney U and Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests (p < 0.05) .

Marfo, William [Univ. of Texas, El Paso, TX (Unite↗

DOE OSTI2021

Intrusion Detection for Cybersecurity of Power Electronics Dominated Grids: Inverters PQ Set-Points Manipulation

This work provides cybersecurity analytics for a high photovoltaic (PV) penetrated distribution network, representing future power electronics dominated grid (PEDG). Firstly, the impact of active and reactive power (PQ) set-points manipulation on the network is studied. Then, an intrusion detection system (IDS) is developed for identifying the potentially compromised PV inverters in the network. The proposed IDS is based on defining the normal, safe, and abnormal operation regions of the PV inverters from point of view of the steady state voltage stability of the network. These three-operation regions are identified by utilizing active power, reactive power, and voltage (PQV) limits of each specific grid-following inverter in the network. Each grid-following inverter's PQV contour includes the information of network topology, inverter ratings, and inverter controller. The developed PQ limits are integrated into the centralized secondary control layer for realization of the proposed IDS. Furthermore, the proposed secondary control layer is capable of providing remedial actions during an anomaly event to enhance the grid resiliency. The theoretical analyses are verified by several attack scenarios for a network of grid-following inverters.

41 EE - Solar Energy Technologies Office (EE-4S)↗

DOE OSTI2021

IoT Intrusion Detection Taxonomy, Reference Architecture, and Analyses

This paper surveys the deep learning (DL) approaches for intrusion-detection systems (IDSs) in Internet of Things (IoT) and the associated datasets toward identifying gaps, weaknesses, and a neutral reference architecture. A comparative study of IDSs is provided, with a review of anomaly-based IDSs on DL approaches, which include supervised, unsupervised, and hybrid methods. All techniques in these three categories have essentially been used in IoT environments. To date, only a few have been used in the anomaly-based IDS for IoT. For each of these anomaly-based IDSs, the implementation of the four categories of feature(s) extraction, classification, prediction, and regression were evaluated. We studied important performance metrics and benchmark detection rates, including the requisite efficiency of the various methods. Four machine learning algorithms were evaluated for classification purposes: Logistic Regression (LR), Support Vector Machine (SVM), Decision Tree (DT), and an Artificial Neural Network (ANN). Therefore, we compared each via the Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curve. The study model exhibits promising outcomes for all classes of attacks. The scope of our analysis examines attacks targeting the IoT ecosystem using empirically based, simulation-generated datasets (namely the Bot-IoT and the IoTID20 datasets).

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

DOE OSTI2023

Bayesian GAN-Based False Data Injection Attack Detection in Active Distribution Grids With DERs

Advancements in information and communication technologies have revolutionized monitoring and control capabilities within smart grids. However, it also brings new vulnerabilities to data acquisition systems and state estimation functions, which attackers can subtly tamper with the measurement data through compromising the communication network. Moreover, the high penetration of renewable energy sources with the inherited characteristics of uncertainty and variability further complicates the design of effective intrusion detection systems. In this paper, a Bayesian deep learning-based approach is developed to detect cyber attacks and maintain the security of smart grids. Our method specifically addresses the prevalent issue of imbalanced data in real power systems, which arises from the predominance of normal system operations over compromised or attacked states. Employing a novel Bayesian GAN-based technique, our approach successfully discriminates between secure and compromised measurement data, even in scenarios with significant data imbalance. Furthermore, the proposed method accommodates various practical application factors, ensuring accurate intrusion detection despite the presence of measurement noise. The feasibility and effectiveness of the proposed detection mechanism are validated by testing on IEEE 13-node and 123-node test systems. Simulation results and comparisons with literature methods demonstrate the superiority of proposed cybersecurity solutions.

Bayesian GAN↗

DOE OSTI2020

Laika BOSS (Binary Object Scanning System)

Laika BOSS (Binary Object Scanning System), often written as "Laikaboss", is an object scanner and intrusion detection system that strives to be scalable, flexible, and verbose. Its goal is to take arbitrary file input and extract all relevant subfiles and metadata for use in helping analysts determine the function and maliciousness of a file at a glance. This is an extension to the original code developed by Lockheed Martin.

Walkup, Gregory↗

DOE OSTI2021

Man‐in‐the‐middle attacks and defence in a power system cyber‐physical testbed

Abstract Man‐in‐The‐Middle (MiTM) attacks present numerous threats to a smart grid. In a MiTM attack, an intruder embeds itself within a conversation between two devices to either eavesdrop or impersonate one of the devices, making it appear to be a normal exchange of information. Thus, the intruder can perform false data injection (FDI) and false command injection (FCI) attacks that can compromise power system operations, such as state estimation, economic dispatch, and automatic generation control (AGC). Very few researchers have focused on MiTM methods that are difficult to detect within a smart grid. To address this, we are designing and implementing multi‐stage MiTM intrusions in an emulation‐based cyber‐physical power system testbed against a large‐scale synthetic grid model to demonstrate how such attacks can cause physical contingencies such as misguided operation and false measurements. MiTM intrusions create FCI, FDI, and replay attacks in this synthetic power grid. This work enables stakeholders to defend against these stealthy attacks, and we present detection mechanisms that are developed using multiple alerts from intrusion detection systems and network monitoring tools. Our contribution will enable other smart grid security researchers and industry to develop further detection mechanisms for inconspicuous MiTM attacks.

Wlazlo, Patrick↗

DOE OSTI2025

Cybersecurity Enhancement in Digital Substations: Hidden Markov Model-Based Smart Cyber Switching and Threat Response

The rising incidence of cyber-attacks on critical infrastructure and power grids poses significant threats to the stability and reliability of electrical substations, with potentially devastating consequences such as extended blackouts. This paper introduces an advanced cybersecurity framework aimed at safeguarding IEC 61850-based substations through the integration of software-defined networking (SDN) and digital twin (DT) technologies. The proposed DT-based framework employs smart cyber switching (SCS) for proactive threat mitigation and concurrent intelligent electronic device (CIED) for swift system restoration, thereby maintaining continuous operational integrity and robust cybersecurity defenses. Central to this framework is the adaptive port controller (APC), which enables dynamic port management to adapt to evolving threats, and an intrusion detection system (IDS) designed to detect and neutralize malicious attacks on IEC 61850-based sampled value (SV) and generic object-oriented substation event (GOOSE) messages within the substation’s communication network. Further, novel predictive intrusion detection and response (PIDR) algorithm is implemented on a digital substation (DS) to predict the best route to be taken by the attacker. The efficacy of these comprehensive cybersecurity frameworks is validated through rigorous simulations and a hardware-in-the-loop (HIL) testbed, showcasing the system’s ability to sustain substation operations amidst cyber-attacks.

Digital substation↗

DOE OSTI2020

Supporting Cyber Security of Power Distribution Systems by Detecting Differences Between Real-time Micro-Synchrophasor Measurements and Cyber-Reported SCADA (Final Report)

As modern power grids tend towards greater levels of automation and communication, the challenges of identifying and mitigating vulnerabilities to cyber-attacks are ones that are increasingly demanding attention. Today’s power system has evolved to form the foundational bedrock of modern society, and an attack on this infrastructure could prove disastrous. In this project we were tasked to investigate the use of distribution synchrophasors as an independent isolated sensor network with which we can corroborate, or flag potentially spoofed,Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition (SCADA) data. We adapted an approach to marry the underlying physical properties of power systems with the network communications used by power systems in order to offer insights unattainable by either data stream isolation. While the concept of intrusion detection systems (IDS) is well understood for monitoring network traffic and traditional IT computing systems, the approach discussed in this report is motivated by several key notions: first, current SCADA communications alone presents an incomplete view of the grid. Second, the power grid, and the equipment controlling it, is grounded by laws of physics. Given this, we leverage high-frequency physical grid measurements to understand the physical condition of the grid, and combine this with SCADA. While high-frequency physical grid measurements and SCADA communication over Internet Protocol (IP) networks are fundamentally disparate information sources, when collectively examined through appropriate lenses, they offer a much more nuanced depiction of the grid.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

DOE OSTI2020

Method for Assessment of Security-Relevant Settings in Anomaly-Based Intrusion Detection for Industrial Control Systems

Ensuring the integrity of Ethernet-based networks is a challenging and constantly evolving domain. This problem is exacerbated for those operational technology (OT) networks supporting industrial control systems (ICS) since much of that equipment was originally designed to be on a network that was isolated and generally considered free of malefactors. Increasing pressure to bridge these systems with traditional information technology (IT) networks has introduced a bevy of new threats. In response, both academia and industry have responded with security solutions tailored to ICS environments. Deploying these protection systems often involves several configuration choices. While some of these choices are clear (e.g., block/enable protocol X) others are far more subjective (e.g. alert threshold == 3.43). Further complicating the situation, while often similar to IT networks, OT networks have unique challenges and characteristics that make the task of protecting them simultaneously more difficult and straight forward.Extant solutions for quantifying the relative security of intrusion detection systems fail to effectively support the operators of said systems with understanding the impact of various configuration changes. Further, they assume that the attacks are static and not subject to manipulation or alteration in the face of defenses. In this paper, we present a threat-based method for quantifying the relative impact of various security settings for intrusion detection systems (IDSs) within ICS environments. This method provides operational staff with a clear understanding of the relative impact of their settings and assumes that the attacks levied against them are dynamic. The model is described in detail, we apply the model to a synthetic data set, and discuss the inferences that can be made and what types of decisions they could be used to support.

Gillen, Rob↗

DOE OSTI2024

Summer 2024 INL Intern Poster Session Submission - Brian Schumitz

This LRS submission is my poster for the INL Intern Poster Session, Summer 2024. Abstract: The Software Engineering and Cybersecurity Lab (SECL) at Montana State University has developed PIQUE, a system for evaluating software quality. PIQUE's adaptability allows for language-specific static-analysis operations, including a model for assessing cloud microservice ecosystems. These ecosystems often rely on Docker for efficient deployment and management of containerized services. Our research focuses on evaluating the network quality within these microservice ecosystems. To automate this process, we're utilizing Snort, an open-source intrusion detection system renowned for its ability to detect and log network traffic. By leveraging Snort's customizable rules, we aim to construct comprehensive testing methods for measuring and quantifying the network quality based on traffic between Docker containers. This research aims to enhance the overall security and reliability of cloud microservice ecosystems by providing automated and robust quality evaluation mechanisms, ultimately contributing to the advancement of software engineering practices in these environments

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

DOE OSTI2024

EV SALaD 2023 Demonstration: Best Practices and Mitigations for Protecting EVSE Infrastructure

The Electric Vehicle Secure Architecture Laboratory Demonstration (EV SALaD) program is a demonstration of cybersecurity best practices for high-power electric vehicle (EV) charging infrastructure led by Idaho National Laboratory (INL), in collaboration with other DOE National Laboratories participating in the EVs at Scale Consortium.a Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) and Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) participated in the first 2-year (FY22-23) demonstration cycle for EV SALaD. This report documents the FY23 demonstration, the second in a series of demonstrations and collaborations in deploying and operating cybersecure EV charging infrastructure. It includes a summary of improvements from the FY22 demonstration, technical analysis of the FY23 demonstration, how the research demonstrates cyber-physical and cybersecurity best practices for high-power EV charging infrastructure, and related impacts to national and energy security. For EV SALaD, the FY22 demonstration focused on the detection, ranking, and prioritization of anomalous events for high-power EV charging. The FY23 demonstration additionally included the demonstration of cybersecurity best practices, which included protection and mitigation solutions to prevent, respond, and recover from anomalous events. During the demonstrations, the multi-lab EV SALaD team conducted a Test Effect Payload (TEP)b evaluation on extreme fast charger (XFC) hardware equipped with Cerberus, a detection and response solution, to demonstrate anomaly detection and mitigation cybersecurity best practices against cyber-enabled events.

33 ADVANCED PROPULSION SYSTEMS↗

DOE OSTI2025

Advanced Transmission Technologies –GETs and HPCs Session 3: HPCs and Building Actions Plans to Digital Assurance Risks

The third session of the Idaho National Laboratory’s (INL) Technical Assistance for Digital Assurance (TADA) program, held on November 11, 2025, centered on High Performance Conductors (HPCs) and the formulation of action plans to address digital assurance risks associated with Grid-Enhancing Technologies (GETs). This session convened experts from utilities, vendors, and government agencies to examine the technical, operational, and cybersecurity aspects of HPC deployment. Discussions highlighted the benefits of HPCs, such as their ability to rapidly increase transmission capacity using existing corridors, improve grid resilience, reduce system losses, and align with FERC Orders 2023 and 1920. Participants evaluated supply chain and digital assurance risks, including reliance on imported materials, limited domestic manufacturing capacity, workforce shortages, and traceability issues. The session also emphasized the importance of digital trust, integration-layer cybersecurity, and unified risk frameworks, introducing tools like intrusion detection systems, encryption, zero trust networking, and firmware integrity. Recaps of earlier workshops on Dynamic Line Ratings (DLRs), Advanced Power Flow Control (APFC), and Transmission Topology Optimization (TTO) underscored institutional barriers and integration challenges. Action plans were proposed to mitigate issues such as inconsistent cybersecurity practices, SBOM usage, supply chain visibility, operator trust, and misaligned incentives. Additionally, INL presented its supply chain risk management tools and Cyber-Informed Engineering (CIE) principles to support secure procurement and system design. The session concluded with a commitment to share key takeaways, incorporate cohort feedback into future policy development, and continue collaborative engagement through upcoming pilot activities. Session 3 of 3.

24 - POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

DOE OSTI2022

Time-Based CAN IDS Paper Results Code

Modern vehicles are complex cyber-physical systems made of hundreds of electronic control units (ECUs) that communicate over controller area networks (CANs). This inherited complexity has expanded the CAN attack surface which is vulnerable to message injection attacks. These injections change the overall timing characteristics of messages on the bus, and thus, to detect these malicious messages, time-based intrusion detection systems (IDSs) have been proposed. However, time-based IDSs are usually trained and tested on low-fidelity datasets with unrealistic, labeled attacks. This makes difficult the task of evaluating, comparing, and validating IDSs. Here we detail and benchmark four time-based IDSs against the newly published ROAD dataset, the first open CAN IDS dataset with real (non-simulated) stealthy attacks with physically verified effects. We found that methods that perform hypothesis testing by explicitly estimating message timing distributions have lower performance than methods that seek anomalies in a distribution related statistic. In particular, these “distribution-agnostic” based methods outperform “distribution-based” methods by at least 55% in area under the precision-recall curve (AUC-PR). Our results expand the body of knowledge of CAN time-based IDSs by providing details of these methods and reporting their results when tested on datasets with real advanced attacks. Finally, we develop an after-market plug-in detector using lightweight hardware, which can be used to deploy the best performing IDS method on nearly any vehicle.

Moriano, Pablo [Oak Ridge National Lab. (ORNL), Oa↗

DOE OSTI2026

Firmware Tampering Detection in Heavy-Duty Vehicles through J1939 CAN Analysis

Modern heavy-duty vehicles rely on complex networks of Electronic Control Units (ECUs) that communicate using the J1939 protocol. While this system makes it easier to update and configure vehicle components, it also opens the door to serious cybersecurity risks if not properly secured. This work investigates the potential for firmware tampering through the J1939 communication protocol, which enables ECU configuration and reprogramming over the Controller Area Network (CAN) bus. By monitoring CAN traffic during legitimate maintenance operations and reverse-engineering OEM diagnostic software, we identified common and proprietary J1939 message identifiers, authentication patterns, and vulnerabilities within Unified Diagnostic Services (UDS). These findings demonstrate that inadequate authentication mechanisms can allow malicious actors to alter ECU firmware or disable safety functions, posing severe operational and safety risks. Our analysis contributes to the development of vehicle intrusion detection systems capable of recognizing abnormal reprogramming activity and future firmware fingerprinting methods to verify software integrity across ECUs. This work highlights the importance of standardizing secure firmware authentication across manufacturers to strengthen cyber resilience in heavy-duty vehicle systems.

33 ADVANCED PROPULSION SYSTEMS↗

DOE OSTI2023

Autonomous Cyber Defense Against Dynamic Multi-strategy Infrastructural DDoS Attacks

Dynamic Infrastructural Distributed Denial of Service (I-DDoS) attacks constantly change attack vectors to congest core backhaul links and disrupt critical network availability while evading end-system defenses. To effectively counter these highly dynamic attacks, defense mechanisms need to exhibit adaptive decision strategies for real-time mitigation. This paper presents a novel Autonomous DDoS Defense framework that employs model-based reinforcement agents. The framework continuously learns attack strategies, predicts attack actions, and dynamically determines the optimal composition of defense tactics such as filtering, limiting, and rerouting for flow diversion. Our contributions include extending the underlying formulation of the Markov Decision Process (MDP) to address simultaneous DDoS attack and defense behavior, and accounting for environmental uncertainties. We also propose a fine-grained action mitigation approach robust to classification inaccuracies in Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS). Additionally, our reinforcement learning model demonstrates resilience against evasion and deceptive attacks. Evaluation experiments using real-world and simulated DDoS traces demonstrate that our autonomous defense framework ensures the delivery of approximately 96 - 98% of benign traffic despite the diverse range of attack strategies.

Dutta, Ashutosh↗

DOE OSTI2026

Decentralised Reinforcement Learning for Dynamic Cyberattack Response in Microgrid Networks

Microgrids rely on communication networks for reliable operation, which makes them inherently vulnerable to cyberattacks. Such attacks can destabilise system dynamics and drive states away from their nominal operating trajectories. Although several physics-informed and machine learning-based strategies have been developed to counter these threats, the rapidly evolving cyber landscape enables adversaries to bypass static defences or rules-based mitigation approaches. This paper proposes a dynamic, online-trained and fully decentralised reinforcement learning (RL)-based cyberattack response framework to protect microgrids from evolving cyberattacks. The proposed framework deploys multiple deep Q-networks (DQNs), each associated with a distributed energy resource (DER), to enable localised and adaptive attack mitigation. In this framework, each DQN processes local voltage and frequency measurements—combined with intrusion detection system (IDS) alerts—as observations and rewards to guide decision-making. Extensive simulation studies demonstrate the robustness of the proposed framework under diverse attack scenarios and varying IDS-induced detection delays. Comparative analysis highlights its superiority over existing static or preexisting rules-based mitigation approaches. Finally, we present an analysis that shows the framework's scalability to real-life microgrids with more interacting agents.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

DOE OSTI2026

The Impact of Time-Aware Design Choices in ICS Anomaly Detection

Industrial control systems (ICS) remain vulnerable to increasingly sophisticated cyberattacks, yet evaluating anomaly detection models in these environments is challenging due to temporal dependencies, missing-not-at-random patterns, and extremely imbalanced datasets. These factors make common practices—especially random data splits and na¨ıve imputation— prone to severe temporal leakage, which can inflate reported performance and obscure real-world limitations. In this work, we systematically examine classical machine learning models, temporal deep learning architecture, and tensordecomposition– based methods on a gas-pipeline dataset using a fully temporally separated evaluation pipeline designed to mimic realistic deployment conditions. Our findings show that proper temporal handling and MNAR-aware preprocessing significantly alter the relative performance of popular anomaly-detection methods, providing practical guidance for designing reliable, leakage-resistant ICS intrusion-detection systems.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

DOE OSTI2025

Design Choices in Anomaly Detection for Industrial Control Systems: Insights from Gas Pipeline Data

Industrial control systems (ICS) remain vulnerable to increasingly sophisticated cyberattacks, yet evaluating anomaly detection models in these environments is challenging due to temporal dependencies, missing-not-at-random patterns, and extremely imbalanced datasets. These factors make common practices—especially random data splits and naïve imputation—prone to severe temporal leakage, which can inflate reported performance and obscure real-world limitations. In this work, we systematically examine classical machine learning models, temporal deep learning architecture, and tensor-decomposition–based methods on a gas-pipeline dataset using a fully temporally separated evaluation pipeline designed to mimic realistic deployment conditions. Our findings show that proper temporal handling and MNAR-aware preprocessing significantly alter the relative performance of popular anomaly-detection methods, providing practical guidance for designing reliable, leakage-resistant ICS intrusion-detection systems.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗