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NASA NTRSDate not supplied

The Application of Artificial Intelligence and Deep Learning to Visually Identify Micrometeoroid and Orbital Debris Impacts

Recent advancements in Artificial Intelligence (AI) have made Machine Learning (ML) techniques readily available for practical applications while using a fraction of time that was previously required. In particular, the use of Deep Learning (DL) algorithms has advanced the field of image and pattern recognition. With the use of Deep Learning algorithms, Micrometeoroid and Orbital Debris(MMOD) penetrations can be identified with high accuracy and give possibilities to new understandings of hypervelocity impacts.

Deep Learning↗
NASA NTRS2009

Handbook for Designing MMOD Protection

Spacecraft are subject to micro-meteoroid and orbital debris (MMOD) impact damage which have the potential to degrade performance, shorten the mission, or result in catastrophic loss of the vehicle. Specific MMOD protection requirements are established by NASA for each spacecraft early in the program/project life, to ensure the spacecraft meets desired safety and mission success goals. Both the design and operations influences spacecraft survivability in the MMOD environment, and NASA considers both in meeting MMOD protection requirements. The purpose of this handbook is to provide spacecraft designers and operations personnel with knowledge gained by NASA in implementing effective MMOD protection for the International Space Station, Space Shuttle, and various science spacecraft. It has been drawn from a number of previous publications [10-14], as well as new work. This handbook documents design and operational methods to reduce MMOD risk. In addition, this handbook describes tools and equations needed to design proper MMOD protection. It is a living report, in that it will be updated and re-released periodically in future with additional information. Providing effective and efficient MMOD protection is essential for ensuring safe and successful operations of spacecraft and satellites. A variety of shields protect crew modules, external pressurized vessels and critical equipment from MMOD on the International Space Station (ISS). Certain Space Shuttle Orbiter vehicle systems are hardened from MMOD impact, and operational rules are established to reduce the risk from MMOD (i.e., flight attitudes are selected and late inspection of sensitive thermal protection surfaces are conducted to reduce MMOD impacts). Science spacecraft include specific provisions to meet MMOD protection requirements in their design (for example, Stardust & GLAST). Commercial satellites such as Iridium and Bigelow Aerospace Genesis spacecraft incorporate MMOD protection. The development of low-weight, effective MMOD protection has enabled these spacecraft missions to be performed successfully. This handbook describes these shielding techniques. For future exploration activities to the Moon and Mars, implementing high-performance MMOD shielding will be necessary to meet protection requirements with minimum mass penalty. A current area of technology development in MMOD shielding is the incorporation of sensors to detect and locate MMOD impact damage. Depending on the type of sensor the signals from the sensor can be processed to infer the location of the impact and the extent of damage. The objective of the sensors is to locate critical damage that would endanger the spacecraft or crew immediately or during reentry (such as an air leak from crew module or critical damage to thermal protection system of reentry vehicles). The information from the sensors can then be used with repair kits, patch kits, hatch closure or other appropriate remedial techniques to reduce MMOD risk.

Arnold, Jim↗
NASA NTRS2007

Hypervelocity Impact Evaluation of Metal Foam Core Sandwich Structures

A series of hypervelocity impact (HVI) tests were conducted by the NASA Johnson Space Center (JSC) Hypervelocity Impact Technology Facility (HITF) [1], building 267 (Houston, Texas) between January 2003 and December 2005 to test the HVI performance of metal foams, as compared to the metal honeycomb panels currently in service. The HITF testing was conducted at the NASA JSC White Sands Testing Facility (WSTF) at Las Cruces, New Mexico. Eric L. Christiansen, Ph.D., and NASA Lead for Micro-Meteoroid Orbital Debris (MMOD) Protection requested these hypervelocity impact tests as part of shielding research conducted for the JSC Center Director Discretionary Fund (CDDF) project. The structure tested is a metal foam sandwich structure; a metal foam core between two metal facesheets. Aluminum and Titanium metals were tested for foam sandwich and honeycomb sandwich structures. Aluminum honeycomb core material is currently used in Orbiter Vehicle (OV) radiator panels and in other places in space structures. It has many desirable characteristics and performs well by many measures, especially when normalized by density. Aluminum honeycomb does not perform well in Hypervelocity Impact (HVI) Testing. This is a concern, as honeycomb panels are often exposed to space environments, and take on the role of Micrometeoroid / Orbital Debris (MMOD) shielding. Therefore, information on possible replacement core materials which perform adequately in all necessary functions of the material would be useful. In this report, HVI data is gathered for these two core materials in certain configurations and compared to gain understanding of the metal foam HVI performance.

Yasensky, John↗
NASA NTRS2024

Enhancing the Protection of Shielded Thermal Protection Systems in Sample Return Spacecraft Against MMOD Impact

Sample return missions seek to collect samples from planets, moons, asteroids, and other planetary bodies and return them to earth for in-depth analysis. Backward planetary protection requirements are often in place for such missions to prevent the introduction of any extra-terrestrial material into the Earth’s biosphere, which could occur if a meteoroid or space debris particle were to damage a critical part of the returning spacecraft. The ability of a shielding system used to mitigate this damage risk is typically characterized by a ballistic limit equation (BLE), which predicts whether or not a protected system or structural element will sustain a critical failure due to a high-speed impact. In this paper, we develop a particle-impact-based BLE for the thermal protection system (TPS) of a sample return spacecraft that is protected by a multi-shock shield. The predictions of the BLE we develop for TPS failure are shown to be consistent with the predictions of hydrocode simulations.

Sample Return Spacecraft↗
NASA NTRS2018

Hypervelocity Impact Testing and MMOD Risk Reduction

Purpose: (1) Provide data to develop, update, and/or verify ballistic limit equations used in the MMOD risk assessment. (2) Provide data used to compare two or more shielding options to reduce MMOD risk. (3) Determine failure modes and failure criteria for hardware: (a) Failure modes: how hardware fails (pressure vessels, pressurized lines, electronic hardware, power cables). (b) Failure criteria: quantify damage level that results in hardware failure (for example: depth of penetration into pressure vessel that results in leak or burst).

Lear, Dana↗
NASA NTRS2012

HVI Ballistic Performance Characterization of Non-Parallel Walls

The Double-Wall, "Whipple" Shield [1] has been the subject of many hypervelocity impact studies and has proven to be an effective shield system for Micro-Meteoroid and Orbital Debris (MMOD) impacts for spacecraft. The US modules of the International Space Station (ISS), with their "bumper shields" offset from their pressure holding rear walls provide good examples of effective on-orbit use of the double wall shield. The concentric cylinder shield configuration with its large radius of curvature relative to separation distance is easily and effectively represented for testing and analysis as a system of two parallel plates. The parallel plate double wall configuration has been heavily tested and characterized for shield performance for normal and oblique impacts for the ISS and other programs. The double wall shield and principally similar Stuffed Whipple Shield are very common shield types for MMOD protection. However, in some locations with many spacecraft designs, the rear wall cannot be modeled as being parallel or concentric with the outer bumper wall. As represented in Figure 1, there is an included angle between the two walls. And, with a cylindrical outer wall, the effective included angle constantly changes. This complicates assessment of critical spacecraft components located within outer spacecraft walls when using software tools such as NASA's BumperII. In addition, the validity of the risk assessment comes into question when using the standard double wall shield equations, especially since verification testing of every set of double wall included angles is impossible.

Bohl, William↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

The NASA JSC Hypervelocity Impact Technology (HVIT) Office

The Hypervelocity Impact Technology (HVIT) office at the Johnson Space Center (JSC) is dedicated to support NASA flight programs in meeting their meteoroid and orbital debris (MMOD) protection requirements both efficiently and effectively, with a minimum of shielding mass, volume, and cost. This paper provides an overview of HVIT capabilities in providing hypervelocity tests, analyses, MMOD risk assessments and shielding expertise. HVIT personnel work closely with NASA Program personnel to develop program-specific MMOD protection requirements which are achievable based on initial risk assessments. Then HVIT proceeds with hypervelocity impact testing and hydrocode assessments to update and verify ballistic limit equations used in the MMOD risk assessment. The final MMOD risk assessment prior to flight will show compliance with MMOD requirements. This final assessment will also incorporate changes in the MMOD environment from meteoroid showers and orbital debris breakups. After the mission is flown, post-flight inspections are performed by HVIT to document and trend MMOD damage to returned spacecraft surfaces and hardware. A majority of the hypervelocity impact tests are performed at the NASA WSTF Remote Hypervelocity Test Laboratory (RHTL), although other hypervelocity facilities that provide complementary test capabilities are called on when necessary to fill data gaps. HVIT accomplishments in NASA mission support are described. In addition, current HVIT activities to aid on-going NASA crewed missions and science missions are presented.

Hypervelocity↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

The NASA JSC Hypervelocity Impact Technology (HVIT) Office

The Hypervelocity Impact Technology (HVIT) office at the National Aeronautical and Space Administration (NASA) Johnson Space Center (JSC) is dedicated to support NASA flight programs in meeting their meteoroid and orbital debris (MMOD) protection requirements both efficiently and effectively, with a minimum of shielding mass, volume, and cost. This paper provides an overview of HVIT capabilities in providing hypervelocity tests, analyses, MMOD risk assessments and shielding expertise. HVIT personnel work closely with NASA program and safety/mission assurance personnel to develop program-specific MMOD protection requirements which are both achievable based on initial risk assessments and will meet overall safety and mission success requirements. HVIT then proceeds with hypervelocity impact testing and hydrocode assessments to update and verify ballistic limit equations used in the MMOD risk assessment. Hypervelocity impact tests are primarily performed at the NASA WSTF Remote Hypervelocity Test Laboratory (RHTL). Other hypervelocity facilities that provide complementary test capabilities are called on when necessary to fill data gaps. The goal of the final pre-flight MMOD risk assessment is to show compliance with MMOD requirements prior to flight. This final assessment will also incorporate changes in the MMOD environment from meteoroid showers and orbital debris breakups. After the mission is flown, post-flight inspections are performed by HVIT to document and trend MMOD damage to returned spacecraft surfaces and hardware. HVIT accomplishments in NASA mission support are described. In addition, current HVIT activities to aid on-going NASA crewed missions and science missions are presented.

Meteoroid↗
NASA NTRS2019

Micro-meteoroid and orbital debris radar from Goldstone Radar observations

Micro-meteoroid and orbital debris (MMOD) refers to millions of micrometeoroids and orbital debris orbiting the Earth, which can come from remaining parts of spacecraft from previous missions. These debris objects keep colliding and creating new pieces of debris, with very different sizes ranging from millimeters to meters. About 99.3% of the debris objects have a size < 1 cm. These debris objects, traveling at speeds of 10 km/s, can cause significant damage to spacecraft, satellites, and astronauts. Despite the historic use of shielding to protect vital spacecraft components, MMOD still present a potential hazard for future missions and operations involving humans in space. Goldstone’s orbital debris radar (ODR) enhances the NASA orbital debris model with radar observation data, providing vital information on orbital debris detections: size, Doppler, range, and orbit inclination angle. These observations currently provide the only access to information about this size class (2 mm to 10 mm) of orbital debris. Goldstone’s ODR experiments operate as a bistatic radar, with overlapping beams providing a wide distribution of ranges. From 2004 to early 2018, Goldstone’s ODR has been collecting orbital debris data from altitudes covering 280 km to 3000 km. Since the decommissioning of the receive antenna in early 2018, Goldstone’s range coverage is reduced to a 300 km window within a 600 km to 1000 km potential range coverage, depending on the pointing geometry and antenna station used. We are investigating alternative transmit receive configurations at Goldstone to recover our previous wide range coverage.

Rodriguez-Alvarez, Nereida↗
NASA NTRS2017

Shape Effect Analysis of Aluminum Projectile Impact on Whipple Shields

The informed design with respect to hypervelocity collisions involving micrometeoroid and orbital debris (MMOD) is influential to the success of space missions. For an orbit comparable to that of the International Space Station, velocities for MMOD can range from 1 to 15 km/s, with an average velocity around 10 km/cu s. The high energy released during collisions at these speeds can result in damage to a spacecraft, or worst-case, loss of the spacecraft, thus outlining the importance of methods to predict the likelihood and extent of damage due to an impact. Through experimental testing and numerical simulations, substantial work has been conducted to better understand the effects of hypervelocity impacts (HVI) on spacecraft systems and shields; however, much of the work has been focused on spherical impacting particles. To improve environment models for the analysis of MMOD, a large-scale satellite break-up test was performed at the Arnold Engineering and Development Complex to better understand the varied impactor geometries that could be generated from a large impact. As a part of the post-experiment analysis, an undertaking to characterize the irregular fragments generated is currently being performed by the University of Florida under the management of NASA's Orbital Debris Program Office at Johnson Space Center (JSC). DebriSat was a representative, modern LEO satellite that was catastrophically broken up in a HVI test. The test chamber was lined with a soft-catch system of foam panels that captured the fragments after impact. Initial predictions put the number of fragments larger than 2mm generated from the HVI at roughly 85,000. The number of fragments thus far extracted from the foam panels has exceeded 100,000, with that number continuously increasing. The shapes of the fragments vary dependent upon the material. Carbon-fiber reinforced polymer pieces, for instance, are abundantly found as thin, flat slivers. The characterization of these fragments with respect to their mass, size, and material composition needs to be summarized in a form that can be used in MMOD analysis. The mechanism that brings these fragment traits into MMOD analysis is through ballistic limit equations (BLE) that have been developed largely for a few types of materials1. As a BLE provides the failure threshold for a shield or spacecraft component based on parameters such as the projectile impact velocity and size, and the target's materials, thickness, and configuration, it is used to design protective shields for spacecraft such as Whipple shields (WS) to an acceptable risk level. The majority of experiments and simulations to test shields and validate BLEs have, heretofore, largely used spheres as the impactor, not properly reflecting the irregular shapes of MMOD. This shortfall has motivated a numerical impact analysis study of HVI involving non-spherical geometries to identify key parameters that environment models should provide.

Carrasquilla, Maria J.↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Application of Stuffed Whipple Shield to Robotic Spacecraft

Protection of human life onboard the International Space Station (ISS) requires reinforced shielding of crewed modules to prevent penetration of micro-meteoroid and orbital debris (MMOD), while optimizing the necessary mass for that application. An efficient way to achieve that protection consists in combining metal plates with ceramic and Kevlar fabrics in critical areas, a configuration known as the “Stuffed Whipple Shield”. In robotic spacecraft, fuel tanks are particularly vulnerable to MMOD impacts due to their pressurized contents and thin walls. Risk assessment of the Plankton, Aerosol, Cloud, ocean Ecosystem (PACE) spacecraft using the Bumper3-Sat hypervelocity impact simulation tool demonstrated that the risk of propulsion tank damage due to MMOD particles coming from the ram direction (Launch Vehicle Adapter side) violated NASA requirements to limit the generation of orbital debris and threatened mission success. To mitigate the risk and achieve compliance, the basic configuration of the ISS Stuffed Whipple shield was scaled down and adapted to become a tank shield in the spacecraft ram direction. This paper will describe the adaptation of the ISS Stuffed Shield to a robotic spacecraft, while also comparing the effectiveness of the proposed shield design with more traditional single-wall and double-wall alternatives used in robotic spacecraft under similar conditions.

Ivonne M. Rodriguez↗
NASA NTRS2017

Surveys of ISS Returned Hardware for MMOD Impacts

Since February 2001, the Hypervelocity Impact Technology (HVIT) group at the Johnson Space Center in Houston has performed 26 post-flight inspections on space exposed hardware that have been returned from the International Space Station. Data on 1,024 observations of MMOD damage have been collected from these inspections. Survey documentation typically includes impact feature location and size measurements as well as microscopic photography (25-200x). Sampling of impacts sites for projectile residue was performed for the largest features. Results of Scanning Electron Microscopy (SEM) analysis to discern impactor source is included in the database. This paper will summarize the post-flight MMOD inspections, and focus on two inspections in particular: (1) Pressurized Mating Adapter-2 (PMA-2) cover returned in 2015 after 1.6 years exposure with 26 observed damages, and (2) Airlock shield panels returned in 2010 after 8.7 years exposure with 58 MMOD damages. Feature sizes from the observed data are compared to predictions using the Bumper risk assessment code.

Hyde, James↗
NASA NTRS2013

International Space Station (ISS) Soyuz Vehicle Descent Module Evaluation of Thermal Protection System (TPS) Penetration Characteristics

The descent module (DM) of the ISS Soyuz vehicle is covered by thermal protection system (TPS) materials that provide protection from heating conditions experienced during reentry. Damage and penetration of these materials by micrometeoroid and orbital debris (MMOD) impacts could result in loss of vehicle during return phases of the mission. The descent module heat shield has relatively thick TPS and is protected by the instrument-service module. The TPS materials on the conical sides of the descent module (referred to as backshell in this test plan) are exposed to more MMOD impacts and are relatively thin compared to the heat shield. This test program provides hypervelocity impact (HVI) data on materials similar in composition and density to the Soyuz TPS on the backshell of the vehicle. Data from this test program was used to update ballistic limit equations used in Soyuz TPS penetration risk assessments. The impact testing was coordinated by the NASA Johnson Space Center (JSC) Hypervelocity Impact Technology (HVIT) Group [1] in Houston, Texas. The HVI testing was conducted at the NASA-JSC White Sands Hypervelocity Impact Test Facility (WSTF) at Las Cruces, New Mexico. Figure

Davis, Bruce A.↗
NASA NTRS2017

Surveys of Returned ISS Hardware for MMMOD Impacts

Since February 2001, the Hypervelocity Impact Technology (HVIT) group at the Johnson Space Center (JSC) in Houston has performed 35 post-flight inspections on space exposed hardware returned from the International Space Station (ISS). Data on 1,188 observations of micrometeoroid and orbital debris (MMOD) damage have been collected from these inspections. Survey documentation typically includes impact feature location and size measurements as well as microscopic photography (25-200x). Sampling of impacts sites for projectile residue was performed for the largest features. Results of energy dispersive X-ray spectroscopic analysis to discern impactor source are included in the database when available. This paper will focus on two inspections, the Pressurized Mating Adapter 2 (PMA-2) cover returned in 2015 after 1.6 years exposure with 26 observed impact features, and two Airlock shield panels returned in 2010 after 8.75 years exposure with 58 MMOD impacts. Feature sizes from the observed data are compared to predictions using the Bumper 3 risk assessment code.

Hyde, J. L.↗
NASA NTRS2017

Failure Mechanisms of Ni-H2 and Li-Ion Batteries Under Hypervelocity Impacts

Lithium-Ion (Li-Ion) batteries have yielded significant performance advantages for many industries, including the aerospace industry, and have been selected to replace nickel hydrogen (Ni-H2) batteries for the International Space Station (ISS) program to meet the energy storage demands. As the ISS uses its vast solar arrays to generate its power, the solar ar-rays meet their sunlit power demands and supply excess power to battery packs for power de-livery on the sun obscured phase of the approximate 90 minute low Earth orbit. These large battery packs are located on the exterior of the ISS, and as such, the battery packs are ex-posed to external environment threats like naturally occurring meteoroids and artificial orbital debris (MMOD). While the risks from these solid particle environments has been known and addressed to an acceptable risk of failure through shield design, it is not possible to completely eliminate the risk of loss of these assets on orbit due to MMOD, and as such, failure consequences to the ISS have been considered.

Miller, J. E.↗
NASA NTRS2017

Failure Mechanisms of Ni-H2 and Li-Ion Batteries Under Hypervelocity Impacts

Lithium-Ion (Li-Ion) batteries have yielded significant performance advantages for many industries, including the aerospace industry, and have been selected to replace nickel hydrogen (Ni-H2) batteries for the International Space Station (ISS) program to meet the energy storage demands. As the ISS uses its vast solar arrays to generate its power, the solar arrays meet their sunlit power demands and supply excess power to battery packs for power delivery on the sun obscured phase of the approximate 90 minute low Earth orbit. These large battery packs are located on the exterior of the ISS, and as such, the battery packs are exposed to external environment threats like naturally occurring meteoroids and artificial orbital debris (MMOD). While the risks from these solid particle environments has been known and addressed to an acceptable risk of failure through shield design, it is not possible to completely eliminate the risk of loss of these assets on orbit due to MMOD, and as such, failure consequences to the ISS have been considered.

Miller, J. E.↗