Results for “National Cybersecurity Strategy” — Page 3

DOE OSTI2025

Demonstration of a Novel Technology to Manage Electricity Demand in Grid-Independent Military Microgrids

This research was conducted by the National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL) in collaboration with the S&C Electric Inc. through funding provided by the ESTCP. The project demonstrates use of cybersecure Automated Demand Response (ADR) technology to effectively manage microgrid loads during grid-independent, also known as "islanded," operation. When military microgrids become isolated from the main electrical grid, they are required to balance electricity supply and demand locally. Given that local generation may be constrained, the prevailing strategy involves shedding all but the most critical loads by tripping smart circuit breakers, which then necessitate manual resetting. This approach is generally implemented at the building level, which means that the buildings with mission-critical activities are exempt from load management and remain fully powered, whereas those deemed non-critical can experience a complete loss of service. In this research we developed a method that allows building automation systems to selectively control their assets in response to load shedding request from a microgrid controller, avoiding total loss of service in contrast to the conventional control approach. A commercial OpenADR client server by GridFabric is used for communication between the microgrid controller and the building management system (BMS). The microgrid controller monitors both generation capacity and various assets within the microgrid and issues a demand reduction request when necessary. This request is communicated to the OpenADR server via Modbus. Upon receiving the request, the OpenADR server forwards it to the BMS utilizing the OpenADR protocol. The BMS is pre-configured with various levels of load reduction strategies based on the controllable assets available, allowing for a nuanced approach to demand reduction. Both lab and field tests were performed that considered load shedding needed to achieve closed transition into island mode and to accommodate changing loads and power source availability while islanded. A commercial microgrid controller was used for these tests with normal programming within the expected constraints of the system capabilities. That is, the solution did not require any specialized modification to the code base of the controller. Given the latency of the round-trip communication path between the microgrid controller and the various devices involved with the load shed processes, there are certain scenarios for which the demonstrated solution are appropriate and some which are not. The methods described in this report can be used for load shedding/restoration during transitions between islanded and grid-tied modes of operation, as well as accommodating normal variations in load and the need to remove a power source from operation for maintenance. These methods should not be used for scenarios that require load shedding within a second or two such as sudden and unanticipated significant load increases or loss of power sources through equipment faults.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

DOE OSTI2025

Electric Grid Security (EGS) FY24 Annual Report

Sandia’s Electric Grid Security program advances a national vision of a secure, resilient, and affordable electric system for all users. Our achievements reflect a strategic approach combining technology development; modeling, simulation, and data analytics; and partnered demonstrations and outreach to further the adoption of advanced grid and storage technologies. Our FY24 efforts leverage the strengths of our partnerships—spanning Sandia’s core science and technology competencies as well as external technology leaders—to develop the solutions today which enable the grid of tomorrow. Key accomplishments in this report that support our strategy span our technical program areas and include: • The advancement of energy storage technologies, including creation of a national Long Duration Energy Storage Consortium; • Applications of artificial intelligence and machine learning to enhanced grid operations and planning; • Development of solid-state power conversion technologies and a new medium-voltage research lab; • New technologies to assess wildfire vulnerabilities and mitigate potential impacts; • Advanced applications of new cybersecurity technologies with industry partners; • Contributions to understanding the impacts of electromagnetic pulses and geomagnetic disturbances on grid components; and • Digital twin development for hybrid microgrids with multiple generators, storage, and loads.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

DOE OSTI2021

Materials and Fuels Complex (FY2021-2025 Five-Year Mission Strategy)

The Idaho National Laboratory (INL), through its designated mission of advancing innovative nuclear energy solutions, is actively engaged in the research, development, demonstration and deployment of advanced nuclear technology, as well as in fostering private-public partnership for technology development. Key to the success of INL’s mission is the Materials and Fuels Complex (MFC), the only complex in the U.S. that hosts a world-class assemblage of facilities, capabilities and instruments for handling, testing, and characterizing radioactive materials. Driven by its mission/vision of “Engineering and Experiments that Drive the World’s Nuclear Energy Future,” MFC is at the center of INL’s – and indeed the Department of Energy’s – advanced nuclear technology development initiatives, providing essential capabilities such as engineering-scale high-assay low-enriched uranium (HALEU) fuel production, reactor demonstration facilities, post-irradiation examination, and transient irradiation testing. Furthermore, MFC provides an ideal environment for test beds that are utilized for research, development and demonstration (RD&D) activities on used fuel treatment, nuclear non-proliferation, forensics, and nuclear power sources used for space exploration missions conducted by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA).

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

DOE OSTI2025

Internship Presentation: Integrating Safety and Cybersecurity: Security-by-Design with SOWT Analysis for Reactor Testing

This study covers leveraging reactor testing facilities that are primarily designed with a focus on safety to enhance cybersecurity testing. By incorporating reactor security-by-design with reactor safety-by-design principles and adopting defense-in-depth strategies that emphasize both safety and security, the research evaluates applicable cyber tools, models, and solutions. This includes simulating specific cyber-attack scenarios using reactor simulators and performing SWOT (Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, Threats) analysis to improve the cybersecurity of reactor systems.

21 - SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLAN↗

DOE OSTI2021

Materials and Fuels Complex Five-Year Mission Strategy (FY21- FY25)

The Idaho National Laboratory (INL), through its designated mission of advancing innovative nuclear energy solutions, is actively engaged in the research, development, demonstration and deployment of advanced nuclear technology, as well as in fostering private-public partnership for technology development. Key to the success of INL’s mission is the Materials and Fuels Complex (MFC), the only complex in the U.S. that hosts a world-class assemblage of facilities, capabilities and instruments for handling, testing, and characterizing radioactive materials. Driven by its mission/vision of “Engineering and Experiments that Drive the World’s Nuclear Energy Future,” MFC is at the center of INL’s – and indeed the Department of Energy’s – advanced nuclear technology development initiatives, providing essential capabilities such as engineering-scale high-assay low-enriched uranium (HALEU) fuel production, reactor demonstration facilities, post-irradiation examination, and transient irradiation testing. Furthermore, MFC provides an ideal environment for test beds that are utilized for research, development and demonstration (RD&D) activities on used fuel treatment, nuclear non-proliferation, forensics, and nuclear power sources used for space exploration missions conducted by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA).

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

DOE OSTI2025

Digital Assurance Checklist for Homeowners and Installers

This document provides a comprehensive Digital Assurance Checklist for securing behind-the-meter energy assets, focusing on both installers and homeowners. As distributed energy resources (DERs) such as solar PV and battery storage become integral to residential energy systems, cybersecurity emerges as a critical component of reliability and safety. The guide outlines actionable steps for installers during pre-installation, commissioning, and post-installation phases, emphasizing practices like network segmentation, credential management, firmware validation, and homeowner education. For homeowners, the document introduces a tiered approach to cyber hygiene—from essential measures like strong Wi-Fi credentials and automatic updates to advanced strategies such as network segmentation, DNS filtering, and intrusion detection. By adopting these practices, stakeholders can mitigate cyber risks, safeguard energy infrastructure, and ensure resilient, secure operation of DER systems. Additional resources and references to industry standards are included to support implementation.

99 - GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

DOE OSTI2026

Digital Assurance Checklist for Homeowners and Installers

This document provides a comprehensive Digital Assurance Checklist for securing behind-the-meter energy assets, focusing on both installers and homeowners. As distributed energy resources (DERs) such as solar PV and battery storage become integral to residential energy systems, cybersecurity emerges as a critical component of reliability and safety. The guide outlines actionable steps for installers during pre-installation, commissioning, and post-installation phases, emphasizing practices like network segmentation, credential management, firmware validation, and homeowner education. For homeowners, the document introduces a tiered approach to cyber hygiene—from essential measures like strong Wi-Fi credentials and automatic updates to advanced strategies such as network segmentation, DNS filtering, and intrusion detection. By adopting these practices, stakeholders can mitigate cyber risks, safeguard energy infrastructure, and ensure resilient, secure operation of DER systems. Additional resources and references to industry standards are included to support implementation.

99 - GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

DOE OSTI2025

Dynamic probabilistic risk assessment and game theory for cyber security risk analysis in nuclear power plants

Nuclear Power Plants and energy systems have become more prone to cyber-attacks with their digitalization and the increased use of smart equipment. Hence, it is important to quantify the risk associated with cyber-attacks in such systems. Dynamic Probabilistic Risk Assessment which involves studying the evolution of a system due to random events and operator and attacker actions during a cyber-attack by employing a physics-based model of the system is a suitable framework to quantify cybersecurity risk in nuclear power plants. In addition to the plant dynamics, it is also important to model the strategies of the attackers and plant operators for an effective cybersecurity risk assessment. Game theory provides a set of necessary tools to model such strategic interactions. In this research, a framework that integrates dynamic probabilistic risk assessment with game theory for cybersecurity risk analysis in nuclear power plants is presented. The mathematical formulation is derived based on the theory of continuous event trees. We propose a game theory based action model, that utilizes physics-based rewards to define the strategies of attackers and operators at every decision epoch. As a case study, the risk associated with cyber-attacks on the digital components in the secondary side of a pressurized water reactor is studied using a reduced order model. A set of attacker actions and a set of operator actions are defined for the system. The operator and attacker interactions were modelled using simultaneous game, their action policies were computed using the concept of mixed strategy Nash equilibrium and the evolution of the system was studied.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

DOE OSTI2022

A Cybersecurity Threat Profile for a Connected Lighting System

In anticipation of improved energy performance and cost savings, cities and building owners are increasingly considering “smart lighting initiatives” that aim to convert their collection of simple luminaires (i.e., lighting fixtures) into an intelligent connected lighting system (CLS) capable of remotely monitoring energy consumption and fault conditions, and possibly implementing adaptive lighting schemes. The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) has set an national goal of tripling the energy efficiency and demand flexibility of the buildings sector by 2030, relative to 2020 levels 1. It is forecast that connected lighting systems can contribute to that goal by delivering 125 TWh of annual energy savings by 2035 2, equivalent to the annual output of 50 typical (500 MW) power plants. However, these energy savings and the DOE goal are put at significant risk if connected technologies are not adopted due to real or perceived cybersecurity concerns. Connected IoT devices such as these have historically been rife with vulnerabilities which sometimes put security considerations secondary to functionality and operability. What are the cybersecurity threats that will impact these systems, as formerly banal luminaires transition into intelligent connected devices that collect information about themselves, their surrounding environment, and possibly us? In this paper we analyze a threat profile performed on a fault-detection use case for streetlights. A threat profile establishes security requirements, justifies security measures, yields actionable controls, and effectively communicates risk to stakeholders. This effort provides critical information for making threat-based decisions to increase security at a reasonable cost, and can effectively be used by development teams, software architects, and managers to make cybersecurity a part of their ongoing culture of awareness, training, and prevention. This leads to more secure systems and better-understood security. On-premise, cloud, and hybrid architectures with different authentication mechanisms were modeled and later categorized using the Microsoft STRIDE framework. An analysis of the recommended controls for each threat was performed to determine which controls could and should be put in place by manufacturers or third-party suppliers, and which controls need to be left up the end-user to implement. Fifty-seven threats were identified. Among our key findings: (1) 65% (37/57) of the threats did not involve the luminaires, but rather the other components needed to communicate with and manage them; (2) 63% (36/57) of the threats could have been mitigated through manufacturer-implemented defensive techniques or “controls”; and (3) 23% (13/57) of the threats were dependent on the network configuration. Recommendations based on the results of this work are made to key stakeholder groups. Notably, lighting technology developers are advised to address all threats that can be reasonably controlled with baked-in technology solutions (e.g., encryption or authentication controls), and employ some form of secure supply chain management and tracking where other parts (e.g., sensors, microprocessors) of a luminaire must also be built and manufactured with the proper security controls in place. Developers should also review threats involving assets not developed in-house to understand how connectivity with other devices will affect their product during system operation and determine if a compensating control for a defense-in-depth strategy will be needed. Finally, those interested in deploying CLS should compare the differences between cloud and on-premise models to determine which is more suitable for their needs and the abilities of their security team.

32 ENERGY CONSERVATION, CONSUMPTION, AND UTILIZATI↗

DOE OSTI2025

Advanced Transmission Technologies – GETs and HPCs Session 1: ATT Foundations and Dynamic Line Ratings (DLRs)

The INL TADA GETs Cohort Session 1, held on November 4, 2025, convened experts to address the integration of advanced transmission technologies, including Grid-Enhancing Technologies (GETs) and High Performance Conductors (HPCs), with a focus on digital assurance challenges. The session highlighted the growing importance of cybersecurity, supply chain transparency, reliability, and business risk management in deploying GETs, especially Dynamic Line Ratings (DLRs). Participants examined how expanded attack surfaces, limited vendor pools, and new regulatory requirements—such as FERC Orders 881, 2023, and 1920—are influencing utilities and technology providers. The workshop underscored the need for cyber-informed engineering, secure-by-design principles, and practical risk management strategies, while fostering collaboration and knowledge sharing among industry peers. Technical discussions covered the evolution from static to dynamic line ratings, complexities of cloud-based architectures, and NERC CIP compliance challenges. The session concluded with a collaborative risk exercise and a preview of future workshops on advanced power flow control and transmission topology optimization, reinforcing the cohort’s commitment to advancing digital assurance in the energy sector.

24 - POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

DOE OSTI2020

IMPLEMENTING CYBERSECURITY INTO AN EXISTING NATIONAL NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION PROGRAMME – A CASE STUDY

Cyber threat profiling and risk mitigation is critical to any nuclear state organization and should be considered as part of any comprehensive nuclear security programme. Defining and evaluating the impact of the cyber threat to mission can be challenging. An existing national nuclear non-proliferation organization undertook an effort to incorporate computer security activities into its programme to address cyber risk. One of the primary goals of this endeavour was to develop a set of prioritised recommendations for organizational follow-through. The organization dedicated subject matter expert resources in the form of a cyber task force to support this goal. Opportunities were identified where computer security could be built into each programme including office-level strategies and tools. Of course, no new identified threat vector is easily considered and incorporated into existing programmes without impact. There are many obstacles to be overcome. Technically literate subject matter experts are difficult to find, management has comparatively less experience applying computer security into its programmes, and trying to change the culture to consider computer security risk at policy and programmatic levels takes time and management attention. As an outcome of this process, a roadmap for program integration was developed, including the establishment of a cyber support team. This paper will discuss the challenges and successes associated with establishing such a team.

Cyber Security, Nuclear, Non-proliferation↗

DOE OSTI2026

Robotic automation of maintenance work in nuclear power plants a cross-sector survey and roadmap

Nuclear power plants face increasing cost pressures, workforce constraints (aging workforce and skilled labor shortages), and safety requirements that are accelerating interest in robotic systems for inspection and maintenance. We conducted semi-structured interviews with personnel from seven U.S. nuclear utilities and compared deployment models, operational use cases, and integration practices with those reported by participants in the oil, gas, and petrochemical sector. In nuclear plants, robotic use remains concentrated in inspection—particularly indoor unmanned aerial vehicles and submersible remotely operated vehicles—with limited application to physical maintenance tasks. Reported near-term value includes reduced radiological and industrial risk, reduced outage labor, and improved data for planning and condition assessment. Key barriers include integration and data-interoperability constraints, operator qualification requirements, cybersecurity review burden, and difficulty demonstrating reliability in plant-representative environments. Cross-sector benchmarking highlights organizational and deployment practices that may help nuclear plants scale from pilots to routine use. We propose a deployment-oriented roadmap emphasizing modular payload strategies, representative qualification pathways and testing environments, and improved data governance to support safe and economically justified expansion of robotics in operating nuclear power plants.

11 - NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

DOE OSTI2020

Why does cyber deterrence fail and when might it succeed? A framework for cyber scenario analysis

Through cyberattacks on information technology and digital communications systems, antagonists have increasingly been able to alter the strategic balance in their favor without provoking serious consequences. Conflict within and through the cyber domain is inherently different from conflict in other domains that house our critical systems. These differences result in new challenges for defending and creating resilient systems, and for deterring those who would wish to disrupt or destroy them. The purpose of this paper is to further examine the question of whether or not deterrence can be an effective strategy in cyber conflict, given our broad and varied interests in cyberspace. We define deterrence broadly as the creation of conditions that dissuade antagonists from taking unwanted actions because they believe that they will incur unacceptably high costs and/or receive insufficient benefits from taking that action. Deterrence may or may not be the most credible or effective strategy for achieving our desired end states in cybersecurity. Regardless of the answer here, however, it is important to consider why deterrence strategies might succeed under certain conditions, and to understand why deterrence is not effective within the myriad contexts that it appears fail. Deterrence remains a key component of U.S. cyber strategy, but there is little detail on how to operationalize or implement this policy, how to bring a whole-of-government and whole-of- private-sector approach to cyber deterrence, which types of antagonists can or should be deterred, and in which contexts. Moreover, discussion about how nations can and should respond to significant cyber incidents largely centers around whether or not the incident constitutes a "use of force," which would justify certain types of responses according to international law. However, we believe the "use of force" threshold is inadequate to describe the myriad interests and objectives of actors in cyberspace, both attackers and defenders. In this paper, we propose an approach to further examine if deterrence is an effective strategy and under which conditions. Our approach includes systematic analysis of cyber incident scenarios using a framework to evaluate the effectiveness of various activities in influencing antagonist behavior. While we only examine a single scenario for this paper, we propose that additional work is needed to more fully understand how various alternative thresholds constrain or unleash options for actors to influence one another's behavior in the cyber domain.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

DOE OSTI2026

Securing The Future: 2026 Manufacturing & Critical Infrastructure Threat Landscape

This report outlines the current state of manufacturing weaknesses introduced by the complexities of modern environments, including cloud services and Internet of Things (IoT) devices, with particular attention paid to the unique vulnerabilities encountered by SMMs. It also highlights CyManII’s strategic initiatives and collaborative solutions to mitigate these risks and strengthen the cybersecurity posture of the manufacturing ecosystem. Utilizing data from 2025 to inform forward-looking mitigation strategies, this report provides manufacturers with a clear understanding of both current and emerging cybersecurity threats, as well as practical opportunities to strengthen their cyber ecosystems. The following sections detail key vulnerabilities and threat vectors, along with actionable mitigation strategies, many of which have been developed or piloted through CyManII-led efforts. A thorough understanding of these risks and mitigation strategies is essential for manufacturers seeking to strengthen the security and resilience of their manufacturing operations.

3D Printing↗

DOE OSTI2024

Cyber Informed Engineering (CIE) Curriculum Guide

The Cyber-Informed Engineering (CIE) Curriculum Guide provides a framework, guidance, and resources for incorporating CIE into university-level engineering programs and related educational activities. A key goal of this guide is to help institutions deliver CIE focused education to produce future engineers and technicians who meet the nation’s infrastructure needs. To accommodate a broad range of educational goals and approaches, this guide outlines several practical integration strategies, links to resources that can accelerate CIE adoption, and offers perspectives from partner academic institutions on the various implementation strategies.

42 ENGINEERING↗

DOE OSTI2025

Engineering Out Industry 4.0 Cyber Risk Presentation for EnCyCriS

The increasing complexity and business requirements of operational technology (OT) devices is beginning to break the normal segmentation between information technology (IT) and OT networks. The introduction of industry 4.0 devices such as industrial internet of things (IIoT) and other intelligent industrial devices (IID), virtualized OT systems, OT cloud integration, and artificial intelligence (AI)-driven industrial control systems (ICS) has challenged traditional IT/OT cybersecurity strategies. Industry 4.0 devices are analyzed through the lens of well-regarded models such as the PERA model and confidentiality, integrity, and availability (CIA) security objectives, showing the division between what is needed and traditional cybersecurity countermeasures. In this paper, the practice of Cyber-Informed Engineering (CIE) is proposed to bridge the gap between IT/OT security, enhance the practice of cybersecurity in this modern age, and reduce the impacts of consequential events in OT.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

DOE OSTI2025

Engineering Out Industry 4.0 Cyber Risk

The increasing complexity and business requirements of operational technology (OT) devices is beginning to break the normal segmentation between information technology (IT) and OT networks. The introduction of industry 4.0 devices such as industrial internet of things (IIoT) and other intelligent industrial devices (IID), virtualized OT systems, OT cloud integration, and artificial intelligence (AI)-driven industrial control systems (ICS) has challenged traditional IT/OT cybersecurity strategies. Industry 4.0 devices are analyzed through the lens of well-regarded models such as the PERA model and confidentiality, integrity, and availability (CIA) security objectives, showing the division between what is needed and traditional cybersecurity countermeasures. In this paper, the practice of Cyber-Informed Engineering (CIE) is proposed to bridge the gap between IT/OT security, enhance the practice of cybersecurity in this modern age, and reduce the impacts of consequential events in OT.

42 - ENGINEERING↗

DOE OSTI2023

Assessment of Cloud-Based Applications Enabling a Scalable Risk-Informed Predictive Maintenance Strategy Across the Nuclear Fleet

The current light water reactor fleet uses time-based or failure-based maintenance strategies to achieve high-capacity factors. But to make nuclear more competitive in the energy market, these reactors could utilize emerging technologies in terms of artificial intelligence (AI) and cloud computing to enable a cost-effective, predictive maintenance strategy. This report examines the feasibility of cloud computing for the nuclear industry’s needs in terms of the cloud’s computing capabilities, feasibility, and regulatory concerns. The technical viability of cloud computing was analyzed using one year worth of data from a boiling water reactor’s safety relief valve. Models were hosted on a local desktop, Idaho National Laboratory’s high-performance computer, and Microsoft Azure. Data was loaded, processed, and two types of models were trained in an A/B fashion. Based on the speed at which these actions were completed, it was used to determined that cloud computing has adequate computing resources. Additionally, the computing power can scale with the demanded load. To enable cloud computing in the existing fleet, additional sensors, networks, and other requirements must be implemented to ensure a smooth transition from current maintenance strategies. However, there is a benefit as the plant no longer needs manage their own servers, software, cybersecurity, and IT support staff. Many of these features can be offloaded on to the cloud provider. A comprehensive analysis was completed that showed the current annual cost of operating is more expensive than using cloud computing resources. Lastly, the regulatory framework does not explicitly address AI or autonomous control. Currently, the NRC and other regulatory bodies are evaluating providing guidance to address gaps rather than new regulations to address the use of AI and ML. But since many of the AI applications are focused on non-safety related applications, such as balance-of-plant components, they will likely have little or no regulatory restrictions or necessary approvals. Demonstrating how AI can improve maintenance and operation of these non-safety related systems seems like the likely path forward for implementing AI and cloud computing resources inside nuclear power plants (NPPs).

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗