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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Dragonfly Mission Entry and Descent Modeling and Simulation Overview

Dragonfly is a New Frontiers Program mission, led by The Johns Hopkins Applied Physics Laboratory, that will deliver a rotorcraft lander to Saturn’s moon, Titan. The focus of this work is to analyze the trajectory of the entry vehicle from cruise stage separation until lander separation. This analysis is done by the NASA Langley Research Center Entry, Descent, and Landing team using the Program to Optimize Trajectories II. This paper provides an overview of the current design and the robustness of the overall entry sequence using a Monte Carlo uncertainty analysis. The work presented in this study includes the updated design, models, and analysis completed since the Dragonfly Entry, Descent, and Landing Mission Preliminary Design Review.

Simulation↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

OSIRIS-REx Entry, Descent, and Landing Performance

The Origins, Spectral Interpretation, Resource Identification, Security, Regolith Explorer (OSIRIS-REx) was the third mission in NASA’s New Frontiers program. OSIRIS-REx launched out of Cape Canaveral, Florida on September 8, 2016, with a science goal to return a minimum of 60 g of a primitive asteroid’s surface, specifically the near-Earth asteroid Bennu. The sample return capsule (SRC) successfully touched down at UTTR on the morning of September 24, 2023. The entry, descent, and landing (EDL) sequence had an off-nominal deployment of the parachute, but the spacecraft safely landed within the pre-flight prediction of the landing ellipse and the payload was safely recovered. This paper discusses the pre-flight EDL modeling and simulation and focus on predictions for EDL operations. Flight observations such as timeline are compared to the predicted timeline produced by the EDL simulation.

EDL↗
NASA NTRS1964

Space, the new frontier

Space program - high thrust boosters with greater payload capabilities, superior guidance and control, and astronaut training

ASTRONAUT TRAINING↗
NASA NTRS2002

System exploration programs

Explore the source record for details and available documents.

Planetary Exploration Program New Frontiers system↗
NASA NTRS2003

Future Mission Proposal Opportunities: Discovery, New Frontiers, and Project Prometheus

The NASA Office of Space Science is expanding opportunities to propose missions to comets, asteroids, and other solar system targets. The Discovery Program continues to be popular, with two sample return missions, Stardust and Genesis, currently in operation. The New Frontiers Program, a new proposal opportunity modeled on the successful Discovery Program, begins this year with the release of its first Announcement of Opportunity. Project Prometheus, a program to develop nuclear electric power and propulsion technology intended to enable a new class of high-power, high-capability investigations, is a third opportunity to propose solar system exploration. All three classes of mission include a commitment to provide data to the Planetary Data System, any samples to the NASA Curatorial Facility at Johnson Space Center, and programs for education and public outreach.

Niebur, S. M.↗
NASA NTRS2006

NASA's 2004 In-Space Propulsion Refocus Studies for New Frontiers Class Missions

The New Frontiers (NF) program is designed to provide opportunities to fulfill the science objectives for top priority, medium class missions identified in the Decadal Solar System Exploration Survey. This paper assesses the applicability of the In-Space Propulsion s (ISP) Solar Electric Propulsion (SEP) technologies for representative NF class missions that include a Jupiter Polar Orbiter with Probes (JPOP), Comet Surface Sample Return (CSSR), and two different Titan missions. The SEP technologies evaluated include the 7-kW, 4,100-second NASA's Evolutionary Xenon Thruster (NEXT), the 3-kW, 2,700-second Hall thruster, and two different NASA Solar Electric Propulsion Technology Readiness (NSTAR) thrusters that are variants of the Deep Space 1 (DS1) thruster. One type of NSTAR, a 2.6-kW, 3,100-second thruster, will be the primary propulsion system for the DAWN mission that is scheduled to launch in 2006; the other is an "enhanced", higher power variant (3.8-kW, 4,100-second) and is so-called because it uses NEXT system components such as the NEXT power processing unit (PPU). The results show that SEP is applicable for the CSSR mission and a Titan Lander mission. In addition, NEXT has improved its applicability for these types of missions by modifying its thruster performance relative to its performance at the beginning of this study.

Witzberger, Kevin E.↗
NASA NTRS2010

Planning and Estimation of Operations Support Requirements

Life Cycle Cost (LCC) estimates during the proposal and early design phases, as well as project replans during the development phase, are heavily focused on hardware development schedules and costs. Operations (phase E) costs are typically small compared to the spacecraft development and test costs. This, combined with the long lead time for realizing operations costs, can lead to de-emphasizing estimation of operations support requirements during proposal, early design, and replan cost exercises. The Discovery and New Frontiers (D&NF) programs comprise small, cost-capped missions supporting scientific exploration of the solar system. Any LCC growth can directly impact the programs' ability to fund new missions, and even moderate yearly underestimates of the operations costs can present significant LCC impacts for deep space missions with long operational durations. The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) D&NF Program Office at Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) recently studied cost overruns and schedule delays for 5 missions. The goal was to identify the underlying causes for the overruns and delays, and to develop practical mitigations to assist the D&NF projects in identifying potential risks and controlling the associated impacts to proposed mission costs and schedules. The study found that 4 out of the 5 missions studied had significant overruns at or after launch due to underestimation of the complexity and supporting requirements for operations activities; the fifth mission had not launched at the time of the mission. The drivers behind these overruns include overly optimistic assumptions regarding the savings resulting from the use of heritage technology, late development of operations requirements, inadequate planning for sustaining engineering and the special requirements of long duration missions (e.g., knowledge retention and hardware/software refresh), and delayed completion of ground system development work. This paper updates the D&NF LCC study, looking at the operations (phase E) cost drivers in more detail and extending the study to include 2 additional missions and identifies areas for increased emphasis by project management in order to improve the fidelity of operations estimates.

Newhouse, Marilyn E.↗
NASA NTRS2011

Lessons Learned for Planning and Estimating Operations Support Requirements

Operations (phase E) costs are typically small compared to the spacecraft development and test costs. This, combined with the long lead time for realizing operations costs, can lead projects to focus on hardware development schedules and costs, de-emphasizing estimation of operations support requirements during proposal, early design, and replan cost exercises. The Discovery and New Frontiers (D&NF) programs comprise small, cost-capped missions supporting scientific exploration of the solar system. Even moderate yearly underestimates of the operations costs can present significant LCC impacts for deep space missions with long operational durations, and any LCC growth can directly impact the programs ability to fund new missions. The D&NF Program Office at Marshall Space Flight Center recently studied cost overruns for 7 D&NF missions related to phase C/D development of operational capabilities and phase E mission operations. The goal was to identify the underlying causes for the overruns and develop practical mitigations to assist the D&NF projects in identifying potential operations risks and controlling the associated impacts to operations development and execution costs. The study found that the drivers behind these overruns include overly optimistic assumptions regarding the savings resulting from the use of heritage technology, late development of operations requirements, inadequate planning for sustaining engineering and the special requirements of long duration missions (e.g., knowledge retention and hardware/software refresh), and delayed completion of ground system development work. This presentation summarizes the study and the results, providing a set of lessons NASA can use to improve early estimation and validation of operations costs.

Newhouse, Marilyn↗
NASA NTRS2010

NASA Spacecraft Fault Management Workshop Results

Fault Management is a critical aspect of deep-space missions. For the purposes of this paper, fault management is defined as the ability of a system to detect, isolate, and mitigate events that impact, or have the potential to impact, nominal mission operations. The fault management capabilities are commonly distributed across flight and ground subsystems, impacting hardware, software, and mission operations designs. The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Discovery & New Frontiers (D&NF) Program Office at Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) recently studied cost overruns and schedule delays for 5 missions. The goal was to identify the underlying causes for the overruns and delays, and to develop practical mitigations to assist the D&NF projects in identifying potential risks and controlling the associated impacts to proposed mission costs and schedules. The study found that 4 out of the 5 missions studied had significant overruns due to underestimating the complexity and support requirements for fault management. As a result of this and other recent experiences, the NASA Science Mission Directorate (SMD) Planetary Science Division (PSD) commissioned a workshop to bring together invited participants across government, industry, academia to assess the state of the art in fault management practice and research, identify current and potential issues, and make recommendations for addressing these issues. The workshop was held in New Orleans in April of 2008. The workshop concluded that fault management is not being limited by technology, but rather by a lack of emphasis and discipline in both the engineering and programmatic dimensions. Some of the areas cited in the findings include different, conflicting, and changing institutional goals and risk postures; unclear ownership of end-to-end fault management engineering; inadequate understanding of the impact of mission-level requirements on fault management complexity; and practices, processes, and tools that have not kept pace with the increasing complexity of mission requirements and spacecraft systems. This paper summarizes the findings and recommendations from that workshop, as well as opportunities identified for future investment in tools, processes, and products to facilitate the development of space flight fault management capabilities.

Newhouse, Marilyn↗
NASA NTRS2010

Results from the NASA Spacecraft Fault Management Workshop: Cost Drivers for Deep Space Missions

Fault Management, the detection of and response to in-flight anomalies, is a critical aspect of deep-space missions. Fault management capabilities are commonly distributed across flight and ground subsystems, impacting hardware, software, and mission operations designs. The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Discovery & New Frontiers (D&NF) Program Office at Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) recently studied cost overruns and schedule delays for five missions. The goal was to identify the underlying causes for the overruns and delays, and to develop practical mitigations to assist the D&NF projects in identifying potential risks and controlling the associated impacts to proposed mission costs and schedules. The study found that four out of the five missions studied had significant overruns due to underestimating the complexity and support requirements for fault management. As a result of this and other recent experiences, the NASA Science Mission Directorate (SMD) Planetary Science Division (PSD) commissioned a workshop to bring together invited participants across government, industry, and academia to assess the state of the art in fault management practice and research, identify current and potential issues, and make recommendations for addressing these issues. The workshop was held in New Orleans in April of 2008. The workshop concluded that fault management is not being limited by technology, but rather by a lack of emphasis and discipline in both the engineering and programmatic dimensions. Some of the areas cited in the findings include different, conflicting, and changing institutional goals and risk postures; unclear ownership of end-to-end fault management engineering; inadequate understanding of the impact of mission-level requirements on fault management complexity; and practices, processes, and tools that have not kept pace with the increasing complexity of mission requirements and spacecraft systems. This paper summarizes the findings and recommendations from that workshop, particularly as fault management development issues affect operations and the development of operations capabilities.

Newhouse, Marilyn E.↗
NASA NTRS2010

Heritage and Advanced Technology Systems Engineering Lessons Learned from NASA Deep Space Missions

In the design and development of complex spacecraft missions, project teams frequently assume the use of advanced technology systems or heritage systems to enable a mission or reduce the overall mission risk and cost. As projects proceed through the development life cycle, increasingly detailed knowledge of the advanced and heritage systems within the spacecraft and mission environment identifies unanticipated technical issues. Resolving these issues often results in cost overruns and schedule impacts. The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Discovery & New Frontiers (D&NF) Program Office at Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) recently studied cost overruns and schedule delays for 5 missions. The goal was to identify the underlying causes for the overruns and delays, and to develop practical mitigations to assist the D&NF projects in identifying potential risks and controlling the associated impacts to proposed mission costs and schedules. The study found that optimistic hardware/software inheritance and technology readiness assumptions caused cost and schedule growth for four of the five missions studied. The cost and schedule growth was not found to result from technical hurdles requiring significant technology development. The projects institutional inheritance and technology readiness processes appear to adequately assess technology viability and prevent technical issues from impacting the final mission success. However, the processes do not appear to identify critical issues early enough in the design cycle to ensure project schedules and estimated costs address the inherent risks. In general, the overruns were traceable to: an inadequate understanding of the heritage system s behavior within the proposed spacecraft design and mission environment; an insufficient level of development experience with the heritage system; or an inadequate scoping of the system-wide impacts necessary to implement an advanced technology for space flight applications. The paper summarizes the study's lessons learned in more detail and offers suggestions for improving the project's ability to identify and manage the technology and heritage risks inherent in the design solution.

Barley, Bryan↗
NASA NTRS2010

Heritage Systems Engineering Lessons from NASA Deep Space Missions

In the design and development of complex spacecraft missions, project teams frequently assume the use of advanced technology systems or heritage systems to enable a mission or reduce the overall mission risk and cost. As projects proceed through the development life cycle, increasingly detailed knowledge of the advanced and heritage systems within the spacecraft and mission environment identifies unanticipated technical issues. Resolving these issues often results in cost overruns and schedule impacts. The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Discovery & New Frontiers (D&NF) Program Office at Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) recently studied cost overruns and schedule delays for 5 missions. The goal was to identify the underlying causes for the overruns and delays, and to develop practical mitigations to assist the D&NF projects in identifying potential risks and controlling the associated impacts to proposed mission costs and schedules. The study found that optimistic hardware/software inheritance and technology readiness assumptions caused cost and schedule growth for all five missions studied. The cost and schedule growth was not found to be the result of technical hurdles requiring significant technology development. The projects institutional inheritance and technology readiness processes appear to adequately assess technology viability and prevent technical issues from impacting the final mission success. However, the processes do not appear to identify critical issues early enough in the design cycle to ensure project schedules and estimated costs address the inherent risks. In general, the overruns were traceable to: an inadequate understanding of the heritage system s behavior within the proposed spacecraft design and mission environment; an insufficient level of development experience with the heritage system; or an inadequate scoping of the systemwide impacts necessary to implement an advanced technology for space flight applications. The paper summarizes the study s lessons learned in more detail and offers suggestions for improving the project s ability to identify and manage the technology and heritage risks inherent in the design solution.

Barley, Bryan↗
NASA NTRS2011

Systems Engineering Using Heritage Spacecraft Technology: Lessons Learned from Discovery and New Frontiers Deep Space Missions

In the design and development of complex spacecraft missions, project teams frequently assume the use of advanced technology or heritage systems to enable a mission or reduce the overall mission risk and cost. As projects proceed through the development life cycle, increasingly detailed knowledge of the advanced or heritage systems and the system environment identifies unanticipated issues that result in cost overruns or schedule impacts. The Discovery & New Frontiers (D&NF) Program Office recently studied cost overruns and schedule delays resulting from advanced technology or heritage assumptions for 6 D&NF missions. The goal was to identify the underlying causes for the overruns and delays, and to develop practical mitigations to assist the D&NF projects in identifying potential risks and controlling the associated impacts to proposed mission costs and schedules. The study found that the cost and schedule growth did not result from technical hurdles requiring significant technology development. Instead, systems engineering processes did not identify critical issues early enough in the design cycle to ensure project schedules and estimated costs address the inherent risks. In general, the overruns were traceable to: inadequate understanding of the heritage system s behavior within the proposed spacecraft design and mission environment; an insufficient level of experience with the heritage system; or an inadequate scoping of the system-wide impacts necessary to implement the heritage or advanced technology. This presentation summarizes the study s findings and offers suggestions for improving the project s ability to identify and manage the risks inherent in the technology and heritage design solution.

Barley, Bryan↗
NASA NTRS2011

Discovery and New Frontiers Project Budget Analysis Tool

The Discovery and New Frontiers (D&NF) programs are multi-project, uncoupled programs that currently comprise 13 missions in phases A through F. The ability to fly frequent science missions to explore the solar system is the primary measure of program success. The program office uses a Budget Analysis Tool to perform "what-if" analyses and compare mission scenarios to the current program budget, and rapidly forecast the programs ability to meet their launch rate requirements. The tool allows the user to specify the total mission cost (fixed year), mission development and operations profile by phase (percent total mission cost and duration), launch vehicle, and launch date for multiple missions. The tool automatically applies inflation and rolls up the total program costs (in real year dollars) for comparison against available program budget. Thus, the tool allows the user to rapidly and easily explore a variety of launch rates and analyze the effect of changes in future mission or launch vehicle costs, the differing development profiles or operational durations of a future mission, or a replan of a current mission on the overall program budget. Because the tool also reports average monthly costs for the specified mission profile, the development or operations cost profile can easily be validate against program experience for similar missions. While specifically designed for predicting overall program budgets for programs that develop and operate multiple missions concurrently, the basic concept of the tool (rolling up multiple, independently-budget lines) could easily be adapted to other applications.

Newhouse, Marilyn E.↗
NASA NTRS2020

NASA Planetary Mission Concept Study: Assessing: Dwarf Planet Ceres' past and Present Habitability Potential

The Dawn mission revolutionized our understanding of Ceres during the same decade that has also witnessed the rise of ocean worlds as a research and exploration focus. We will report progress on the Planetary Mission Concept Study (PMCS) on the future exploration of Ceres under the New Frontiers or Flagship program that was selected for NASA funding in October 2019. At the time this writing, the study was just kicked off, hence this abstract reports the study plan as presented in the proposal.

Castillo-Rogez, J. C.↗
NASA NTRS1996

Cassini Solid State Recorder: A High Capacity, Radiation Tolerant High-Performance Unit

Onboard the Cassini spacecraft, and the subject of this paper, are two Solid State Recorders designed and built by TRW, Inc., of Redondo Beach, California, for NASA's Jet Propulsion Laboratory. These recorders, which were the first ones designed and selected by NASA for a space program, represent the new frontier and a new beginning for spaceborne data storage.

Cassini↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Lunar Utilization Control Area (LUCA): Configurable Mission Control Rooms and the Benefits to Future Spaceflight

Configurable Control Rooms provide the ability to rapidly change capabilities from mission to mission and customer to customer. Future missions will likely not have the 24/7/365 need for a dedicated mission support room, and CCR could easily be adapted for continuous support if needed. CCRs offer physical, centralized locations for teams to support, and the HOSC provides a secure, reliable facility with constant monitoring by network specialists. Institutions and payload teams can cost save by utilizing a CCR at MSFC eliminating the need to assemble an entire custom control room at their location. This new paradigm in flight operations can ease the creation of any mission from a cubesat to a New Frontiers or Flagship program and anything in between.

Configurable Control Rooms↗