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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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At least 55 records · Page 3
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2021

Assessment of the High Flux Isotope Reactor Cybersecurity Initiative

Recent cyber-attacks on industrial control systems, and inadvertent exposure of nuclear plant systems to cyber-exploits underscore the need for plant operators to adopt and deploy cyber-security defense solutions made for industrial control systems. Of increasing concern is the fact that international cyber hackers are beginning to target critical infrastructure, and because these more modern controls systems depend on advanced use of digital systems, they are more vulnerable than ever before to cyber-attacks. Traditional cyber defense strategies and products that have been available for decades are tailored for use on IT or corporate networks but can cause interruptions and catastrophic damage when deployed on industrial control system networks. The Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Nuclear Energy established the Gateway for Accelerated Innovation in Nuclear (GAIN) program to provide private companies pursuing innovative nuclear energy technologies with access to the technical support necessary to move toward commercialization. One of these GAIN small business vouchers was awarded to Dragos, Inc. to enable collaboration with Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) to evaluate the Dragos Platform on a production nuclear reactor test bed, hence laying the path for future commercial adoption. The vision was to provide a guide for industrial operators on implementing an industrial monitoring solution and to show how these solutions can be deployed without causing safety and reliability issues. This report documents the results of the collaboration between ORNL and Dragos, Inc.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗
DOE OSTI2025

Hands-On, Heads-Up: Blending Cyber T&E with Data Science-Driven Training in Jupyter Notebooks

In an era of increasingly sophisticated threats to critical infrastructure, cybersecurity professionals must be more than just aware; they must be immersed, agile, and equipped to operate in environments where failure is not an option. Nowhere is this truer than in the nuclear sector, where cyber-physical systems, regulatory scrutiny, and insider threat potential demand a new generation of hands-on, technically fluent defenders. This paper presents a unified training approach that integrates Cybersecurity Test and Evaluation (T&E) with data science techniques using Jupyter Notebooks as the interactive lab environment. The program centers on a modular, scenario-driven curriculum designed to build not just knowledge but practical capability in the assessment and defense of radiation detection systems, firmware interfaces, and operational security postures.

98 - NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL↗
DOE OSTI2020

A PROVEN APPROACH FOR EFFECTIVE COMPUTER SECURITY SELF-ASSESSMENTS AT NUCLEAR FACILITIES

A proven method for conducting cybersecurity self-assessments at nuclear power plants is now available for international use. This method was originally developed by Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, under the sponsorship of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), for use at U.S. nuclear power plants. The “Method,” described in NUREG/CR-6847 “Cyber Security Self-Assessment Method for U.S. Nuclear Power Plants,” was originally a limited release document that was withheld from public disclosure but is now publicly available. The Method provides a systematic, phased, and risk-informed approach to help decision makers and security specialists understand their relative cybersecurity posture. Completed Method assessments may be used to support or validate selection of computer security controls to mitigate cyber threats as well as demonstrate compliance with regulations or statutes enacted by competent authorities. The Method assesses the cybersecurity posture of key systems at a nuclear facility with a focus on protection of design base functions. It considers both physical and digital elements of system vulnerabilities and the resulting potential consequences from exploitation. It is well-suited for addressing blended cyberattacks. A semi-quantitative analytical approach is used in the evaluation of potential vulnerabilities, consequences, and risks and provides a technical basis for the selection of security controls to mitigate cyberattacks. The Method’s application at U.S. nuclear power plants has been very encouraging. The only nuclear plant in the United States that did not have adverse findings during its initial NRC computer security inspection prepared for inspection through the diligent application of this self-assessment method and the implementation of recommendations that came out of that self-assessment. Nuclear facilities around the world might find application of the Method extremely helpful for making cost-effective, risk-based decisions regarding computer security and for preparing to pass computer security inspections by their competent authorities.

Cyber security, Nuclear security, Self-assessment↗
DOE OSTI2020

APPLICATION OF MATURITY MODELS FOR EVALUATING CYBERSECURITY PROGRAMS AT NUCLEAR AND RADIOLOGICAL FACILITIES

Maturity models can be used to provide government agencies, industry associations, and organizations operating nuclear facilities with the ability to quickly evaluate the maturity of their cybersecurity programs and identify areas to prioritize for improvement. The Cybersecurity Capability Maturity Model (C2M2) was developed by the U.S. Department of Energy to allow organizations in the energy sector to evaluate the programmatic capabilities of their cybersecurity programs in a consistent manner, communicate programmatic maturity information, prioritize cybersecurity investments in targeted areas of concern, and track how the maturity of their cybersecurity program evolves over time. The C2M2 is designed for use by any critical infrastructure organization regardless of ownership, structure, or size. The C2M2 can be easily fine-tuned to access the maturity of nuclear cybersecurity programs and their application at individual facilities. Built on a foundation of existing cybersecurity standards, frameworks, programs, and initiatives, the model features 10 security domains. Performance in each security domain is characterized using a structured set of cybersecurity practices that represent activities an organization can perform to improve cybersecurity in their domain. Each practice can be quickly evaluated as being either fully, largely, partially, or not implemented. Once practices are evaluated for each security domain, the model defines four maturity indicator levels that apply independently to each domain in the model. To earn a maturity level in a given domain, an organization must adequately perform all the practices for that maturity level and its predecessor level(s). A small assessment team can conduct a C2M2 assessment in a single day. A screening version of the C2M2 allows an initial look at the maturity of nuclear cybersecurity programs that could be completed in under an hour.

Cyber security, Nuclear security, maturity model↗
DOE OSTI2020

Evaluating software defined networking solutions to reduce the digital attack surface of nuclear security systems

Most nuclear security systems used today were not designed for today’s threat environment. Systems that were intended to be stand alone are now interconnected. Devices that have a single purpose are built on multi-purpose platforms and communication protocols that, while effective, have no ability to authenticate authorized versus unauthorized commands. These attributes provide an attacker significant ability to affect the system, pivot throughout the interconnected networks, and remain undetected if he/she is able to compromise a single node. Software defined networking (SDN) has been used for years by information technology (IT) cloud service providers to quickly provision or remove servers or other systems to meet changing demand. The same concept has recently been applied to operational technology (OT) systems to enable very fast failover on critical systems that have stringent and deterministic (<5ms) transmit/receive times. By carefully engineering the communication flows through a network using preplanned routes and specific pathways it is possible to achieve deterministic and extremely reliable message delivery even when components fail. This engineering approach to network design has added security benefits including securing the networking control plane, eliminating network scanning and mapping, inhibiting ARP spoofing and host masquerading, eliminating unauthorized network pivoting and enabling greater situational awareness on the network. SDN in OT environments is new but early testing in electrical power and other critical infrastructure has shown it to be a very powerful tool for building reliable networks and reducing the digital attack surface of the network. The authors tested a software defined network switch on a simple physical protection system with components commonly found in nuclear security systems and found improved mitigations to denial of service attacks, lateral movement and network reconnaissance. The paper details the tests and their results.

Cyber security, Nuclear security, software defined↗
DOE OSTI2021

Advanced Reactor Fragility Considerations

This presentation describes advanced reactor concepts at a high level and discusses them with respect to their implications on failure modes, criticality safety, and proliferation. The presentation is meant to give cyber security specialists with no nuclear background a high level overview of future technologies and how they may be impacted by cyber security concerns. The conference will be held on Wednesday, July 21st so the presentation needs to be approved by the morning on July 20th.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗
DOE OSTI2024

Operation and Security Considerations for Heat Pipe Cooled Microreactors

Microreactors and small modular reactors (SMRs) are anticipated to be key elements in the United States' carbon-free energy portfolio, serving as reliable power sources for remote communities, disaster relief zones, extraterrestrial deployments, and backup power needs. Microreactors employ technologies that are substantially more advanced and recent compared to conventional reactors. Furthermore, they are of a drastically smaller scale and are designed to be operated in a diverse set of locations, offering operational flexibility and mobility. In addition, the autonomous or semi-autonomous operation of microreactors with minimal or no on-site staff is anticipated. These factors give rise to specific challenges with regards to their safety and security. The present work investigates considerations related to heat pipe operation, reactor transport, and cyber/cyberphysical security to ensure the indirect and direct consequences of nefarious actors’ actions are understood and can be mitigated by design or through physical security measures. In addition, future directions are proposed for consideration by both HPMR designers and for regulators.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2025

Cyber-Physical Tabletop Exercise for Small Modular Reactor Facilities

U.S. nuclear power facilities face increasing challenges in meeting dynamic security requirements caused by evolving and expanding threats while keeping costs reasonable to make nuclear energy competitive. This evolving threat landscape includes adversaries having offensive cyber capabilities to attack information technology (IT) systems and operation technology (OT) systems. These adversaries may have the ability to attack the physical protection system (PPS) networks with potential consequential impacts that could degrade the effectiveness of the PPS. These cyber attacks may also be used to attack the safety and operational systems used to operate and ensure the safety of the reactor. Additionally, adversaries may gain access to unmanned aerial systems (UAS) that may be used to provide reconnaissance and surveillance of the facility, provide information to the adversaries, and be equipped with kinetic capabilities such as explosives or weapons that can be used to directly attack the facility. The Department of Energy’s Office of Nuclear Energy’s Advanced Reactor Safeguards and Security (ARSS) program funded Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) and Idaho National Laboratory (INL) to develop a cyber-physical tabletop exercise (TTX). This exercise was conducted on a hypothetical small modular reactor (SMR) facility, and only considered a potential adversary cyber attack on the PPS to a physical attack on the hypothetical facility to achieve a radiological release. This cyber-physical TTX is meant to provide lessons learned to integrate the cyber security system design and the physical protection system (PPS) design to decrease design, operation, and maintenance costs as well as increase effectiveness for defending against design basis threat attacks at the facility. This TTX will also provide a framework and method for SMR and microreactor vendors to conduct their own cyber-physical TTX and gain impactful insights to improving the cyber and physical protection system design for their SMR or microreactor facility design.

42 ENGINEERING↗
DOE OSTI2024

Reactor System Demonstration with Cyber-Attack Scenarios Using CrowPis and Arduino Microcontrollers

This study covers developing and simulating nuclear reactor system using CrowPis and Arduino microcontrollers for demonstrating cyber-attack scenarios. The team was tasked with implementing more sensors and cybersecurity aspects to the reactor program that was created by last year’s high school interns. The team received the opportunity to collaborate and obtain advice from multiple university interns that helped us gain a better perspective of our project. Our mentor’s background in nuclear science was pivotal to our understanding what we could add to the reactor program to make it as realistic as possible. The first week of our internship was spent reading as much material as possible to gain an understanding of and the background for cyber-attacks and nuclear science. Nuclear science was a new horizon for each of the high school interns on the team, so spending this time in the beginning of our internship was crucial to our success. For the remaining portion of our internship, the team collectively did our best to implement as many sensors and use as much hardware as we could to make an accurate representation of a nuclear reactor in the program that was created. This internship was a big learning experience for everyone on the team. We all gained so many insights into the nuclear world and how it can benefit our lives, as well as how so many moving pieces are needed for it to work properly.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗
DOE OSTI2025

Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction (CWMD) Zero Trust Framework: CWMD Zero Trust Principles Model

The research focuses on the critical need for enhanced cybersecurity within the Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction (CWMD) Office, specifically targeting Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear devices. Traditional perimeter-based security models are insufficient against modern cyber threats, prompting a shift toward Zero Trust principles (ZTP) that emphasize continuous verification and stringent security for all devices. Federal directives mandate the adoption of Zero Trust (ZT) across agencies, supported by guidelines from National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) and National Security Agency (NSA). The research involved mapping ZT guidance from these agencies to develop tailored CWMD ZTP. The study identified gaps and areas for improvement, including clear transitional guidance from traditional to ZT architectures and the focus on explicit cross cutting capabilities. Design improvements are recommended to ensure increased comprehensive protection and resilience against sophisticated cyber threats for Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) devices. Collaborative efforts among federal agencies are essential for the successful deployment of an optimized ZT guidance.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
DOE OSTI2025

SECURED: Simulator-Enhanced Control and Understanding of Reactor systems for cyber-Event Defense

The study discusses a learning approach for analyzing cyber-events in reactor systems using integrated hardware and personal computer simulator models. Key points include the rise in cyber-attacks and their sophistication in industrial control systems (ICS), the necessity for awareness, understanding, resource allocation, and preparation to combat these threats, and the digital transformation of old and new nuclear plants, increasing their exposure to cyber threats. It highlights the cyber vulnerabilities of advanced reactor systems, which rely on digital instrumentation and control for operations and safety functions, making them susceptible to cyber-attacks. The approach involves demonstrating reactor system plant ICS cyber-attacks under various operational conditions utilizing tools like simulator models and hardware-based kits. A strategic solution approach tailored to critical infrastructure is emphasized, along with community engagement for public and government support, adopting effective learning approaches, and the preparation for anticipated future challenges. The presentation concludes with a call to action to address challenges, leverage opportunities, and advance through lesson learning in cybersecurity for nuclear energy systems.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗
DOE OSTI2022

Draft Methodology for Cybersecurity Analysis for Adoption of Wireless Technology in Nuclear Power Plants

The report is delivered as DOE-NE Cybersecurity Program Milestone M2CT-22IN1104014-Industry cybersecurity guidance adoption status. The milestone is specifically to document the process and the status of the efforts towards developing guidance in support of industry’s adoption of wireless communication technologies. To transform the operation of nuclear power plants, including domestic light-water reactors, advanced reactors, microreactors, and fission battery, for grid and non-grid applications, secure and resilient wireless capabilities are required. In addition, to realize new operational concepts such as autonomous operation and remote monitoring, advanced sensor, and instrumentation, wireless technology is essential. However, industry implementation is low, and there is no technical basis for how to understand and address potential risks for wireless communications for critical plant functions. A methodology with a technical basis for implementing secure wireless communication is crucial. This wireless adoption methodology is intended to assist a licensee in identifying an appropriate technological approach for securing wireless communications in nuclear power plant. However, this methodology does not provide guidance for addressing wireless design criteria or for addressing all the cybersecurity commitments in licensees’ cybersecurity plans (CSPs) including addressing security impact analysis that a licensee must perform before an update to a Critical Digital Asset (CDA). This methodology guides a licensee through a process of evaluating a proposed wireless implementation and drafting a plant change notification for an example use case. The example is a generic/nonproprietary version of the first test case of the methodology, which, if successfully implemented, is part of the consideration for protecting other functions’ use of wireless in a cybersecure manner.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2021

Cyber-Physical Risks for Advanced Reactors

Cybersecurity for industrial control systems is an important consideration that advance reactor designers will need to consider. How cyber risk is managed is the subject of on-going research and debate in the nuclear industry. This report seeks to identify potential cyber risks for advance reactors. Identified risks are divided into absorbed risk and licensee managed risk to clearly show how cyber risks for advance reactors can potentially be transferred. Absorbed risks are risks that originate external to the licensee but may unknowingly propagate into the plant. Insights include (1) the need for unification of safety, physical security, and cybersecurity risk assessment frameworks to ensure optimal coordination of risk, (2) a quantitative risk assessment methodology in conjunction with qualitative assessments may be useful in efficiently and sufficiently managing cyber risks, and (3) cyber risk management techniques should align with a risked informed regulatory framework for advance reactors.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗