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DOE OSTI2023

Technical Challenges and Gaps in Integration of Advanced Sensors, Instrumentation, and Communication Technologies with Digital Twins for Nuclear Application

This paper explores integrating advanced sensor, instrumentation, and communication technologies with digital twin technologies for nuclear energy application. Digital twins and digital-twin-enabling technologies are expected to integrate with future nuclear reactor designs and have the potential to impact currently operating nuclear power plants. Greater digital integration, advanced instrumentation and control systems, and advanced operations and maintenance practices are all associated with digital-twin-enabling technologies. Advanced sensors, instrumentation, and communication technology are expected to comprise important elements of the infrastructure required to develop and operate a nuclear digital twin system. This paper identifies and discusses challenges and gaps in developing and implementing advanced sensors and instrumentation and communication technology to be integrated with a digital twin in current and advanced reactor applications. It is important to address some challenge and gap to enable a successful near-term deploying advanced sensors, instrumentation, and communication technologies integrated with digital twins.

Yadav, Vaibhav↗
DOE OSTI2021

INS–Support for Formal Cyber Security Education in Brazil–After Action Report

The adoption of digital technology into Instrumentation and Control (I&C) systems in nuclear facilities fundamentally changes the nature of these systems. Greater interconnectivity of reprogrammable, and functionally interdependent control systems has given rise to the need for computer security consideration in digital I&C Systems. The cyber security of I&C systems presents a growing risk to nuclear facilities and requires the development of educational and research tools to ensure the safety of these facilities. Currently there is a major gap in formal educational offerings on cyber security for these Operational Technology (OT) systems. To provide formal cyber security education resources, DOE’s office of International Nuclear Security (INS) partnered with the University of São Paulo (USP) to develop a training course on the cyber security of nuclear facility I&C systems using the hypothetical Nuclear Power Plant, Asherah.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗
DOE OSTI2023

Investigation of the Use of Dynamic Probabilistic Risk Assessment Methodologies for Identifying Digital I&C System Common Cause Failures

Digital Instrumentation and Control (I&C) systems have a key role in nuclear power plants in the upgrade of aging analog systems. Digital systems improve plant safety and reliability through features such as increased hardware reliability and stability and improved failure detection capability. There is no consensus on which of the current probabilistic risk assessment methods are most suitable for use in the reliability analysis of digital I&C systems. While the traditional event-tree/fault-tree (ET/FT) approach is still used for their reliability modeling, there are concerns regarding this approach in properly accounting for dynamic interactions among system components since potentially significant dependencies among failure events may not be identified and/or their likelihood may not be properly quantified. Dynamic methodologies are expected to provide a much more accurate representation of probabilistic evolution of the I&C systems in time due to their capability to more properly account for complex interactions than the static approach. The applicability of dynamic PRA methodologies for digital I&C system is investigated using the criteria presented in the NUREG/CR-6901, and the comparisons made in NUREG/CR-6901 are updated in light of the latest studies. The Dynamic Event Tree (DET) approach has been identified as one of the top dynamic methods when evaluated against the requirements for the reliability modeling of digital I&C systems. The DET method is a strong candidate for integration into existing PRA studies, as it bears many similarities to the traditional ET approach. In this study, the DET approach has been applied to the Plant Protection System of the APR1400 design, and the results are compared to results from its available traditional ET/FT analysis. Possible approaches to evaluate and quantify the effects of common cause failures on system safety using dynamic methods are also examined.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗
DOE OSTI2022

Draft Methodology for Cybersecurity Analysis for Adoption of Wireless Technology in Nuclear Power Plants

The report is delivered as DOE-NE Cybersecurity Program Milestone M2CT-22IN1104014-Industry cybersecurity guidance adoption status. The milestone is specifically to document the process and the status of the efforts towards developing guidance in support of industry’s adoption of wireless communication technologies. To transform the operation of nuclear power plants, including domestic light-water reactors, advanced reactors, microreactors, and fission battery, for grid and non-grid applications, secure and resilient wireless capabilities are required. In addition, to realize new operational concepts such as autonomous operation and remote monitoring, advanced sensor, and instrumentation, wireless technology is essential. However, industry implementation is low, and there is no technical basis for how to understand and address potential risks for wireless communications for critical plant functions. A methodology with a technical basis for implementing secure wireless communication is crucial. This wireless adoption methodology is intended to assist a licensee in identifying an appropriate technological approach for securing wireless communications in nuclear power plant. However, this methodology does not provide guidance for addressing wireless design criteria or for addressing all the cybersecurity commitments in licensees’ cybersecurity plans (CSPs) including addressing security impact analysis that a licensee must perform before an update to a Critical Digital Asset (CDA). This methodology guides a licensee through a process of evaluating a proposed wireless implementation and drafting a plant change notification for an example use case. The example is a generic/nonproprietary version of the first test case of the methodology, which, if successfully implemented, is part of the consideration for protecting other functions’ use of wireless in a cybersecure manner.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2022

An Integrated Risk Assessment Process of Safety-Related Digital I&C Systems in Nuclear Power Plants

Upgrading the existing analog instrumentation and control (I&C) systems to state-of-the-art digital I&C (DI&C) systems will greatly benefit existing light water reactors. However, the issue of software common cause failure (CCF) remains an obstacle in terms of qualification for digital technologies. Existing analyses of CCFs in I&C systems mainly focus on hardware failures. With the application and upgrading of new DI&C systems, design flaws could cause software CCFs to become a potential threat to plant safety, considering that most redundancy designs use similar digital platforms or software in their operating and application systems. With complex multilayer redundancy designs to meet the single failure criterion, these I&C safety systems are of particular concern in U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission licensing procedures. In Fiscal Year 2019, the Risk-Informed Systems Analysis (RISA) Pathway of the U.S. Department of Energy’s Light Water Reactor Sustainability Program initiated a project to develop a risk assessment strategy for delivering a strong technical basis to support effective, licensable, and secure DI&C technologies for digital upgrades and designs. An integrated risk assessment for the DI&C process was proposed for this strategy to identify potential key digital-induced failures, implement reliability analyses of related digital safety I&C systems, and evaluate the unanalyzed sequences introduced by these failures (particularly software CCFs) at the plant level. Here this paper summarizes these RISA efforts in the risk analysis of safety-related DI&C systems at Idaho National Laboratory.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2024

Common Cause Failure Analysis for Nuclear Power Plant Instrumentation and Control Systems

This presentation is prepared for the IAEA Virtual Consultancy Meeting on Preparation of a Coordinated Research Project on Common Cause Failures in Nuclear Power Plant Instrumentation and Control Systems from February 5 ? 8, 2024. It provides an overview of the INL activities on the common cause failure analysis for instrumentation and control system in nuclear power plants.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗
DOE OSTI2021

Cyber-Informed Engineering Case Study of an Integrated Hydrogen Generation Plant

Strategies for securing digital instrumentation and control (I&C) systems within the nuclear industry are provided by multiple standards and guidance documents. However, since selection and use of security controls outlined in these documents are frequently only considered during or after installation, there are often limitations on their use, such as technological constraints related to design or operation. Furthermore, alternative controls intended to provide the same or similar security countermeasure as the primary control may also be infeasible at these stages, leaving the I&C system vulnerable to cyber-attacks. The limitations associated with ‘bolting on’ security controls late in the systems engineering lifecycle can be reduced by integrating Cyber-Informed Engineering (CIE) into the process. This paper evaluates the use of CIE during the high-level design stage of a hydrogen generation project where heat and electricity are provided by a nuclear power plant. Applying CIE to this project highlighted potential cyber vulnerabilities of the initial design, leading to recommendations for process flow and I&C system design modifications to reduce, and at times eliminate, the risk from both deliberate and unintentional cyber incidents.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2025

An Approach to Automate tools for the Risk Assessment of Digital Instrumentation and Control Systems

Reliable digital instrumentation and control systems (DI&C) are integral for sustaining the continued operation of nuclear power plants. These systems ensure that nuclear reactors operate safely, efficiently, and within regulatory requirements. Yet, the cost of designing and licensing new nuclear DI&C can be prohibitively expensive. Under the U.S. Department of Energy Light Water Reactor Sustainability Program, Idaho National Laboratory has developed a framework for supporting the risk-informed design of DI&C systems by offering methods to support the identification, quantification, and evaluation of risks for various DI&C design architectures. The framework indicates potential software failure modes and provides pathways for quantifying the potential for these software failures, including common cause failures. Using the framework’s systematic approach, challenges for assessing risks within new and existing nuclear DI&C systems can be reduced. Nevertheless, the current framework can be further improved using the convenience of automation. This paper introduces the development of Software for the Hazard Identification and Evaluation of Digital Systems (SHIELDS). SHIELDS is an engineering software package that enables the identification, elimination, and mitigation of potential risks and reduces the burden of deploying reliable DI&C systems. This work introduces plans and techniques to digitize and improve the manual risk assessment modules of the framework. These improvements will save time and increase the repeatability and usability of the framework, making it more accessible to a wider range of users. Ultimately, this introduces SHIELDS and how its modules support efficient development of safe and reliable DI&C systems.

46 - INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AN↗
DOE OSTI2021

INTEGRATED RISK ASSESSMENT OF DIGITAL I&C SAFETY SYSTEMS FOR NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS

Upgrading the existing analog instrumentation and control (I&C) systems to state-of-the-art digital I&C (DI&C) systems provides the foremost means to improve performance and reduce costs for existing light-water reactors (LWRs). However, qualification of digital technologies remains a challenge?especially the issue of software common cause failure (CCF), which has been difficult to address. Existing analyses of CCFs in I&C systems mainly focus on hardware failures. With the application and upgrading of new DI&C systems, software CCFs due to design flaws might become a potential threat to plant safety, considering that most redundancy designs use similar digital platforms or software in their operating and application systems. With complex multi-layer redundancy designs to meet the single failure criterion, these I&C safety systems are of particular concern in U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) licensing procedures. In 2019, the Risk-Informed Systems Analysis (RISA) Pathway of the U.S. Department of Energy?s (DOE?s) Light Water Reactor Sustainability (LWRS) Program initiated a project to develop a risk assessment strategy for delivering a strong technical basis to support effective, licensable, secure DI&C technologies for digital upgrades/designs. An integrated risk assessment for the DI&C (RADIC) process was proposed for this strategy to identify potential key digital-induced failures, implement reliability analyses of related digital safety I&C systems, and evaluate the unanalyzed sequences introduced by these failures (particularly software CCFs) at the plant level. This paper summarizes these RISA efforts in the risk analysis of safety-related DI& systems at Idaho National Laboratory.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2023

Creating a Simulation Platform for Research and Development of Advanced Control Methods

Advanced nuclear reactors are essential to meet the changing energy requirements throughout both the United States and the rest of world. In addition to other features, they are designed to enable deployment in remote locations and operate in a fully (or near-fully) autonomous manner, which will require a new control paradigm. To realize autonomously operating reactors, the U.S. Department of Energy’s Nuclear Energy Enabling Technologies Advanced Sensors and Instrumentation (NEET ASI) program conducts research and development into the enabling technologies and methods needed, including digital twins, machine learning, and risk modeling, in addition to various types of control methods. These technologies and methods are the key foundations needed to achieve fully autonomous systems. To develop and evaluate the technologies and methods necessary for achieving autonomous operations, it is critical to identify a software tool capable of integrating all the required elements. In surveying the available solutions, no software platforms were identified that could accomplish what was needed without introducing drawbacks. This challenge was the motivation for the current effort: to develop a software platform that can seamlessly integrate autonomouscontrol-enabling technologies and methods, allowing for accelerated research and development and transfer of ideas. The resulting platform, known as the Control and Optimization Modular Modeling Application for Nuclear Deployment (COMMAND), is Python-based, and leverages open-source tools to provide flexibility and facilitate building upon prior research. It is designed to enable advanced reactor developers to deploy and test advanced control technologies and methods coupled with their own models, solutions, and hardware. Given the substantial undertaking of developing such a platform, the current effort focused on laying down scalable, flexible software foundations and infrastructure, then demonstrating the platform via a use case. These foundations included developing generic modules, which contain the base variable and system blocks (the information and functional building blocks, respectively, that can be used to design a simulation) and the data handling and storage blocks needed to exchange information between the various blocks; as well as enablingtechnology-specific modules. This platform was evaluated via a use case, which was to simulate and control a process for the Microreactor Automated Control System (MACS) test bed. While MACS is not currently directly coupled to any specific microreactor physics, it was initially developed in concert with the Microreactor Applications Research Validation and Evaluation (MARVEL) microreactor, and so the MARVEL physics are used here. As part of this use case, several enabling-technology-specific blocks within COMMAND were integrated, including a proportional integral derivative (PID) control block, a Reactor Excursion and Leak Analysis Program (RELAP5-3D) block, and an anomaly detection block. The COMMAND software platform was successfully demonstrated to achieve the scalability and flexibility objectives of this effort and will be leveraged by the program’s research efforts to advance state of the art control methodologies towards autonomous operations of advanced reactors. As new use cases are created and implemented, it is anticipated that COMMAND will continue to grow and evolve to meet new requirements.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗
DOE OSTI2021

A Cybersecurity Event Simulation Tool and Platform

Digital Instrumentation and Control Systems (ICSs) have replaced analog control systems in nuclear power plants raising cybersecurity concerns. To study and understand the cybersecurity risks of nuclear power plants both high fidelity models of the plant physics and controllers must be created, and a framework to test and evaluate cyber security events must be established. A testing and evaluation framework of cybersecurity events consists of a method of interfering with control systems, a simulation of the plant network, and a network packet capture and recording tool. Sandia National Labs (SNL) in collaboration with the University of New Mexico’s Institute for Space and Nuclear Power Studies (UNM-ISNPS) is developing such a cybersecurity testing framework.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗
DOE OSTI2023

Integrated Operations for Nuclear: Work Reduction Opportunity Demonstration Strategy

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY The Light Water Reactor Sustainability Program Plant Modernization Pathway has been working with industry for a number of years to leverage digital technology to extend the life and improve the performance of the existing fleet through modernized technologies and improved processes for plant operation and power generation. This includes development of modernization solutions to improve reliability and economic performance while addressing US nuclear industry’s aging and obsolescence challenges. The objective of these efforts is to deliver a sustainable business model that enables US nuclear industry to remain competitive. Digital Infrastructure (DI) research has established a technical foundation for these efforts. This effort began with technical analysis and support for a safety-related instrumentation and control (I&C) pilot upgrade being performed at Constellation Energy Generation’s Limerick Nuclear Plant. The following publicly available reports were produced as part of this effort. • INL/EXT-20-61079, Vendor-Independent Design Requirements for a Boiling Water Reactor Safety System Upgrade [1] • INL/EXT-20-59371, Business Case Analysis for Digital Safety-Related Instrumentation & Control System Modernizations [2] • INL/EXT-20-59809, “Safety-Related Instrumentation and Control Pilot Upgrade: Initial Scoping Phase Implementation Report and Lessons Learned [3] • INL/RPT-23-72105, Safety-Related Instrumentation and Control Upgrade: Conceptual – Detailed Design Phase Report and Lessons Learned [4]

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗
DOE OSTI2026

MARVEL Instrumentation, Control, and Software Considerations

This paper details the various I&C considerations and design decisions made throughout the MARVEL (Micro-reactor Applications Research Validation and Evaluation) project, including sensor and actuator selection, safety-related functionality, digital control hardware and software, and testing methodologies. Key challenges such as managing radiation, temperature, and space constraints are discussed, along with the trade-offs between using standard equipment and custom solutions. The successful integration of off-the-shelf components, the emphasis on minimizing safety-related instrumentation, and the lessons learned from prototyping and testing are highlighted. The authors aim to provide insights that can benefit future micro-reactor designs and emphasize the importance of real-world testing in advancing reactor technology.

46 - INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AN↗
DOE OSTI2023

Application of NEAMS Multiphysics Framework for Species Tracking in Molten Salt Reactors

This report from Idaho National Laboratory (INL) summarizes the key modeling and simulation activities conducted under the Department of Energy (DOE) Molten Salt Reactor (MSR) Campaign during the Fiscal Year 2023 (FY23). The focus of the work was to leverage state-of-the-art modeling capabilities from the DOE Nuclear Energy Advanced Modeling and Simulation (NEAMS) codes to enable novel multiphysics and multiscale modeling and simulation of MSRs. Through collaboration with NEAMS code developers, advanced multiphysics analysis capabilities for MSR systems were demonstrated by coupling depletion, thermal-hydraulics, and thermochemistry into an innovative framework for chemical species transport in MSRs. As a result, the framework can track nuclides throughout their lifetimes in the core, from production (depletion) to advection throughout the salt volume (thermal-hydraulics) and off-gassing or precipitation outside of the salt (thermochemistry). This work supports the near-term deployment of MSRs by integrating the synergistic efforts between the DOE’s MSR Campaign and NEAMS program. The resulting framework will help better connect system design modelers with experimentalists to better understand and predict complex physical behaviors in MSRs. Researchers and MSR developers alike can now leverage these new modeling and simulation capabilities to perform novel analyses with applications including: • MSR dynamics during normal operational transients and accident scenarios • Off-gas system design and performance for fuel cycle and depletion analysis • Corrosion and active chemistry control for reactor component health and lifetime determination • Source term, decay heat and activity determination in accident scenarios • Special nuclear material accountancy and chemical forensic analysis for safeguards • Digital twin development of experiments and experimental reactor demonstrations • Measurement requirements for instrumentation and control design • Uncertainty and sensitivity analysis of missing data to inform future experimental data collection.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI2020

Cyber Security Analysis for Nuclear Reactor Control Systems (Final Technical Report)

This project investigated the cyber-security impacts of moving from an all analog, point-to-point, instrumentation and control (I&C) system to a digital I&C system based on Modbus and a shared communication medium. A formalism called a hybrid attack graph was expanded to support the nuclear research reactor system. The hybrid attack graph allows one to check a system for vulnerabilities, in this case cyber-security vulnerabilities, and to document the attack vectors (scenarios) causing those vulnerabilities. In parallel, a simulation of the system was developed to model both the physical reactor parameters and operations, as well as the network interconnects and communications. This simulation platform was modeled on the nuclear research reactor located at Washington State University. The simulation platform provided a sandbox to evaluate and quantify the impact of identified and proposed vulnerabilities in the system and to determine the effectiveness of countermeasures at stopping these attacks. The simulation and hybrid attack graph tools were integrated to provide a streamlined process of generating attack scenarios, playing those scenarios out in the simulation, and then analyzing the results to correlate system state to states in the hybrid attack graph. This process was used to (1) quantify the impact of attack scenarios and (2) to determine if the system moved through the hybrid attack graph as anticipated. The hybrid attack graph tool was extended and customized to produce a tool to automatically identify critical assets (CAs) and critical digital assets (CDAs) as defined by NRC Regulatory Guide 5.71. This tool was verified using the nuclear research reactor at Washington State University. Finally, a series of educational modules covering the findings of the different aspects of this research have been created.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
DOE OSTI2021

How the NRC modernized its digital I&C infrastructure and where it goes from here

The NRC first formally developed infrastructure for the review of digital instrumentation and control (I&C) systems in the 1990’s. Although, the current U.S. fleet of nuclear power plants were originally designed and constructed with analog systems, the U.S. nuclear industry has for more that thirty years been working to upgrade these older systems with modern digital systems. Digital systems have many advantages but also pose different engineering challenges and need to be reviewed by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) in a different way. Because of this the NRC started looking at its regulatory infrastructure to see if changes needed be made to support the expanded safe use of digital systems in nuclear power plants. Several efforts in the 1990’s included a review by the National Academies’ National Research Council, a review of the impact of potential new digital systems by the NRC staff as a result of advanced reactor designs and the NRC staff’s update to the I&C section of the Standard Review Plan (SRP) (Ref 1).

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗