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At least 55 records · Page 3

Application of Hybrid K-Edge Densitometry in Reprocessing Facilities

During reprocessing operations, accurately determining the elemental concentrations of uranium and plutonium is critical for nuclear security. Reprocessing facilities processes hundreds of tons of nuclear material annually, requiring accurate measurements to ensure effective nuclear material control and accountability. Hybrid K-edge densitometry (HKED) system combines K-edge absorption densitometry with x-ray fluorescence to measure actinide elemental concentrations with a low uncertainty. This system uses high-purity germanium gamma-ray detectors and advanced signal processing equipment to detect x-ray accurately. This document provides guidance on how to achieve effective performance from an HKED system for measuring uranium and plutonium concentrations in reprocessing facilities. It includes best practices for the setup and operation of an HKED system, while highlighting factors influencing uncertainties.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Qualification and Re-Qualification of NDA Instruments

Non-Destructive Assay (NDA) instruments are a large component of nuclear material (NM) measurement at LANL. Nuclear Material Control and Accountability Group (SAFE-NMCA) personnel in the Safeguards Division are responsible for oversight of the instruments used for material accountability measurements. It is the responsibility of SAFE-NMCA to ensure that all instruments are operating as expected and can produce quality measurements to provide assurance that requirements of the DOE approved NMCA Plan are being met.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

Initial Testing of a Small Gamma Detector (GR1+) for Detection of Holdup in HEPA Filters

Measuring and assessing holdup is a key component of proper inventorying of a Material Balance Area (MBA). The Nuclear Material Control and Accountability (NMC&A) group at the Savannah River Site is responsible for ensuring that the methods used to determine holdup in the MBAs are valid for the conditions of that MBA. Holdup can be contained inside processing equipment or inside ventilation systems that that pulls air out of the glovebox through HEPA filters and stainless steel piping.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

Implementation of a System of Gamma Imagers for Measuring Plutonium Holdup

The Surplus Plutonium Disposition (SPD) project is an effort to dilute and dispose of many tonsof weapons grade plutonium. This work will take place in a shielded glovebox to protect workers fromradiological dose. Accurate measurements of the holdup, or material left behind, in the gloveboxes is im-portant for Nuclear Material Control and Accountancy, worker dose minimization, criticality safety, andprocess monitoring. Shielding around the gloveboxes presents an obstacle for the traditional GeneralizedGamma Holdup (GGH) method. The uncertainties associated with that method, at around 28%, arealso detrimental since the amount of holdup must be kept below an established limit with a high level ofconfidence.Passive gamma-ray imaging provides a more complete depiction of the distribution of radioactivematerials. Recent refinement of the method has demonstrated that quantitative information can beextracted from the images with a well-characterized system. A permanently installed system of gamma-ray imagers is currently being developed to measure plutonium holdup in the SPD gloveboxes. Thispaper will report on progress with the development of this system.This application requires that the features of current commercially available instruments from H3Dand PHDS, optimized for measurement performance in a mobile application, be translated into theconstraints of the operational environment with fixed installations. The interaction between facilityconstraints and measurement capabilities will be addressed.A series of measurements with plutonium sources in a mocked-up glovebox geometry with imagersmounted above the ceiling of the glovebox have been taken. Imager performance with respect to angularresolution, minimum measurement time for quantification, and signal-to-noise ratio with a multitudeof sources will be evaluated for those measurements. A series of prototypes of user interfaces will bepresented for display of the data to its various consumers for the purposes of Nuclear Material Controland Accountancy, worker dose minimization, criticality safety, and process monitoring.

Schmitt, Kyle↗

Gamma and Neutron Measurement and Modeling of Irradiated TRISO Fuel

Given the unique characteristics of the PBR fuel cycle, both gamma and neutron measurements are expected to play important roles in performing and maintaining nuclear material control and accounting for spent pebbles to safeguard the fuel cycle. Given the lack of irradiated pebbles in the US, a variety of irradiated TRISO fuel samples with wide ranges of burnups and cooling times available at ORNL were used in this work. A large number of gamma and neutron measurements have been performed on these samples to collect data to test the various detectors and to benchmark the computer models to simulate the depletion and decay of the fuel and the measurements themselves. Two neutron detectors, including a custom-made detector and the Very High-Performance Neutron Multiplicity Counting, were used to measure the neutrons emitted by these TRISO samples. Three gamma spectrometry detectors, including an HPGe and the M400 CZT detector, were used to measure gamma-ray emissions from these samples. The M400 was recently adopted by the IAEA for fresh uranium measurements, but it was tested for spent fuel measurements prior to this project. Detailed MCNP models were developed to simulate these neutron and gamma measurements. Some GADRAS models were also developed to cross check the MCNP models for the gamma measurements. It was found challenging to perform neutron measurements in the hot cell due to the high background counts. Close agreements were observed between the simulated and measured neutron count rates in both detectors’ measurements of californium calibration sources. Both the HPGe and M400 detectors were able to measure the 604 and 662 keV peaks from these samples, which are the two most important peaks used to infer fuel burnup. Although the M400 detector did not have nearly good energy resolution and did not detect some of the minor peaks as the HPGe detector, it was found to be capable of handling significantly higher dose rates than HPGe. Given the complexities in the TRISO samples (e.g., different samples sizes) and uncertainties in the alignments between the detector and the TRISO fuel inside the containers, large scatters were found between the peak area rates and the samples’ burnups. However, the 604/662 peak ratios were found to trend well with the samples’ burnups among most samples in both measured and simulated results.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Delayed Neutron Temporal Signatures for Uranium Enrichment Measurement NA-241 SGTech (Final Report)

Nondestructive determination of uranium enrichment is a core capability for nuclear material accounting and control (NMAC) and safeguards verification measurements; however, traditional gamma spectroscopy-based techniques for enrichment measurement rely on significant assumptions of material composition and geometry, precluding their use in scenarios where a heterogeneous spatial distribution of enrichments is encountered. As an alternative, we are developing a technique to use delayed neutron temporal signatures for the measurement of uranium enrichment. Each uranium isotope has unique delayed neutron group yields, resulting in a unique delayed neutron decay time profile which can be analyzed to determine enrichment without the need for calibration sources. As part of this effort, we performed a series of measurement campaigns in which we used an active well coincidence counter (AWCC) retrofitted with commercial D-D and D-T generators to evaluate the operational characteristics of this method in response to a set of uranium enrichment and mass standards, as well as representative diversion scenarios in which either “concealed” enriched uranium is shielded by depleted uranium or declared enriched uranium is “hollowed out” and replaced with a central region of depleted uranium. A standard operating procedure and best practices were compiled to facilitate the use of delayed neutron-based enrichment measurements for international safeguards inspections.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

Modeling and Simulation of Fuel Burnup in Pebble Bed Reactors

Modeling and simulation of fuel burnup plays important roles in reactor design, operation, safety, and security as well as nuclear material control and accounting (MC&A) [1]. This task is uniquely challenging for pebble bed reactors (PBR) because the pebbles are continuously added and recycled into the reactor core, and their paths through the core are random. To address this problem, we present two simulation models in this paper. Brookhaven National Laboratory (BNL) developed a simple lattice model of a PBR in Serpent software to generate used pebble isotopic concentrations. The benefit of using Serpent software in this specific application is that it helps streamline the data generation process without having to use too many independent software codes in combination to achieve a simple task. For example, transport, burnup and zero power decay can be implemented in a single pass. Three-dimensional core models were developed using Serpent to simulate the burnup process of five subject pebbles starting from fresh till they reach nearly target burnup, with each pebble placed in one of the five artificially designated radial channels to capture the changing neutron spectra along the core radius. Equilibrium isotopic concentrations were assumed in all other pebbles in the core. To provide a verification for the Serpent isotope transmutation and decay results, Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) performed simple SCALE/ORIGEN calculations using the average neutron spectra calculated by Serpent for each of the five pebbles. The 252-group neutron spectra from Serpent were then used by ORIGEN to produce the one-group library for depletion and decay calculations. The isotopic concentrations of a few nuclides of interest and neutron and gamma source terms produced from the ORIGEN calculations were compared with the ones from the Serpent calculations. The model simulated in this work was based on the Pebble Bed Modular Reactor (PBMR)-400 design because many data needed for the simulation such as core power profiles, fuel and reflector temperatures, and equilibrium core composition are publicly available. In this paper, we will compare the results between these two approaches and benchmark the results against a set of well-established simulation results for PBMR-400.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Signature Analysis Utilizing a Dynamic Molten Salt Reactor Model for MC&A

Moving from traditional fixed fuel nuclear reactor systems to a mobile, dynamic fuel system that has dissolved special nuclear material in a molten salt is a paradigm shift in several respects. One major consideration is how to develop effective nuclear material controls and accounting for these novel reactor systems. The Molten Salt Reactor Experiment is one example of a critical molten salt system and provided a significant reference library based on the documented effort. But it was low thermal power that was not intended to reflect a commercial scale electricity production design. Therefore, to facilitate and assist vendors with domestic licensing considerations, research is underway to identify methods that could be used for domestic safeguards approaches for these novel reactor systems. This research presents the results of a signature analysis of data generated from three simulated scenarios using the molten salt demonstration reactor model defined in the Transient Simulation Framework of Reconfigurable Modules. Each scenario provides 1 hour isotope inventories over a 180 day period. The scenarios investigated provide test cases to examine if direct gamma-ray spectroscopy of the fuel can be used to identify changes comparing a base case (no reactivity control and fixed fission contribution) to an insertion of reactivity (10 pcm no change in fission composition) and a change in fission composition. The analysis demonstrates that monitoring the total count rate in a highly collimated high-resolution photon energy spectrum is sensitive to perturbations imposed into the reactor model. The total photon count rate changes ≈2% for the fission composition change and ≈4.5% for the reactivity insertion compared to the base case. However, both scenarios show an increase in the total photon count rate. The total photon count rate can be used to identify changes due to power (number of fissions) but not due to a change in the material undergoing fission. To distinguish between the two cases of increased power, the photon spectrum would require an intensive analysis technique. A photon peak count rate ratio analysis could be used to identify changes in the fissile material fission generation in the core through identification of a static peak that shows little variation to the source of fission and a highly varying peak. The photon peak strength will ultimately be determined by the isotope’s fission yield. A preliminary analysis investigating the coupling of the isotope’s fission yield and its concentration in the fuel salt derived from the modeling has been performed. A ratio analysis of the photon peak count rates of 140 La to 99 Mo demonstrated that the reactivity insertion creates a distinct difference in the ratio compared to the fission composition change scenario.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Conceptual design study of neutron detectors for safeguards measurement of an irradiated pebble

Nuclear material control and accounting (MC&A) of pebble-bed reactors (PBRs) is challenging because a PBR utilizes hundreds of thousands of identical, unmarked pebbles that are continuously recirculated through the core. To develop tools that enable the implementation of international safeguards, especially in the context of MC&A of spent pebbles, we designed and simulated three neutron detection concepts to determine fissile content in individual pebbles: a differential die-away (DDA) detector, a californium interrogation prompt neutron (CIPN) detector, and a passive neutron albedo reactivity (PNAR) detector using Monte Carlo calculations. Burnup calculations were performed on the spent pebbles from the PBMR-400 classic PBR. The varying neutron and gamma source terms, and isotopic compositions in the spent pebbles calculated at various burnup levels were used in the neutron detector models. DDA was found to be sensitive to the number of passes a pebble has had through the core and to the fissile content contained in a spent pebble. Optimization in the DDA design further increased the neutron count rates and thus reduced counting uncertainty. Meanwhile, passive neutron counting using the same detector body could distinguish pebbles with different numbers of passes, but its response was dominated by neutron-emitting actinides and was not sensitive to fissile content. On the other hand, the PNAR technique was not viable for a single pebble but performed reasonably for a 27-pebble array, which suggested potential use for verification measurements of containers filled with 27 or more spent pebbles.

CIPN↗

Fissionable Materials Handlers Operators-Initial Training

These courses were designed for all Initial Fissionable Material Handlers Operators and Supervisors whose job activities will require the performance of Fissile Material Operations located within the Plutonium Facility (PF-4). The course requirements are based on DOE order 426.2, Personnel Section, Qualification, and Training Requirements for Fissionable Material Handlers. These courses are required training for all initial Fissionable Material Handlers and is specific to TA-55 FMH Certification. It covers the core areas and topics in Criticality Safety, Material-at-Risk, Nuclear Material Control and Accountability, Radiological Protection, TA-55 Material Handling and Movement.

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗

Introduction to LANMAS and LAMCAS, Course #50061 [Slides]

This course is designed to offer a detailed introduction to the LAMCAS program, and the software tools used to support the Nuclear Material Control and Accountability (NMC&A) mission. The course covers the importance of NMC&A in LANL's operations, as well as its significance on a national and global scale. Completion of this course is required before an employee can access the inquiry features of the LAMCAS software.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Modeling and Simulation of Fuel Burnup in Pebble Bed Reactors

Modeling and simulation of fuel burnup plays important roles in reactor design, operation, safety, and security as well as nuclear material control and accounting (MC&A) [1]. This task is uniquely challenging for pebble bed reactors (PBR) because the pebbles are continuously added and recycled into the reactor core, and their paths through the core are random. To address this problem, we present two simulation models in this paper. Brookhaven National Laboratory (BNL) developed a simple lattice model of a PBR in Serpent software to generate used pebble isotopic concentrations. The benefit of using Serpent software in this specific application is that it helps streamline the data generation process without having to use too many independent software codes in combination to achieve a simple task. For example, transport, burnup and zero power decay can be implemented in a single pass. Three-dimensional core models were developed using Serpent to simulate the burnup process of 5 subject pebbles starting from fresh till they reach nearly target burnup, with each pebble placed in one of the five artificially designated radial channels to capture the changing neutron spectra along the core radius. Equilibrium isotopic concentrations were assumed in all other pebbles in the core. To provide a verification for the Serpent isotope transmutation and decay results, Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) performed simple SCALE/ORIGEN calculations using the average neutron spectra calculated by Serpent for each of the 5 pebbles. The 252-group neutron spectra from Serpent were then used by ORIGEN to produce the one-group library for depletion and decay calculations. The isotopic concentrations of a few nuclides of interest and neutron and gamma source terms produced from the ORIGEN calculations were compared with the ones from the Serpent calculations. The model simulated in this work was based on the Pebble Bed Modular Reactor (PBMR)-400 design because many data needed for the simulation such as core power profiles, fuel and reflector temperatures, and equilibrium core composition are publicly available. In this paper, we will compare the results between these two approaches and benchmark the results against a set of well-established simulation results for PBMR-400.

Dim, Odera↗

The Meaning of Risk for Safety, Security, and Safeguards in the Design of Advanced Nuclear Reactors

What is the meaning of risk as it applies to the design of advanced reactors in the disciplines of safety, security, and safeguards? How can we find common terminology for the concept of risk and how can we find interfaces between these disciplines? These are important questions that should be explored in order that they may be applied in an integrated manner for the most effective and efficient design approaches. Eliminating or minimizing risks is a key design driver that motivates and informs the development of nuclear reactors. For safety, risk is well understood and applied in Probabilistic Risk Assessments. For security, the risk-based concepts of vulnerability assessments and vital areas are all considered in designing security systems. For safeguards, the concept of risk is not formally defined, as it relates to the design and operation of nuclear reactors. International nuclear safeguards seek to reduce the risk of proliferation in the nuclear fuel cycle and as such the concept of risk does exist. Therefore, the current understanding of the “3S’ approach, which seeks to find the interfaces and conflicts between safety, security, and safeguards requires a thorough understanding of the role that the reduction of risk plays in all three disciplines. The intersection of risk for safety and security is now being developed as there is a strong correlation between reactor design and operations and their vulnerability to sabotage. The intersection of risk for security and safeguards has to date chiefly been focused on the nuclear material control and accounting systems, which are relied on by both the operator (State) and the IAEA. This paper explores the concept of risk in each of the three disciplines, how they interact, potential conflicts and interfaces , how these might be addressed and leveraged, and a notional framework for how this could be achieved.

Kovacic, Donald N↗

Recommendations for a Fundamental Nuclear Material Control (FNMC) Plan for TRISO Fuel Fabrication Facilities Under NRC Regulations

A fundamental nuclear material control (FNMC) plan, which is required for all fuel fabrication facilities that are authorized to possess more than 1 effective kg of special nuclear material, describes how material control and accounting (MC&A) requirements will be met to comply with US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) regulations. Tristructural isotropic (TRISO) fuel fabrication facilities are likely to have issues in meeting MC&A requirements because of the new processes and fuel types their work involves. This report provides recommendations for an FNMC plan specifically for a TRISO fuel fabrication facility under NRC regulations and includes a draft outline of an FNMC plan. This report was produced for the Materials Protection, Accounting, and Control Technologies (MPACT) program under the Nuclear Fuel Cycle Technologies programs within the US Department of Energy’s Office of Nuclear Energy.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Workshop on Improving Holdup Monitoring in the US

The characterization and quantification of nuclear deposits, or residual nuclear material retained in process equipment, generally referred to as holdup, continues to challenge nuclear processing facilities in DOE program areas such as nuclear criticality safety, material control and accountability, environmental management. The efficiency and effectiveness of nuclear operations in these facilities depends heavily on the results from nondestructive techniques designed to measure nuclear materials in situ. The traditional methods used to measure holdup were established more than 30 years ago and assume unrealistic conditions for most measurement cases. These blind, in situ measurements present unique challenges due to the following attributes: unique, non-ideal geometries; unknown deposit thicknesses; lack of representative calibration standards; large number of holdup deposit locations; and poor accessibility for many measurement locations. These difficulties and the poor assumptions made to handle them have resulted in measurement uncertainties that are often too large for many programs to effectively utilize. In an effort to address and identify solutions to the current holdup challenges facing the US nuclear industry, Oak Ridge National Laboratory hosted the Technical Workshop on Improving Holdup Monitoring in the US. The two-day workshop held August 21–22, 2019, was attended by 35 holdup measurement practitioners, program managers, stakeholders from US Department of Energy sites, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and representatives from commercial industry. The primary objectives were to identify critical elements of a successful and defensible holdup measurement program; identify technical challenges, needs, and potential improvements associated with measurement of holdup; and share best practices and lessons learned from recent accumulation events. Fourteen presentations were delivered on holdup topics including necessary elements for effective program management, measurement needs, emerging technologies and other measurement solutions, and lessons learned from recent events. These presentations highlighted best practices related to accumulation monitoring, considerations and proactive steps to facilitate holdup in new facility designs, imaging solutions to improve holdup assumptions, and new software developed in support of holdup measurements. Breakout sessions were also employed to determine additional needs and identify potential solutions to common holdup challenges. The primary discussions focused on causes and prevention of material accumulations, needs for uranium and plutonium measurements, and reduction of measurement uncertainty, all of which were explicitly identified as critical needs during the 2018 Workshop on Technical and Programmatic Needs for a Sustainable NDA Program for the US DOE.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Improved plutonium and americium photon branching ratios from microcalorimeter gamma spectroscopy

Photon branching ratios are critical input data for activities such as nuclear materials protection and accounting because they allow material compositions to be extracted from measurements of gamma-ray intensities. Uncertainties in these branching ratios are often a limiting source of uncertainty in composition determination. Here, we use high statistics, high resolution - (60–70 eV full-width-at-half-maximum at 100 keV) gamma-ray spectra acquired using microcalorimeter sensors to substantially reduce the uncertainties for 11 plutonium ( 238 Pu, 239 Pu, 241 Pu) and 241 Am branching ratios important for material control and accountability and nuclear forensics in the energy range of 125 keV to 208 keV. Lastly, we show a reduction in uncertainty of over a factor of three for one branching ratio and a factor of 2–3 for four branching ratios.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

Safeguards Material Control And Accountancy Considerations For Molten Salt Reactors

Molten salt reactors are a class of nuclear reactor designs with features and operational characteristics that vary significantly. Variations in design features include the physical, chemical, and isotopic composition of fresh and irradiated fuel, neutron energy spectrums, breeding ratios, and the design’s plans for chemical processing. Specific designs within these variations affect the material control and accountancy approaches implemented by both domestic and international nuclear safeguards. This paper identifies safeguards-relevant design features for molten salt reactors and describes how each feature might influence both domestic and international nuclear safeguards implementation. Additionally, this paper describes two potential general categories of material control and accountancy approaches that may be appropriate for molten salt reactors: a black box material-balance approach with measurements on the feed and waste streams combined with robust containment and surveillance on the nuclear material within the reactor or an approach that aims to quantify the nuclear material throughout the reactor (i.e., a process monitoring approach). This paper describes the benefits and challenges of these approaches to meet technical safeguards objectives and identifies gaps in current technologies.

Hogue, Karen↗

Considerations of Radiation-Hardened Electronics for Alpha Detectors in Molten Salt Reactors

Along with advanced generations of reactors quickly becoming reality, the need for instrumentation to provide reliable information for their safety and operation is also becoming relevant. Instrumentation-wise, molten salt reactors (MSRs) represent an especially challenging case in which detectors must survive extreme temperatures, high amounts of radiation, and a highly corrosive coolant. Adding to the complexity, tight material control and accounting must be maintained with any special nuclear material (SNM), a practice made more difficult by the nature of a loop of flowing fuel. Alpha spectroscopy offers a unique window into investigating the isotopic concentrations of actinides within just such a molten salt environment. The characteristic α emissions of specific actinide isotopes in the salt enable quantification of their concentrations. Semiconductor devices based on wide bandgap materials such as silicon carbide and gallium oxide can withstand the extreme temperatures within MSRs and offer good chemical stability with the corrosive salt. Collaborators at The Ohio State University are fabricating and testing a β gallium oxide α particle sensor that could identify actinide concentrations within the fuel salt to help improve the material control and accounting required for complicated system inherent to MSRs.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗