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This report is Supplement 22 to Nuclear Power Plant Infrastructure Evaluations for Removal of Spent Nuclear Fuel (PNNL-35730) and contains the infrastructure evaluation for Duane Arnold.
Condensate storage tanks (CSTs) in nuclear power plants (NPPs) are classified as critical equipment capable of surviving strong shaking in a design basis earthquake to assure the ability to subsequently provide cooling water. Structural modeling and dynamic analysis of CSTs are complicated due to fluid-structure interaction (FSI) and coupling issues, which could have significant effects on seismic response. The capability of a number of approximate models to capture seismic response is investigated using dynamic analysis results from detailed finite element models. Modal analyses and time history analyses are carried out using both 2D and 3D models to predict the dynamic behavior of CSTs as a function of ground motion intensity. Although 2D simplified models can be used to quickly evaluate the dynamic response of CSTs when there is substantial margin to failure, a detailed 3D model is required when it is necessary to examine a limit state associated with the failure mode of the tank. The findings show good agreement between the natural frequencies of convective modes determined from the 2D and 3D CST models. The difference between the frequencies of impulsive modes were found to be equal to or less than 25%.
This report is Supplement 21 to Nuclear Power Plant Infrastructure Evaluations for Removal of Spent Nuclear Fuel (PNNL-35730) and contains the infrastructure evaluation for Three Mile Island.
Natural hazard-induced nuclear accidents, such as the Fukushima Daiichi Accident that occurred in Japan in 2011, have significantly increased reactor safety studies in understanding nuclear power plant (NPP) responses to external hazard events such as earthquakes and floods. Natural hazards could cause the loss of offsite power in nuclear power plants, potentially leading to a Station Blackout (SBO) accident that significantly contributes to the overall risk of nuclear power plant accidents. Despite the fact that extensive research has been conducted on the station blackout accident for nuclear power plant, further understanding of these events is needed, particularly in the context of the dynamic nature of external hazards such as external flooding. This paper estimates the progression of station blackout events for a generic pressurized water reactor (PWR) in response to external flooding events. The original RELAP5-3D model of the Westinghouse four-loop design pressurized water reactor was adopted and modified to simulate the external flood-induced station blackout accident, including the short-term and long-term station blackout scenarios. A sensitivity analysis of long-term station blackout, examining reactor operation times and analyzing key parameters over time, was also conducted in this work. The results of the analyses, especially the critical timing parameters of key event sequences, provide useful insights about the time during the external flooding event, which is important for plant operators to make timely decisions to prevent potential core damage. This paper represents significant progress toward developing an integrated risk assessment framework for further identifying and assessing the effects of the critical sources of uncertainties of nuclear power plant under external hazard-induced events.
The primary objective of the research presented in this report is to develop scalable technologies that are deployable across plant assets and across the nuclear fleet to achieve risk-informed predictive maintenance (PdM) strategies at commercial nuclear power plants (NPPs). Over the years, the nuclear fleet has relied on labor-intensive and time-consuming preventive maintenance (PM) programs, driving up operation and maintenance (O&M) costs to achieve high capacity factors. A well-constructed risk-informed PdM approach for an identified plant asset has been developed in this research, taking advantage of advancements in data analytics, machine learning (ML), artificial intelligence (AI), physics-informed modeling, and visualization. These technologies would allow commercial NPPs to reliably transition from current labor-intensive PM programs to a technology driven PdM program, eliminating unnecessary O&M costs. The work presented in the report is being developed as part of a collaborative research effort between Idaho National Laboratory and Public Service Enterprise Group Nuclear, LLC. This report (1) reflects the results of work by LWRS Program researchers with PSEG, Nuclear LLC-owned Salem and Hope Creek Nuclear Power Plants; (2) presents utilization of circulating water system (CWS) heterogeneous data and fault modes from both the Salem and Hope Creek nuclear power plant sites to develop salient fault signatures associated with each fault mode; (3) describes the integration of component-level predictive models into a robust system-level model enabled by the federated-transfer learning; (4) describes the development of physics-informed model of circulating water pump and motor; (5) develops a scalable risk and economic model; and (6) outlines the development of a user-centric visualization application. The outcomes presented in this report lays the foundation and provides a much-needed technical basis to focus on explainability and trustworthiness of ML and AI-based technologies, as part of future research.
Nuclear power plants face increasing cost pressures, workforce constraints (aging workforce and skilled labor shortages), and safety requirements that are accelerating interest in robotic systems for inspection and maintenance. We conducted semi-structured interviews with personnel from seven U.S. nuclear utilities and compared deployment models, operational use cases, and integration practices with those reported by participants in the oil, gas, and petrochemical sector. In nuclear plants, robotic use remains concentrated in inspection—particularly indoor unmanned aerial vehicles and submersible remotely operated vehicles—with limited application to physical maintenance tasks. Reported near-term value includes reduced radiological and industrial risk, reduced outage labor, and improved data for planning and condition assessment. Key barriers include integration and data-interoperability constraints, operator qualification requirements, cybersecurity review burden, and difficulty demonstrating reliability in plant-representative environments. Cross-sector benchmarking highlights organizational and deployment practices that may help nuclear plants scale from pilots to routine use. We propose a deployment-oriented roadmap emphasizing modular payload strategies, representative qualification pathways and testing environments, and improved data governance to support safe and economically justified expansion of robotics in operating nuclear power plants.
There is an imminent need for existing United States nuclear power plants to reduce their operating and maintenance costs to remain economically viable. Digital technology provides significant opportunity for the existing nuclear power plant fleet to transform that way in which work is accomplished to reduce costs and allow the fleet to remain economically competitive. However, a careful understanding of the human-technology integration is needed to ensure the continued safe and reliable operation of these existing plants with new digital capabilities. This work presents interim findings in applying human factors engineering to a safety-significant digital upgrade for a United States nuclear power plant, following the new Alternative Review Process in the recently revised Digital Instrumentation and Control Interim Staff Guidance Licensing Process, Revision 2. The interim results described in this work provides an industry perspective, based on ongoing work, to recent work published from Vazquez, Green, and Desaulniers (2022).
Operation and Maintenance costs of a nuclear power plant account for 60% of overall plant costs due to the nuclear industry?s risk-adverse culture (World Nuclear Association, 2020). The industry relies on highly conservative estimates to avoid risk and brute force reactions to manage the unexpected and keep a plant running safely. This approach has kept plants operating safer than any other power source available over the last six decades (Ritchie, 2020). However, these conservative methods have cost the nuclear industry in market competitiveness. The solution? Transform the conservative approaches to accurate, efficient, and still safe data-driven approaches that leverage advanced technologies available in the digital age of operation. This project endeavored to identify two key aspects to successfully incorporate historical work execution data. First, where in the work management process is that information most pertinent? Next, what variables are key to informing the best strategy for organizing the upcoming work? The Smart Planner uses data collected by dynamic work instructions to provide a basis for suggesting requirements of similar, upcoming work packages. Further, it curbs inefficiencies of the work management process by analyzing the likelihood of discovery work, offering suggestions to build a contingency package. All this taking place as the work planner builds work packages that meet the predetermined scope of work to be performed.
Analyzing initiating event rates is important because it indicates trends and patterns of plant performance and provides inputs to several U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) risk-informed regulatory activities. This report presents an analysis of initiating event frequencies at U.S. commercial nuclear power plants from calendar year 1988 through 2021, as reported in licensee event reports. Engineers with nuclear power plant experience reviewed each event report since the last update to this report to categorize and characterize reactor trips. To be included in this study, an event had to meet all of the following criteria: (1) the event included an unplanned reactor trip (not a scheduled reactor trip on the daily operations schedule), (2) the sequence of events started when the reactor was critical and at or above the point of adding heat, (3) the event occurred at a U.S. commercial nuclear power plant (excluding Fort St. Vrain and LaCrosse), and (4) the event was reported by a licensee event report. Sixteen initiating event groupings are trended and displayed. For some of the categories, relevant events are plotted separately for boiling-water reactors (BWR) and pressurized-water reactors (PWR). P-values are given for the possible presence of a trend over the most recent 10 years. The following trends were identified for the most recent 10 years (2012–2021): • A highly statistically significant decreasing trend was identified for Loss of Offsite Power (p-value = 0.002) • A statistically significant decreasing trend was identified for BWR general transients (p-value = 0.025) • A statistically significant decreasing trend was identified for PWR general transients for the second year in a row (p-value = 0.038).
The decommissioning of the Zion Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) provided a unique opportunity to harvest and study service-aged reactor pressure vessel (RPV) beltline materials. This work, conducted through the U.S. Department of Energy’s Light Water Reactor Sustainability (LWRS) Program, aims to improve the understanding of radiation-induced embrittlement to support extended nuclear plant operations. Material segments containing the Linde 80 flux, wire heat 72105 (WF-70) beltline weld and the A533B Heat B7835-1 base metal, obtained from the intermediate shell region with a peak fluence of 0.7 × 10 19 n/cm 2 (E > 1.0 MeV), were extracted, cut into blocks, and machined into test specimens for mechanical and microstructural characterization. The segmentation process involved oxy-propane torch-cutting, followed by precision machining using wire saws and electrical discharge machining (EDM). A chemical composition analysis confirmed the expected variations in alloying elements, with copper levels being notably higher in the weld metal. The harvested specimens enable a detailed evaluation of through-wall embrittlement gradients, a comparison with the existing surveillance data, and the validation of predictive embrittlement models. This study provides critical data for assessing long-term reactor vessel integrity, informing aging-management strategies, and supporting regulatory decisions to extend the life of nuclear plants. This article is a revised and expanded version of a paper entitled, “Current Status of the Characterization of RPV Materials Harvested from the Decommissioned Zion Unit 1 Nuclear Power Plant”, PVP2017-65090, which was accepted and presented at the ASME 2017 Pressure Vessels and Piping Conference, Waikoloa, HI, USA, 16–20 July 2017.
Navigating through the complex tapestry of technological advancements, "Response Strategy for Hyperparameter attacks of Digital Twin Machine Learning Model in Nuclear Power Plants" stands at the intersection of cybersecurity and nuclear power plant operations, embarking on a journey through the intricacies of securing digital twins against malicious cyber activities. As nuclear power plants progressively integrate digital twin technology and machine learning models to optimize operations and ensure system reliability, they inadvertently expose themselves to a new spectrum of vulnerabilities, notably in the realm of hyperparameter attacks. Hyperparameters, integral in machine learning model tuning and optimal performance of digital twins, have emerged as a target for adversaries aiming to destabilize the predictive capabilities and therefore, the operational accuracy of these digital entities within critical infrastructures like nuclear plants. This paper, therefore, meticulously threads the needle through the development of a robust response strategy, poised to shield these digital reflections against calculated hyperparameter manipulations, ensuring that the digital twin can effectively and securely function as a reliable proxy for its physical counterpart. The ensuing sections delve into the orchestrated maelstrom of multi-rate time-changing intelligent coordinated hyperparameter attacks and the implementation of event-triggered predictive control, laying down a structured, predictive, and responsive framework that safeguards the nexus where the digital and physical realms of nuclear power plants coalesce. The operational integrity of digital twins in nuclear power plants depends critically on the security of machine learning hyperparameters. This study makes two different contributions. First, a decision-based idea known as a multi-rate time changing intelligent coordinated hyperparameter attack is put forth. In this attack, many hyperparameters are repeatedly changed using both random and intelligent optimal techniques by the attacker. These assaults introduce varied rates at different attack steps, compromise various amounts of hyperparameters, and improve stealth and flexibility. Second, a technique is developed for event triggered predictive control to rapidly respond to potential hyperparameter attacks. This control integrates a sliding window framework, retaining a history of previous data points and employing linear regression to predict the next data point from the current dataset. The control gain K is determined using the Lyapunov-Krasovskii method, and subsequently, an action is developed. Finally, the outcome of the simulation demonstrates the viability of the proposed method for defending nuclear power plant digital twins from hyperparameter attacks.
This study presents the development of an AI-powered Zero-Trust cybersecurity framework for malware prevention in nuclear power plants. The framework aims to enhance the security of critical systems within nuclear power plants by adopting the principles of Zero-Trust and leveraging artificial intelligence (AI) technologies. By assuming no implicit trust in any user or device and continuously authenticating and authorizing access, the framework ensures a robust defense against malware attacks. The integration of AI allows for the detection and prevention of malware through behavioral analytics, endpoint protection, network segmentation, and continuous monitoring. The paper discusses the key considerations, steps, and technologies involved in developing this framework, emphasizing the importance of regular updates, training, compliance, and auditing. The proposed framework serves as a comprehensive approach to safeguarding nuclear power plants from sophisticated malware threats and protecting the integrity and safety of critical infrastructure.
The ability of nuclear reactors to operate their power conversion cycles more flexibly will enhance their value to energy grids with variable pricing. Current nuclear control systems are typically classical controllers that are often based on proportional-integral-derivative (PID) control. This paper presents a method of augmenting the existing PID control for difficult transient operations in nuclear power plants using a reinforcement learning–derived feedforward signal applied in real time. The agents, which are trained on a test thermal load-following problem, are designed to improve steam generator outlet temperature control for a range of fast load-following scenarios covering ramp rates from 9%/min to 15%/min. Several reinforcement learning algorithms were initially investigated for the training of the feedforward agents with deep Q-learning (DQN) and proximal policy optimization (PPO) networks, which were found to be the most promising. The DQN controllers utilize discrete actions, giving them a better disturbance rejection at steady state but inconsistent response to initial temperature deviations. In contrast, PPO-trained agents, which take continuous actions except for a dead zone around zero, were shown to have the best combination of high disturbance rejection at steady state and good tracking of the desired temperature value. The ability of the PPO agent was also examined, with the average time of decision making found to be on the order of 1 ms. The fault properties of the controller under the loss of the reinforcement learning agent feedforward signal were also examined. The controller showed strong performance in situations of “no-signal” faults. but was less good at handling “stuck-at” faults, where the feedforward signal remains at a set value. In both cases, however, the PID was able to successfully maintain stability, eventually returning the system to a steady state. It is hoped that this work will allow for the proposed control architecture to be examined for more difficult control problems such that it may eventually be used to adapt existing nuclear plants for more aggressive load-following on grids of the future.
Analyzing initiating event rates is important because it indicates trends and patterns of plant performance and provides inputs to several U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) risk-informed regulatory activities. This report presents an analysis of initiating event frequencies at U.S. commercial nuclear power plants from calendar year 1988 through 2022, as reported in licensee event reports. Engineers with nuclear power plant experience reviewed each event report since the last update to this report to categorize and characterize reactor trips. To be included in this study, an event had to meet all of the following criteria: (1) the event included an unplanned reactor trip (not a scheduled reactor trip on the daily operations schedule), (2) the sequence of events started when the reactor was critical and at or above the point of adding heat, (3) the event occurred at a U.S. commercial nuclear power plant (excluding Fort St. Vrain and LaCrosse), and (4) the event was reported by a licensee event report. Sixteen initiating event groupings are trended and displayed. For some of the categories, relevant events are plotted separately for boiling-water reactors (BWR) and pressurized-water reactors (PWR). P-values are given for the possible presence of a trend over the most recent 10 years.
Seismic analysis, design, and qualification of systems, structures, and components (SSCs) is a significant contributor to the capital cost of a nuclear power plant. To reduce capital costs of advanced nuclear power plants and make commercial nuclear energy more competitive, innovations are needed in their structural design and construction, and not just in the reactor core and associated systems. Seismic isolation has been identified as an important cost-cutting technology that enables standardization of equipment across various sites. This paper develops and demonstrates a cost- and risk-based seismic design optimization of a representative safety system in a nuclear power plant with the dual goals of minimizing overnight capital cost and meeting safety goals. The design optimization can also include component seismic isolation, in which case, the optimized design includes a set of equipment that needs to be seismically isolated to minimize capital cost. The open-source codes MASTODON and Dakota are used for seismic probabilistic risk assessment and design optimization, respectively. A generic nuclear facility with a safety system comprising SSCs that are common to nuclear power plants is considered for the demonstration of the design optimization and is assumed to be located at the Idaho National Laboratory site. Generic costs and seismic design cost functions are assumed for the SSCs of the safety system. The sum of the costs of the SSCs is minimized in the optimization process, while the risk of failure of the safety system is provided as a constraint. Furthermore, results show that the optimization process reduces capital costs significantly while automatically prioritizing the safety of SSCs that contribute most to the risk of the safety system.
This research explores the colocation of nuclear power plants (NPPs) with industrial applications. Three existing industrial sites were considered to demonstrate the siting process and illuminate technological gaps for future work. The three applications demonstrated for colocation here are a petroleum refinery, a methanol production plant, and a pulp and paper plant. This study uses a modified version of the EPRI siting criteria to explore the geological and demographic characteristics of the location of the current industrial site, as well as exploring external hazards from the industrial plant and its surrounding land use. Data was collected from public databases to estimate site characteristics. We then discuss how the site characteristics may impact the ability to colocate an NPP with an industrial application. The application site and 5 additional sites were explored for each application to give a general indication of the siting implications for an NPP in each area. The hazards for each industrial application was also explored to determine how colocation may impact reactor safety. The following gaps have been identified and should be explored in future research on colocation of NPPs with petroleum refineries, methanol plants, and pulp and paper plants: - There is a variety of industrial use, hazards, and pipelines in the surrounding area. A more thorough review of these hazards should be considered for colocation. - In general, the whole region around some applications seems to have softer soil, with implications for large site preparation costs. Further site investigations should prioritize looking into the geotechnical conditions. - Applications along coastlines are susceptible to flooding and hurricanes. The benefits of colocation should be weighed against the potential design implications. - The benefits of natural gas pipeline infrastructure in place should be explored further. If heat supply from the NPP is not required or not feasible due to the distance between the NPP and the application, there may be an opportunity to supply hydrogen to the plant through an existing pipeline. - Because there are several collocated industrial plants in the regions for the refinery and methanol plant, the benefits of sharing resources from the NPP should be explored further. This may open up additional sites for colocation. The following knowledge gaps were identified for the colocation of NPPs with these three industries, and industrial applications in general. These gaps are: - While the STAND tool contains many important characteristics for the reactor siting process, it is not calibrated for the colocation of NPPs with industrial facilities. - There are aspects of both the NPP and industrial application that need to be quantified for a siting analysis. Particularly, we need to understand the water intake requirements for NPPs and each application. - Further work may focus on adapting the STAND site comparison methodology to comparison of sites for co-location. This will involve using the data documented in this report as a starting point and performing a comprehensive and quantitative comparison. - Without spending significant resources, it would be impossible to gather data for each site to evaluate all aspects of siting. One approach to finding data and understanding its implications to siting is looking at FSARs for existing plants. For example, most sites considered in this study have small Vs30 values, indicating soft soil. However, there are NPPs located in the vicinity of most of the sites (e.g., Waterford Steam Electric Station near New Orleans) and reviewing available site characteristics and geotechnical data for these NPPs, might provide further information for siting. - The siting analysis in this study indicates that colocation of the NPP with the industrial site could be difficult based on external hazards, cooling requirements, weather, or population. We need to determine the impact of distance between the two facilities on cost and quality of energy transport. - This study did not touch on socioeconomic impacts for NPP colocation with industrial facilities. The input-output analysis methodology could be applied to the communities referenced in this study to determine the socioeconomic impact of these projects. - Similarly, the impacts of colocation on emergency planning was not explored in this study. The impacts on emergency planning infrastructure are somewhat related to the socioeconomic impacts, and could be explored using a similar methodology. - This study also did not address physical and cybersecurity, which will be important aspects of co-location [ref] . Cybersecurity will be important, regardless of the distance, but physical security will be important if the facilities are located very closely. Physical security might also be important for the steam lines between the plants, unless they are determined to be non-safety significant. - In many site l
The Decision-making process in the Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) control room faces some challenges: operator incomplete knowledge, insufficient time for responding to the highly dynamic events, and a large number of indicators to monitor. Because of the complexity of the NPP system, it is hard to pre-plan all the failures/mitigative actions. An intelligent operator support system is vital to mitigate these shortcomings. In this paper, an AI declarative approach (Answer Set Programming (ASP)) is employed to represent our knowledge of the nuclear power plant in the form of logic rules. This represented knowledge is structured to form a reasoning-based operator support system. When an incident occurs, this ASP-based reasoning support system is demonstrated to be capable of fault identification (diagnosis), informing the operator of different scenarios and consequences, and generating the control options (decision making).
With threats to nuclear facilities continuously evolving, the development and implementation of insider threat mitigation programs is increasingly important. The Office of International Nuclear Security within the U.S. Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration (DOE/NNSA’s) developed the “Insider Threat Mitigation Program: Facility Implementation Handbook” to assist organizations to be better positioned to minimize the risks posed by malicious insiders. The handbook identified eight elements that contribute to the development and implementation of insider threat mitigation programs. This report outlines the development of a capability building progression of an insider threat mitigation program at international nuclear power plants. This information can be stand-alone or be accompanied by a technical exchange with subject matter experts to support development and implementation of programs with interested international partners.