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DOE OSTI2024

1. Physical Security Engineering by Design for Nuclear Facilities; 2. Nuclear Power Plant Site Security Management – A Security Strategy; 3. The UAE Women in Nuclear Energy Security

1. Security by design, or SeBD, is a comprehensive approach that integrates the physical protection system of a nuclear plant into every stage of its existence. This includes planning, designing, constructing, commissioning, and operating the facility, using a combination of analytical, physical, technological, and procedural measures. Essentially, SeBD involves intentionally applying and incorporating security into all aspects of design and operation throughout the entire lifecycle of a facility. By implementing this methodology throughout various phases such as program development, process implementation, staff training and procedures management in conjunction with plant equipment, facilities can be optimized to minimize security risks without compromising functional design requirements. This ultimately improves the overall security posture of the site and reduces the need for costly modifications or additional security resources post-design. 2. A site security strategy is a living document that is revised on a periodic or event-driven basis, ensuring that site security operations and corresponding procedures provide long-term, effective protection for the entire nuclear power plant (NPP) site. A site security strategy aims to mitigate threats across the entire NPP site via in-depth defense approaches and mutual support; therefore, if a layer is omitted or altered, then the effect across all layers must be re-evaluated. Therefore, the aim of the site security strategy is to provide an appropriate, scalable security regime that deters, denies, delays, and detects incidents and, equally importantly, reassures legitimate users and the regulator that due diligence and regulatory compliance have been achieved, ensuring that the site is safe and secure. Robust access control for vehicles and pedestrians is at the heart of the strategy. Vehicle and pedestrian searching and screening are seen as the strongest mitigation methods against vehicle- and pedestrian-borne attacks. The security strategy must also be supported through comprehensive staff training and the development of robust processes, procedures, and planning. If all these measures are to be effective, then training must be implemented during each phase of construction, partial operation/commissioning, and full operation. No single element of site security is completely isolated from the influence of other elements. Ideally, consideration of all key elements will result in a security strategy that is integrated and proportional to the threat and that does not over specify individual security solutions through the application of isolated measures but rather applies a holistic, all-encompassing approach. 3. When women enter the labor force, numerous positive outcomes emerge, including increased GDP, educational gains, and decreased maternal mortality. Despite these benefits, women's employment rates and equality vary significantly worldwide as does support for women in the workforce. This paper will explore the multifaceted benefits of women's employment, the factors influencing labor force participation rates, and the urgency to achieve gender equality as outlined in the 2015 United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). It will then examine the emerging presence of women in the traditionally male-dominated nuclear field, specifically within the United Arab Emirates (UAE) as a testament to their resilience and determination to break social norms and advance gender equality.

Zineddin, Dr. Z.↗

DOE OSTI2025

Responsible Artificial Intelligence for Insider Threat Mitigation

This report examines the application of artificial intelligence (AI) technologies for insider threat mitigation (ITM) programs in nuclear security facilities. Insider threat detection presents unique challenges due to the subtle and adaptive nature of these threats, the complex signatures involved, and the scarcity of available data for analysis. Traditional human-centered approaches, while essential, face limitations in processing large amounts of data continuously and detecting subtle patterns across multiple systems. AI technologies can potentially address these limitations by providing 24/7 monitoring capabilities, identifying complex patterns that might escape human observation, and offering consistent application of security criteria. However, the deployment of AI in nuclear security contexts introduces significant new risks, including workflow disruption, expanded attack surfaces, potential for misuse, and ethical concerns regarding privacy, fairness, transparency, safety, and security. The high-consequence nature of nuclear security decisions demands careful consideration of these risks and systematic approaches to their mitigation.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

DOE OSTI2024

2023 Annual Site Environmental Report for Sandia National Laboratories, Tonopah Test Range, Nevada

Sandia National Laboratories is a multimission laboratory managed and operated by National Technology & Engineering Solutions of Sandia, LLC, a wholly owned subsidiary of Honeywell International Inc., for the U.S. Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration. The National Nuclear Security Administration’s Sandia Field Office administers the contract and oversees contractor operations at Sandia National Laboratories, Tonopah Test Range. Activities at the site are conducted in support of U.S. Department of Energy weapons programs and have operated at the site since 1957. The U.S. Department of Energy and its management and operating contractor are committed to safeguarding the environment, assessing sustainability practices, and ensuring the validity and accuracy of the monitoring data presented in this annual site environmental report. This report summarizes the environmental protection, restoration, and monitoring programs in place at Sandia National Laboratories, Tonopah Test Range during calendar year 2023. Environmental topics include cultural resource management, chemical management, air quality, ecology, environmental restoration, oil storage, site sustainability, terrestrial surveillance, waste management, water quality, wastewater discharge, and implementation of the National Environmental Policy Act. This report is prepared in accordance with and as required by DOE O 231.1B, Admin Change 1, Environment, Safety and Health Reporting, and has been approved for public distribution.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

DOE OSTI2024

2023 Annual Site Environmental Report for Sandia National Laboratories, Kaua‘i Test Facility, Hawai‘i

Sandia National Laboratories is a multimission laboratory managed and operated by National Technology & Engineering Solutions of Sandia, LLC, a wholly owned subsidiary of Honeywell International Inc., for the U.S. Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration. The National Nuclear Security Administration’s Sandia Field Office administers the contract and oversees contractor operations at the Sandia National Laboratories Kaua‘i Test Facility in Hawai‘i. Activities at the site are conducted in support of U.S. Department of Energy weapons programs, and the site has operated as a rocket preparation launching and tracking facility since 1962. The U.S. Department of Energy and its management and operating contractor are committed to safeguarding the environment, assessing sustainability practices, and ensuring the validity and accuracy of the monitoring data presented in this annual site environmental report. This report summarizes the environmental protection, restoration, and monitoring programs in place at Sandia National Laboratories, Kaua‘i Test Facility, during calendar year 2023. Environmental topics include cultural resource management, chemical management, air quality, meteorology, ecology, oil storage, site sustainability, terrestrial surveillance, waste management, water quality, wastewater discharge, and implementation of the National Environmental Policy Act. This report is prepared in accordance with and as required by DOE O 231.1B, Admin Change 1, Environment, Safety and Health Reporting, and has been approved for public distribution.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

DOE OSTI2024

2023 Annual Site Environmental Report for Sandia National Laboratories, Albuquerque, New Mexico

Sandia National Laboratories is a multimission laboratory managed and operated by National Technology & Engineering Solutions of Sandia, LLC, a wholly owned subsidiary of Honeywell International Inc., for the U.S. Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration. The National Nuclear Security Administration’s Sandia Field Office administers the contract and oversees contractor operations at Sandia National Laboratories, New Mexico. Activities at the site support research and development programs with a wide variety of national security missions, resulting in technologies for nonproliferation, homeland security, energy and infrastructure, and defense systems and assessments. The U.S. Department of Energy and its management and operating contractor are committed to safeguarding the environment, assessing sustainability practices, and ensuring the validity and accuracy of the monitoring data presented in this annual site environmental report. This report summarizes the environmental protection and monitoring programs in place at Sandia National Laboratories, New Mexico, during calendar year 2023. Environmental topics include cultural resource management, chemical management, air quality, ecology, environmental restoration, oil storage, site sustainability, terrestrial surveillance, waste management, water quality, and implementation of the National Environmental Policy Act. This report is prepared in accordance with and as required by DOE O 231.1B, Admin Change 1, Environment, Safety and Health Reporting, and has been approved for public distribution.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

DOE OSTI2025

2024 SNL/KTF Annual Site Environmental Report (ASER)

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

DOE OSTI2025

C136A and C138A Report of Analysis

In this work the isotopic ratios and weight percentages of 238 Pu, 239 Pu, 240 Pu, 241 Pu and 242 Pu were determined using Isotope Dilution Mass Spectrometry. Two samples of C136A and C138A were sent to the Analytical Research laboratories by the National Nuclear Security Administration Nuclear Reference Material Program. The four samples were dissolved in concentrated hydrochloric acid. From the parent solutions, eight aliquots were taken, diluted, spiked with 244 Pu and submitted to separations. After the samples were separated, they were analyzed using Multicollector Inductively Coupled Plasma Mass Spectrometry. Along with the samples, two C126A Quality Control Samples were analyzed each day. Mass bias standards were also analyzed at the beginning, during and at the end of the analysis. GUM Workbench Pro software Version 2.4.1.406 was used to calculate the isotopic ratios relative to 239 Pu, and total Pu mass and the correlated expanded uncertainties.

37 - INORGANIC, ORGANIC, PHYSICAL AND ANALYTICAL C↗

DOE OSTI2024

Women as a force multiplier for bringing nuclear forensic capabilities to the international stage

In 2009, the U.S. Department of Energy / National Nuclear Security Administration’s (DOE/NNSA) Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation (DNN) Program initiated a new nuclear forensics outreach effort under its Confidence Building Measures Program. Little did they know that the timing could not have been better. This article focuses on the early years (2009-2015) of the NNSA’s international nuclear forensics outreach, specifically the efforts and experiences of the women who helped establish this program, building it from a fledgling bilateral effort into an enduring technical capacity provider engaging with dozens of countries and multilateral organizations. At the onset of the program, nuclear forensics was an emerging priority within the U.S. Government and receiving increased focus from international organizations through high-level diplomatic efforts such as the Nuclear Security Summit and Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism. Additionally, working-level initiatives were gaining traction through the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Nuclear Forensics International Technical Working Group. Over the next six years, a small team comprised of a uniquely large number of women NNSA federal, contract, and national laboratory staff served as key leaders engaging with the international community to strengthen global technical nuclear forensics capacity and best practices. The program continues today under the Nuclear Smuggling Detection and Deterrence Program as Investigation Support. The experiences shared here detail a unique time period when the new technical discipline of nuclear forensics was beginning to mature and gain international traction. The authors have made every effort to remember history correctly and be as inclusive as possible. A wealth of training, guidance, and exercises documentation was developed in the 2009-2015 timeframe, much of which still serves as the foundation for today’s even more extensive program and community of dedicated technical and diplomatic practitioners.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

DOE OSTI2025

Test and Evaluation of Radiofrequency Tamper Indicating Devices for Remote Monitoring of Advanced/Small Modular Reactors

Advanced and small modular reactors (A/SMRs), due to their versatile nature, are likely to be used in remote locations to provide electrical power or other services in regions that are difficult to access or have limited transportation infrastructure. This will result in limited on-site staff, therefore driving A/SMR vendors to consider remote monitoring as a solution to support nuclear security. Maintaining Continuity of Knowledge (CoK) of nuclear material quantities and locations is vital to nuclear security, and remote monitoring of active tamper indicating devices (TIDs) has been well established as a component of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Safeguards since the early 2000s. Active TIDs, such as radiofrequency TIDs (RFTIDs), immediately alarm upon unauthorized access attempts, promoting timely detection. In contrast, passive TIDs require a surveillance regime and offer delayed detection. Active TIDs deter insiders and enable prompt detection of malicious acts. They can be used on nuclear material containers and controlled entry points like vaults and toolboxes. Therefore, the implementation of RFTIDs into security programs bolsters overall nuclear material control, and provides a visible deterrent, with primary efficacy in mitigating the insider threat and potentially allowing for Security by Design considerations. They are a strong candidate technology for maintaining nuclear security of A/SMRs but need to be evaluated for feasibility and implementation into the wider physical protection system.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

DOE OSTI2026

Study on Application of Distributed Network of Sensors with List Mode for NMAC Literature Review

Nuclear material accounting and control (NMAC) for nuclear security detects, deters, and resolves questions related to unauthorized removal (i.e. theft) or misuse of nuclear material. NMAC also serves as a key insider threat mitigation measure and aids in recovery of nuclear material that is missing. Effective nuclear security depends on NMAC for timely and accurate information about nuclear material types, quantities, and locations. Bulk nuclear material processing facilities, however, present unique challenges for effective NMAC due to the presence of large quantities of material in-process and the accumulation of residual material holdup within process equipment. These holdup accumulations can obscure accurate physical inventory taking and complicate efforts to resolve NMAC irregularities at the facility level. Bulk material monitoring systems often rely on material balance calculations and indirect measurement techniques, which may mask protracted theft of smaller amounts of nuclear material. These monitoring limitations have generated increased interest in continuous monitoring technologies, including distributed non-destructive assay (NDA) sensor networks capable of providing real-time or near-real-time measurement of material movement and accumulation within bulk processing environments. Recent advancements in distributed networks of NDA radiation detectors and sensing technologies provide an opportunity to address these limitations. Although such distributed sensor networks have been implemented in select facilities for IAEA Safeguards applications, their potential for supporting NMAC functions specifically tailored to nuclear security objectives remains largely unexplored. Furthermore, emerging list-mode data acquisition technologies have reached high technology readiness levels, enabling time-correlated detection of nuclear events across multiple temporal scales. These capabilities provide enhanced opportunities for accurate holdup measurement, continuous process monitoring, and improved detection of material theft or misuse over time. The increasing global expansion of civil nuclear power and development of related bulk material processing facilities, including those supporting high-assay low-enriched uranium (HALEU) and other advanced reactor fuel fabrication, further increases the need for advanced measurement and monitoring strategies for NMAC.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗

DOE OSTI2025

Integrating Safety, Security, and Nuclear Operations for Advanced Reactors

The traditional separation between safety, security, and operations teams has created significant barriers to achieving optimal outcomes. When security considerations are introduced late in the design process, they often conflict with already-established architectural, operational, or engineering parameters. Retrofitting security measures can lead to increased costs, schedule delays, and compromises in security effectiveness. For instance, the need to retrofit physical barriers or surveillance systems often results in trade-offs that could have been avoided with earlier input from security professionals. Delayed integration can also affect regulatory processes and result in licensing delays. Security reviews conducted at later stages frequently identify gaps that necessitate significant redesign efforts, impacting not only scope, schedule, and budget, but also adding risk and lowering stakeholder confidence in the project. This paper aims to address these challenges by identifying practical opportunities for integrating security considerations seamlessly with design and operations teams throughout the entire lifecycle of nuclear facilities—from conceptual design to commissioning and beyond. The research emphasizes the value of early and continuous collaboration among stakeholders to ensure that security measures are robust, operationally effective, and cost-efficient. By examining case studies, analyzing past incidents, and leveraging best practices from other high-security industries, this study highlights actionable strategies for bridging the gap between safety, security, and operations teams.

Zineddin, Dr. Z. [ORNL] (ORCID:0009000848740725)↗

DOE OSTI2024

Increasing Diversity in the Field of Radiological Security

This paper will report on a diversity initiative undertaken by the NNSA Office of Radiological Security (ORS), Brookhaven National Laboratory and the Institute of Nuclear Materials Management. This paper will report on the planning associated with inclusion of radiological and nuclear security in the annual meeting program, the process of identifying and selecting individuals who will receive grants to attend the meeting, the expected impact of the INMM/ORS diversity initiative on the nuclear security community, and lessons learned.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

DOE OSTI2024

Laboratory for Laser Energetics Targets Inertial Confinement Fusion

The University of Rochester’s Laboratory for Laser Energetics is targeting laser-driven inertial confinement fusion, as part of National Nuclear Security Administration’s Stockpile Stewardship Program and in the quest for clean sources of energy. The Laboratory for Laser Energetics (LLE) is home to two extremely powerful lasers—OMEGA and OMEGA EP—and researchers are using them to explore laser-driven inertial confinement fusion (ICF). ICF involves compressing a small amount of fuel consisting of hydrogen isotopes, deuterium (D), and tritium (T), and heating it to temperatures greater than the center of stars. “When these conditions are reached, the fuel undergoes fusion—releasing enormous energy that can be used for research relevant to the National Nuclear Security Administration’s (NNSA) Stockpile Stewardship Program (SSP) and to drive carbon-free power plants,” explains Valeri Goncharov, distinguished scientist and director of the Theory Division at LLE. LLE was established at the University of Rochester in 1970 and is the largest U.S. Department of Energy university-based research program in the nation, supported by the National Nuclear Security Administration as part of its Stockpile Stewardship Program (SSP). “As a center for exploring the interaction of intense radiation with matter, LLE is a unique national resource for research and education in science and technology,” says Goncharov. “Our current research includes exploring fusion for the SSP program and as a future source of energy, developing new laser and materials technologies, and pursuing a better understanding of high-energy-density phenomena.”

70 PLASMA PHYSICS AND FUSION TECHNOLOGY↗

DOE OSTI2024

Report series: finding of effect and mitigation documentation for the mercury solar photovoltaic array and battery energy storage system, area 23, nevada national security site, nye county, nevada

The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office (NNSA/NFO) proposes to install solar photovoltaic (PV) power generation arrays and an associated battery energy storage system (BESS) for the town of Mercury at the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) in Nye County, Nevada (Figure 1). The purposes of the development of this facility are to support long-term efforts to modernize Mercury and to provide energy-resilient infrastructure and address climate adaptation needs. Because it is within the boundary of the Mercury Historic District (MHD), it is subject to the terms of the Programmatic Agreement Between the National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office and the Nevada State Historic Preservation Officer Regarding Modernization and Operational Maintenance of the Nevada National Security Site, at Mercury in Nye County, Nevada (hereafter referred to as the Mercury PA). An identification and evaluation report prepared for this undertaking determined that a contributing element to the MHD, the Mercury airstrip (26NY15777), is within the APE (Haynes 2024). The Mercury airstrip was developed following the closure of Camp Desert Rock in 1957 and used until late 1963 or 1964 when the Camp Desert Rock Airport was renovated, and the Mercury Bypass road constructed. The town of Mercury and the immediate surrounding area have been determined eligible for listing in the National Register of Historic Places (NRHP) as the MHD (SHPO Resource No. D230) under Criteria A and C for its importance in supporting nuclear testing and scientific research from 1951 through 1992 (Reed 2019). Originally recorded in 2016, 26NY15777 was determined individually not eligible for listing in the NRHP because it lacked sufficient integrity to convey its significance (Palmer 2016). It was subsequently determined in 2018 to be a contributing element of the MHD in an architectural survey of the district (Palmer 2018) and identified in Appendix C of the Mercury PA as a Category I contributing element. However, as per Stipulation IV.B.2, because the airstrip had already been formally evaluated and determined not to be individually eligible for the NRHP in consultation with the SHPO, this categorization was an error. NNSA/NFO reported this to the SHPO in Haynes 2024 and the SHPO concurred on June 11, 2024 (Reed). Accordingly, the airstrip is a Category II Property for the purposes of complying with the Mercury PA. The Mercury airstrip is a historic property for the purposes of compliance with Section 106 of the National Historic Preservation Act (NHPA) and subject to the stipulations of the Mercury PA.

25 ENERGY STORAGE↗

DOE OSTI2025

Capability Building Progression of an Insider Threat Mitigation Program at an International Nuclear Power Plant (Rev. 1)

With threats to nuclear facilities continuously evolving, the development and implementation of insider threat mitigation programs (ITMPs) are increasingly important. The Office of International Nuclear Security (INS) within the U.S. Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration (DOE/NNSA’s) developed Capability Building Progression of an Insider Threat Mitigation Program at an International Nuclear Power Plant to assist newcomers and existing nuclear power plant (NPP) operators in addressing insider threats and establishing effective response measures for insider activities.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

DOE OSTI2024

Capability Building Progression of an Insider Threat Mitigation Program at International Nuclear Power Plant

With threats to nuclear facilities continuously evolving, the development and implementation of insider threat mitigation programs is increasingly important. The Office of International Nuclear Security within the U.S. Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration (DOE/NNSA’s) developed the “Insider Threat Mitigation Program: Facility Implementation Handbook” to assist organizations to be better positioned to minimize the risks posed by malicious insiders. The handbook identified eight elements that contribute to the development and implementation of insider threat mitigation programs. This report outlines the development of a capability building progression of an insider threat mitigation program at international nuclear power plants. This information can be stand-alone or be accompanied by a technical exchange with subject matter experts to support development and implementation of programs with interested international partners.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

DOE OSTI2026

LDRD FY25 Program Overview

As Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory’s (LLNL’s) Laboratory Directed Research and Development (LDRD) program enters its fifth decade of leading-edge research and development, its impact and importance have never been stronger. The program continues to advance strategic investments in pioneering science, technology, and engineering, ensuring LLNL will be ready to deliver on our mission as it evolves over the coming decades. Investing in LDRD research, and the people who perform this critical work, gives LLNL the ability to sustain our role as a leader in the Department of Energy and National Nuclear Security Administration enterprise. The LDRD program enables high-risk, high-payoff research that anticipates emerging threats and future mission needs. By nurturing the ingenuity of the Lab’s greatest asset, its people, LDRD funding advances not only our research but also grows and nurtures our workforce: engaging future innovators with student mentoring, challenging postdoctoral researchers to apply their skills to support national security, and strengthening the leadership skills of early career staff. This annual report documents how LDRD investments advance LLNL’s science, technology, and engineering across our mission space. To assess LDRD’s impact we track both short and long-term metrics such as peer-reviewed publications, number of students, or professional fellows. In addition to reviewing these metrics, I encourage you to delve deeper into the breadth of science and technology that illustrate the strategic value of this research portfolio. For instance, a recent exploratory research project used advanced manufacturing to construct miniaturized three-dimensional ion traps for a quantum computer with reduced quantum error rates to enable applications that address national security missions and support basic science. Another project has delved into studying detonation by examining deflagration to enhance the safety and security of the nuclear weapons stockpile. LDRD researchers are also deploying AI agents on two of the world’s most powerful supercomputers to automate and accelerate inertial confinement fusion experiments. Other teams are delivering more accurate optical constants to enable improved validation for aluminum to advance atomic and molecular physics models. LDRD-driven discoveries of how metals deform under extreme conditions strengthen our ability to model and design materials for demanding national security environments. National security challenges are increasingly complex and continuously evolving. LDRD focuses our most innovative science and technology on these challenges, ensuring the Laboratory is developing creative, forward-leaning solutions for our nation and the world. The following pages feature highlights of published scientific advances, patents, and honors that stem from LDRD investments. As you read this report, I hope you will understand how these investments position the Laboratory, and our partners, to meet the demands of the decades ahead.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗

DOE OSTI2025

Sample screening of uranium ore concentrates using portable spectrophotometers: investigating the correlation between visible colors and chemical signatures

A research collaboration between the Japan Atomic Energy Agency and the Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration examined nuclear forensic signatures and analytical methods for tracing the origins of uranium ore concentrates (UOCs). Here, this study focuses on utilizing portable spectrophotometers capable of reflectance measurements in the visible light spectrum as a potential rapid screening tool for nuclear forensics analysis. Unlike laboratory-based near-infrared spectroscopy or digital image analysis, this research investigated the potential to correlate visible color measurements with key nuclear forensics signatures using seven types of UOC samples with known origins and three UOC certified reference materials. Results demonstrated that distinct color groups, quantified using CIELAB values, correlated with major uranium compounds. Furthermore, the findings indicated that trace elements can influence the UOC colors, providing additional insights into material characteristics. Although this approach requires further validation across a broader range of UOC species, this study demonstrated that simple colorimetric analysis using visible spectrophotometry, which does not require complex sample preparation or data processing, can serve as a practical and novel rapid tool for preliminary screening and attribution in nuclear forensics investigations.

and nuclear chemistry↗