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Results for “Operational Technology (OT)”

Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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50 records · Page 3
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2024

Operational Process for Trigger Identification and Comprehension (OPTIC)

The Operational Process for Trigger Identification and Comprehension (OPTIC) is a standalone, downloadable application designed to enhance the CyOTE (Cybersecurity for the Operational Technology Environment) methodology and will be made available for free download to industry. OPTIC brings key CyOTE functionalities into focus. OPTIC aids OT professionals in analyzing and determining whether an observed anomaly may indicate possible malicious activity or merely a maintenance related irregularity.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗
DOE OSTI2024

CloudZero Phase 2 Technical Report

Expand upon the successful Phase 1 net zero cloud test proof of concept by moving actual OT systems to the cloud and proving cloud feasibility to support various OT technologies such as IoT, Machine Learning, etc. Explore threat analysis when these technologies are moved to the cloud. A detailed analysis in NREL ARIES Cyber Range will be used to conduct deeper analysis of cloud suitability to support OT and net zero system operations in a higher fidelity representative environment. Outputs will identify, quantify, and document the results and cyber security risks associated with the move of these OT technologies in a formal delivered report. Programmatic Benefits: Identify cloud integration challenges for energy systems characterize the cloud threat space, contribute to policy and standards discussions, empower the sector to change their cloud culture where appropriate.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
DOE OSTI2025

GridSTIX

SF-25-112 Grid-STIX is a comprehensive extension of the STIX (Structured Threat Information Expression) 2.1 ontology specifically designed for electrical grid cybersecurity applications. This ontology provides a standardized, machine-readable framework for modeling grid assets, operational technology devices, threats, vulnerabilities, supply chain risks, and security relationships in electrical power systems. ## Key Features - **Comprehensive Grid Coverage**: Physical assets, OT devices, grid components, sensors, and energy storage systems - **Zero Trust Architecture**: Policy decision points, enforcement points, trust brokers, and continuous monitoring - **AMI Infrastructure**: Advanced metering networks, head-end systems, mesh gateways, and MDM systems - **Advanced Security Modeling**: Attack patterns, vulnerabilities, mitigations, and supply chain risks - **Critical Grid Relationships**: Power flow, protection, control, and synchronization relationships - **Supply Chain Security**: Supplier modeling, country of origin tracking, and risk assessment - **Protocol Support**: DNP3, Modbus, IEC 61850, IEC 60870-5-104, OPC-UA, and IEEE standards - **Python Code Generation**: Automated STIX-compliant Python class generation from ontologies - **Interactive Visualization**: Enhanced HTML network graphs with grid-specific categorization - **STIX 2.1 Compliance**: Full compatibility with STIX threat intelligence ecosystem

Blakely, Benjamin [Argonne National Laboratory (AN↗
NASA NTRS1977

Visible and infrared imaging radiometers for ocean observations

The technology of visible and infrared imaging sensors designed for the remote monitoring of the oceans is assessed. Emphasis is placed on multichannel scanning radiometers that are either operational or under development. Present design practices and parameter constraints are discussed. Airborne sensor systems examined include the Ocean Color Scanner (OCS) and the Ocean Temperature Scanner (OTS). The Coastal Zone Color Scanner (CZCS) and Advanced Very High Resolution Radiometer (AVHRR), are reviewed with emphasis on design specifications, expected completion, and anticipated performance. Finally, recent technology advances and their probable impact on sensor design are examined.

Barnes, W. L.↗
NASA NTRS2000

X-33, Stepping Stone ot Low Cost Access to Space

In response to the Access to Space Study, which was conducted in 1993 through the Office of Space Systems Development, an advanced technology Reusable Launch Vehicle (RLV) was selected for demonstration. The X-33 was advanced as an demonstration project, to build and test a 53-percent scale prototype of an operational RLV, it would also demonstrate new technologies which would be required to assure the operation of the new RLV. This presentation reviews the progress of the X-33 development and supporting sites. The X-33 design has been completed and fabrication and assembly is progressing well. The X-33 launch site has been completed. The first LH2 tank and engine is in testing. This will lead to the full scale development of VentureStar(tm).

Naftel, J. Chris↗
DOE OSTI2024

Formally Verified ZTA Requirements for OT/ICS Environments with Isabelle/HOL

The clean energy transformation includes the integration of distributed energy resources with the power grid, which has led to a substantial increase in the complexity of power grids infrastructure and the underlying operational technology environment. Power grids infrastructure represents an operational technology environment that has become a system of systems, integrating heterogeneous devices which are both software-and hardware-intensive; as a result, there are increasing demands to exploit advances in the commodity of software-hardware infrastructures to improve energy systems requirements such as cybersecurity and resilience. In such a setting, system requirements at different levels mix, which leads to vulnerabilities and undesirable outcomes. The use of formal methods to characterize and prove system requirements removes ambiguity, increases automation, and provides high levels of assurance and reliability. In this paper, we contribute a methodology and a framework for the system-level verification of zero trust architecture requirements in operational technology environments. We define a formal specification for the core functionalities of operational technology environments, the corresponding invariants, and security proofs. Of particular note is our modular approach for the formal verification of asynchronous interactions in operational technology environments. The formal specification and the proofs have been mechanized using the interactive theorem proving environment Isabelle/HOL.

formal methods↗
DOE OSTI2025

OT Defender Presentation - Hacker Mindset

Presentation on hacker mindset and what utilities may be up against from lone hackers or professional groups, with ideas on how to improve defensive posture.

99 - GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗
DOE OSTI2024

Bayesian Attack Model (BAM)

The Bayesian Attack Model (BAM) is an analytical tool designed to enhance the comprehension of adversarial activity in OT environments. BAM leverages both expert cybersecurity insights and historical data to characterize the likelihood of adversarial behavior given anomalous observable events.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗
DOE OSTI2026

Equipment Self-Assessment Guide Checklist

This Equipment Self-Assessment Checklist is designed for asset owners and operators (AOOs) responsible for the deployment, operation, maintenance, or cybersecurity oversight of grid systems and digital energy technologies. It provides a structured inspection checklist for evaluating the security, integrity, and operational trustworthiness of equipment across substations, generation sites, distributed energy resources (DERs), and control environments.

32 - ENERGY CONSERVATION, CONSUMPTION, AND UTILIZA↗
NASA NTRS1992

An electromechanical actuation system for an expendable launch vehicle

A major effort at the NASA Lewis Research Center in recent years has been to develop electro-mechanical actuators (EMA's) to replace the hydraulic systems used for thrust vector control (TVC) on launch vehicles. This is an attempt ot overcome the inherent inefficiencies and costs associated with the existing hydraulic structures. General Dynamics Space Systems Division, under contract to NASA Lewis, is developing 18.6 kW (25 hp), 29.8 kW (40 hp), and 52.2 kW (70 hp) peak EMA systems to meet the power demands for TVC on a family of vehicles developed for the National Launch System. These systems utilize a pulse population modulated converter and field-oriented control scheme to obtain independent control of both the voltage and frequency. These techniques allow an induction motor to be operated at its maximum torque at all times. At NASA Lewis, we are building on this technology to develop our own in-house system capable of meeting the peak power requirements for an expendable launch vehicle (ELV) such as the Atlas. Our EMA will be capable of delivering 22.4 kW (30 hp) peak power with a nominal of 6.0 kW (8 hp). This system differs from the previous ones in two areas: (1) the use of advanced control methods, and (2) the incorporation of built-in-test. The advanced controls are essential for minimizing the controller size, while the built-in-test is necessary to enhance the system reliability and vehicle health monitoring. The ultimate goal of this program is to demonstrate an EMA which will be capable of self-test and easy integration into other projects. This paper will describe the effort underway at NASA Lewis to develop an EMA for an Atlas class ELV. An explanation will be given for each major technology block, and the status of each major technology block and the status of the overall program will be reported.

Burrows, Linda M.↗
DOE OSTI2024

Design and construction of the CMS Outer Tracker for the Phase-2 Upgrade

he High Luminosity LHC (HL-LHC) is expected to deliver an integrated luminosity of $3000-4000$~fb$^{-1}$ after 10 years of operation with peak instantaneous luminosity reaching about $5-7.5\times10^{34}$cm$^{-2}$s$^{-1}$. During Long Shutdown 3, several components of the CMS detector will undergo major changes, called Phase-2 upgrade, to be able to operate in the challenging environment of the HL-LHC. The current CMS silicon strip tracker has to be replaced with a new detector. The Phase-2 Outer Tracker (OT) will have higher radiation tolerance, higher granularity, and the capability to handle higher data rates compared to the current system. Another key feature of the OT will be to provide tracking information to the Level-1 (L1) trigger, allowing trigger rates to be kept at a sustainable level without sacrificing physics potential. For this, the OT will be made out of modules with two closely spaced sensors read out by front-end ASICs, which can correlate hits in the two sensors creating short track segments called stubs. The stubs will be used for tracking in the L1 track finder. The modules come in two flavors: strip-strip (2S) and pixel-strip (PS), which contain different sensor configurations and multiple ASICs. In this contribution, the design of the CMS Phase-2 OT, the technological choices, and the quality assurance (QA) procedures used to ensure the functionality of the modules will be reported. The contribution will cover the first results with pre-production devices and the different aspects taken into account during the QA: from fulfilling the precision specification of the module assembly procedure to ensuring the proper communication between the different ASICs on the module. The module noise performance is also checked and the full module functionality is verified at different temperatures.

Zoi, Irene↗
NASA NTRS2000

The Transition from Spacecraft Development Ot Flight Operation: Human Factor Considerations

In the field of aeronautics and astronautics, a paradigm shift has been witnessed by those in academia, research and development, and private industry. Long development life cycles and the budgets to support such programs and projects has given way to aggressive task schedules and leaner resources to draw from all the while challenging assigned individuals to create and produce improved products of processes. however, this "faster, better, cheaper" concept cannot merely be applied to the design, development, and test of complex systems such as earth-orbiting of interplanetary robotic spacecraft. Full advantage is not possible without due consideration and application to mission operations planning and flight operations, Equally as important as the flight system, the mission operations system consisting of qualified personnel, ground hardware and software tools, and verified and validated operational processes, should also be regarded as a complex system requiring personnel to draw upon formal education, training, related experiences, and heuristic reasoning in engineering an effective and efficient system. Unquestionably, qualified personnel are the most important elements of a mission operations system. This paper examines the experiences of the Deep Space I Project, the first in a series of new technology in-flight validation missions sponsored by the United States National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), specifically, in developing a subsystems analysis and technology validation team comprised of former spacecraft development personnel. Human factor considerations are investigated from initial concept/vision formulation; through operational process development; personnel test and training; to initial uplink product development and test support. Emphasis has been placed on challenges and applied or recommended solutions, so as to provide opportunities for future programs and projects to address and disposition potential issues and concerns as early as possible to reap the benefits associated with learning from other's past experiences.

Basilio, Ralph R.↗
NASA NTRS2007

NASA's Software Safety Standard

NASA relies more and more on software to control, monitor, and verify its safety critical systems, facilities and operations. Since the 1960's there has hardly been a spacecraft launched that does not have a computer on board that will provide command and control services. There have been recent incidents where software has played a role in high-profile mission failures and hazardous incidents. For example, the Mars Orbiter, Mars Polar Lander, the DART (Demonstration of Autonomous Rendezvous Technology), and MER (Mars Exploration Rover) Spirit anomalies were all caused or contributed to by software. The Mission Control Centers for the Shuttle, ISS, and unmanned programs are highly dependant on software for data displays, analysis, and mission planning. Despite this growing dependence on software control and monitoring, there has been little to no consistent application of software safety practices and methodology to NASA's projects with safety critical software. Meanwhile, academia and private industry have been stepping forward with procedures and standards for safety critical systems and software, for example Dr. Nancy Leveson's book Safeware: System Safety and Computers. The NASA Software Safety Standard, originally published in 1997, was widely ignored due to its complexity and poor organization. It also focused on concepts rather than definite procedural requirements organized around a software project lifecycle. Led by NASA Headquarters Office of Safety and Mission Assurance, the NASA Software Safety Standard has recently undergone a significant update. This new standard provides the procedures and guidelines for evaluating a project for safety criticality and then lays out the minimum project lifecycle requirements to assure the software is created, operated, and maintained in the safest possible manner. This update of the standard clearly delineates the minimum set of software safety requirements for a project without detailing the implementation for those requirements. This allows the projects leeway to meet these requirements in many forms that best suit a particular project's needs and safety risk. In other words, it tells the project what to do, not how to do it. This update also incorporated advances in the state of the practice of software safety from academia and private industry. It addresses some of the more common issues now facing software developers in the NASA environment such as the use of Commercial-Off-the-Shelf Software (COTS), Modified OTS (MOTS), Government OTS (GOTS), and reused software. A team from across NASA developed the update and it has had both NASA-wide internal reviews by software engineering, quality, safety, and project management. It has also had expert external review. This presentation and paper will discuss the new NASA Software Safety Standard, its organization, and key features. It will start with a brief discussion of some NASA mission failures and incidents that had software as one of their root causes. It will then give a brief overview of the NASA Software Safety Process. This will include an overview of the key personnel responsibilities and functions that must be performed for safety-critical software.

Ramsay, Christopher M.↗