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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
NASA NTRS2008

Increasing the Cost-efficiency of the DSN

JPL has operated the Deep Space Network (DSN) on behalf of NASA since the 1960's. Over the last two decades, the DSN budget has generally declined in real-year dollars while the aging assets required more attention, and the missions became more complex. As a result, the budget has been increasingly consumed by Operations and Maintenance (O and M), significantly reducing the funding wedge available for technology investment and for enhancing the DSN capability and capacity. Responding to this budget squeeze, the DSN launched an effort to improve the cost-efficiency of the O and M. In this paper we: Analyze the components of O&M. We note for example that, for the DSN, less than 20% of the staff engage in the traditional human-in-front-a-console role, so any effort to increase the cost efficiency must go beyond reducing the number of "Real-time operators." Explain the underlying organizational and cultural structures. Any cost-efficiency activities changes either accept, or carefully modify these structures. For example, the DSN O&M is based on the concept that there are three nearly identical antenna complexes separated by approximately 1200 in latitude and that each antenna complex is operated by a different contractor (driven by international agreements). Explore planned changes in the customer interface, e.g. web-based automated scheduling, and the processes required for a transition. Changes have to be evaluated in the larger end-to-end context, e.g. do the changes provide a net cost-efficiency for the DSN and the missions, or do they merely shift cost from the DSN to the missions. Consider possible significant changes in real-time pass management, e.g. full-remoting of operations, and lights-dim operations, while maintaining (or improving) the performance metrics of the DSN. Investigate how procedural and administrative changes could increase cost-efficiency, in conjunction with changes in the customer interfaces and real-time pass management. Examples would be handling of inter-governmental agreements, improved sharing of resources with other agencies, and better use of commercial (rather than government) resources

Deep Space Network (DSN)↗
NASA NTRS2002

The Role of a Multidimensional Concept of Trust in the Performance of Global Virtual Teams

This paper focuses on the concept of trust as an important ingredient of effective global virtual team performance. Definitions of trust and virtual teams are presented. The concept of trust is developed from its unilateral application (trust, absence of trust) to a multidimensional concept including cognitive and affective components. The special challenges of a virtual team are then discussed with particular emphasis on how a multidimensional concept of trust impacts these challenges. Propositions suggesting the multidimensional concept of trust moderates the negative impacts of distance, cross cultural and organizational differences, the effects of electronically mediated communication, reluctance to share information and a lack of hi story/future on the performance of virtual teams are stated. The paper concludes with recommendations and a set of techniques to build both cognitive and affective trust in virtual teams.

Bodensteiner, Nan Muir↗
NASA NTRS2014

Innovation @ NASA

This presentation provides an overview of the activities National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) is doing to encourage innovation across the agency. All information provided is available publicly.

Organizational Culture↗
NASA NTRS2017

Digital Model-Based Engineering: Expectations, Prerequisites, and Challenges of Infusion

Digital model-based engineering (DMbE) is the use of digital artifacts, digital environments, and digital tools in the performance of engineering functions. DMbE is intended to allow an organization to progress from documentation-based engineering methods to digital methods that may provide greater flexibility, agility, and efficiency. The term 'DMbE' was developed as part of an effort by the Model-Based Systems Engineering (MBSE) Infusion Task team to identify what government organizations might expect in the course of moving to or infusing MBSE into their organizations. The Task team was established by the Interagency Working Group on Engineering Complex Systems, an informal collaboration among government systems engineering organizations. This Technical Memorandum (TM) discusses the work of the MBSE Infusion Task team to date. The Task team identified prerequisites, expectations, initial challenges, and recommendations for areas of study to pursue, as well as examples of efforts already in progress. The team identified the following five expectations associated with DMbE infusion, discussed further in this TM: (1) Informed decision making through increased transparency, and greater insight. (2) Enhanced communication. (3) Increased understanding for greater flexibility/adaptability in design. (4) Increased confidence that the capability will perform as expected. (5) Increased efficiency. The team identified the following seven challenges an organization might encounter when looking to infuse DMbE: (1) Assessing value added to the organization. Not all DMbE practices will be applicable to every situation in every organization, and not all implementations will have positive results. (2) Overcoming organizational and cultural hurdles. (3) Adopting contractual practices and technical data management. (4) Redefining configuration management. The DMbE environment changes the range of configuration information to be managed to include performance and design models, database objects, as well as more traditional book-form objects and formats. (5) Developing information technology (IT) infrastructure. Approaches to implementing critical, enabling IT infrastructure capabilities must be flexible, reconfigurable, and updatable. (6) Ensuring security of the single source of truth (7) Potential overreliance on quantitative data over qualitative data. Executable/ computational models and simulations generally incorporate and generate quantitative vice qualitative data. The Task team also developed several recommendations for government, academia, and industry, as discussed in this TM. The Task team recommends continuing beyond this initial work to further develop the means of implementing DMbE and to look for opportunities to collaborate and share best practices.

Hale, J. P.↗
NASA NTRS2020

Recurring Causes of Human Spaceflight Mishaps during Flight Tests and Early Operations

n analysis of recurring causes underlying human spaceflight mishaps that occurred during flight tests and early operations was performed. Eight mishaps from the Apollo, Soyuz, Skylab, Space Shuttle, and Constellation Programs (i.e., the Ares-1X test flight) and commercial suborbital systems were included in the study. Detailed event analyses were performed for the historical mishaps and aggregate data analyses conducted to identify recurring issues. The nine most frequent issues were inadequate technical controls or risk management practices, incomplete procedures, system design and development issues, inadequate inspection or secondary verification requirements, failures of organizations to learn from previous incidents, inadequate schedule controls, inadequate task analyses or design processes, flaws in the design of organizations, and issues with organizational safety cultures.

Timothy S Barth↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Recurring Causes of Human Spaceflight Mishaps During Flight Tests and Early Operations

An analysis of recurring causes underlying human spaceflight mishaps that occurred during flight tests and early operations was performed. Eight mishaps from the Apollo, Soyuz, Skylab, Space Shuttle, and Constellation Programs (i.e., the Ares-1X test flight) and early commercial suborbital operations were included in the study. Detailed event analyses were performed for the historical mishaps and aggregate data analyses conducted to identify recurring issues. The nine most frequent issues were inadequate technical controls or risk management practices, incomplete procedures, system design and development issues, inadequate inspection or secondary verification requirements, failures of organizations to learn from previous incidents, inadequate schedule controls, inadequate task analyses or design processes, flaws in the design of organizations, and issues with organizational safety cultures.

Human Spaceflight↗
NASA NTRS2024

X-Plane Knowledge Capture Workshop Summary Report

The history of experimental aircraft research and development at the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) provides a large body of work for current and future team members to learn from and apply. NASA values the knowledge it gains from all the research it performs and desires to have that knowledge grow with each new project, incrementally adding to the collective knowledge base. To support this knowledge growth and sharing, in May 2019, NASA convened over 60 engineers; researchers; and other personnel (internal and external to NASA) for the X-plane1 Knowledge Capture Workshop to discuss their over 50-years’ worth of experiences in developing, operating, and managing experimental aircraft. Over the course of a two-day workshop, the group not only focused, primarily, on current X-plane development but also discussed a wide range of topics about experimental aircraft and flight research. In addition to the discussions, senior NASA aeronautics leaders shared their personal lessons learned with the workshop audience. Broadly, these discussions centered around the topics of organizational and cultural practices, the project lifecycle, flight, and risk and safety. Many of the observations offered by participants are applicable to other NASA team-based projects, demonstrating the value in sharing lessons learned and best practices across projects regardless of their research focus. To share the most valuable lessons learned as broadly as possible, a summary of these discussions has been compiled into the following report. These discussions are mostly included in their entirety, with some light editing for clarity and privacy. NASA is sharing this knowledge internally and making it available to the public in hopes that others can learn from the experimental aircraft challenges and successes at NASA. Note: this document represents the perspectives, experiences, and opinions of others but does not necessarily represent the official view of NASA.

Steven R Hirshorn↗
NASA NTRS2019

NASA's Journey to Safety Culture

One of the organizational causes of the Shuttle Columbia mishap found by the Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB) Report was a "Broken Safety Culture". Since its release, NASA has strived to improve its Safety Culture In 2009, the Chief of the Office of Safety and Mission Assurance asked a member of the Air Force Safety Center and of the CAIB for assistance to develop a NASA Safety Culture Program. This presentation describes the journey that NASA personnel has taken developing a NASA Safety Culture Program to "repair" its Safety Culture.

Dillinger, Tracy↗
DOE OSTI2020

Integrated Hydro-Terrestrial Modeling: Development of a National Capability

Water is one of our most important natural resources and is essential to our national economy and security. Multiple federal government agencies have mission elements that address national needs related to water. Each water-related agency champions a unique science and/or operational mission focused on advancing a portion of the nation’s ability to meet our water-related challenges. These diverse mission needs have engendered a rich and extensive base of water-related data and modeling capabilities. While useful for their intended purposes, these capabilities are not well integrated to address complex regional problems and overarching national problems. These major investments by a number of federal agencies, however, lay the foundation for an integrated hydro-terrestrial modeling and data infrastructure that will enhance knowledge, understanding, prediction, and management of the nation’s diverse water challenges. Creating a more seamless national hydro-terrestrial modeling and data capacity presents an enormous opportunity to advance operational as well as research capabilities leading to more effective water management. Advances are necessary not only in operational tools for forecasting but also in research to identify and resolve knowledge and data gaps that lead to unacceptable uncertainties in forecast outcomes. As such, close coordination across scientific, operational, and resource management communities is required. To this end, an interagency workshop on “Integrated Hydro-Terrestrial Modeling: Development of a National Capacity” was held at the National Science Foundation (NSF) headquarters in Alexandria, Virginia in September 2019, led jointly by the NSF, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) and the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) and with broader interagency support provided through an interagency steering committee. This workshop provided a venue to bring together representatives of water-related agencies and their scientific partners (including university researchers) to initiate and refine a vision for a national Integrated Hydro-Terrestrial Modeling (IHTM) and data infrastructure and advance ideas towards its development. The workshop was designed to address three critical foci to advance the development of a national IHTM capacity: “Priority Water Challenges” around which to motivate and initiate development; Technical and methodological obstacles related to data and modeling; Organizational, structural, and cultural barriers that heretofore have impeded integration of capabilities across the federal and research landscapes. The following “Priority Water Challenge” domain areas represent targets for initiating development of the IHTM and were identified and selected in alignment with priorities of the administration’s Water Sub-Cabinet: (1) Nutrient loading, hypoxia, and harmful algal blooms; (2) Water availability in the western United States; and (3) Extreme weather-related water hazards. These water challenges span agency mission boundaries and encompass a broad range of geographies, complex system dynamics and feedbacks, and critical processes spanning hydrological, climatic, and biophysical systems as well as land-use/land-cover, agricultural, built infrastructure, societal, economic, and decisional environments. These three Priority Water Challenges cannot be fully addressed without leveraging complementary and synergistic capabilities across multiple agencies.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗
NASA NTRS1996

Crew Selection and Training

This research addressed a number of issues relevant to the performance of teams in demanding environments. Initial work, conducted in the aviation analog environment, focused on developing new measures of performance related attitudes and behaviors. The attitude measures were used to assess acceptance of concepts related to effective teamwork and personal capabilities under stress. The behavioral measures were used to evaluate the effectiveness of flight crews operating in commercial aviation. Assessment of team issues in aviation led further to the evaluation and development of training to enhance team performance. Much of the work addressed evaluation of the effectiveness of such training, which has become known as Crew Resource Management (CRM). A second line of investigation was into personality characteristics that predict performance in challenging environments such as aviation and space. A third line of investigation of team performance grew out of the study of flight crews in different organizations. This led to the development of a theoretical model of crew performance that included not only individual attributes such as personality and ability, but also organizational and national culture. A final line of investigation involved beginning to assess whether the methodologies and measures developed for the aviation analog could be applied to another domain -- the performance of medical teams working in the operating room.

Helmreich, Robert L.↗
NASA NTRS2006

Knowledge Management: A Skeptic's Guide

A viewgraph presentation discussing knowledge management is shown. The topics include: 1) What is Knowledge Management? 2) Why Manage Knowledge? The Presenting Problems; 3) What Gets Called Knowledge Management? 4) Attempts to Rethink Assumptions about Knowledgs; 5) What is Knowledge? 6) Knowledge Management and INstitutional Memory; 7) Knowledge Management and Culture; 8) To solve a social problem, it's easier to call for cultural rather than organizational change; 9) Will the Knowledge Management Effort Succeed? and 10) Backup: Metrics for Valuing Intellectural Capital i.e. Knowledge.

Linde, Charlotte↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Safety Culture at the World’s Premier Multi-User Spaceport

NASA’s Agency-wide Safety Culture is implemented at the Kennedy Space Center (KSC) using a unique strategy due an unparalleled approach in making human spaceflight history. Kennedy Space Center, the world’s premier multi-user spaceport, enables U.S. government and commercial space access, while providing the world a resource to allow the exploration of and the ability to work in space. A consistently healthy safety culture at KSC is imperative for mission success: desired achievements, protection of space flight hardware, and ultimately, the preservation of human life requires the support of a healthy safety culture. Emphasis on the NASA Agency-wide development of Safety Culture began with the conception of the NASA Agency Safety Culture Working Group. After the devastating loss of life and mission of the Space Shuttle Colombia, a broken safety culture was identified as an organizational cause by the Columbia Accident Investigation Board Report. Thus, the Agency Safety Culture Working Group was developed in 2009 to assess the status of the Agency’s Safety Culture, while addressing safety culture concerns at the NASA Center-level. A Five-factor model was developed to serve as the guiding principles for Safety Culture: 1) Reporting Culture, 2) Just Culture, 3) Flexible Culture, 4) Learning Culture, and 5) Engaged Culture. These five factors are included in the NASA Safety Culture logo, which was intentionally designed as a DNA double helix to prompt the permeation of safety into day-to-day work. KSC specifically implements the NASA Agency-wide Safety Culture principles in a tailored approach that is relevant to the diversity of work being performed. An emphasis is placed on the implementation to include safety at home, not exclusively at work. This emphasis is a KSC-specific element that has been intentionally added to promote a closed loop Safety Culture. To advertise the safety culture, various safety and health events are held throughout the calendar year, providing innovative speakers and engaging activities, while also promoting a wide range of curated safety initiatives. Development and continuous improvement of the KSC safety tracking database, allows for advanced tracking-to-closure, along with providing data sets used to identify areas of emphasis. Other safety initiatives rely solely on employee participation, such as the photo challenges; participants are encouraged to identify and capture themselves, coworkers, or family members participating in safe or healthy activities to share with others within the Center and at Agency levels. Fabrication of exclusive videos and graphics are utilized to advertise and inform employee of safety initiatives, upcoming safety events, and general dispersion of safety information. In addition, an anonymous Agency-wide Safety Culture Survey is advertised, administered, and analyzed at Kennedy Space Center, with the purpose of receiving basic feedback on Safety Culture perceptions to help prevent future incidents from occurring. Through these briefly identified means, and many other forms of employee engagement, Kennedy Space Center aims to maintain safety in the forefront, while creating an environment where everyone trusts that safety is a priority.

Larrin E. Moody↗
DOE OSTI2020

On the Road to Achieving Safety Excellence at the Idaho Cleanup Project: The Initial Challenges, Solutions, and Positive Results of Striving to be the Best and Safest in the DOE Complex - 20518

When Fluor Idaho, LLC (Fluor Idaho) assumed the Idaho Cleanup Project Core contract (ICP Core) in mid-2016, it inherited the successful multi-faceted, employee-owned safety programs of two prior contractors supporting cleanup operations at the Idaho National Laboratory Site. Fluor Idaho incorporated the best of both safety programs along with Fluor Corporate's 106-year legacy of safety initiatives and successes. Fluor Idaho integrated the separate programs and cultures under a One Fluor approach - one project, one mission, One Fluor. Job changes, management changes, and procedures, processes, and system changes presented multiple challenges. Those challenges combined with the severe Winter of 2016/2017 resulted in numerous slips, trips, and falls first aids and reportable injuries. The road to safety excellence started off bumpy and stayed that way for some time. Since then, Fluor Idaho has successfully implemented several key initiatives including employee engagement; management engagement and time in the field; communications improvements; safety culture sustainment; injury/illness prevention; organizational learning; and DOE Voluntary Protection Program (VPP) readiness and preparation. Management became more engaged by making more workplace visits and increasing their supervision of 'life critical work' or complex activities. Additional training became mandatory for first-line supervisors and front-line workers. Most recently, Fluor Idaho increased its injury and illness prevention initiatives extensively. In the last year, things have turned around in a dramatic way. This shift is directly attributable to the significant number of initiatives launched in late 2017 and 2018. These initiatives addressed safety performance in the five key areas of the DOE VPP and promoted sustainability of the company's safety culture. The five key areas are: management leadership, employee involvement, work-site analysis, hazard prevention and control, and safety and health training. Employees and managers alike recommitted to making safety the highest value. The result of this laser-like focus on safety and accident and injury prevention is that injuries and first aids are a fraction of what they were. During FY 2019, employees worked more than 4.2 million hours without a serious injury or lost work-day and 1 million hours without a recordable injury. Fluor Idaho is proud of its safety trend. The company invested significant resources in improving its safety record, and that investment is paying off. Other contractors in the DOE Complex can learn and benefit from this discussion of the challenges Fluor Idaho faced, as well as its innovative safety initiatives that are producing results that are being recognized by our U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) customer. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2022

Case Study - Intentional Inclusion: How embedding inclusion into the fabric of Idaho National Laboratory positioned the organization for a sustainable future

Idaho National Laboratory, a Department of Energy national laboratory headquartered in Idaho Falls, Idaho, set out to embed inclusion into every aspect of its organization. The goal was to ensure the laboratory is a place where everyone feels they are valued, belong and can bring their best selves to work each day. The laboratory viewed inclusion as a journey in which a consistent, collective commitment to intentional decision-making and incremental progress ultimately achieves amazing results. INL’s intentional inclusion strategy has allowed the organization to: • Retain and build a next-generation workforce to transform the world’s energy future and secure the nation’s most critical infrastructure. • Lead inclusively through individual, team-based, and labwide actions that elevate organizational effectiveness. • Grow laboratory cultural acumen by establishing a clear connection between inclusion and mission success. This case study shares how INL brought employees along on the inclusion journey and inspired everyone to keep moving forward together.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗
NASA NTRS1992

Total Quality Management in Space Shuttle Main Engine manufacturing

The Total Quality Management (TQM) philosophy developed in the Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) is briefly reviewed and the ongoing TQM implementation effort which is being pursued through the continuous improvement (CI) process is discussed. TQM is based on organizational excellence which integrates the new supportive culture with the technical tools necessary to identify, assess, and correct manufacturing processes. Particular attention is given to the prime contractor's change to the organizational excellence management philosophy in SSME manufacturing facilities.

Ding, J.↗
NASA NTRS2011

Enabling the Capture and Sharing of NASA Technical Expertise Through Communities of Practice

Historically, engineers at the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) had few opportunities or incentives to share their technical expertise across the Agency. Its center- and project- focused culture often meant that knowledge never left organizational and geographic boundaries. With increasingly complex missions, the closeout of the Shuttle Program, and a new generation entering the workforce, developing a knowledge sharing culture became critical. To address this need, the Office of the Chief Engineer established communities of practice on the NASA Engineering Network. These communities were strategically aligned with NASA's core competencies in such disciplines as avionics, flight mechanics, life support, propulsion, structures, loads and dynamics, human factors, and guidance, navigation, and control. This paper describes the process used to identify and develop communities, from establishing simple websites that compiled discipline-specific resources to fostering a knowledge-sharing environment through collaborative and interactive technologies. It includes qualitative evidence of improved availability and transfer of knowledge. It focuses on pivotal capabilities that increased knowledge exchange such as a custom-made Ask An Expert system, community contact lists, publication of key resources, and submission forms that allowed any user to propose content for the sites. It discusses the peer relationships that developed through the communities and the leadership and infrastructure that made them possible.

Topousis, Daria E.↗
DOE OSTI2025

Hungary 908 Event - Risk Based Graded Approach to ITM

This presentation, Risk-Based, Graded Approach to Insider Threat Mitigation: Human Measures, introduces a structured framework for managing insider threat risk using internationally recognized guidance from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Nuclear Security Series No. 8-G (Rev. 1) and the Joint Statement on Mitigating Insider Threats (INFCIRC/908). The presentation emphasizes that effective insider threat mitigation (ITM) depends on both positional controls, which manage inherent risk based on access, authority, and knowledge, and human measures, which address residual risk reflected in behavior, motivation, and reliability. Using a risk-informed and graded approach, the presentation outlines methods for identifying and prioritizing high-risk positions, applying layered organizational controls, and integrating human reliability mechanisms such as the Behavior Observation Program (BOP), Fitness-for-Duty (FFD) evaluations, Employee Assistance Programs (EAP), and Nuclear Security Culture (NSC). The human-focused portion examines behavioral and organizational indicators of opportunity, vulnerability, motivation, and crisis, demonstrating how early detection, deterrence, and response can prevent insider events. The session concludes with a case review of the Millstone Nuclear Power Station incident involving engineer George Galatis. The case illustrates how weak leadership and a poor safety culture can create conditions for failure and how a comprehensive ITM framework could have altered the outcome. The objective of this presentation is to help practitioners apply a risk-based, graded philosophy to human factors and promote a culture of accountability, communication, and resilience within nuclear organizations.

99 - GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗
NASA NTRS2006

Near-Miss Evaluation Bias as an Obstacle to Organizational Learning: Lessons from NASA

After the Shuttle Columbia catastrophe, the investigation board (CAIB) stated that NASA needs to develop a "learning culture", meaning a capability to learn from past failures by understanding the technical and organizational causes of these mistakes (CAIB report, 2003). While many organizations learn from obvious failures, we argue that it is harder for organizations to learn from near-miss events (i.e., situations where a failure does not occur but nearly did), because these near-misses are processed as successes. For the shuttle program, prior debris problems could have caused a similar failure as on the Columbia mission except that the large pieces missed the highly sensitive portions of the orbiter. This acceptance of foam debris was adopted as a normal occurrence by the shuttle program managers similar to the problems at the time of the Challenger Disaster (detailed in Vaughan, 1996). We extend that work to show that an outcome bias influences people's evaluation of project managers, such that managers of failed missions were perceived more poorly than managers who made the same decisions but whose mission ended in either success or a near-miss. The similarity of ratings between the near-miss and success condition imply that even when a problem occurs that is clearly linked to prior managerial decisions, if the project is not harmed because of good luck, that manager is not held accountable for faculty decision making and neither the individual manager nor the organization learn from the experience potentially increasing the likelihood of a failure in the future.

Dillon, Robin L.↗