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At least 55 records · Page 3

From Obsolete to Optimal (ATR Demineralized Water System)

My project was migrating a Human-Machine Interface (HMI) and Programmable Logic Controller (PLC) program from legacy software to a modern platform, enhancing operational efficiency and eliminating unsupported, obsolete equipment. Initially, I used a migration tool to transfer the programs to the new software, then manually updated variables to align with the new PLC. I optimized the PLC code by leveraging new scaling features in the I/O cards, removing over 45 obsolete rungs, and enhancing clarity with functional tag aliases. Next, I modernized the HMI's visuals with an updated color scheme and 3D buttons. I developed multiple interface versions iteratively refining them based on operator feedback. I also designed and created a dedicated "Rounds" screen incorporating insights from a previous intern’s project to streamline daily rounds. To improve clarity, consistency, and efficiency I redesigned the entire interface. Adding visual indicators to enhance operational awareness: red is used for values outside normal specifications, green for normal operating modes, yellow for manual mode, and grey for offline units. Additionally, I added a dynamic visual representation of tank levels, creating PLC logic to show the level in inches as well as inches and feet. I then incorporated a navigation sidebar to facilitate efficient screen transitions. Risk of human error was mitigated by defining narrow input ranges for tank level shutoff and password protecting setpoint changes. I also fixed issues with datatypes that caused inaccuracies in the original code. Overall, this comprehensive upgrade significantly enhanced the HMI's functionality, user experience, and operational reliability.

47 - OTHER INSTRUMENTATION↗

Control System Upgrade for Battery State-of-Charge Indications

The Advanced Test Reactor (ATR) Complex at Idaho National Laboratory (INL) relies on Battery Backed Power (BBP) systems and Uninterruptible Power Supplies (UPS) to ensure continuous power supply to critical components. This project aims to enhance the reliability and functionality of the battery monitoring and control systems by updating the State-of-Charge (SOC) system, Programmable Logic Controller (PLC), and Human-Machine Interface (HMI) for the nuclear safety-related battery banks. The current system, while functional, has areas for improvement, particularly in recharging calculations and alarm functions. The project objectives include developing flow charts, programming the new PLC and HMI, conducting bench tests, and updating design documentation. Additionally, the project ensures compliance with safety standards, develops training materials, creates comprehensive documentation, and integrates seamlessly with existing ATR infrastructure. The new SOC system is designed to be scalable for future upgrades, improve efficiency, enhance data accuracy, implement redundancy features, and achieve project goals within budget constraints while considering environmental impact. The methodology involved familiarizing with BBP and UPS systems, collecting current readings, rescaling signals, learning ladder logic, and updating the HMI. The transition from SLC 5/03 PLC using RS Logix 500 to CompactLogix 5380 using Studio 5000 was a key step. Despite challenges in transferring outdated PLC ladder logic and HMI code, starting from scratch led to a more accurate and efficient monitoring system, contributing to improved safety and operational efficiency. The project is currently awaiting approval of the Engineering Calculation and Analysis Report (ECAR) before implementation.

42 - ENGINEERING↗

ON THE EFFECTIVENESS OF LLMS IN UNIT TEST GENERATION FOR STRUCTURED TEXT PROGRAMS

The reliability of industrial automation systems heavily depends on the correctness of Programmable Logic Controller (PLC) programs, which are often written in Structured Text (ST). While Large Language Models (LLMs) have shown promise in automating test generation for mainstream programming languages, their effectiveness for the syntactically strict ST language remains underexplored. This thesis presents a systematic empirical evaluation of three state-of-the-art LLMs—GPT-4o, Gemini 2.5 Pro, and Claude Sonnet 4.5—for generating ST unit tests. We examine three prompting strategies: Natural Language (NL), Code Language (CL), and Chain-of-Thought (CoT), across a curated set of 11 ST function blocks. The quality of the generated tests is assessed using Compilation Success Rate (CSR), Statement Coverage (SC), and Branch Coverage (BC). In the zero-shot setting, Claude Sonnet 4.5 achieves the highest CSR, while Gemini 2.5 Pro consistently delivers the best statement and branch coverage, particularly under CL prompts. By incorporating a one-shot CL prompt, all models exhibit substantial improvements—most notably GPT-4o, whose CSR increases from 45.45% to 90.91%, with substantial gains in both SC and BC. To further contextualize these findings, we compare GPT-4o’s one-shot results with PLCAutoTester, a state-ofthe- art ST unit test generation tool, on an additional benchmark dataset. While LLMgenerated tests approach competitive coverage levels, PLCAutoTester maintains significantly higher and more stable coverage across programs. This study provides the first comprehensive benchmark of modern LLMs for ST unit testing, highlighting their strengths, limitations, and improvements through one-shot prompting, and positioning their performance relative to specialized automated testing tools in industrial automation.

42 ENGINEERING↗

A New Era for Modern Bubble Chamber Technology: Cooling and Real-Time Control for the MAMBA Neutrino Bubble Chamber∗

Future neutrino experiments such as DUNE will be limited less by statistics than by how well neutrino--nucleus interactions are understood, and the cleanest way to improve that understanding is to measure interactions with light nuclei such as hydrogen or deuterium. The detector best suited to the job, the bubble chamber, has not been built for a neutrino beam in about fifty years. MAMBA (Modern Adaptive Modular Bubble chamber Archetype) is a small prototype at Fermilab intended to bring the technology back with modern cryogenics and automation, cycling continuously at 1~Hz. This paper summarizes my work on two of its subsystems during a summer internship. A new solid copper thermal link brought the coldhead to 21.3~K in a commissioning cooldown, near the 20~K operating target. An Industrial Shields Raspberry Pi programmable logic controller (PLC) running OpenPLC was characterized at a median round-trip response of 0.64~ms over 20,000 trials, with 0.66\% of trials exceeding 1~ms. Both results support continuous cycling.

Williams, Nicholas [Fermilab; DuPage Coll.]↗

Upgrading the TFTR Transrex Power Supplies

In order to provide improved and expanded experimental capabilities, the existing Transrex power supplies at PPPL are to be upgraded and modernized. Each of the 39 power supplies consists of two six pulse silicon controlled rectifier sections forming a twelve pulse power supply. The first modification is to split each supply into two independent six pulse supplies by replacing the existing obsolete twelve pulse firing generator with two commercially available six pulse firing generators. The second change replaces the existing control link with a faster system, with greater capacity, which will allow for independent control of all 78 power supply sections. The third change replaces the existing Computer Automated Measurement and Control (CAMAC) based fault detector with an Experimental Physics and Industrial Control System (EPICS) compatible unit, eliminating the obsolete CAMAC modules. Finally the remaining relay logic and interfaces to the "Hardwired Control System" will be replaces with a Programmable Logic Controller (PLC).

70 PLASMA PHYSICS AND FUSION TECHNOLOGY↗

Innovative PLC Design for Optimized Potable Water Managment

My project here at Idaho National Laboratory (INL) was to work on Potable Water PLC Design (Programmable Logic Controllers). I was tasked in making a new panel design for the PLC system that will be moved from TRA BLDG 696 to TRA BLDG 608. This design needed to be updated since the old PLC system being about 20 years old. The manufacturer of the MicroLogix 1200 life expectancy showed it to be 10-20 years, and the system was discontinued in 2017. The new system we implemented was called CompactLogix Controller 5380, along with a new 24 VDC/10 Amp Power Supply. I made a design using Microsoft Visio, with the new material. But we needed to add it onto an Aluminum Panel that the system will be mounted onto, we need Unistrut’s for the aluminum panel to be mounted to. Some of the material we will still be using, like the R1 Alarm Relay, will be moving with the PLC system. The rest of the material will be new supplies that need to be updated systems, which the site is waiting for to complete the PLC system.

47 - OTHER INSTRUMENTATION↗

Overshadow PLC to Detect Remote Control-Logic Injection Attacks

Programmable logic controllers (PLCs) in industrial control systems (ICS) are vulnerable to remote control logic injection attacks. Attackers target the control logic of a PLC to manipulate the behavior of a physical process such as nuclear plants, power grids, and gas pipelines. Control logic attacks have been studied extensively in the literature, including hiding the transfer of a control logic over the network from both packet header-based signatures, and deep packet inspection. For instance, these attacks transfer a control logic code as data, into small fragments (one-byte per packet), that are further padded with noise data. To detect control logic in ICS network traffic, this paper presents Shade, a novel shadow memory technique that observes the network traffic to maintain a local copy of the current state of a PLC memory. To analyze the memory contents, Shade employs a classification algorithm with 42 unique features categorized into five types at different semantic levels of a control logic code, such as number of rungs, number of consecutive decompiled instructions, and n-grams. We then evaluate Shade against control logic injection attacks on two PLCs, Modicon M221 and MicroLogix 1400 from two ICS vendors, Schneider electric and Allen-Bradley, respectively. The evaluation results show that Shade can detect an attack instance (i.e., identifying at least one attack packet during the transfer of a malicious control logic) accurately without any false alarms.

Yoo, Hyunguk↗

PLC Vulnerabilities and Mitigations

Programmable Logic Controllers (PLCs) are used extensively in many high-importance industrial and nonindustrial settings including controlling elevators, manufacturing machines, and utility facilities such as power and natural gas, however cybersecurity protection for them has been neglected. Within recent years, PLCs have been put under more security scrutiny and experts have advocated for changes from the addition of protocol encryption and network segmentation to intrusion detection systems on the PLCs themselves. While PLC security is critical, a large portion of the PLCs available today will never receive these changes due to being legacy or the difficulty of overhauling the security on existing systems. Due to the infeasibility of applying many recommended security measures towards currently available machines, we aim to provide realistic and affordable best practices for hardening PLCs. We will first conduct security analysis and consider attack vectors within our target PLC. Once we’ve analyzed the device’s security, we will evaluate a variety of mitigation methods and create guidelines to effectively reduce the threat posed by PLC attacks with minimal disruption to operations.

42 ENGINEERING↗

Instrumentation and Control Selection for the 12 GeV Hall-B Magnets at Jefferson Lab

Here, as part of the Jefferson Lab 12 GeV accelerator upgrade, the Experimental Physics Hall B detector system requires two superconducting magnets – a Torus and a Solenoid. The specifications required maximum space for the detectors which led to the choice of conduction cooling for each magnet. The Torus consists of 6 trapezoidal 'race-track'-type coils connected in series with an operating current of 3770 A. The Solenoid is an actively shielded 5 Tesla magnet consisting of 5 coils connected in series operating at 2416 A. Within the hall the two magnets are located in close proximity to each other and are surrounded by particle detectors. We describe the philosophy behind the instrumentation selection and control design that accounts for this proximity and other challenging working conditions. We describe the choice of sensor technologies, as well as the control and data acquisition methods. The magnet power and cryogenic control sub-systems are implemented using Allen Bradley Control Logix 1756-L72 Programmable Logic Controllers. Sensor instrumentation read-backs are routed into the PLC via National Instruments cRIO hardware (Field Programmable Gate Arrays or FPGA/RT application) using Jefferson Lab designed FPGA-based multi-sensor-excitation-chassis. Configuration, monitoring, and alarm handlers for the magnet systems are provided via an Experimental Physics Instrumentation & Control System interface (EPICS). Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and the requirement to monitor critical parameters during operation guided the selection of instrumentation and associated hardware. The design of the quench protection and voltage tap sub-systems was driven by the anticipated level of voltages developed during a magnet quench. The primary hard-wired quench detection and protection sub-system together with the secondary PLC-based protection sub-system is also discussed. The successful commissioning and subsequent performance of these magnets demonstrates the robustness of the design and implementation approach that was adopted by the Jefferson Lab team and serves as an excellent 'How To' guide for future projects of this size and complexity.

12 GeV↗

PLC-based Impedance Measurement and Current Injection Response Analysis

Studying and mitigating the vulnerabilities of Programmable Logic Controllers (PLCs) to electromagnetic pulse is important for the reliability of the power system. In this paper, an effective impedance measurement scheme is proposed to estimate the susceptibility of PLCs to an electromagnetic pulse. The equivalent non-uniform transmission line model is established to eliminate the impact of the fixture in the de-embedding process. Based on the measured impedance, the equivalent circuit is established to calculate the response of the device when subjected to the electromagnetic pulse. The voltage and current responses of different interfaces are compared utilizing the developed pulse Current Injection (CI) method. Finally, the impedance measurement scheme is verified through testing using three measuring instruments. And the CI simulation experiments reveal the characteristics and susceptibilities of different PLCs interfaces, indicating that some protection measures are required for the reliable operation of PLC.

Qiu, Wei↗

Strengthening Cybersecurity for Industrial Control Systems: Innovations in Protecting PLC-Based Infrastructure

In this paper, we propose two new approaches aimed at enhancing the security of industrial control systems (ICS) that utilize programmable logic controllers (PLCs) for the control of critical processes. The first approach involves the addition of a unique digital watermark to the PWM control that adjusts the motor speed to control the critical process. This enables efficient detection and identification of any unauthorized modifications to the sensor signals responsible for controlling the plant. The second approach focuses on monitoring the input current (i.e power) drawn by the PLC during the execution of critical process control tasks. Malicious intrusions to change the PLC parameters and/or unauthorized firmware updates can be rapidly detected. Both approaches demonstrate a substantial improvement in the security of ICS, effectively safeguarding against potential cyber-attacks. Experimental results from a laboratory scale water tank level controlled via PLC showcases rapid intrusion detection capabilities.

Huang, Peng-Hao↗

Port Impedance Measurement and Current Injection Response Analysis for PLCs

Programmable Logic Controllers (PLCs) are used to control devices throughout the power system since they have fast control capabilities and can utilize multiple types of communication interfaces. Therefore, studying and mitigating their vulnerabilities to electromagnetic pulse is important for the reliability of PLC operations. Here, in this paper, an effective impedance measurement scheme is proposed and demonstrated for three PLCs to estimate their susceptibility to an electromagnetic pulse. The equivalent non-uniform transmission line model is established to eliminate the impact of the fixture in the de-embedding process. Then different parameters of the impedance measurement setup are explored. Based on the measured impedance, the equivalent circuit is established to calculate the response of the device when subjected to the electromagnetic pulse. The voltage and current responses of different interfaces are compared utilizing the developed pulsed Current Injection (CI) method. Finally, the impedance measurement scheme is verified through testing using three measuring instruments. And the CI simulation experiments reveal the characteristics and susceptibilities of different PLCs interfaces, indicating that some protection measures are required for the reliable operation of the PLC.

42 ENGINEERING↗

Detecting Payload Attacks on Programmable Logic Controllers (PLCs)

Programmable logic controllers (PLCs) play critical roles in industrial control systems (ICS). Providing hardware peripherals and firmware support for control programs (i.e., a PLC’s “payload”) written in languages such as ladder logic, PLCs directly receive sensor readings and control ICS physical processes. An attacker with access to PLC development software (e.g., by compromising an engineering workstation) can modify the payload program and cause severe physical damages to the ICS. To protect critical ICS infrastructure, we propose to model runtime behaviors of legitimate PLC payload program and use runtime behavior monitoring in PLC firmware to detect payload attacks. By monitoring the I/O access patterns, network access patterns, as well as payload program timing characteristics, our proposed firmware-level detection mechanism can detect abnormal runtime behaviors of malicious PLC payload. Using our proof-of-concept implementation, we evaluate the memory and execution time overhead of implementing our proposed method and find that it is feasible to incorporate our method into existing PLC firmware. In addition, our evaluation results show that a wide variety of payload attacks can be effectively detected by our proposed approach. The proposed firmware-level payload attack detection scheme complements existing bumpin- the-wire solutions (e.g., external temporal-logic-based model checkers) in that it can detect payload attacks that violate realtime requirements of ICS operations and does not require any additional apparatus.

42 ENGINEERING↗

Edge Deployed Cyber Security Hardware Architecture for Energy Delivery Systems

At a time of accelerated cyber conflict, an “edge deployed” system will supply sensor based cyber ground truth to live grid models, and under secure command, take complete control of suspected rogue programmable logic controllers (PLCs) to maintain bulk power delivery to chosen critical sites. This hardware solution is purpose built to be agnostic to PLC vendor or protocol with the realization that a widely deployed solution must function with existing devices for rapid adoption by industry. An overview of the situation and how this developed system functions is provided.

42 ENGINEERING↗

Control system devices : architectures and supply channels overview.

This report describes a research project to examine the hardware used in automated control systems like those that control the electric grid. This report provides an overview of the vendors, architectures, and supply channels for a number of control system devices. The research itself represents an attempt to probe more deeply into the area of programmable logic controllers (PLCs) - the specialized digital computers that control individual processes within supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems. The report (1) provides an overview of control system networks and PLC architecture, (2) furnishes profiles for the top eight vendors in the PLC industry, (3) discusses the communications protocols used in different industries, and (4) analyzes the hardware used in several PLC devices. As part of the project, several PLCs were disassembled to identify constituent components. That information will direct the next step of the research, which will greatly increase our understanding of PLC security in both the hardware and software areas. Such an understanding is vital for discerning the potential national security impact of security flaws in these devices, as well as for developing proactive countermeasures.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

StructuredFuzzer: Fuzzing Structured Text-Based Control Logic Applications

Rigorous testing methods are essential for ensuring the security and reliability of industrial controller software. Fuzzing, a technique that automatically discovers software bugs, has also proven effective in finding software vulnerabilities. Unsurprisingly, fuzzing has been applied to a wide range of platforms, including programmable logic controllers (PLCs). However, current approaches, such as coverage-guided evolutionary fuzzing implemented in the popular fuzzer American Fuzzy Lop Plus Plus (AFL++), are often inadequate for finding logical errors and bugs in PLC control logic applications. They primarily target generic programming languages like C/C++, Java, and Python, and do not consider the unique characteristics and behaviors of PLCs, which are often programmed using specialized programming languages like Structured Text (ST). Furthermore, these fuzzers are ill suited to deal with complex input structures encapsulated in ST, as they are not specifically designed to generate appropriate input sequences. This renders the application of traditional fuzzing techniques less efficient on these platforms. To address this issue, this paper presents a fuzzing framework designed explicitly for PLC software to discover logic bugs in applications written in ST specified by the IEC 61131-3 standard. The proposed framework incorporates a custom-tailored PLC runtime and a fuzzer designed for the purpose. We demonstrate its effectiveness by fuzzing a collection of ST programs that were crafted for evaluation purposes. We compare the performance against a popular fuzzer, namely, AFL++. The proposed fuzzing framework demonstrated its capabilities in our experiments, successfully detecting logic bugs in the tested PLC control logic applications written in ST. On average, it was at least 83 times faster than AFL++, and in certain cases, for example, it was more than 23,000 times faster.

47 OTHER INSTRUMENTATION↗

WeaselBoard :

Critical infrastructures, such as electrical power plants and oil refineries, rely on programmable logic controllers (PLCs) to control essential processes. State of the art security cannot detect attacks on PLCs at the hardware or firmware level. This renders critical infrastructure control systems vulnerable to costly and dangerous attacks. WeaselBoard is a PLC backplane analysis system that connects directly to the PLC backplane to capture backplane communications between modules. WeaselBoard forwards inter-module traffic to an external analysis system that detects changes to process control settings, sensor values, module configuration information, firmware updates, and process control program (logic) updates. WeaselBoard provides zero-day exploit detection for PLCs by detecting changes in the PLC and the process. This approach to PLC monitoring is protected under U.S. Patent Application 13/947,887.

Mulder, John C.↗

Attacking the IEC-61131 Logic Engine in Programmable Logic Controllers in Industrial Control Systems

In industrial control systems (ICS), programmable logic controllers (PLCs) directly monitor and control a physical process such as nuclear power plants, gas pipelines, and water treatment. They are equipped with a control logic written in IEC-61131 languages (e.g., ladder logic and structured text) that defines how a PLC should control a physical process. A PLC's control logic is a usual target of a cyberattack to sabotage a physical process. For instance, Stuxnet targets a control logic of a Siemens S7-300 PLC to damage a nuclear facility's centrifuges. The existing attacks in the literature generally focus only on injecting malicious control logic into a PLC. This paper presents a new dimension of control logic attacks that target the control logic engine (responsible for running a control logic) of a PLC. It demonstrates that a cyberattack can disable the control logic engine successfully by exploiting inherent PLC features such as program mode and starting/stopping engine. We develop two novel case studies on control logic engine attacks by employing the MITRE ATT\&CK knowledge base on the real-world PLCs used in industry settings, i.e., 1) Schweitzer Engineering Laboratory (SEL)'s Real-Time Automation Controller (SEL-3505 RTAC) equipped with security features such as encrypted traffic and device-level access control, and 2) traditional PLCs, i.e., Schneider Electric's Modicon M221, Allen-Bradley's MicroLogix 1400 and 1100 that do not have security features. The case studies present the internals of the logic engine attacks and facilitate the ICS research community and industry to understand the attack vectors on the control logic engine. We evaluate the effectiveness of the control engine attacks on a power substation, a 4-floor elevator, and a conveyor belt to demonstrate their real-world impact of halting a physical process.

Ali qasim, Syed↗