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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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At least 55 records · Page 3
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2023

Gridtrust: Electricity Grid Root-of-Trust Decentralized Supply Chain Cyber-Security (Final Scientific/Technical Report)

GridTrust represents a departure from reliance on a single organization or a single person to multiple organizations and therefore multiple people across organizational structures. The motivating idea behind involving multiple organizations is the increase in security due to human factors. More specifically, the requirement that distinct people in different organizations sign off on a change or an update makes a cyberattack much less likely due to the inherent requirement that both organizations be penetrated and fooled. GridTrust focuses on the software update process as the primary exemplar for the research and development work. A novel hardware-based technology referred to as a Physical Unclonable Function (PUF) provides a microchip Root-of-Trust (RoT), i.e., a starting point for verifying that the hardware being communicated with is the hardware the control center believes the hardware to be. As a result, staff at power grid control centers can ensure the accurate and reliable identification of hardware devices from the outset. The GridTrust protocol introduces two key innovations, as detailed in this report. Firstly, the utilization of a PUF as a root-of-trust in the initial phase of a software or firmware update. Secondly, the application of multiple cryptographic signatures from two or more organizations to the update binary. These signatures are verified before implementing the update on a power grid device in the field. In terms of GridTrust hardware design, this report outlines two main components. The first is the GridTrust Native Device, integrating PUF technology intrinsically into the hardware device itself. The second is the GridTrust Interfacing Device, which incorporates PUF technology and multiple cryptographic signatures. These signatures are cross-checked within a separate hardware positioned between the power grid control center and the legacy power grid device, functioning as an intermediary. While the GridTrust Interfacing Device offers the advantage of being applicable to existing power grid equipment, it may have reduced security if the intermediary component is targeted. On the other hand, the GridTrust Native Device boasts increased security due to protocol integration within a unified form factor. The effectiveness of GridTrust technology has been extensively demonstrated, with multiple external red-team attackers unable to breach GridTrust's security measures. This was observed both in controlled laboratory settings during Phase 1 of the project and in real-world conditions within a City of Marietta substation during Phase 2 of the project.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
DOE OSTI2024

Reproducible emission from nonlinear random lasers

Multiple scattering of light serves as a mechanism for feedback in random lasers. Consequently, internal spatial mode patterns, lasing wavelengths, and output directionality can all be random. Strong mode interaction can occur in such devices due to spatially overlapping modes resulting in nonlinearity with respect to the pump input power. Nevertheless, temporal coherence and lasing mode amplitude can be fixed at a constant pumping rate. This is a property desirable for applications where unique randomness is exploited but expected to be reliable over time, such as physical unclonable functions. Random lasers can also be cheaply and easily fabricated, exhibit relatively low lasing thresholds and high emission intensity. However, the precise scattering properties of such structures and fluctuations in the pump field can make device emission irreproducible, thereby limiting random laser applications. Here, in this work, we directly compare the random lasing spectra from zinc oxide samples fabricated in four distinct ways: spin-coating, sputtering, solgel deposition, and atomic layer deposition. The particular method of fabrication has a strong impact. Samples made through atomic layer deposition here exhibit both reproducibility and strong nonlinearity desirable for applications. Randomness in emission spectra persists across hundreds of repeated and averaged measurements irrespective of spatial location and is demonstrably nonlinear with respect to input signal intensity.

47 OTHER INSTRUMENTATION↗
DOE OSTI2015

SRAM-Based Digital Arbiter PUF

The increased use of Field Programmable Gate Arrays (FPGAs) in critical systems brings new challenges in securing the diversely programmable fabric from cyber-attacks. FPGAs are an inexpensive, efficient, and flexible alternative to Application Specific Integrated Circuits (ASICs), which are becoming increasingly expensive and impractical for low volume manufacturing as technology nodes continue to shrink. Unfortunately, FPGAs are not designed for high security applications, and their high-flexibility lends itself to low security and vulnerability to malicious attacks. Similar to securing an ASIC’s functionality, FPGA programmers can exploit the inherent randomness introduced into hardware structures during fabrication for security applications. Physically Unclonable Functions (PUFs) are one such solution that uses the die specific variability in hardware fabrication for both secret key generation and verification. PUFs strive to be random, unique, and reliable. Throughout recent years many PUF structures have been presented to try and maximize these three design constraints, reliability being the most difficult of the three to achieve. This thesis presents a new PUF structure that combines two elementary PUF concepts (a bi-stable SRAM PUF and a delay-based arbiter PUF) to create a PUF with increased reliability, while maintaining both random and unique qualities. Properties of the new PUF will be discussed as well as the various design modifications that can be made to tweak the desired performance and overhead.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
DOE OSTI2013

Hardware device to physical structure binding and authentication

Detection and deterrence of device tampering and subversion may be achieved by including a cryptographic fingerprint unit within a hardware device for authenticating a binding of the hardware device and a physical structure. The cryptographic fingerprint unit includes an internal physically unclonable function ("PUF") circuit disposed in or on the hardware device, which generate an internal PUF value. Binding logic is coupled to receive the internal PUF value, as well as an external PUF value associated with the physical structure, and generates a binding PUF value, which represents the binding of the hardware device and the physical structure. The cryptographic fingerprint unit also includes a cryptographic unit that uses the binding PUF value to allow a challenger to authenticate the binding.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
DOE OSTI2022

Secure Firmware Update and Device Authentication for Smart Inverters using Blockchain and Physically Uncloable Function (PUF)-Embedded Security Module

Cybersecurity of inverters has been significantly important as inverters become smarter in cyber-physical environments. However, firmware security of smart inverters against firmware attacks from various attack vectors has been less studied. Furthermore, this paper proposes a secure firmware update and device authentication method using a blockchain-based public key infrastructure (PKI) management system and a physically unclonable function (PUF)-embedded security module in a smart inverter. The proposed method is validated by experiments.

blockchain↗
DOE OSTI2014

Sensor Authentication in Collaborating Sensor Networks

In this thesis, we address a new security problem in the realm of collaborating sensor networks. By collaborating sensor networks, we refer to the networks of sensor networks collaborating on a mission, with each sensor network is independently owned and operated by separate entities. Such networks are practical where a number of independent entities can deploy their own sensor networks in multi-national, commercial, and environmental scenarios, and some of these networks will integrate complementary functionalities for a mission. In the scenario, we address an authentication problem wherein the goal is for the Operator O i of Sensor Network S i to correctly determine the number of active sensors in Network Si. Such a problem is challenging in collaborating sensor networks where other sensor networks, despite showing an intent to collaborate, may not be completely trustworthy and could compromise the authentication process. We propose two authentication protocols to address this problem. Our protocols rely on Physically Unclonable Functions, which are a hardware based authentication primitive exploiting inherent randomness in circuit fabrication. Our protocols are light-weight, energy efficient, and highly secure against a number of attacks. To the best of our knowledge, ours is the first to addresses a practical security problem in collaborating sensor networks.

42 ENGINEERING↗
DOE OSTI2021

High-resolution magnetic microscopy applications using nitrogen-vacancy centers in diamond

Magnetic microscopy with high spatial resolution helps to solve a variety of technical problems in condensed-matter physics, electrical engineering, biomagnetism, and geomagnetism. In this work we used quantum diamond magnetic microscope (QDMM) setups, which use a dense uniform layer of magnetically-sensitive nitrogen-vacancy (NV) centers in diamond to image an external magnetic field using a fluorescence microscope. We used this technique for imaging few-micron ferromagnetic needles used as a physically unclonable function (PUF) and to passively interrogate electric current paths in a commercial 555 timer integrated circuit (IC). As part of the QDMM development, we also found a way to calculate ion implantation recipes to create diamond samples with dense uniform NV layers at the surface. This work opens the possibility for follow-up experiments with 2D magnetic materials, ion implantation, and electronics characterization and troubleshooting.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗
DOE OSTI2019

Arms Control Opportunities for Inherently Safe and Secure Nuclear Command, Control, and Communications

The Department of Defense Science Board has stated that the United States is "not prepared to defend againsr cyber-attacks and that the military could lose "trust in the information and ability to control U.S. systems and forces [including nuclear forces]." One potential weak spot in cyber-security is storing encryption keys in computer memory. This paper explores the use of hardware devices (so-called Physical Unclonable Functions, or PUFs) to generate, in the nuclear weapon itself, unique encryption keys each time they are needed. Not only do we find that this has the potential to mitigate a number of cyberthreats, but such hardware has the potential to greatly diminish the total uncertainty associated with radiation-based warhead authentication procedures; a procedure many analysts feel will be key to future arms control regimes. After outline the use of PUFs in nuclear command, control, and communications--and indicating some of the areas that still require further research--we discuss their application to arms control and warhead authentication

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2023

Remote inspection of adversary-controlled environments

Remotely monitoring the location and enduring presence of valuable items in adversary-controlled environments presents significant challenges. In this article, we demonstrate a monitoring approach that leverages the gigahertz radio-wave scattering and absorption of a room and its contents, including a set of mirrors with random orientations placed inside, to remotely verify the absence of any disturbance over time. Our technique extends to large physical systems the application of physical unclonable functions for integrity protection. Its main applications are scenarios where parties are mutually distrustful and have privacy and security constraints. Examples range from the verification of nuclear arms-control treaties to the securing of currency, artwork, or data centers.

47 OTHER INSTRUMENTATION↗
DOE OSTI2024

Tunable stochastic memristors for energy-efficient encryption and computing

Information security and computing, two critical technological challenges for post-digital computation, pose opposing requirements – security (encryption) requires a source of unpredictability, while computing generally requires predictability. Each of these contrasting requirements presently necessitates distinct conventional Si-based hardware units with power-hungry overheads. This work demonstrates Cu 0.3 Te 0.7 /HfO 2 (‘CuTeHO’) ion-migration-driven memristors that satisfy the contrasting requirements. Under specific operating biases, CuTeHO memristors generate truly random and physically unclonable functions, while under other biases, they perform universal Boolean logic. Using these computing primitives, this work experimentally demonstrates a single system that performs cryptographic key generation, universal Boolean logic operations, and encryption/decryption. Circuit-based calculations reveal the energy and latency advantages of the CuTeHO memristors in these operations. This work illustrates the functional flexibility of memristors in implementing operations with varying component-level requirements.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
DOE OSTI2014

Sandia PUF Analysis Tool

This program is a graphical user interface for measuring and performing inter-active analysis of physical unclonable functions (PUFs). It is intended for demonstration and education purposes. See license.txt for license details. The program features a PUF visualization that demonstrates how signatures differ between PUFs and how they exhibit noise over repeated measurements. A similarity scoreboard shows the user how close the current measurement is to the closest chip signatures in the database. Other metrics such as average noise and inter-chip Hamming distances are presented to the user. Randomness tests published in NIST SP 800-22 can be computed and displayed. Noise and inter-chip histograms for the sample of PUFs and repeated PUF measurements can be drawn.

Source record↗
DOE OSTI2014

Hardware device binding and mutual authentication

Detection and deterrence of device tampering and subversion by substitution may be achieved by including a cryptographic unit within a computing device for binding multiple hardware devices and mutually authenticating the devices. The cryptographic unit includes a physically unclonable function ("PUF") circuit disposed in or on the hardware device, which generates a binding PUF value. The cryptographic unit uses the binding PUF value during an enrollment phase and subsequent authentication phases. During a subsequent authentication phase, the cryptographic unit uses the binding PUF values of the multiple hardware devices to generate a challenge to send to the other device, and to verify a challenge received from the other device to mutually authenticate the hardware devices.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
DOE OSTI2014

Deterrence of device counterfeiting, cloning, and subversion by substitution using hardware fingerprinting

Deterrence of device subversion by substitution may be achieved by including a cryptographic fingerprint unit within a computing device for authenticating a hardware platform of the computing device. The cryptographic fingerprint unit includes a physically unclonable function ("PUF") circuit disposed in or on the hardware platform. The PUF circuit is used to generate a PUF value. A key generator is coupled to generate a private key and a public key based on the PUF value while a decryptor is coupled to receive an authentication challenge posed to the computing device and encrypted with the public key and coupled to output a response to the authentication challenge decrypted with the private key.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
DOE OSTI2014

Multi-factor authentication

Detection and deterrence of spoofing of user authentication may be achieved by including a cryptographic fingerprint unit within a hardware device for authenticating a user of the hardware device. The cryptographic fingerprint unit includes an internal physically unclonable function ("PUF") circuit disposed in or on the hardware device, which generates a PUF value. Combining logic is coupled to receive the PUF value, combines the PUF value with one or more other authentication factors to generate a multi-factor authentication value. A key generator is coupled to generate a private key and a public key based on the multi-factor authentication value while a decryptor is coupled to receive an authentication challenge posed to the hardware device and encrypted with the public key and coupled to output a response to the authentication challenge decrypted with the private key.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
DOE OSTI2014

Sandia PUF Analysis Tool

This program is a graphical user interface for measuring and performing inter-active analysis of physical unclonable functions (PUFs). It is intended for demonstration and education purposes. See license.txt for license details. The program features a PUF visualization that demonstrates how signatures differ between PUFs and how they exhibit noise over repeated measurements. A similarity scoreboard shows the user how close the current measurement is to the closest chip signatures in the database. Other metrics such as average noise and inter-chip Hamming distances are presented to the user. Randomness tests published in NIST SP 800-22 can be computed and displayed. Noise and inter-chip histograms for the sample of PUFs and repeated PUF measurements can be drawn.

Source record↗
DOE OSTI2018

Secure true random number generation using 1.5-T transistor flash memory

This disclosure relates generally to physically unclonable function (PUF) circuitry along with methods of generating numbers. In one embodiment, the PUF circuitry includes a memory, a memory control circuitry, and whitening circuitry. To reduce or eliminate the systematic bias from the array, whitening circuitry is configured to generate a random number comprising random number bits in response to the memory control circuit implementing at least one sequence of memory cycles on the array of the memory cells in the memory. The whitening circuitry is configured to provide the random number bits of the random number based on the variable bit states stored by the array of the memory cells. On average the whitening circuitry is configured to provide approximately half of the random number bits in the first bit state and half of random number bits in a second bit state.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
DOE OSTI2019

Repeatable masking of sensitive data

The various technologies presented herein relate to enabling a value generated based upon a physical unclonable function (PUF) response to be available as needed, while also preventing exposure of the PUF to a malicious entity. A masked PUF response can be generated based upon applying a function to a combination of the PUF response and a data file (e.g., a bitstream), and the masked PUF response is forwarded to a requesting entity, rather than the PUF response. Hence, the PUF is masked from any entity requiring access to the PUF. The PUF can be located in a FPGA, wherein the data file is a bitstream pertinent to one or more configurable logic blocks included in the FPGA. A first masked PUF response generated with a first data file can have a different value to a second masked PUF response generated with a second data file.

Hamlet, Jason↗
DOE OSTI2023

Micromagnet PUF readout using a quantum diamond microscope

A physically unclonable function (PUF) and a method of reading it are provided. The PUF is constituted by a microfabricated array of randomly polarized micromagnets disposed on a substrate. The PUF can be read by creating a magnetization map of the PUF from the signal output of a quantum diamond microscope (QDM) and converting the magnetization map to a numerical sequence.

Kehayias, Pauli Mark↗