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1. Physical Security Engineering by Design for Nuclear Facilities; 2. Nuclear Power Plant Site Security Management – A Security Strategy; 3. The UAE Women in Nuclear Energy Security

1. Security by design, or SeBD, is a comprehensive approach that integrates the physical protection system of a nuclear plant into every stage of its existence. This includes planning, designing, constructing, commissioning, and operating the facility, using a combination of analytical, physical, technological, and procedural measures. Essentially, SeBD involves intentionally applying and incorporating security into all aspects of design and operation throughout the entire lifecycle of a facility. By implementing this methodology throughout various phases such as program development, process implementation, staff training and procedures management in conjunction with plant equipment, facilities can be optimized to minimize security risks without compromising functional design requirements. This ultimately improves the overall security posture of the site and reduces the need for costly modifications or additional security resources post-design. 2. A site security strategy is a living document that is revised on a periodic or event-driven basis, ensuring that site security operations and corresponding procedures provide long-term, effective protection for the entire nuclear power plant (NPP) site. A site security strategy aims to mitigate threats across the entire NPP site via in-depth defense approaches and mutual support; therefore, if a layer is omitted or altered, then the effect across all layers must be re-evaluated. Therefore, the aim of the site security strategy is to provide an appropriate, scalable security regime that deters, denies, delays, and detects incidents and, equally importantly, reassures legitimate users and the regulator that due diligence and regulatory compliance have been achieved, ensuring that the site is safe and secure. Robust access control for vehicles and pedestrians is at the heart of the strategy. Vehicle and pedestrian searching and screening are seen as the strongest mitigation methods against vehicle- and pedestrian-borne attacks. The security strategy must also be supported through comprehensive staff training and the development of robust processes, procedures, and planning. If all these measures are to be effective, then training must be implemented during each phase of construction, partial operation/commissioning, and full operation. No single element of site security is completely isolated from the influence of other elements. Ideally, consideration of all key elements will result in a security strategy that is integrated and proportional to the threat and that does not over specify individual security solutions through the application of isolated measures but rather applies a holistic, all-encompassing approach. 3. When women enter the labor force, numerous positive outcomes emerge, including increased GDP, educational gains, and decreased maternal mortality. Despite these benefits, women's employment rates and equality vary significantly worldwide as does support for women in the workforce. This paper will explore the multifaceted benefits of women's employment, the factors influencing labor force participation rates, and the urgency to achieve gender equality as outlined in the 2015 United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). It will then examine the emerging presence of women in the traditionally male-dominated nuclear field, specifically within the United Arab Emirates (UAE) as a testament to their resilience and determination to break social norms and advance gender equality.

Zineddin, Dr. Z.↗

Nuclear Power Plant Physical Protection Recommendation Document

This document is aimed at providing guidance to the National Nuclear Security Administration’s (NNSA) Office of International Nuclear Security’s (INS) country and regional teams for implementing effective physical protection systems (PPSs) for nuclear power plants (NPPs) to prevent the radiological consequences of sabotage. This recommendation document includes input from the Physical Protection Functional Team (PPFT), the Response Functional Team (RFT), and the Sabotage Functional Team (SFT) under INS. Specifically, this document provides insights into increasing and sustaining physical protection capabilities at INS partner countries’ NPP sites. Nuclear power plants should consider that the intent of this document is to provide a historical context as well as technologies and methodologies that may be applied to improve physical protection capabilities. It also refers to relevant guidance from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC).

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Advanced Control and Protection system Design Methods for Modular HTGRs

The project supported the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) in identifying and evaluating the regulatory implications concerning the control and protection systems proposed for use in the Department of Energy's (DOE) Next-Generation Nuclear Plant (NGNP). The NGNP, using modular high-temperature gas-cooled reactor (HTGR) technology, is to provide commercial industries with electricity and high-temperature process heat for industrial processes such as hydrogen production. Process heat temperatures range from 700 to 950 C, and for the upper range of these operation temperatures, the modular HTGR is sometimes referred to as the Very High Temperature Reactor or VHTR. Initial NGNP designs are for operation in the lower temperature range. The defining safety characteristic of the modular HTGR is that its primary defense against serious accidents is to be achieved through its inherent properties of the fuel and core. Because of its strong negative temperature coefficient of reactivity and the capability of the fuel to withstand high temperatures, fast-acting active safety systems or prompt operator actions should not be required to prevent significant fuel failure and fission product release. The plant is designed such that its inherent features should provide adequate protection despite operational errors or equipment failure. Figure 1 shows an example modular HTGR layout (prismatic core version), where its inlet coolant enters the reactor vessel at the bottom, traversing up the sides to the top plenum, down-flow through an annular core, and exiting from the lower plenum (hot duct). This research provided NRC staff with (a) insights and knowledge about the control and protection systems for the NGNP and VHTR, (b) information on the technologies/approaches under consideration for use in the reactor and process heat applications, (c) guidelines for the design of highly integrated control rooms, (d) consideration for modeling of control and protection system designs for VHTR, and (e) input for developing the bases for possible new regulatory guidance to assist in the review of an NGNP license application. This NRC project also evaluated reactor and process heat application plant simulation models employed in the protection and control system designs for various plant operational modes and accidents, including providing information about the models themselves, and the appropriateness of the application of the models for control and protection system studies. A companion project for the NRC focused on the potential for new instrumentation that would be unique to modular HTGRs, as compared to light-water reactors (LWRs), due to both the higher temperature ranges and the inherent safety features.

08 HYDROGEN↗

The Ural Electrochemical Integrated Plant Sustainability Program of Nuclear Material Protection, Control and Accounting System Upgrades

UEIP has been working on a comprehensive sustainability program that includes establishing a site sustainability working group, information gathering, planning, organizing, developing schedule and estimated costs, trhough joint UEIP-US DOE/NNSA National Laboratory sustainability contracts. Considerable efforts have been necessary in the sustainability planning, monitoring, and control of the scope of work using tools such as Microsoft Excel, Microsoft Project and SAP R/3. While information interchanges within the sustainability program provides adequate US assurances that US funds are well spent through its quarterly reporting methodology, proper information security and protection measures are taken throughout the process. Decommissioning of outdated equipment has also become part of determining sustainability requirements and processes. The site’s sustainability program has facilitated the development of a transition plan toward eventual full Russian funding of sustaining nuclear security upgrades.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

AP1000{sup R} design robustness against extreme external events - Seismic, flooding, and aircraft crash

Both the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) require existing and new nuclear power plants to conduct plant assessments to demonstrate the unit's ability to withstand external hazards. The events that occurred at the Fukushima-Dai-ichi nuclear power station demonstrated the importance of designing a nuclear power plant with the ability to protect the plant against extreme external hazards. The innovative design of the AP1000{sup R} nuclear power plant provides unparalleled protection against catastrophic external events which can lead to extensive infrastructure damage and place the plant in an extended abnormal situation. The AP1000 plant is an 1100-MWe pressurized water reactor with passive safety features and extensive plant simplifications that enhance construction, operation, maintenance and safety. The plant's compact safety related footprint and protection provided by its robust nuclear island structures prevent significant damage to systems, structures, and components required to safely shutdown the plant and maintain core and spent fuel pool cooling and containment integrity following extreme external events. The AP1000 nuclear power plant has been extensively analyzed and reviewed to demonstrate that it's nuclear island design and plant layout provide protection against both design basis and extreme beyond design basis external hazards such as extreme seismic events, external flooding that exceeds the maximum probable flood limit, and malicious aircraft impact. The AP1000 nuclear power plant uses fail safe passive features to mitigate design basis accidents. The passive safety systems are designed to function without safety-grade support systems (such as AC power, component cooling water, service water, compressed air or HVAC). The plant has been designed to protect systems, structures, and components critical to placing the reactor in a safe shutdown condition within the steel containment vessel which is further surrounded by a substantial 'steel concrete' composite shield building. The containment vessel is not affected by external flooding, and the shield building design provides hazard protection beyond that provided by a comparable reinforced concrete structure. The intent of this paper is to demonstrate the robustness of the AP1000 design against extreme events. The paper will focus on the plants ability to withstand extreme external events such as beyond design basis flooding, seismic events, and malicious aircraft impact. The paper will highlight the robustness of the AP1000 nuclear island design including the protection provided by the unique AP1000 composite shield building. (authors)

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Implications of the 2015 and 2016 Ukrainian electric grid cyber attacks to nuclear power plants - 113

Nuclear plants can be vulnerable from electric grid cyber attacks. In December 2015 and December 2016, cyber attackers attacked the Ukrainian electric grid and 'turned off the lights' by opening substation protective relays. The 2015 cyber attacks targeted electric distribution systems and the 2016 cyber attacks targeted electric transmission systems. In order to accomplish the attacks, the cyber attackers compromised field control system devices to inject malware and then open protective relays in substations. There are some very significant implications to nuclear plant operations from hacking the substations and switchyard breakers that serve nuclear plants. The nuclear plant operational concerns are compromising protective relays to prevent relay protection that would result in damage to large electric equipment; spurious actuation of protective relays causing loss-of-offsite power (LOOP) conditions; and the closing and then reopening of protective relays out-of-phase with the grid causing the Aurora vulnerability damaging generators, Alternating Current (AC) motors, and transformers. All of these protective relay conditions have already occurred in actual or test conditions. The common thread to these scenarios are that switchyard and substation protective relays are out-of-scope of existing nuclear cyber security regulations yet, when compromised, have demonstrated impacts to nuclear plant operations and challenged safety systems. There is one other issue about an attack originating from a protective relay. That is, it would be irrelevant whether the nuclear plant system that would be impacted would have analog or digital instrumentation and control (I and C) systems because the impact is upstream of the I and C. (authors)

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Overview of the preliminary design of the ITER plasma control system

An overview of the Preliminary Design of the ITER Plasma Control System (PCS) is described here, which focusses on the needs for 1st plasma and early plasma operation in hydrogen/helium (H/He) up to a plasma current of 15 MA with moderate auxiliary heating power in low confinement mode (L-mode). Candidate control schemes for basic magnetic control, including divertor operation and kinetic control of the electron density with gas puffing and pellet injection, were developed. Commissioning of the auxiliary heating systems is included as well as support functions for stray field topology and real-time plasma boundary reconstruction. Initial exception handling schemes for faults of essential plant systems and for disruption protection were developed. The PCS architecture was also developed to be capable of handling basic control for early commissioning and the advanced control functions that will be needed for future high performance operation. A plasma control simulator is also being developed to test and validate control schemes. To handle the complexity of the ITER PCS, a systems engineering approach has been adopted with the development of a plasma control database to keep track of all control requirements.

70 PLASMA PHYSICS AND FUSION TECHNOLOGY↗

Evaluation of Battery and Battery Charger Short-Circuit Current Contributions to a Fault on the DC Distribution System at a Nuclear Power Plant

Inherent in designing and maintaining short-circuit protection in a DC distribution system protection is knowing what the contributions are from the station battery and battery charger(s), the major sources of direct current to a fault on the DC distribution system. There is an extensive amount of literature dealing with this subject in the form of industry guidance or standards, journal articles, and test reports. The purpose of this BNL technical report is to review these sources and summarize the information that is relevant to better understanding the expected contributions from batteries and battery chargers in response to a fault on a DC distribution system at a nuclear power plant.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

I&C Modeling in SPAR Models

The Standardized Plant Analysis Risk (SPAR) models for the U.S. commercial nuclear power plants currently have very limited instrumentation and control (I&C) modeling [1]. Most of the I&C components in the operating plant SPAR models are related to the reactor protection system. This was identified as a finding during the industry peer review of SPAR models. While the Emergency Safeguard Features (ESF) actuation and control system was incorporated into the Peach Bottom Unit 2 SPAR model in a recent effort [2], various approaches to expend resources for detailed I&C modeling in other SPAR models are investigated.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Test based reliability assessment method for a safety critical software in reactor protection system - 284

Digitalization of the instrumentation and control systems in nuclear power plant entails some new features which do not exist in analog systems. When the new features are applied in safety critical systems, the risk stemming from them should be quantified properly to assure the reliability of the entire power plant. Among the new features, software is considered as the most important factor because it can cause common cause failure to many redundant systems. Therefore, in this work, a test based reliability assessment method for a safety-critical software is developed. An output of a software is determined by not only inputs but also the internal state of the software at the time. In the case of safety critical software developed for usage in nuclear power plant, it is possible to directly investigate probable internal states thanks to detailed design specification and programing features, and the probable inputs also can be identified based on the physical linearity of each process parameter and hardware characteristics related to data acquisition. In this work, a development method for practical exhaustive test case consisting of investigation of internal state and probable input sets to a specific internal state are suggested. In addition to this, software logic simulator for execution of software logic test and the reliability quantification method based on the test result are developed. The feasibility of the suggested method is demonstrated via a case study. (authors)

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Reducing the Overnight Capital Cost of Advanced Reactors Using Equipment-Level Seismic Protective Systems

Consideration of the effects of earthquake shaking on the design and construction of nuclear power plants adds substantially to the overnight capital cost, with anecdotal estimates as high as 35+%, attributed to additional construction materials, need for one-off and sub-optimal designs of equipment due to conflicting design choices, the high cost of seismic qualification of equipment, and regulatory review. Safety-critical equipment in large light water reactors is designed and qualified for seismic demands imposed by the supporting reactor building, optimal mechanical designs are not possible, and designs of a given piece of equipment may vary with height above grade. Similar negative impacts are expected for advanced reactors unless the seismic design paradigm is changed. The overarching goal of this transformational MEITNER project, which involved a multidisciplinary engineering team and designers of three fundamentally different advanced reactors, was to adapt proven seismic isolation and damping technologies to operationalize modular protective systems for safety-class equipment inside advanced reactor buildings. Such seismic protective systems would be tightly integrated into design development for reactor support systems and balance-of-plant construction. The adoption of the technology, which is widely used in non-nuclear sectors, would simplify plant design, enable the use of standardized equipment and buildings, optimized for operational performance, and reduce plant size and weight. The need for site-specific equipment would be eliminated, enabling identical equipment to be used across multiple plants sited across the US and economies of scale, and catalyzing new interest and investment. The equipment-based protective systems would allow siting of advanced reactors in regions of high seismic hazard.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Improving nuclear power plant safety and operating margins through linear quadratic estimation - 290

Redundant measurement, trip, and actuation channels are required for reactor trips and engineered safety systems in nuclear power plants. There are three or four independent channels in existing plants, depending on the system. To prevent failures, consistent signals from any two channels together can trip the reactor or actuate safety systems. Measurements associated with safety trips and actuations include uncertainties related to the instruments making the measurements and to process conditions. Margins that include measurement uncertainties are set for each trip and actuation channel as though it were the only one taking action, thus preserving independence. There are sensors, however, that provide partially redundant information that could be used to decrease the uncertainty associated with measurements of plant conditions, while maintaining the three-channel redundancy important to plant safety. Reducing these uncertainties would both improve plant safety by providing more accurate knowledge of plant conditions and improve the operating margins that must take such uncertainties into account. This paper demonstrates how information that is already available to plant instrumentation and control systems and is already redundant can be used through software routines to reduce the error that must be taken into account in reactor trip and safety system actuation setpoints. Issues that would have to be addressed related to standards, licensing, and implementation are also discussed. (authors)

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

An Approach for Assessing Consequences of Potential Supply Chain and Insider Contributed Cyber Attacks on Nuclear Power Plants

The Stuxnet attack at the Natanz facility is an example of a targeted and successful cyber attack on a nuclear facility. Snowden's release of National Security Agency documents demonstrated the consequences of the insider threat. More recently, the United States tried to attack North Korea but failed, South Korea was attempting to attack North Korea, and both applied Stuxnet-like approaches. These sophisticated targeted attacks differ from web-site hacking events that are reported almost daily in the news mainly because targeted attacks require detailed design and operation information of the systems attacked and/or are often carried out by insiders. For instance, in order to minimize disruption of facilities around the world, Stuxnet remained idle until it recognized the specific configuration of the Natanz facility, demonstrating that the attackers possessed extremely detailed information about the facility. Such targeted cyber attacks could become a national-level military weapon and be used in coercion of hostile countries. While U.S. nuclear power plants (NPPs) are well designed and protected and not easily attacked through internet hacking, there have been a few digital-system-related incidents. For example, in 2003, the Slammer worm breached the private network of the Davis Besse plant and disabled a safety monitoring system for almost five hours. The breach did not pose a safety hazard because the plant was offline, but it demonstrates the vulnerability of NPP systems. The worm did not enter the plant systems directly; it began by entering the systems of a Davis Besse contractor, and entered through the T1 line bridging the contractor's computer and Davis Besse's corporate networks. The T1 line was not protected by the plant's firewall. The success of the Stuxnet-Natanz case demonstrates that supply-chain level attack (i.e., physically tampering with digital systems to install undetectable malware for the purpose of bringing harm to a player further down the supply chain network) plays a crucial role in a successful attack. Although attacking an NPP naturally requires more complex strategies and tactics than internet hacking, NPP's have a variety of sophisticated and possibly sensitive systems that may be attacked. Previous studies, for example, Baylon, have identified and confirmed that such attack strategies and tactics can be designed and could produce severe damage to an NPP. Current NPPs were designed according to design basis accidents that predate use of the internet by the general public and did not take into consideration potential cyber attacks that could be carried out by state-sponsored attackers and malicious insiders. To date, no detailed engineering analysis has been performed to realistically examine the consequences these attacks may have on the plants. In this paper, we discuss an approach for assessing the potential consequences of Stuxnet type of attacks. We will examine the engineering criteria used in designing the plants, develop possible attack scenarios in terms of the structures, components, and systems (SSCs) being controlled by digital systems at the NPPs, perform engineering analysis to determine if the attacks would impose conditions that are beyond design bases, and categorize the consequences of the potential accidents. (authors)

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Nuclear Power Plant Simulation and Cybersecurity

Critical infrastructure protection is vital to the day-to-day operation of any country, and those systems need to be protected to the fullest extent possible. As with what was seen in Ukraine in late 2016, with the cyber attack on the power grid, these systems are susceptible to attacks that can cause serious damage, both physically and economically. This incident shut down the power grid for 6 hours, with nearly 80,000 people affected. Cyber security can be referred to as the protection of data and systems in networks, both wired and wireless, from unauthorized access or attack. In nuclear power plants, assessments of cyber security are critical to ensuring the safe and reliable operation of the systems used. According to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), the purpose of cyber security assessments is to detect and then eliminate or mitigate vulnerabilities in the digital system that could be exploited either from outside or inside the digital system protected area. These cyber security assessments are essentially intended to reduce cyber security risk. The NRC refers to cyber security risk as the combination of the consequence to the nuclear power plant and the susceptibility of a digital system to internal and external cyber attack.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Differential antioxidant defense and detoxification mechanisms in photodynamically stressed rice plants treated with the deregulators of porphyrin biosynthesis, 5-aminolevulinic acid and oxyfluorfen

This study focuses on differential molecular mechanisms of antioxidant and detoxification systems in rice plants under two different types of photodynamic stress imposed by porphyrin deregulators, 5-aminolevulinic acid (ALA) and oxyfluorfen (OF). The ALA-treated plants with white necrosis exhibited a greater decrease in photochemical quantum efficiency, F{sub v}/F{sub m}, as well as a greater increase in activity of superoxide dismutase, compared to the OF-treated plants. By contrast, the brown necrosis in OF-treated plants resulted in not only more widely dispersed H{sub 2}O{sub 2} production and greater increases in H{sub 2}O{sub 2}-decomposing enzymes, catalase and peroxidase, but also lower ascorbate redox state. In addition, ALA- and OF-treated plants markedly up-regulated transcript levels of genes involved in detoxification processes including transport and movement, cellular homeostasis, and xenobiotic conjugation, with prominent up-regulation of serine/threonine kinase and chaperone only in ALA-treated plants. Our results demonstrate that different photodynamic stress imposed by ALA and OF developed differential actions of antioxidant enzymes and detoxification. Particularly, detoxification system may play potential roles in plant protection against photodynamic stress imposed by porphyrin deregulators, thereby contributing to alleviation of photodynamic damage. - Highlights: • We employ two different types of photodynamic stress, white and brown necrosis. • We examine molecular mechanisms of antioxidative and detoxification systems. • ALA and OF develop differential actions of antioxidant and detoxification systems. • Coordinated mechanism of antioxidants and detoxification works against toxic ROS. • Detoxification system plays critical roles in protection against photodynamic stress.

60 APPLIED LIFE SCIENCES↗

Development and application of FPGA-based logic controller - 357

The control systems of nuclear power plants contain many components which are becoming obsolete at an increasing rate. Nowadays maintenance for analog-based protection systems may be difficult as analog parts become obsolete or hard to obtain. Various studies have been conducted to address this control system hardware obsolescence issue. Those control systems of nuclear power plants have been replaced with modern digital control systems such as the programmable logic controller (PLC) and the distributed control system (DCS). The central processing unit (CPU)- based platforms such as the PLC and the DCS require an operating system (OS) and application software, and thus they might result in a common-cause failure when a problem occurs in the operating system or application software. The field programmable gate array (FPGA) is highlighted as an alternative to the conventional protection or control systems. This paper presents the development of an FPGA-based logic controller (FLC) and a diverse protection system (DPS) with the FLC platform. Protection functions for the DPS were implemented in FPGAs without any CPU or OS. (authors)

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Secure Data Logging and Processing with Blockchain and Machine Learning (Final Report)

Secure Data Logging and Processing with Blockchain and Machine Learning (ML) research is focused on the development of a platform to securely log and process sensor data in fossil power plants. The platform integrates two emerging technologies, blockchain and ML, and incorporates several innovative mechanisms to ensure the integrity, reliability, and resiliency of power systems. The goal is to protect the power plant from various cyberattacks such as false data injection and denial of service attacks using these technologies. The research goal was enabled by the following Research Project Objectives: 1) Secure authentication and identity verification of sensor nodes, actuators, and other equipment within a network. 2) Development of mechanisms that ensure only data sent by legitimate sensors are accepted and stored in the data repository. 3) Development of data aggregation methodologies using ML / Deep Learning (DL) algorithms to minimize noise / faulty data. 4) Implementation of the blockchain technologies to provide data security using secured IOTA framework & nodes.

20 FOSSIL-FUELED POWER PLANTS↗