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NASA NTRS2002

Research on Intelligent Synthesis Environment

The ultimate goal of this research project is to develop a methodology for the assessment and continuous improvement of engineering team effectiveness in distributed collaborative environments. This review provides the theoretical foundation upon which subsequent empirical work will be based. Our review of the team performance literature has identified the following 12 conceptually distinct team interaction processes as characteristic of effective teams. 1) Mission Analysis; 2) Resource Distribution; 3) Leadership; 4) Timing; 5) Intra-team Feedback; 6) Motivational Functions; 7) Team Orientation; 8) Communication; 9) Coordination; 10) Mutual Performance Monitoring; 11) Back-up Behaviors; and 12) Cooperation. In addition, this review summarizes how team task characteristics (i.e., task type, task complexity, motivation, and temporal changes), team characteristics (i.e., team structure and team knowledge), and individual team member characteristics (i.e., dispositions and teamwork knowledge, skills, and abilities) affect team interaction processes, determine the relevance of these processes, and influence team performance. The costs and benefits of distributed team collaboration are also considered. The review concludes with a brief discussion of the nature of collaborative team engineering tasks.

Loftin, R. Bowen↗

NASA NTRS2010

NASA Tech Briefs, March 2010

Topics covered include: Software Tool Integrating Data Flow Diagrams and Petri Nets; Adaptive Nulling for Interferometric Detection of Planets; Reducing the Volume of NASA Earth-Science Data; Reception of Multiple Telemetry Signals via One Dish Antenna; Space-Qualified Traveling-Wave Tube; Smart Power Supply for Battery-Powered Systems; Parallel Processing of Broad-Band PPM Signals; Inexpensive Implementation of Many Strain Gauges; Constant-Differential-Pressure Two-Fluid Accumulator; Inflatable Tubular Structures Rigidized with Foams; Power Generator with Thermo-Differential Modules; Mechanical Extraction of Power From Ocean Currents and Tides; Nitrous Oxide/Paraffin Hybrid Rocket Engines; Optimized Li-Ion Electrolytes Containing Fluorinated Ester Co-Solvents; Probabilistic Multi-Factor Interaction Model for Complex Material Behavior; Foldable Instrumented Bits for Ultrasonic/Sonic Penetrators; Compact Rare Earth Emitter Hollow Cathode; High-Precision Shape Control of In-Space Deployable Large Membrane/Thin-Shell Reflectors; Rapid Active Sampling Package; Miniature Lightweight Ion Pump; Cryogenic Transport of High-Pressure-System Recharge Gas; Water-Vapor Raman Lidar System Reaches Higher Altitude; Compact Ku-Band T/R Module for High-Resolution Radar Imaging of Cold Land Processes; Wide-Field-of-View, High-Resolution, Stereoscopic Imager; Electrical Capacitance Volume Tomography with High-Contrast Dielectrics; Wavefront Control and Image Restoration with Less Computing; Polarization Imaging Apparatus; Stereoscopic Machine-Vision System Using Projected Circles; Metal Vapor Arcing Risk Assessment Tool; Performance Bounds on Two Concatenated, Interleaved Codes; Parameterizing Coefficients of a POD-Based Dynamical System; Confidence-Based Feature Acquisition; Algorithm for Lossless Compression of Calibrated Hyperspectral Imagery; Universal Decoder for PPM of any Order; Algorithm for Stabilizing a POD-Based Dynamical System; Mission Reliability Estimation for Repairable Robot Teams; Processing AIRS Scientific Data Through Level 3; Web-Based Requesting and Scheduling Use of Facilities; AutoGen Version 5.0; Time-Tag Generation Script; PPM Receiver Implemented in Software; Tropospheric Emission Spectrometer Product File Readers; Reporting Differences Between Spacecraft Sequence Files; Coordinating "Execute" Data for ISS and Space Shuttle; Database for Safety-Oriented Tracking of Chemicals; Apparatus for Cold, Pressurized Biogeochemical Experiments; Growing B Lymphocytes in a Three-Dimensional Culture System; Tissue-like 3D Assemblies of Human Broncho-Epithelial Cells; Isolation of Resistance-Bearing Microorganisms; Oscillating Cell Culture Bioreactor; and Liquid Cooling/Warming Garment.

Source record↗

NASA NTRS2013

MPST Software: grl_pef_check

This innovation is a tool used to verify and validate spacecraft sequences at the predicted events file (PEF) level for the GRAIL (Gravity Recovery and Interior Laboratory, see http://www.nasa. gov/mission_pages/grail/main/index. html) mission as part of the Multi-Mission Planning and Sequencing Team (MPST) operations process to reduce the possibility for errors. This tool is used to catch any sequence related errors or issues immediately after the seqgen modeling to streamline downstream processes. This script verifies and validates the seqgen modeling for the GRAIL MPST process. A PEF is provided as input, and dozens of checks are performed on it to verify and validate the command products including command content, command ordering, flight-rule violations, modeling boundary consistency, resource limits, and ground commanding consistency. By performing as many checks as early in the process as possible, grl_pef_check streamlines the MPST task of generating GRAIL command and modeled products on an aggressive schedule. By enumerating each check being performed, and clearly stating the criteria and assumptions made at each step, grl_pef_check can be used as a manual checklist as well as an automated tool. This helper script was written with a focus on enabling the user with the information they need in order to evaluate a sequence quickly and efficiently, while still keeping them informed and active in the overall sequencing process. grl_pef_check verifies and validates the modeling and sequence content prior to investing any more effort into the build. There are dozens of various items in the modeling run that need to be checked, which is a time-consuming and errorprone task. Currently, no software exists that provides this functionality. Compared to a manual process, this script reduces human error and saves considerable man-hours by automating and streamlining the mission planning and sequencing task for the GRAIL mission.

Call, Jared A.↗

NASA NTRS2002

Brahms Mobile Agents: Architecture and Field Tests

We have developed a model-based, distributed architecture that integrates diverse components in a system designed for lunar and planetary surface operations: an astronaut's space suit, cameras, rover/All-Terrain Vehicle (ATV), robotic assistant, other personnel in a local habitat, and a remote mission support team (with time delay). Software processes, called agents, implemented in the Brahms language, run on multiple, mobile platforms. These mobile agents interpret and transform available data to help people and robotic systems coordinate their actions to make operations more safe and efficient. The Brahms-based mobile agent architecture (MAA) uses a novel combination of agent types so the software agents may understand and facilitate communications between people and between system components. A state-of-the-art spoken dialogue interface is integrated with Brahms models, supporting a speech-driven field observation record and rover command system (e.g., return here later and bring this back to the habitat ). This combination of agents, rover, and model-based spoken dialogue interface constitutes a personal assistant. An important aspect of the methodology involves first simulating the entire system in Brahms, then configuring the agents into a run-time system.

Clancey, William J.↗

NASA NTRS2012

An Altair Overview: Designing a Lunar Lander for 21st Century Human Space Exploration

Altair, the lunar lander element of NASA's Constellation program, was conducted in a different design environment than many other NASA projects of similar scope. Because of this relatively unique approach, there are a number of significant success stories that should be considered during the development of any future lunar landers or human spacecraft. This paper is divided into two separate themes; the first is the approach used during the conceptual design studies, including the systematic analysis cycles and the decision making process associated with each: and the second is a summary of the resulting lessons learned that were compiled after looking back at the lifetime of the Project. Altair was terminated before entering Phase B of its design, and was often criticized for being a very heavy and very large vehicle. While there was specific rationale for all of the decisions that led up to that configuration, future design cycles were specifically planned to re-address the mass challenge. Had the project continued, the deliberate, stepwise design process would have converged on an optimized lander design that balanced mass, risk, cost and capabilities. Some of the specific items that will be addressed in this paper include project development strategy, organizational approach and team dynamics, risk-informed design process, mission architecture constraints, mission key driving requirements, model-based systems engineering process, configuration studies, contingency considerations, subsystem overviews and key trade studies. The paper will conclude with a summary of the lessons identified during the Altair project and make suggestions for application to future studies.

Brown, Kendall K.↗

NASA NTRS2018

Cassini Spacecraft Attitude Control System: Flight Performance and Lessons Learned, 1997-2017

A sophisticated interplanetary spacecraft, Cassini/Huygens was launched on October 15, 1997. Since achieving orbit at Saturn in 2004, Cassini has collected science data throughout its four-year prime mission (2004–08), and has since been approved for first and second extended missions through September 2017. The Cassini Attitude and Articulation Control Subsystem (AACS) is perhaps the spacecraft subsystem that must satisfy the most mission and science pointing requirements. Since launch, the performance of the Cassini AACS design has been superb. All key mission and science requirements are met with significant margins. An overview of the flight performance of the Cassini attitude control system as well as AACS mission operation-centric lessons learned, from launch to 2017, are described by topics. Many of these lessons learned should be applicable to the safe operations of other interplanetary missions. Processes taken by the AACS operation team to guard against “human” errors are also outlined in this paper.

Lee, Allan Y.↗

NASA NTRS2011

Mars Science Laboratory Flight Software Internal Testing

The Mars Science Laboratory (MSL) team is sending the rover, Curiosity, to Mars, and therefore is physically and technically complex. During my stay, I have assisted the MSL Flight Software (FSW) team in implementing functional test scripts to ensure that the FSW performs to the best of its abilities. There are a large number of FSW requirements that have been written up for implementation; however I have only been assigned a few sections of these requirements. There are many stages within testing; one of the early stages is FSW Internal Testing (FIT). The FIT team can accomplish this with simulation software and the MSL Test Automation Kit (MTAK). MTAK has the ability to integrate with the Software Simulation Equipment (SSE) and the Mission Processing and Control System (MPCS) software which makes it a powerful tool within the MSL FSW development process. The MSL team must ensure that the rover accomplishes all stages of the mission successfully. Due to the natural complexity of this project there is a strong emphasis on testing, as failure is not an option. The entire mission could be jeopardized if something is overlooked.

entry, descent, and landing (EDL)↗

NASA NTRS2006

From Prime to Extended Mission: Evolution of the MER Tactical Uplink Process

To support a 90-day surface mission for two robotic rovers, the Mars Exploration Rover mission designed and implemented an intensive tactical operations process, enabling daily commanding of each rover. Using a combination of new processes, custom software tools, a Mars-time staffing schedule, and seven-day-a-week operations, the MER team was able to compress the traditional weeks-long command-turnaround for a deep space robotic mission to about 18 hours. However, the pace of this process was never intended to be continued indefinitely. Even before the end of the three-month prime mission, MER operations began evolving towards greater sustainability. A combination of continued software tool development, increasing team experience, and availability of reusable sequences first reduced the mean process duration to approximately 11 hours. The number of workshifts required to perform the process dropped, and the team returned to a modified 'Earth-time' schedule. Additional process and tool adaptation eventually provided the option of planning multiple Martian days of activity within a single workshift, making 5-day-a-week operations possible. The vast majority of the science team returned to their home institutions, continuing to participate fully in the tactical operations process remotely. MER has continued to operate for over two Earth-years as many of its key personnel have moved on to other projects, the operations team and budget have shrunk, and the rovers have begun to exhibit symptoms of aging.

mission operations↗

NASA NTRS2006

From Prime to Extended Mission: Evolution of the MER Tactical Uplink Process

To support a 90-day surface mission for two robotic rovers, the Mars Exploration Rover mission designed and implemented an intensive tactical operations process, enabling daily commanding of each rover. Using a combination of new processes, custom software tools, a Mars-time staffing schedule, and seven-day-a-week operations, the MER team was able to compress the traditional weeks-long command-turnaround for a deep space robotic mission to about 18 hours. However, there was never an intention of maintaining the pace of this process indefinitely. Even before the end of the three-month prime mission, MER operations began evolving towards greater sustainability. A combination of continued software tool development, increasing team experience, and availability of reusable sequences first reduced the mean process duration to approximately 11 hours. The number of workshifts required to perform the process dropped, and the team returned to a modified 'Earth-time' schedule. Additional process and tool adaptation eventually provided the option of planning multiple Martian days of activity within a single workshift, making 5- day-a-week operations possible. The vast majority of the science team returned to their home institutions, continuing to participate fully in the tactical operations process remotely. MER has continued to operate for over two Earth-years as many of its key personnel have moved on to other projects, the operations team and budget have shrunk, and the rovers have begun to exhibit symptoms of aging.

Mars exploration↗

NASA NTRS2014

Modernization of the Cassini Ground System

The Cassini Spacecraft and its ground system have been operational for over 16 years. Modernization presents several challenges due to the personnel, processes, and tools already invested and embedded into the current ground system structure. Every mission's ground system has its own unique complexities and challenges, involving various organizational units. As any mission from its inception to its execution, schedules are always tight. This forces GDS engineers to implement a working ground system that is not necessarily fully optimized. Ground system challenges increase as technology evolves and cyber threats become more sophisticated. Cassini's main challenges were due to its ground system existing before many security requirements were levied on the multi-mission tools and networks. This caused a domino effect on Cassini GDS tools that relied on outdated technological features. In the aerospace industry reliable and established technology is preferred over innovative yet less proven technology. Loss of data for a spacecraft mission can be catastrophic; therefore, there is a reluctance to make changes and updates to the ground system. Nevertheless, all missions and associated teams face the need to modernize their processes and tools. Systems development methods from well-known system analysis and design principles can be applied to many missions' ground systems. Modernization should always be considered, but should be done in such a way that it does not affect flexibility nor interfere with established practices. Cassini has accomplished a secure and efficient ground data system through periodic updates. The obstacles faced while performing the modernization of the Cassini ground system will be outlined, as well as the advantages and challenges that were encountered.

Razo, Gus↗

NASA NTRS2014

Modernization of the Cassini Ground System

Razo, Gus↗

NASA NTRS1972

Apollo experience report: Communications system flight evaluation and verification

Flight tests of the synergetic operation of the spacecraft and earth based communications equipment were accomplished during Apollo missions AS-202 through Apollo 12. The primary goals of these tests were to verify that the communications system would adequately support lunar landing missions and to establish the inflight communications system performance characteristics. To attain these goals, a communications system flight verification and evaluation team was established. The concept of the team operations, the evolution of the evaluation processes, synopses of the team activities associated with each mission, and major conclusions and recommendations resulting from the performance evaluation are represented.

Travis, D.↗

NASA NTRS2011

The Application of Lean Thinking Principles and Kaizen Practices for the Successful Development and Implementation of the Ares I-X Flight Test Rocket and Mission

On October 28, 2009 the Ares I-X flight test rocket launched from Kennedy Space Center and flew its suborbital trajectory as designed. The mission was successfully completed as data from the test, and associated development activities were analyzed, transferred to stakeholders, and well documented. Positive lessons learned from Ares I-X were that the application of lean thinking principles and kaizen practices are effective in streamlining development activities. Ares I-X, like other historical rocket development projects, was hampered by technical, cost, and schedule challenges and if not addressed boldly could have resulted in cancellation of the test. The mission management team conducted nine major meetings, referred to as lean events, across its elements to assess plans, procedures, processes, requirements, controls, culture, organization, use of resources, and anything that could be changed to optimize schedule or reduce risk. The preeminent aspect of the lean events was the focus on value added activities and the removal or at least reduction in non-value activities. Trained Lean Six Sigma facilitators assisted the Ares I-X developers in conducting the lean events. They indirectly helped formulate the mission s own unique methodology for assessing schedule. A core team was selected to lead the events and report to the mission manager. Each activity leveraged specialized participants to analyze the subject matter and its related processes and then recommended alternatives and solutions. Stakeholders were the event champions. They empowered and encouraged the team to succeed. The keys to success were thorough preparation, honest dialog, small groups, adherence to the Ares I-X ground rules, and accountability through disciplined reporting and tracking of actions. This lean event formula was game-changing as demonstrated by the success of Ares I-X. It is highly recommended as a management tool to help develop other complex systems efficiently. The key benefits for Ares I-X were obtaining unambiguous schedule margin, defining enabling options for risk reduction, and most importantly a stronger more unified team.

Askins, B. R.↗

NASA NTRS2011

The Application of Lean Thinking Principles and Kaizen Practices for the Successful Development and Implementation of the Ares I-X Flight Test Rocket and Mission

On October 28, 2009 the Ares I-X flight test rocket launched from Kennedy Space Center and flew its suborbital trajectory as designed. The mission was successfully completed as data from the test, and associated development activities were analyzed, transferred to stakeholders, and well documented. A positive lesson learned from Ares I-X was that the application of lean thinking principles and kaizen practices was very effective in streamlining development activities. Ares I-X, like other historical rocket development projects, was hampered by technical, cost, and schedule challenges and if not addressed boldly could have resulted in cancellation of the test. The mission management team conducted nine major meetings, referred to as lean events, across its elements to assess plans, procedures, processes, requirements, controls, culture, organization, use of resources, and anything that could be changed to optimize schedule or reduce risk. The preeminent aspect of the lean events was the focus on value added activities and the removal or at least reduction in non-value added activities. Trained Lean Six Sigma facilitators assisted the Ares I-X developers in conducting the lean events. They indirectly helped formulate the mission s own unique methodology for assessing schedule. A core team was selected to lead the events and report to the mission manager. Each activity leveraged specialized participants to analyze the subject matter and its related processes and then recommended alternatives and solutions. Stakeholders were the event champions. They empowered and encouraged the team to succeed. The keys to success were thorough preparation, honest dialog, small groups, adherence to the Ares I-X ground rules, and accountability through disciplined reporting and tracking of actions. This lean event formula was game-changing as demonstrated by Ares I-X. It is highly recommended as a management tool to help develop other complex systems efficiently. The key benefits for Ares I-X were obtaining unambiguous schedule margin, defining enabling options for risk reduction, and most importantly a stronger more unified team.

Askins, B. R.↗

NASA NTRS1994

Increases in Efficiency and Enhancements to the Mars Observer Non-stored Commanding Process

The Mars Observer team was, until the untimely loss of the spacecraft on August 21, 1993, performing flight operations with greater efficiency and speed than any previous JPL mission of its size. This level of through-put was made possible by a Mission Operations System which was composed of skilled personnel using sophisticated sequencing and commanding tools. During cruise flight operations, however, it was realized by the project that this commanding level was not going to be sufficient to support the activities planned for the mapping operations. The project had committed to providing the science instrument principle investigators with a much higher level of commanding during mapping. Thus, the project began taking steps to enhance the capabilities of the flight team. One mechanism used by project management was a tool available from Total Quality Management (TQM). This tool is known as a Process Action Team (PAT). The Mars Observer PAT was tasked to increase the capacity of the flight team's non-stored commanding process by fifty percent with no increase in staffing and a minimal increase in risk. The outcome of this effort was to, in fact, increase the capacity by a factor of 2.5 rather than the desired fifty percent and actually reduce risk. The majority of these improvements came from the automation of the existing command process. The results required very few changes to the existing mission operations system. Rather, the PAT was able to take advantage of automation capabilities inherent in the existing system and make changes to the existing flight team procedures. This paper will describe in detail the enhancements recommended by the PAT for the non-stored command generation process on Mars Observer. This will be contrasted with the process used by the flight team prior to implementation of these improvements. Finally, there will be a discussion of the applicability of the techniques devised by the PAT for enhancement of the non-stored command process to present and future projects.

Process↗

NASA NTRS2015

Implementing NASA's Capability-Driven Approach: Insight into NASA's Processes for Maturing Exploration Systems

NASA is engaged in transforming human spaceflight. The Agency is shifting from an exploration-based program with human activities focused on low Earth orbit (LEO) and targeted robotic missions in deep space to a more sustainable and integrated pioneering approach. Through pioneering, NASA seeks to address national goals to develop the capacity for people to work, learn, operate, live, and thrive safely beyond the Earth for extended periods of time. However, pioneering space involves more than the daunting technical challenges of transportation, maintaining health, and enabling crew productivity for long durations in remote, hostile, and alien environments. This shift also requires a change in operating processes for NASA. The Agency can no longer afford to engineer systems for specific missions and destinations and instead must focus on common capabilities that enable a range of destinations and missions. NASA has codified a capability driven approach, which provides flexible guidance for the development and maturation of common capabilities necessary for human pioneers beyond LEO. This approach has been included in NASA policy and is captured in the Agency's strategic goals. It is currently being implemented across NASA's centers and programs. Throughout 2014, NASA engaged in an Agency-wide process to define and refine exploration-related capabilities and associated gaps, focusing only on those that are critical for human exploration beyond LEO. NASA identified 12 common capabilities ranging from Environmental Control and Life Support Systems to Robotics, and established Agency-wide teams or working groups comprised of subject matter experts that are responsible for the maturation of these exploration capabilities. These teams, called the System Maturation Teams (SMTs) help formulate, guide and resolve performance gaps associated with the identified exploration capabilities. The SMTs are defining performance parameters and goals for each of the 12 capabilities, developing maturation plans and roadmaps for the identified performance gaps, specifying the interfaces between the various capabilities, and ensuring that the capabilities mature and integrate to enable future pioneering missions. By managing system development through the SMTs instead of traditional NASA programs and projects, the Agency is shifting from mission-driven development to a more flexible, capability-driven development. The process NASA uses to establish, integrate, prioritize, and manage the SMTs and associated capabilities is iterative. NASA relies on the Human Exploration and Operation Mission Directorate's SMT Integration Team within Advanced Exploration Systems to coordinate and facilitate the SMT process. The SMT Integration team conducts regular reviews and coordination meetings among the SMTs and has developed a number of tools to help the Agency implement capability driven processes. The SMT Integration team is uniquely positioned to help the Agency coordinate the SMTs and other processes that are making the capability-driven approach a reality. This paper will introduce the SMTs and the 12 key capabilities they represent. The role of the SMTs will be discussed with respect to Agency-wide processes to shift from mission-focused exploration to a capability-driven pioneering approach. Specific examples will be given to highlight systems development and testing within the SMTs. These examples will also show how NASA is using current investments in the International Space Station and future investments to develop and demonstrate capabilities. The paper will conclude by describing next steps and a process for soliciting feedback from the space exploration community to refine NASA's process for developing common exploration capabilities.

Williams-Byrd, Julie↗

NASA NTRS2014

Space Mission Operations Ground Systems Integration Customer Service

The facility, which is now the Huntsville Operations Support Center (HOSC) at Marshall Space Flight Center in Huntsville, AL, has provided continuous space mission and related services for the space industry since 1961, from Mercury Redstone through the International Space Station (ISS). Throughout the long history of the facility and mission support teams, the HOSC has developed a stellar customer support and service process. In this era, of cost cutting, and providing more capability and results with fewer resources, space missions are looking for the most efficient way to accomplish their objectives. One of the first services provided by the facility was fax transmission of documents to, then, Cape Canaveral in Florida. The headline in the Marshall Star, the newspaper for the newly formed Marshall Space Flight Center, read "Exact copies of Documents sent to Cape in 4 minutes." The customer was Dr. Wernher von Braun. Currently at the HOSC we are supporting, or have recently supported, missions ranging from simple ISS payloads requiring little more than "bentpipe" telemetry access, to a low cost free-flyer Fast, Affordable, Science and Technology Satellite (FASTSAT), to a full service ISS payload Alpha Magnetic Spectrometer 2 (AMS2) supporting 24/7 operations at three operations centers around the world with an investment of over 2 billion dollars. The HOSC has more need and desire than ever to provide fast and efficient customer service to support these missions. Here we will outline how our customer-centric service approach reduces the cost of providing services, makes it faster and easier than ever for new customers to get started with HOSC services, and show what the future holds for our space mission operations customers. We will discuss our philosophy concerning our responsibility and accessibility to a mission customer as well as how we deal with the following issues: initial contact with a customer, reducing customer cost, changing regulations and security, and cultural differences, to ensure an efficient response to customer issues using a small Customer Service Team (CST) and adaptability, constant communication with customers, technical expertise and knowledge of services, and dedication to customer service. The HOSC Customer Support Team has implemented a variety of processes, and procedures that help to mitigate the potential problems that arise when integrating ground system services for a variety of complex missions and the lessons learned from this experience will lead the future of customer service in the space operations industry.

Roth, Karl↗

NASA NTRS2022

Risk of Performance and Behavioral Health Decrements Due to Inadequate Cooperation, Coordination, and Psychosocial Adaptions within a Team

The Risk of Performance and Behavioral Health Decrements Due to Inadequate Cooperation, Coordination, Communication, and Psychosocial Adaptation within a Team (the Team Risk) is primarily performance-focused, with a secondary emphasis on behavioral health outcomes resulting from team performance and interpersonal interactions. Monitoring tools, measures, and countermeasures are aimed at enhancing team processes and team composition configurations to optimize team performance and functioning. Long-duration exploration missions (LDEMs) will include major challenges that could affect team performance, including social isolation, physical confinement, a small and diverse crew, communication delays between crew and ground, limited or no crew rotation or evacuation options, limited or no resupply, and a high-consequence environment. Each of these conditions will affect the crew’s coordination, cooperation, psychological well-being, and performance. Although the International Space Station (ISS) remains important for studies that require spaceflight testing and validation, the current conditions on the ISS do not adequately mimic the exploration environment that is required for National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) teams research, and thus access to terrestrial or ground-based analogs of LDEM conditions is paramount. The emphasis on analogs for research is reflected in this updated evidence review of the Team Risk, and includes data from studies conducted at isolated, confined, extreme (ICE) environments (e.g., Antarctic stations), and from several mission simulation analogs such as the Human Exploration Research Analog (HERA) (HERA Experiment Information Package, 2014), also known as isolated, confined, controlled (ICC) environments. These studies have characterized many team factors regarding LDEMs, and the Team Risk has now matured from risk characterization to focusing more on countermeasure development. Because spaceflight evidence for team-level research is lacking, no reliable data is available to quantify the impact of team-level variables on individual and team-level outcomes during spaceflight missions. Until recently, no systematic attempt had been undertaken to measure the performance effects of team cohesion, team composition, team training, or team-related psychosocial adaptation during spaceflight. The Team Risk is a relatively young research area for NASA, with substantial growth only since the 2000s, and with limited access to spaceflight performance data. As a result, spaceflight evidence is lacking to identify specifically what team composition, level of training, amount of cohesion, or quality of psychosocial adaptation is necessary to reduce the risk of performance errors in space. However, astronaut journals and interviews and reports from spaceflight subject matter experts (SMEs) provide testimonies that team performance during spaceflight is important for mission success and to maintain crew health. Team spaceflight data is now being collected as part of the Spaceflight Standard Measures task (Clement, 2021)—a set of core measurements related to many human spaceflight risks that are collected from astronauts before, during, and after long-duration missions. The team-related standard measures focus on team cohesion, team performance, group living, team climate, and team processes. Collection of standard measures data is ongoing and published data is not yet available. Finally, although spaceflight evidence is lacking, evidence gleaned from ground studies and spaceflight analog studies will help close the gaps outlined in the Team Risk. Ground-based studies provide quantitative evidence for team functioning in ICE environments. Academic research on teams has produced dozens of meta-analyses that can be used to understand the general relationships among team inputs (e.g., team member characteristics and skills, job context), team processes, and emergent states (e.g., coordination, communication, cooperation, cohesion, trust, shared cognition), and team outcomes (e.g., effectiveness, errors, adaptation). Teams are complex, incorporating individual characteristics of team members, but also existing at a level that is greater than the sum of its parts. Therefore, the Team Risk must be integrated with other individual-focused NASA Human Research Program (HRP) risks, including Behavioral Medicine (BMed), Sleep, and Human-Systems Integration Architecture (HSIA), and emerging research indicates more integration may needed between the Team Risk and the physiologically oriented risks. Much of this integration occurs through the Human Systems Risk Board (HSRB). A lack of team functioning may be a stressor in some circumstances, but the team often acts as a countermeasure. For example, support for team leaders and teammates can facilitate individual functioning and encourage psychological and physically healthy behaviors and attitudes. However, more research is needed regarding teams during LDEMs and the remaining gaps in the research are described in the current report.

Lauren Blackwell Landon↗