Search NASA⌕ Search

SEARCH · Search NASA

Results for “Protection & Control”

Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

Quote a phrase for an exact phrase match. Source license links do not imply unrestricted reuse.

At least 55 records · Page 3

Design and Development of a High Fidelity Cyber-Physical Testbed

In order to ensure that future critical infrastructure systems are resilient to various types of such advanced and persistent threats, it is important to develop and integrate tailored solutions that holistically address cyber-attack detection and mitigation in a timely manner such that adverse system impacts that impact a large population are avoided. Further, it is essential to create environments that allow control, protection and communication to exist within a realistic environment to analyze the effects of adverse conditions and system operating modes. This project aims to establish a high-fidelity testbed environment for modeling and simulating a single microgrid all the way up to a network of microgrids along with baseline controls, protection, and associated cyber communication. This is an important activity because accurately modeling and simulating the various power-electronics-based DERs and loads in a microgrid is critical to adequately capturing their behaviors over a wide range of off-normal conditions, as well as to evaluate the resilience of the system using the developed controls. The work presented in this report focuses on the process of building this high-fidelity testbed and the associated experimentation it enables. The model enables the creation of high-fidelity use cases and associated datasets that have been used extensively within the initiative to study resilience and support novel control development and prototyping. The work heavily leverages existing capability that is part of the high-fidelity cyber-physical system experimentation lab to create a power hardware-in-the-loop setup. The report also details the creation of an automated model building platform that can enable high-fidelity real-time models to be built without much effort allowing existing low-fidelity models to be analyzed in higher fidelity. Lastly, the report also discusses efforts center around scaling to large complex power system models to make the experimentation more effective.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Regulatory Protection and Control Standards Applicable to The Vietnam Grid Under High Inverter-Based Resource (IBR) Penetration: A Review of Standards Applicable for Vietnam Grid

This report provides a review of the current standards and practices followed by regulatory authorities for interconnection of inverter-based resources (IBR). With the increased penetration of IBRs into the transmission and distribution networks, the legacy protection methodologies are getting challenged. Due to the lack of regulations on IBR operations under a fault it is essential to have a thorough understanding of the present-day interconnection standards to ensure proper IBR operations. A focus is placed on the regulation and standards enforced by the North American Reliability Corporation (NERC), Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC), Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineer (IEEE), Underwriters Laboratories (UL) and other regulations proposed by the responsible commissions.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Nexus of technologies : international safeguards, physical protection and arms control.

New technologies have been, and are continuing to be, developed for Safeguards, Arms Control, and Physical Protection. Application spaces and technical requirements are evolving - Overlaps are developing. Lessons learned from IAEA's extensive experience could benefit other communities. Technologies developed for other applications may benefit Safeguards - Inherent cost benefits and improvements in procurement security processes.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Collaborative Defense of Transmission and Distribution Protection and Control Devices Against Cyber Attacks (CODEF) DE-OE0000674. ABB Inc. Final Scientific/Technical Report

This report summarizes the activities conducted under the DOE-OE funded project DEOE0000674, where ABB Inc. (ABB), in collaboration with University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign (UIUC), Bonneville Power Administration (BPA), and Ameren-Illinois (Ameren-IL) pursued the development of a system of collaborative defense of electrical substation’s intelligent electronic devices against cyber-attacks (CODEF). An electrical substation with CODEF features will be more capable of mitigating cyber-attacks especially those that seek to control switching devices. It leverages the security extensions of IEC 61850 to empower existing devices to collaborate in identifying and blocking malicious intents to trip circuit breakers, mis-coordinate devices settings, even though the commands and the measurements comply with correct syntax. The CODEF functions utilize the physics of electromagnetic systems, electric power engineering principles, and computer science to bring more in depth cyber defense closer to the protected substation devices.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Insulator-protected mechanically controlled break junctions for measuring single-molecule conductance in aqueous environments

We present a method to fabricate insulated gold mechanically controlled break junctions (MCBJ) by coating the metal with a thin layer of aluminum oxide using plasma enhanced atomic layer deposition. The Al{sub 2}O{sub 3} thickness deposited on the MCBJ devices was varied from 2 to 15 nm to test the suppression of leakage currents in deionized water and phosphate buffered saline. Junctions coated with a 15 nm thick oxide layer yielded atomically sharp electrodes and negligible conductance counts in the range of 1 to 10{sup −4} G{sub 0} (1 G{sub 0} = 77 μS), where single-molecule conductances are commonly observed. The insulated devices were used to measure the conductance of an amphiphilic oligophenylene ethynylene derivative in deionized water.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗

Classified Matter Protection and Control Overview Course 16028

This course will assist personnel in preventing the compromise of classified matter by presenting requirements for classifying, marking, reproducing, destroying, inventorying, and transmitting classified matter.

96 KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT AND PRESERVATION↗

Assessment of Thermal Control and Protective Coatings

This final report is concerned with the tasks performed during the contract period which included spacecraft coating development, testing, and applications. Five marker coatings consisting of a bright yellow handrail coating, protective overcoat for ceramic coatings, and specialized primers for composites (or polymer) surfaces were developed and commercialized by AZ Technology during this program. Most of the coatings have passed space environmental stability requirements via ground tests and/or flight verification. Marker coatings and protective overcoats were successfully flown on the Passive Optical Sample Assembly (POSA) and the Optical Properties Monitor (OPM) experiments flown on the Russian space station MIR. To date, most of the coatings developed and/or modified during this program have been utilized on the International Space Station and other spacecraft. For ISS, AZ Technology manufactured the 'UNITY' emblem now being flown on the NASA UNITY node (Node 1) that is docked to the Russian Zarya (FGB) utilizing the colored marker coatings (white, blue, red) developed by AZ Technology. The UNITY emblem included the US American flag, the Unity logo, and NASA logo on a white background, applied to a Beta cloth substrate.

Mell, Richard J.↗

Protecting Accelerator Control Systems in the Face of Sophisticated Cyber Attacks

Cyber security for industrial control systems has received significant attention in the past two years. The news coverage of the Stuxnet attack, believed to be targeted at the control system for a uranium enrichment plant, brought the issue to the attention of news media and policy makers. This has led to increased scrutiny of control systems for critical infrastructure such as power generation and distribution, and industrial systems such as chemical plants and petroleum refineries. The past two years have also seen targeted network attacks aimed at corporate and government entities including US Department of Energy National Laboratories. Both of these developments have potential repercussions for the control systems of particle accelerators. The need to balance risks from potential attacks with the operational needs of an accelerator present a unique challenge for the system architecture and access model.

02 PETROLEUM↗

Cybersecurity Vulnerability Assessment Methodologies for Nuclear Power Plants

As any mechanical system ages, broken or outdated parts must be replaced; nuclear power plants (NPPs) are no different. The average age of a NPP in the United States' aging fleet of commercial reactors is 35 years, with many of these plants operating under extensions of their original licenses. These plants, originally designed in the 1960's and 1970's, are controlled by analog instrumentation and control (I and C) systems, and have since been upgraded (to varying degrees) to hybrid analog-digital systems. As these NPPs are upgraded to continue operating and to meet more stringent safety requirements imposed by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), the implementation of digital systems to monitor and run the power plant introduces new vulnerabilities that must be addressed. The main objectives of a vulnerability assessment (VA) are to identify, quantify, and prioritize all of the susceptibilities inherent in a system. This allows for all weaknesses to be analyzed, and for the most serious concerns to be addressed first. Traditional VA methodologies deal with the analysis of physical systems associated with the NPP; with the introduction of digital control systems and computer networks, these methodologies must be expanded to include these fundamentally different systems and vulnerability concerns. Digital systems have been used in NPPs since the 1980's, but only for non-safety control systems; attacks on these systems were not deemed consequential, and no dedicated VA methodology was required. However, 'all new NPPs are being designed with integrated digital instrumentation and control systems as the backbone of protection, controls, alarms, and display and monitoring'. This gives rise to new vulnerabilities such as disrupted data displays, the suppression of critical alarms, or unauthorized access to secure systems from connected networks. The NRC released formal cybersecurity regulations in March 2009 (10 CFR 73.54), as well as a guide for the program in January 2010 (RG 5.71). However, the regulations and guide provide limited insight on how to identify these vulnerabilities; the focus is on remediating them once found. Hence, there is a need for a comprehensive, systematic methodology to conduct a VA on digital computer and communications and network systems. In this paper, we review traditional VA methodologies and discuss relevant cases. Then we discuss challenges to vulnerabilities within the context of modernization of the fleet and what needs to be done to address this issue.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗