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All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2023

Dose estimates and their uncertainties for use in epidemiological studies of radiation-exposed populations in the Russian Southern Urals

Many residents of the Russian Southern Urals were exposed to radioactive environmental pollution created by the operations of the Mayak Production Association in the mid- 20 th century. There were two major releases: the discharge of about 1x10 17 Bq of liquid waste into the Techa River between 1949 and 1959; and the atmospheric release of 7.4 * 10 16 Bq as a result an explosion in the radioactive waste-storage facility in 1957. The releases into the Techa River resulted in the exposure of more than 30,000 people who lived in riverside villages between 1950 and 1961. The 1957 accident contaminated a larger area with the highest exposure levels in an area that is called the East Urals Radioactive Trace (EURT). Current epidemiologic studies of the exposed populations are based on dose estimates obtained using a Monte-Carlo dosimetry system (TRDS-2016MC) that provides multiple realizations of the annual doses for each cohort member. These dose realizations provide a central estimate of the individual dose and information on the uncertainty of these dose estimates. In addition, the correlation of individual annual doses over realizations provides important information on shared uncertainties that can be used to assess the impact of shared dose uncertainties on risk estimate uncertainty.This paper considers dose uncertainties in the TRDS-2016MC. Individual doses from external and internal radiation sources were reconstructed for 48,036 people based on environmental contamination patterns, residential histories, individual 90 Sr body-burden measurements and dietary intakes. Dietary intake of 90 Sr resulted in doses accumulated in active bone marrow (or simply, marrow) that were an order of magnitude greater than those in soft tissues. About 84% of the marrow dose and 50% of the stomach dose was associated with internal exposures. The lognormal distribution is well-fitted to the individual dose realizations, which, therefore, could be expressed and easily operated in terms of geometric mean (GM) and geometric standard deviation (GSD). Cohort average GM for marrow and stomach cumulative doses are 0.21 and 0.03 Gy, respectively. Cohort average dose uncertainties in terms of GSD are as follows: for marrow it is 2.93 (90%CI: 2.02–4.34); for stomach and the other non-calcified tissues it is 2.32 (90% CI: 1.78–2.9).

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗
DOE OSTI2020

New Designed Containers for Activated ILW from NPP Decommissioning - 20208

The paper focuses on packaging of dismantled and fragmented reactor components into containers and their transport to their storage and/or disposal facility within the immediate dismantling strategy applied on decommissioning of nuclear power plant (NPP) finally shutdown after standard operation. The main purpose of the paper is to present the process of design, manufacture, testing and use of new transport and storage containers for activated intermediate level waste (ILW) from V1 NPP decommissioning at Jaslovske Bohunice site. Legislation conditions, container selection process, requirements on their design and manufacture, scope of associated licensing documentation and technical procedures applied up to their use on site are described in detail. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2020

The TRANSCEND Consortium - In-situ Identification of Surface Corrosion Products on Spent Nuclear Fuels - 20276

The management of spent nuclear fuel is a major ongoing concern for the UK owing to the cessation of reprocessing operations at Sellafield and the large, complex inventory arising from Magnox, AGR, PWR and prototype reactors. Retrieval and relocation operations for legacy fuels are imminent and therefore, any models that enhance our understanding of fuel evolution will help mitigate the risks associated with fuel storage and disposal. The TRANSCEND Consortium on nuclear waste management comprises four work packages, within this current paper we provide a summary overview of progress to date and illustrative results from Theme 3: Spent Nuclear Fuels. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2020

Disposition of Newly Generated Transuranic Waste at ORNL - 20107

ORNL operates the High Flux Isotope Reactor, which provides a high neutron source for production of isotopes for medical, industrial, and nuclear research programs and is the US DoE's center for production, storage, and distribution for TRU isotopes (plutonium through californium). Operation of these facilities results in the generation of CH-TRU and RH-TRU waste for disposal at the WIPP. This paper describes the program ORNL is implementing in collaboration with the Carlsbad Field Office National TRU Program Difficult Waste Team to disposition newly generated TRU waste. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2020

Fission Product Gas Monitoring During Fuel Drying Operations - 20094

The goal of the project was to devise and implement a method of accurately qualifying any noble gas emitted during fuel drying operations (part of the dry fuel storage process) in order to provide the data needed to validate the off-site dose calculations. The imputes of the project was the NRC publishing Information Notice 18-01, 'Noble Fission Gas Releases During Spent Fuel Cask Loading Operations' in February 2018. The information notice describes some industry events that occurred during vacuum drying operations as part of a dry fuel campaign. The solution was devised by Fort Calhoun Station staff in partnership with Mirion Technologies technical staff. The monitoring was accomplished by directing all the effluent from the fuel storage cask vacuum drying machine through a sample chamber containing a compact ISOCS characterized CZT based gamma spectrometer connected to a Mirion Data Analyst. This resulted near real-time quantification of the radionuclides of concern. (authors)

07 ISOTOPE AND RADIATION SOURCES↗
DOE OSTI2025

Building confidence in models for complex barrier systems for radionuclides

The modeling and simulation of the Cement-clay Interaction-Diffusion field (CI-D) experiment at the Mont Terri site in Switzerland presented here demonstrates that it is possible to capture the multiscale physical and chemical features of natural and engineered barrier systems for radionuclides. The simulations are successfully carried out with the newly developed CrunchODiTi high-performance computing software that accounts for multiple continua, including a continuum representing the electrical double layer (EDL) developed along negatively charged clay particles in clay rock. The simulation also accounts for both the complex three-dimensional (3D) geometry, expected as the norm in a geological waste repository, and the anisotropy of the geological formation. In addition, the high resolution of the model makes it possible to include "skin effects" developed at the interface between highly reactive materials, in this case between the high pH cement and the circumneutral but electrostatic Opalinus Clay. The successful history matching with the field experiment demonstrates that the distinct geochemical and physical properties of the cement and the Opalinus Clay in the CI-D experiment can be accounted for. Such analyses are essential for developing a defensible safety case for the underground storage of radioactive waste.

Sarsenbayev, Dauren↗
DOE OSTI2020

Repurposing Hanford Waste Tank AP-106 for Interim Storage of Treated Low-Activity Waste - 20044

Hanford Double-Shell Tank AP-106 is being repurposed to serve as the lag storage tank holding feed for the Direct Feed Low-Activity Waste (DFLAW) process at the Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant (WTP). The repurposing process is the sequence of tank additions and transfers that will remove the Cs 137 inventory from AP-106. The repurposing process steps are designed to remove Cs-137 more effectively and efficiently as compared to regular supernatant transfers. The process steps are estimated to take 2-months to complete. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2020

Nevada Higher Education Benefits from US Department of Energy (DOE) Environmental Management (EM) Nevada Program's Transfer of Geologic Samples - 20442

The Nevada National Security Site (NNSS), formerly the Nevada Test Site, was the location of 100 historic atmospheric and 828 historic underground nuclear tests from 1951 to 1992. Related to this historic nuclear testing, geologic and hydrologic studies of the site were conducted utilizing the skills and the expertise of the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) and national laboratories (Los Alamos National Laboratory, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory), who were principal in leading the development of weapons and were responsible for specific underground testing programs. The subsurface samples and technical/scientific data associated with NNSS geologic studies (past and present) are preserved and stored at the USGS Mercury Core Library and Data Center located at the NNSS. Currently, the facility stores over 2,000,000 linear feet of cores and cuttings from more than 2,600 drill holes that can be accessed for study. Most of the samples and historic geologic work was focused directly on subsurface geologic settings that relate directly to historic underground nuclear testing. Since 1992, the United States has observed a unilateral moratorium on full-scale nuclear testing, and the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Environmental Management (EM) Nevada Program is now responsible for hydrogeologic characterization of the potential impacts to the natural groundwater systems that may have resulted from historic underground nuclear tests. As part of this effort, the EM Nevada Program Underground Test Area (UGTA) Activity has drilled and completed over 58 deep (2,000 - 7,000 ft.) characterization wells, totaling in excess of 170,000 linear feet of cuttings and core samples. Cutting samples were collected as triplicate samples for each respective depth interval, to account for potential later nondestructive/destructive analysis and to preserve samples for regulatory purposes. Recently, it was recognized by the EM Nevada Program that opportunities may exist to reduce the cost and floor space required for the storage of geologic samples at the Mercury Core Library without impacting the integrity and representative nature of the samples necessary for project execution. An initiative was sponsored by EM Nevada Program to evaluate several options: 1) disposal of a portion of cuttings and cores in a land fill setting; 2) reduction in sample volume through skeletonizing core and cuttings from wells to a representative but much smaller number of samples; and 3) solicit potential interest in the academic community where other geoscientists could freely access the samples for studies. The Nevada state university system through the Nevada Bureau of Mines and Geology responded positively to the opportunity to receive these NNSS samples from the EM Nevada Program. In June 2019, approximately 17,000 geologic samples, representing greater than 170,000 linear feet of drilling and weighing over 20,000 pounds, were shipped from the NNSS to the Great Basin Science Sample and Records Library located in Reno, Nevada. The benefits resulting from this transfer were realized by the EM Nevada Program in terms of cost and space savings for geologic sample storage at the NNSS. The transfer did not impact the EM Nevada Program mission as access to representative geologic samples for regulatory and scientific purposes was preserved. Moreover, the Nevada Bureau of Mines and Geology acquired a significant resource of subsurface geologic samples and supporting technical data to support academic and scientific studies in a complex volcanic setting in southwest Nevada. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2020

Spent Nuclear Fuel Exploratory Roadmaps - 20054

The U.S. Department of Energy manages nearly 2,500 metric tons of heavy metal (MTHM) of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) resulting from several decades of research, testing, and production reactors [DOE 1995]. This SNF is managed at the DOE Hanford Site in Washington State (Hanford), Idaho National Laboratory (INL), and Savannah River Site in South Carolina (SRS). From 1995 to 2004, the Department of Energy (DOE) made several key programmatic decisions, supported by appropriate documentation in accordance with the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) for the management of SNF [DOE 1995]. These decisions have provided an overarching framework for SNF management, as well as site-specific and SNF-related management decisions for the past two decades. In the years since these decisions were made, with the notable exception of the successful drying and packaging of the production reactor fuel at Hanford, a majority of the decisions have been largely unimplemented. Also, since these decisions were made, a number of changes that bear on considerations relative to the path forward have occurred. A SNF Exploratory Road map activity, identified reasonable alternate pathways for DoE's inventory of SNF. Three fundamental pathways were identified in this activity for the long-term management and disposition of DOE SNF: Direct Disposal Pathway, Existing Processing Pathway and Alternate Processing Pathway. Further actions would be required (e.g., evaluation of NEPA analysis, technology maturity evaluations, refinement of cost and risks, benefits and advantages relative to other alternate paths) to define and inform many key decisions that will result in the selection of the disposition pathways that are most beneficial to the US Government in dispositioning DoE's SNF inventory. DOE is currently managing all SNF safely; however, the age of DOE-owned SNF and facilities for storing and processing SNF, coupled with the uncertainty of the storage duration, necessitates decisions and actions to ensure that the infrastructure will be in place to ensure continued safe and effective long-term management and eventual disposal. The identification of reasonable alternate pathways took these considerations into account in an effort to proactively manage conditions that could challenge the safety of storing and managing DOE SNF over the time periods now contemplated and also to ensure that flexibility is preserved to ensure that the DOE SNF remains compatible with final disposition pathways when they become available. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2020

Criticality Consideration for Geologic Disposal of DOE-Owned Spent Nuclear Fuels - 20255

Decisions must be made relative to packaging spent nuclear fuel (SNF) for storage, transportation, and eventual disposal. This paper evaluates potential criticality-related loading and packaging considerations for Department of Energy (DOE)-owned SNF that could be impacted favorably or unfavorably by disposal uncertainties and proposes approaches to minimize such impacts. Using Al-Based SNF as an example and drawing on analyses performed in support of the Yucca Mountain Repository License Application (LA), this paper explores the role of natural barriers, engineered barriers, and waste form characteristics relative to reducing the potential for postclosure criticality. Several parameters important to postclosure criticality are considered in order to determine which are useful discriminators to support packaging decisions. Using these parameters, a qualitative assessment is performed relative to three options for managing DOE-owned SNFs. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2020

Retrieval of Transuranic Drums with Deflagration to Detonation Potential from a Vault at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory - 20207

During the final phase of a long-term project, a total of 80 TRU waste drums at ORNL have been retrieved from a below-grade storage vault in which they have remained untouched for about 25 years. The drums, which house material generated from past ORNL operations, are now stored and ready for eventual transfer to the Transuranic Waste Processing Center, located on Highway 95 in Oak Ridge. The Transuranic Waste Processing Center will process and ship the drums to WIPP in Carlsbad, New Mexico, for disposal. Workers lifted the drums one-by-one from the underground storage vault with a 110-ton crane over a one-week period in October 2017. Although the physical work was performed in one week, years of detailed planning preceded the fieldwork. A key obstacle needed to be overcome before the project could safely proceed. This obstacle involved the need to ensure controls were developed for the Deflagration to Detonation Transition (DDT) potential. DDT refers to a phenomenon in ignitable mixtures of a flammable gas and air (or oxygen) when a sudden transition takes place from a deflagration type of combustion to a detonation type of explosion. Basically, these drums, under certain circumstances, have a potential to detonate and overpressurize. Extensive analysis of the drums verified that detonation, while unlikely, was possible. Of the total 103 drums that were retrieved or moved in preparation for retrieval, 18 had DDT potential. Extensive security requirements were also necessary, due to the nature of the material, and this added another layer of complexity to the fieldwork. Prior to retrieving the drums from the underground storage vault, space needed to be made for them within the various above-grade facilities. Inventory and security requirements dictated what could be stored where, and the first step of the field work involved a number of drum movements in preparation for storage of the newly retrieved drums. This effort involved moving 21 drums already in the storage area to facilitate the addition of the newly retrieved ones. The retrieval project required a total of 107 critical lifts using the 110-ton crane, under 3 critical lift plans. The TRU waste storage facility is a Category 2 Nuclear Facility and is managed under an extensive Documented Safety Analysis. The TRU retrieval project was conducted in accordance with DOE Order 425.1D and included three Implementation Verification Reviews, two Management Assessments, one Readiness Assessment, and seven mock-ups in preparation for the field work. Despite being stored for 25 years, the drums were in good shape due to the integrity of the facilities where the drums were stored. Of the 80 drums that were retrieved, 12 were placed in special containers called 'overpacks' based on their content. The drums were removed safely and without incident, thanks to a lot of preparation and the efforts of a highly skilled team. Lessons learned through the DDT control development and the drum retrieval and overpacking process could be beneficial to others having to manage similar drums of TRU waste. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2020

The Corrective Maintenance Paradigm Shift at Hanford's Tank Farms - 20077

Hanford's Tank Farms facilities have been used to safely store waste for over 70 years, with the first single-shell tanks being constructed in 1943. Tank Farm facilities consist of 149 single-shell tanks, 28 double-shell tanks, an evaporator facility, and wastewater treatment facilities. Tank Farm facilities are aging, with a tremendous corrective maintenance burden on the Tank Farm contractor. The mission of Tank Farm facilities is soon changing from waste storage to waste staging for the Hanford Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant (WTP). WTP operations will demand a significant increase in Tank Farm facility operations, in which corrective maintenance outage windows will shrink drastically. This realization has forced the Tank Farm contractor to consider a paradigm shift in Tank Farm facilities Maintenance planning, and the use of reliability Engineering tools. The Tank Farm Production Operations Engineering Cognizant System Engineering (CSE) organization has led the way in motivating this paradigm shift. This shift has been realized through the use of: 1) technical exchange with other Department of Energy (DOE) contractors to develop improvements in the CSE program, 2) a shift from the use of lagging to leading system health indicators, and 3) a Plant Health Committee to unite Engineering, Operations, and Maintenance personnel toward a productive maintenance strategy. The CSE organization has held several technical exchanges with other DOE contractors to discuss CSE concepts, and how to better maintain aging infrastructure. The technical exchange with other contractors has greatly reduced the time required to make improvements in the Tank Farm CSE program. Other DOE contractors have already faced issues surrounding aging infrastructure, and have vast experience in improving the reliability and usable life of structures and components in nuclear facilities. The past CSE program used lagging health indicators to determine the health of systems. The key lagging indicator used to determine system health was availability, which is the percentage of time that a facility was ready for operation compared to the time the facility was demanded for operation. Availability was a good indicator of health in the waste storage mission of Tank Farms, where safe storage was the most important function of the facility, and where maintenance outage windows were typically long-duration. In current and future operations, outage windows are reducing, resulting in the need for much more reliable systems. Systems that have had high availability may suddenly become inoperable due to a failed component or sub-system. In several instances, the use of availability as an indicator of system health failed to predict system/equipment failure before its occurrence. In discussions with other DOE contractors, a set of reliability tools, including leading indicators of health, has been implemented in the CSE program. This primarily involves the use of failure modes and effects analysis and the study of equipment failure to develop system monitoring plans that focus on trending data to detect oncoming equipment failure ahead of time. In addition, the use of a Plant Health Committee has added significantly to the paradigm shift from a corrective maintenance philosophy to the use of predictive and preventive maintenance. The Plant Health Committee is a chartered team consisting of Engineering, Operations, and Maintenance personnel. CSEs use this forum to present the results of their performance monitoring, including the presentation of health via leading health indicators. The most positive aspect of this committee is the communication that it creates within these critical organizations. The Operations and Maintenance organization benefit from focusing maintenance on the reliability-centered focus provided by Engineering. Engineering benefits from the operational experience of the Operations organization and from the failure data that can be provided by Maintenance personnel. The continued use of the Plant Health Committee is expected to further decrease maintenance outage times, in better support of oncoming 24/7 operations. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2020

Predicting Saturated Hydraulic Conductivity over Time for Degrading Saltstone Vault Concrete - 20376

At the Savannah River Site (SRS), low-level liquid tank waste is mixed with cementitious materials to produce a solid, monolithic waste form referred to as saltstone. The liquid saltstone mixture is pumped into massive concrete structures referred to as saltstone disposal units (SDUs) for curing and long-term storage. SDUs are vaults made of high performance concrete forming a barrier between saltstone and the surrounding environment. Predicting the long-term performance of SDU vault concrete, as well as the saltstone material itself, is critical to understanding the potential releases of radionuclides to the surrounding environment as described in the Saltstone Disposal Facility (SDF) performance assessment (PA). The hydraulic conductivity profile for SDU vault concrete was conservatively assumed to degrade linearly from the initial saturated hydraulic conductivity of the intact concrete over a long period of time. The initial hydraulic properties of saturated SDU vault concrete have been measured, and the final hydraulic properties of degraded vault concrete are assumed to be the same as the porous backfill material that will surround the vault after closure. The assumed final condition of the vault concrete is also conservative in that it provides a greater estimate of water penetration through the vault than would generally be expected. Therefore, insights that provide more realistic but conservative estimates as to how degradation processes may change the hydraulic properties of the SDU vault concrete, the time dependent relationship of the vault concrete hydraulic properties to degradation (and thus time), and the final hydraulic properties of the vault concrete provides useful additions to the SDF PA. This paper focuses on the assumption that the saltstone vault concrete saturated hydraulic conductivity would decrease linearly as a function of degradation time; this assumption resulted from a worst-case, weighted (by relative layer thickness), arithmetic average of intact and backfill material hydraulic conductivities representing flow parallel to a layered system. This research indicates that the effective saturated hydraulic conductivity of the degraded SDU vault concrete should be based on the relative thickness-weighted geometric mean of the intact and degraded layers hydraulic conductivities. This alternative, which is supported extensively in the relevant literature and evaluated in this paper, leads to a more realistic and defensible estimate of the effective saturated hydraulic conductivity in degraded vault concrete while remaining conservative. The impact of using the more realistic estimate of the effective saturated hydraulic conductivity for the degraded concrete decreases the effective saturated hydraulic conductivity by up to several orders of magnitude for early times (i.e., when the SDU vault concrete is assumed degraded via sulfate attack and carbonation). This revised estimate of the effective saturated hydraulic conductivity has been implemented in the recently revised SDF PA. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2020

Pilot Test Remediation of a Fractured Bedrock Aquifer at the Maywood Superfund Site, Maywood, New Jersey - 20073

The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) and Cabrera Services are conducting a Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA) Pilot Test treatment of a fractured bedrock aquifer at the Formerly Utilized Sites Remedial Action Program (FUSRAP) Maywood Superfund Site (FMSS) located in Maywood, New Jersey (NJ), USA. The Maywood Chemical Company Superfund Site in Bergen County, NJ is listed on the United States Environmental Protection Agency (USEPA) Superfund National Priorities List (NPL). The National Superfund Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Information System (CERCLIS) identification number is NJD980529762. The Maywood Chemical Company Superfund Site (hereafter referred to as the FMSS) consists of 92 designated properties in the communities of Maywood, Lodi and Rochelle Park, NJ. These are collectively known as FMSS 'Vicinity Properties' and include property owned by the federal government (the Maywood Interim Storage Site, or MISS); the Stepan Company (former location of the Maywood Chemical Works, or MCW); 62 residential properties; three properties owned by the state or federal government; four municipal properties; and 21 commercial properties. The Stepan Company property includes contaminated buildings and three remediated U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) licensed burial pits; the MISS also includes a contaminated building. Contamination on the FMSS is being addressed under three separate actions coordinated by the lead regulator USEPA Region 2. The USACE is addressing thorium (Th) and other wastes at the site defined as 'FUSRAP waste' in the Soils and Buildings and Groundwater Records of Decision (ROD) for the FMSS. Stepan Company is addressing other chemical wastes (non-FUSRAP waste) at the FMSS. The Groundwater ROD [1] was signed into agreement by USACE Division Commander in June 2012 and USEPA Region 2 Administrator in July 2012 and presents the selected remedial actions for Operable Unit (OU) 2 groundwater at the MISS and adjacent properties. The selected remedial action is removal of non-radiologically contaminated soils on the MISS containing arsenic, lithium, and benzene with concentrations above cleanup levels, and monitored natural attenuation (MNA) of arsenic, lithium, and benzene in groundwater. In situ treatment of arsenic in the overburden aquifer using oxidation reduction (redox) alteration will also be performed if needed to meet the groundwater cleanup levels after the source soil is removed. The need for in situ treatment will be determined during the Groundwater ROD review at least three to four years after the contaminated source soil removal is completed. The third action addressing non-FUSRAP chemical wastes will be the responsibility of the Stepan Company as a primary responsible party in this action. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2020

Progress on Advancing the Robotic Air-slot Volumetric Inspection System (RAVIS) for Hanford Under-tank Inspection - 20519

The 27 in-service double-shell tank (DST) systems at Hanford provide interim storage for nearly 56 million gallons of nuclear and hazardous chemical legacy waste. The safe and reliable storage of the waste is critical to the site's extended cleanup mission. While in service, the leak integrity of the DSTs must be demonstrated to satisfy the Washington Administrative Code, inform decisions on tank management, and gauge fitness for continued service beyond originally intended design lives. The carbon steel plates and welds that comprise DST primary tank sidewalls and lower knuckles are routinely 'sampled' for volumetric non-destructive testing using ultrasonic inspection technology to determine whether corrosion pitting, cracking, or general corrosion are occurring that could compromise tank leak integrity. However, the carbon steel plates and welds that comprise the bottoms of primary tanks have not been thoroughly inspected since the DSTs were constructed (i.e., since 1968-1986) due to limited physical access to the exterior tank bottoms. The Robotic Air-slot Volumetric Inspection System, or 'RAVIS,' is being engineered to overcome the challenge of tank bottom in-service inspection. The system will be deployed under primary tanks within the small cooling channels/air-slots in the refractory pads upon which the tanks rest and will use ultrasonic guided wave inspection technology to volumetrically inspect physically inaccessible regions that make up ∼90% of a tank bottom, as well as regions that are physically accessible from the air-slots but comprise only ∼10% of a tank bottom. This paper describes the air-slot sensor and robotic deployment system and focuses on the testing approach and methods that are being applied to support (1) design feedback and performance acceptance (requirement verification) and (2) performance repeatability/reliability assessments (qualification) to ensure the RAVIS is prepared for successful inservice inspections of primary tank bottoms. Test progress made against the test plan, the results of 2019 testing, and the future outlook are included. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2020

Analysis of Material Properties of Aged Rigid Polyurethane Foam

Foams are classified as either rigid or flexible and are commonly used in applications such as pipe insulation, carpet fibers, and chair foam cushions. Polyurethane foams are excellent thermal insulators, have excellent mechanical properties, and are chemically inert. With the addition of fire protective additives, polyurethane foams have the ability to intumescence when exposed to high temperatures. For the future storage of the 9977 nuclear shipping packages, the material properties of the General Plastics 3716 rigid polyurethane foam were evaluated for long term performance by comparing aged samples to unaged samples. General Plastics 3716 rigid polyurethane foam was aged from November 2014 to June 2019 at varying temperatures of: 160 deg. F, 160 deg. F + 50% relative humidity (RH), 185 deg. F, 215 deg. F, and 250 deg. F. The foam was then analyzed via Fourier Transform Infrared Spectroscopy (FTIR), 3D Optical Microscope, Thermal Gravimetric Analysis (TGA), Differential Scanning Calorimetry (DSC). FTIR and Optical Microscope: No significant change to chemical or physical structure was evident by FTIR or optical microscope analysis. DSC: Decrease of heat capacity over time for all oven temperatures except a slight increase for the 185 deg. F conditioned foams. Largest decrease evident with foams conditioned at 250 deg. F. A slight increase in heat capacity for humid samples. Similar trends in heat capacities at 71 deg. C and 102 deg. C. TGA: As conditioning temperature increased, a decline was evident in the average percent weight loss, onset temperature, and first derivative peak temperature. No significant effect due to humidity except for a decrease in first derivative peak temperature. Unaged samples exhibited strong intumescence. Foams conditioned at 160 deg. F exhibited slight intumescence. Results suggest fire protective additives decomposed at higher temperatures, which contributed to a lower average percent mass loss in higher temperature conditioning. Further thermal degradation testing would be beneficial to evaluate the ability of the conditioned foams to intumesce. Evaluate irradiation dose rate effects on conditioned foam. Possible conditioning in an environment with a known humidity or analyzing a new aliquot of sample for each trial to achieve a more representative heat capacity calculation.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2020

Co-Disposal Waste Package Loading Options for DOE SNF and HLW - 20331

The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) is responsible for managing spent nuclear fuel (SNF) that is currently in, or will in the future come into, its possession. DOE must continue to safely store that SNF, transport it to an interim storage site or a repository, and dispose of it. These fuels come from a wide range of reactor types with various cladding materials and enrichments. Many of these reactors, now decommissioned, had unique design features, such as core configuration, fuel element and assembly geometry, moderator and coolant materials, operational characteristics, and neutron spatial and spectral properties, resulting in a large diversity of reactor and fuel designs. Because of the wide variety and conditions of SNF, a robust DOE Standard Canister was proposed that would confine radionuclides and preclude moderator. The DOE Standard Canister had four variations: 3.05-meter (10-foot) or 4.57-meter (15-foot) length, and 45.7-cm (18-inch) or 61.0-cm (24-inch) diameter. For ultimate disposal in the Yucca Mountain Repository, these canisters were to be grouped with 61.0-cm (24-inch) diameter high level waste (HLW) canisters in a 2.13-meter (84-inch) diameter co-disposal waste package. The smaller 45.7-cm (18-inch) diameter DOE Standard Canister could be placed in the middle of five HLW canisters. The larger 61.0-cm (24-inch) diameter DOE Standard Canister would take the place of one of the five HLW canisters on the outer ring in the co-disposal waste package. No DOE Standard Canisters have been loaded. A preliminary evaluation has estimated the number of elements of a fuel type that can fit into the different sizes of the DOE Standard Canister, but no definitive loading configuration has been selected. Changing the loading configuration could impact the number of loadable DOE Standard Canisters and the number of co-disposal waste packages needed for eventual disposition. This paper conveys the ranges of DOE Standard Canisters and HLW canisters that may be produced under certain conditions. It also examines the differences in the estimated number of co-disposal waste packages produced for eventual disposal when using different loading strategies in the DOE Standard Canister for Advanced Test Reactor (ATR), Peach Bottom, and High Flux Isotope Reactor (HFIR) SNF. Changing the loading configurations of ATR, Peach Bottom, and HFIR SNF slightly impacted the number of co-disposal waste packages that may be needed for ultimate disposal. The change in loading configuration was more impactful when a different canister was used, as opposed to varying the number of elements that could fit inside the same size canister. In one case, a reduction of co-disposal waste packages could be achieved by allowing mixing of short HLW canisters with long DOE Standard Canisters. The main conclusion from this analysis is that the ratio between HLW canisters and DOE Standard Canisters will drive the total number of co-disposal waste packages. If too many HLW canisters (i.e., more than five times the number of 18-inch DOE standard canisters) or DOE Standard Canisters are produced, some co-disposal waste packages may not have all positions filled. A co-disposal waste package may be filled with all HLW with no DOE Standard Canister, or a co-disposal waste package could be filled with a single DOE Standard Canister. A ratio that does not closely align to optimum could allow for the design of waste packages that hold just HLW canisters or just DOE SNF canisters. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2020

Verification of Reactor Activation Modelling with Physical Characterization Data and the Impact on Long Term Assessments - 20303

Whiteshell Laboratories, located in Manitoba, Canada, provided research facilities for the Canadian nuclear industry since the early 1960's. The facility was centered on Whiteshell Reactor 1 (WR-1), an organically cooled, heavy water moderated nuclear reactor. WR-1 was safely shut down in 1985, defueled and drained, and has been in a safe Storage with Surveillance (Deferred Decommissioning) state until present day. In support of an Environmental Assessment for proposed in-situ disposal of WR-1, detailed characterization information regarding the reactor core components (calandria, calandria tubes, and pressure tubes) was necessary to provide confidence that the long-term impacts of the facility can be assessed adequately. A simplified estimate of the total activation of core components was completed in 1992 using conservative assumptions, expected reactor configuration and computer models built with WIMS-CRNL, ONEDANT and ORIGEN-S. Due to the simplification, and age of the work, there was considerable doubt that the modelled inventory estimate of the core components was sufficient to support long-term performance modeling of the planned in-situ decommissioning. Additional data would be required to provide this confidence. Several options were considered for characterizing the WR-1 core components, but it was decided to collect only a limited number of samples in an effort to validate the 1992 simplified estimate as bounding. The limited number of samples reduced risks to workers, both radiological and non-radiological, and significantly reduced the costs required to confidently define and bound the radiological inventory of activation products in the core. The results of the sampling were compared to the simplified activation estimation. There was good agreement between the modelled and sampled results, with all major contributors to total activity showing similar relative quantities. The samples were generally lower than predicted by the models, with few exceptions. Notable exceptions included Nb-94, which were higher in the sample results than the model. This was determined to be caused by the use of Niobium containing steel alloys in the stainless steel pressure tube that were not accounted for in the models. The comparison of results provided confidence that the original inventory estimates produced through the simplified model are conservative and bounding, and therefore suitable for use in the long-term assessment of in situ disposal of the WR-1 reactor. This paper provides details of the simplified computer model results, their comparison to results of the sampling, and the changes adopted in the assessment of the in-situ decommissioning of WR-1 as a result. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗