Search NASA⌕ Search

SEARCH · Search NASA

Results for “REGULATORY GUIDES”

Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

Quote a phrase for an exact phrase match. Source license links do not imply unrestricted reuse.

At least 55 records · Page 3

Technical Review Report for the Model 9978-96 Package Safety Analysis Report for Packaging (S-SARP-G-00002, Revision 1, March 2009)

This Technical Review Report (TRR) documents the review, performed by Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) Staff, at the request of the Department of Energy (DOE), on the 'Safety Analysis Report for Packaging (SARP), Model 9978 B(M)F-96', Revision 1, March 2009 (S-SARP-G-00002). The Model 9978 Package complies with 10 CFR 71, and with 'Regulations for the Safe Transport of Radioactive Material-1996 Edition (As Amended, 2000)-Safety Requirements', International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Safety Standards Series No. TS-R-1. The Model 9978 Packaging is designed, analyzed, fabricated, and tested in accordance with Section III of the American Society of Mechanical Engineers Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code (ASME B&PVC). The review presented in this TRR was performed using the methods outlined in Revision 3 of the DOE's 'Packaging Review Guide (PRG) for Reviewing Safety Analysis Reports for Packages'. The format of the SARP follows that specified in Revision 2 of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's Regulatory Guide 7.9, i.e., 'Standard Format and Content of Part 71 Applications for Approval of Packages for Radioactive Material'. Although the two documents are similar in their content, they are not identical. Formatting differences have been noted in this TRR, where appropriate. The Model 9978 Packaging is a single containment package, using a 5-inch containment vessel (5CV). It uses a nominal 35-gallon drum package design. In comparison, the Model 9977 Packaging uses a 6-inch containment vessel (6CV). The Model 9977 and Model 9978 Packagings were developed concurrently, and they were referred to as the General Purpose Fissile Material Package, Version 1 (GPFP). Both packagings use General Plastics FR-3716 polyurethane foam as insulation and as impact limiters. The 5CV is used as the Primary Containment Vessel (PCV) in the Model 9975-96 Packaging. The Model 9975-96 Packaging also has the 6CV as its Secondary Containment Vessel (SCV). In comparison, the Model 9975 Packagings use Celotex{trademark} for insulation and as impact limiters. To provide a historical perspective, it is noted that the Model 9975-96 Packaging is a 35-gallon drum package design that has evolved from a family of packages designed by DOE contractors at the Savannah River Site. Earlier package designs, i.e., the Model 9965, the Model 9966, the Model 9967, and the Model 9968 Packagings, were originally designed and certified in the early 1980s. In the 1990s, updated package designs that incorporated design features consistent with the then-newer safety requirements were proposed. The updated package designs at the time were the Model 9972, the Model 9973, the Model 9974, and the Model 9975 Packagings, respectively. The Model 9975 Package was certified by the Packaging Certification Program, under the Office of Safety Management and Operations. The Model 9978 Package has six Content Envelopes: C.1 ({sup 238}Pu Heat Sources), C.2 ( Pu/U Metals), C.3 (Pu/U Oxides, Reserved), C.4 (U Metal or Alloy), C.5 (U Compounds), and C.6 (Samples and Sources). Per 10 CFR 71.59 (Code of Federal Regulations), the value of N is 50 for the Model 9978 Package leading to a Criticality Safety Index (CSI) of 1.0. The Transport Index (TI), based on dose rate, is calculated to be a maximum of 4.1.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Coronado Generating Station Repowering Evaluation - Siting Evaluation

The purpose of this initial siting evaluation is to consider the suitability of the Salt River Project (SRP) owned land at/near Coronado Generating Station (CGS) for a nuclear generating station (including advanced light water reactors, light water small modular reactors, and non-light-water designs1) and to assess if there are any exclusionary or avoidance factors associated with coal to nuclear repowering at CGS. This initial siting evaluation considers several characteristics (e.g., environmental conditions, seismic concerns, site footprint, water use, etc.) and highlights favorable/preferred characteristics as well as potential risks to feasibility. The results are intended to inform SRP on the strengths and weaknesses associated with the CGS site and inform the selection of candidate nuclear technologies for the CGS site that align with SRP’s mission and business objectives. This report relies on industry-recognized siting guidance, including Electric Power Research Institute’s (EPRI’s) Siting Guide (Reference 1) 2 and Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s (NRC’s) Regulatory Guide (RG) 4.7 (Reference 3), as well as nuclear domain expertise within the Gateway for Accelerated Innovation in Nuclear (GAIN), MPR Associates, Inc. (MPR), and the Idaho National Laboratory (INL).

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

A stress-state modified strain based failure criterion for evaluating the structural integrity of an inner eutectic barrier.

A slight modification of a package to transport solid metal contents requires inclusion of a thin titanium liner to protect against possible eutectic formation in 10 CFR 71.74 regulatory fire accident conditions. Under severe transport regulatory impact conditions, the package contents could impart high localized loading of the liner, momentarily pinching it between the contents and the thick containment vessel, and inducing some plasticity near the contact point. Actuator and drop table testing of simulated contents impacts against liner/containment vessel structures nearly bounded the potential plastic strain and stress triaxiality conditions, without any ductile tearing of the eutectic barrier. Additional bounding was necessary in some cases beyond the capability of the actuator and drop table tests, and in these cases a stress-modified evolution integral over the plastic strain history was successfully used as a failure criterion to demonstrate that structural integrity was maintained. The Heaviside brackets only allow the evolution integral to accumulate value when the maximum principal stress is positive, since failure is never observed under pure hydrostatic pressure, where the maximum principal stress is negative. Detailed finite element analyses of myriad possible impact orientations and locations between package contents and the thin eutectic barrier under regulatory impact conditions have shown that not even the initiation of a ductile tear occurs. Although localized plasticity does occur in the eutectic barrier, it is not the primary containment boundary and is thus not subject to ASME stress allowables from NRC Regulatory Guide 7.6. These analyses were used to successfully demonstrate that structural integrity of the eutectic barrier was maintained in all 10 CFR 71.73 and 71.74 regulatory accident conditions. The NRC is currently reviewing the Safety Analysis Report.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗

Development of Criteria for Hardware Descripted Language Programmed-Devices for Safety Systems in Nuclear Power Plants in the U.S

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is in the process of developing a regulatory guide (RG) describing a method the staff of the NRC considers acceptable, for use in complying with NRC regulations with respect to the development of hardware description language-programmed device (HPD). Examples include: field programmable gate arrays (FPGAs), systems in the power, instrumentation, and control portions of safety systems for nuclear power plants. The regulatory framework that NRC is establishing for nuclear power plants consists of a number of regulations and supporting guidelines applicable to the development of HPD-based safety systems. The NRC issues RGs to describe to the public, methods that the NRC staff considers acceptable for use in implementing specific parts of the agency's regulations; to explain techniques that the NRC staff uses in evaluating specific problems or postulated accidents; and to provide guidance to applicants. (authors)

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Standard review plan for evaluating nuclear power reactor license termination plans

This standard review plan (SRP) guides the staff of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) in conducting safety reviews of license termination plans (LTPs). The principal purpose of this SRP is to ensure the quality and uniformity of NRC staff reviews and to present a well-defined base from which to evaluate the requirements for terminating the license of a nuclear power plant. It is also the purpose of this SRP to make information about regulatory matters widely available, so that interested members of the public and the nuclear industry can gain a better understanding of the NRC staff's review process. Specific guidance for licensees is included in Regulatory Guide 1.179, "Standard Format and Content of License Termination Plans for Nuclear Power Reactors." Licensees may also use this SRP to assist in developing an LTP. The SRP presents the acceptance criteria for all areas of review for license termination, and identifies the matters to be reviewed, the basis for the review, and the conclusions that are sought. For example, NUREG-1757, "Consolidated Decommissioning Guidance" offers additional guidance on how to demonstrate compliance with the unrestricted release, restricted release, and alternative criteria for license termination, in accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR), Part 20, "Standards for Protection against Radiation," Subpart E, "Radiological Criteria for License Termination." To avoid duplication of information, this SRP references applicable sections of NUREG-1757 for additional guidance. In addition, the NRC has issued supplemental guidance that will subsequently be consolidated into NUREG-1757 to address partial site release before LTP approval, and compliance with 10 CFR Part 20, Subpart E. It should be noted that the memorandum of understanding (MOU) between the Environmental Protection Agency and NRC may contain consultation triggers for some radionuclides that may be lower than the NUREG-1757 Vol. 2 Revision 1, Appendix H screening values.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Development of a Consensus Standard for Verification and Validation of Nuclear System Thermal-Fluids Software

With the resurgence of nuclear power and increased interest in advanced nuclear reactors as an option to supply abundant energy without the associated greenhouse gas emissions of the more conventional fossil fuel energy sources, there is a need to establish internationally recognized standards for the verification and validation (V&V) of software used to calculate the thermal-hydraulic behavior of advanced reactor designs for both normal operation and hypothetical accident conditions. To address this need, ASME (American Society of Mechanical Engineers) Standards and Certification has established the V&V 30 Committee, under the jurisdiction of the V&V Standards Committee, to develop a consensus standard for verification and validation of software used for design and analysis of advanced reactor systems. The initial focus of this committee will be on the V&V of system analysis and computational fluid dynamics (CFD) software for nuclear applications. To limit the scope of the effort, the committee will further limit its focus to software to be used in the licensing of High-Temperature Gas-Cooled Reactors. In this framework, the Standard should conform to Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and other regulatory practices, procedures and methods for licensing of nuclear power plants as embodied in the United States (U.S.) Code of Federal Regulations and other pertinent documents such as Regulatory Guide 1.203, 'Transient and Accident Analysis Methods' and NUREG-0800, 'NRC Standard Review Plan'. In addition, the Standard should be consistent with applicable sections of ASME NQA-1-2008 'Quality Assurance Requirements for Nuclear Facility Applications (QA)'. This paper describes the general requirements for the proposed V&V 30 Standard, which includes; (a) applicable NRC and other regulatory requirements for defining the operational and accident domain of a nuclear system that must be considered if the system is to be licensed, (b) the corresponding calculation domain of the software that should encompass the nuclear operational and accident domain to be used to study the system behavior for licensing purposes, (c) the definition of the scaled experimental data set required to provide the basis for validating the software, (d) the ensemble of experimental data sets required to populate the validation matrix for the software in question, and (e) the practices and procedures to be used when applying a validation standard. Although this initial effort will focus on software for licensing of High-Temperature Gas-Cooled Reactors, it is anticipated that the practices and procedures developed for this Standard can eventually be extended to other nuclear and non-nuclear applications.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

A broad-group cross-section library based on ENDF/B-VII.0 for fast neutron dosimetry Applications

A new ENDF/B-VII.0-based coupled 44-neutron, 20-gamma-ray-group cross-section library was developed to investigate the latest evaluated nuclear data file (ENDF) ,in comparison to ENDF/B-VI.3 used in BUGLE-96, as well as to generate an objective-specific library. The objectives selected for this work consisted of dosimetry calculations for in-vessel and ex-vessel reactor locations, iron atom displacement calculations for reactor internals and pressure vessel, and {sup 58}Ni(n,{gamma}) calculation that is important for gas generation in the baffle plate. The new library was generated based on the contribution and point-wise cross-section-driven (CPXSD) methodology and was applied to one of the most widely used benchmarks, the Oak Ridge National Laboratory Pool Critical Assembly benchmark problem. In addition to the new library, BUGLE-96 and an ENDF/B-VII.0-based coupled 47-neutron, 20-gamma-ray-group cross-section library was generated and used with both SNLRML and IRDF dosimetry cross sections to compute reaction rates. All reaction rates computed by the multigroup libraries are within {+-} 20 % of measurement data and meet the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission acceptance criterion for reactor vessel neutron exposure evaluations specified in Regulatory Guide 1.190. (authors)

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Calibration and validation of NRC fuel performance models

FRAPCON and FRAPTRAN are the steady-state and transient fuel performance codes, respectively, that are used by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) in performing confirmatory calculations of licensee fuel performance codes and safety analysis methods during the review and approval of these codes and methods for light-water reactors. The NRC also uses these codes to perform calculations to direct regulatory research and to assist in the development of new regulations and regulatory guides. FRAPCON and FRAPTRAN are well-validated fuel performance codes that are kept in a constant state of maintenance. FRAPCON and FRAPTRAN have an extensive database of separate effects data used to validate individual material property and fuel performance models and an integral effects database used to assess the overall code prediction within the full range of fuel operations. The key code predictions that are of regulatory interest as they relate to various specified acceptable design limits are: fuel and cladding temperature, rod internal pressure, cladding hoop strain, cladding corrosion and hydriding, and fission gas release. To assess the ability of the code to accurately predict these values, the integral assessment database consists of measurements of fuel centerline temperature, fission gas release, void volume, cladding corrosion, and cladding hoop strain. This paper will discuss the activities that are performed to ensure that FRAPCON and FRAPTRAN represent the state of the industry and will describe the separate effect and integral effect databases that are used to validate the models and are continually being expanded to ensure validation over the full range of fuel operations.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

NRC ARDC Guidance Support Status Report

This report provides a summary that reflects the progress and status of proposed regulatory design criteria for advanced non-light water reactor (LWR) designs in accordance with the Level 3 milestone M3AT-17IN2001013 in work package AT-17IN200101. These criteria have been designated as advanced reactor design criteria (ARDC) and they provide guidance to future applicants for addressing the general design criteria (GDC) that are currently applied specifically to LWR designs. This report provides a summary of Phase 2 activities related to the various tasks associated with ARDC development and the subsequent development of ARDC regulatory guidance for sodium fast reactor (SFR) and modular high-temperature gas-cooled reactor (HTGR) designs. Status Report Organization: Section 2 discusses the origin of the GDC and their application to LWRs. Section 3 addresses the objective of this initiative and how it benefits the advanced non-LWR reactor vendors. Section 4 discusses the scope and structure of the initiative. Section 5 provides background on the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) ARDC team’s original development of the proposed ARDC that were submitted to the NRC for consideration. Section 6 provides a summary of recent ARDC Phase 2 activities. Appendices A through E document the DOE ARDC team’s public comments on various sections of the NRC’s draft regulatory guide DG–1330, “Guidance for Developing Principal Design Criteria for Non-Light Water Reactors.”

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Waste Isolation Pilot Plant Environmental Monitoring Plan (Rev. 4)

U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Order 450.1A, Environmental Protection Program, requires each DOE site to conduct environmental monitoring. Environmental monitoring at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) is conducted in order to: (1) verify and support compliance with applicable federal, state, and local environmental laws, regulations, permits, and orders; (2) establish baselines and characterize trends in the physical, chemical, and biological condition of effluent and environmental media; (3) identify potential environmental problems and evaluate the need for remedial actions or measures to mitigate the problems; (4) detect, characterize, and report unplanned releases; (5) evaluate the effectiveness of effluent treatment and control, and pollution abatement programs; and (6)determine compliance with commitments made in environmental impact statements, environmental assessments, safety analysis reports, or other official DOE documents. This Environmental Monitoring Plan (EMP) explains the rationale and design criteria for the environmental monitoring program, extent and frequency of monitoring and measurements, procedures for laboratory analyses, quality assurance (QA) requirements, program implementation procedures, and direction for the preparation and disposition of reports. Changes to the environmental monitoring program may be necessary to allow the use of advanced technology and new data collection techniques. This EMP will document changes in the environmental monitoring program. Guidance for preparation of EMPs is contained in DOE/EH-0173T, Environmental Regulatory Guide for Radiological Effluent Monitoring and Environmental Surveillance.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Waste Isolation Pilot Plant Environmental Monitoring Plan

U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Order 450.1, Environmental Protection Program, requires each DOE site to conduct environmental monitoring. Environmental monitoring at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) is conducted in order to: (a) Verify and support compliance with applicable federal, state, and local environmental laws, regulations, permits, and orders; (b) Establish baselines and characterize trends in the physical, chemical, and biological condition of effluent and environmental media; (c) Identify potential environmental problems and evaluate the need for remedial actions or measures to mitigate the problems; (d) Detect, characterize, and report unplanned releases; (e) Evaluate the effectiveness of effluent treatment and control, and pollution abatement programs; and (f) Determine compliance with commitments made in environmental impact statements, environmental assessments, safety analysis reports, or other official DOE documents. This Environmental Monitoring Plan (EMP) explains the rationale and design criteria for the environmental monitoring program, extent and frequency of monitoring and measurements, procedures for laboratory analyses, quality assurance (QA) requirements, program implementation procedures, and direction for the preparation and disposition of reports. Changes to the environmental monitoring program may be necessary to allow the use of advanced technology and new data collection techniques. This EMP will document changes in the environmental monitoring program. Guidance for preparation of EMPs is contained in DOE/EH-0173T, Environmental Regulatory Guide for Radiological Effluent Monitoring and Environmental Surveillance.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Regulatory Framework for Permanent Shut-down and Decommissioning of Nuclear Power Plant in Korea - 18101

Kori Unit 1, the first commercial NPP in Korea which was commissioned in 1978, was put on permanent shutdown for decommissioning on June 2017, after 40 years of operation. For permanent shutdown of the Kori Unit 1, an operation change permit was submitted in 2016 prior to the expiration since the NSA (Nuclear Safety Act) recognizes permanent shutdown as one of the operation stage. In preparation for the decommissioning of Kori Unit 1, the NSA related to decommissioning was revised and promulgated in 2015. The lower statues including Enforcement Decree and Regulation of the NSA, etc. were promptly revised to reflect decommissioning related requirements and procedures accordingly. For new NPPs, preliminary decommissioning plan is submitted and is being reviewed in the course of license review. Operating NPPs are also planning to submit the decommissioning plan by 2018 and receive approvals from Nuclear Safety and Security Commission. In case that an operator intends to decommission a nuclear installation, the operator shall apply for decommissioning and receive an approval from the NSSC. As discussed, framework for permanent shutdown and decommissioning of nuclear facilities have been well formatted by successful revision of NSA in Korea. Further detailed technical standards and regulatory guides on decommissioning will be developed to facilitate the relevant activities and ensure the nuclear safety. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Key Regulatory Issues for Digital Instrumentation and Control Systems at Nuclear Power Plants

To help reduce the uncertainty associated with application of digital instrumentation and controls (I&C) technology in nuclear power plants, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has issued six Interim Staff Guidance (ISG) documents that address the current regulatory positions on what are considered the significant digital I&C issues. These six documents address the following topics: Cyber Security, Diversity and Defense-in-Depth, Risk Informed Digital I&C Regulation, Communication issues, Human Factors and the Digital I&C Licensing Process (currently issued as Draft). After allowing for further refinement based on additional technical insight gathered by NRC staff through near-term research and detailed review of relevant experience, it is expected that updated positions ultimately will be incorporated into regulatory guides and staff review procedures. This paper presents an overview of the guidance provided by the NRC-issued ISGs on key technology considerations (i.e., the first five documents above) for safety-related digital I&C systems.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Estimates of Internal Dose Resulting from I-131 Patients in Hotels - Paper 147

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Regulatory Guide 8.39 provides the following estimate to the maximum internal committed effective dose, CED{sub i}, to an individual from a released patient having received radionuclide therapy: CED{sub i} = 10{sup -5} Q{sub adm} DCF where Q{sub adm} = activity administered to the patient (Bq), DCF = ingestion dose coefficient (Sv/Bq). Since many released patients stay in a hotel for a day or two after administration of the I-131, an effort was made to provide reasonable estimates of internal committed effective dose to a housekeeper at a hotel. Reasonable exposure scenarios are presented herein with the resulting doses. The value 10{sup -6} from a health physics 'rule of thumb' for intake in workplace environments, and explored by Brodsky, was multiplied by a factor of 10 to account for the most highly exposed individual and to add a degree of conservatism to the evaluation. The ingestion dose coefficient was used since it was felt that the maximum internal intake would either be via the skin or mouth. The scenarios investigated to date and presented herein show rather low potential doses of hotel housekeepers due to internal contamination. The internal doses are conservative since they assume the immediate release and placement of the patient in the hotel or household. The existing Reg. Guide 8.39 internal dose estimate appears to be very conservative and are very low in comparison to external gamma ray dose due to released patients. (authors)

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗

Regulatory Analysis of Reactivity Transients

This paper will describe modifications made to the FRAPCON-3 and FRAPTRAN fuel performance codes and models that impact reactivity initiated accident (RIA) analyses. The modified models include an upper bound empirical and best estimate release models for fast transients, and a revised fuel failure model that accounts for ductile and brittle failure. Because experimental data exists for discrete test conditions, the codes and models are used to interpolate and to some extent, to extrapolate these test conditions. An upper bound empirical model for release is used to establish new recommended release fractions for long-lived and short lived (radioactive) isotopes for RIA events in Regulatory Guide 1.183. A best estimate release model is used in FRAPTRAN 1.4 based on grain boundary gas concentrations from FRAPCON-3.4 to predict release for RIA events. Code and model predictions will be compared to failure and release data from RIA tests to demonstrate accuracy.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Maxdose-SR and popdose-SR routine release atmospheric dose models used at SRS

MAXDOSE-SR and POPDOSE-SR are used to calculate dose to the offsite Reference Person and to the surrounding Savannah River Site (SRS) population respectively following routine releases of atmospheric radioactivity. These models are currently accessed through the Dose Model Version 2014 graphical user interface (GUI). MAXDOSE-SR and POPDOSE-SR are personal computer (PC) versions of MAXIGASP and POPGASP, which both resided on the SRS IBM Mainframe. These two codes follow U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (USNRC) Regulatory Guides 1.109 and 1.111 (1977a, 1977b). The basis for MAXDOSE-SR and POPDOSE-SR are USNRC developed codes XOQDOQ (Sagendorf et. al 1982) and GASPAR (Eckerman et. al 1980). Both of these codes have previously been verified for use at SRS (Simpkins 1999 and 2000). The revisions incorporated into MAXDOSE-SR and POPDOSE-SR Version 2014 (hereafter referred to as MAXDOSE-SR and POPDOSE-SR unless otherwise noted) were made per Computer Program Modification Tracker (CPMT) number Q-CMT-A-00016 (Appendix D). Version 2014 was verified for use at SRS in Dixon (2014).

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗

Documented Safety Analysis Addendum for the Neutron Radiography Reactor Facility Core Conversion

The Neutron Radiography Reactor Facility (NRAD) is a Training, Research, Isotope Production, General Atomics (TRIGA) reactor which was installed in the Idaho National Laboratory (INL) Hot Fuels Examination Facility (HFEF) at the Materials and Fuels Complex (MFC) in the mid 1970s. The facility provides researchers the capability to examine both irradiated and non-irradiated materials in support of reactor fuel and components programs through non-destructive neutron radiography examination. The facility has been used in the past as one facet of a suite of reactor fuels and component examination facilities available to researchers at the INL and throughout the DOE complex. The facility has also served various commercial research activities in addition to the DOE research and development support. The reactor was initially constructed using Fuel Lifetime Improvement Program (FLIP)- type highly enriched uranium (HEU) fuel obtained from the dismantled Puerto Rico Nuclear Center (PRNC) reactor. In accordance with international non-proliferation agreements, the NRAD core will be converted to a low enriched uranium (LEU) fuel and will continue to utilize the PRNC control rods, control rod drives, startup source, and instrument console as was previously used with the HEU core. The existing NRAD Safety Analysis Report (SAR) was created and maintained in the preferred format of the day, combining sections of both DOE-STD-3009 and Nuclear Regulatory Commission Regulatory Guide 1.70. An addendum was developed to cover the refueling and reactor operation with the LEU core. This addendum follows the existing SAR format combining required formats from both the DOE and NRC. This paper discusses the project to successfully write a compliant and approved addendum to the existing safety basis documents.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

IEEE STD. 1012 and NEI 96-07, Appendix D - Strange bedfellows? - 149

The final draft of a revision to IEEE Std. 1012-2012, 'IEEE Standard for System, Software and Hardware Verification and Validation', is expected to be approved for publication in June 2017. A draft of NEI 96-07, Appendix D, 'Supplemental Guidance for Application of 10 CFR 50.59 to Digital Modifications', has been submitted to the NRC staff for review and endorsement. What, if any, relationship exists between these two documents? How can the nuclear industry utilize the first one to help ensure success when applying the second one? NRC Regulatory Guides only endorse digital system and software related industry standards for application to safety-related systems and components, but the vast majority of digital modifications are made to non-safety related systems and components, so are these industry standards of little or no use when performing digital upgrades to non-safety related equipment? This paper answers these and other related questions and shows how application of a graded approach to verification and validation, utilizing the IEEE Std. 1012 concept of 'integrity level', can increase the likelihood of a 10 CFR 50.59 evaluation outcome that does not require prior NRC review and approval for non-safety related digital modifications. (authors)

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗