Automation levels for nuclear reactor operations: A revised perspective
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In this article, we describe the seismoacoustic wavefield recorded outdoors but inside the facility fence of the High Flux Isotope Reactor (HFIR) at Oak Ridge National Laboratory (Tennessee). HFIR is a research nuclear reactor that generates neutrons for scattering, irradiation research, and isotope production. This reactor operates at a nominal power of 85 MW, with a full-power period between 24 and 26 days. This study uses data from a single seismoacoustic station that operated for 60 days and sampled a full operating reactor cycle, that is, full-power operation and end-of-cycle outage. The analysis presented here is based on identifying signals that characterize the steady, that is, full-power operation and end-of-cycle outage, and transitional, that is, start-up and shutdown, states of the reactor. We found that the overall seismoacoustic energy closely follows the main power cycle of the reactor and identified spectral regions excited by specific reactor operational conditions. In particular, we identified a tonal noise sequence with a fundamental frequency around 21.4 Hz and multiple harmonics that emerge as the reactor reaches 90% of nominal power in both seismic and acoustic channels. We also utilized temperature measurements from the monitoring system of the reactor to suggest links between the operation of reactor’s subsystems and seismoacoustic signals. We demonstrate that seismoacoustic monitoring of an industrial facility can identify and track some industrial processes and detect events related to operations that involve energy transport.
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Integrated energy systems (IES) are increasing in popularity and relevance given the heightened penetration of variable renewable energy sources. This variability is causing traditional baseload generators to reconsider their business cases as exclusively electrical generation stations and to instead consider ancillary products (e.g., hydrogen) to remain competitive in the current energy market. This work investigates the coupling, control, and overall viability of IES consisting of an advanced nuclear reactor coupled with a high-temperature steam electrolysis (HTSE) plant and hydrogen storage. The goal of such IES is to produce hydrogen without impacting reactor operations during periods of off-peak electricity demand and then sell electricity to the grid during periods of high demand. To accomplish this, a novel heat exchanger, control scheme, and coupling strategy were needed to ensure that the advanced nuclear power plant could make these transitions. Idaho National Laboratory’s open-source Framework for Optimization of Resources and Economics (FORCE) framework was used to develop novel coupling and control schemes that demonstrate the viability of multi-market operation of advanced nuclear reactors to produce both electricity and hydrogen. The results demonstrated the coupled IES could operate without impacting reactor systems while monetizing the electricity market and meeting all contractual hydrogen consumer demands.
Negative triangularity (NT) has received renewed interest as a fusion reactor regime due to its beneficial power-handling properties, including low scrape-off layer power and a larger divertor wetted area that facilitates simple divertor integration. NT experiments have also demonstrated core performance on par with positive triangularity (PT) high confinement mode (H-mode) without edge-localized modes (ELMs), encouraging further study of an NT reactor core. In this work, we use integrated modeling to scope the operating space around two NT reactor strategies. The first is the high-field, compact fusion pilot plant concept Modular, Adjustable, NT ARC (MANTA) and the second is a low field, high aspect ratio concept based on work by Medvedev et al. By integrating equilibrium, core transport, and edge ballooning instability models, we establish a range of operating points with less than 50 MW scrape-off layer power and fusion power comparable to PT H-mode reactor concepts. Heating and seeded impurities are leveraged to accomplish the same fusion performance and scrape-off layer exhaust power for various pressure edge boundary conditions. Scans over these pressure edge conditions accommodate any current uncertainty of the properties of the NT edge and show that the performance of an NT reactor will be extremely dependent on the edge pressure. The high-field case is found to enable lower scrape-off layer power because it is capable of reaching high fusion powers at a relatively compact size, which allows increased separatrix density without exceeding the Greenwald density limit. Adjustments in NT shaping exhibit small changes in fusion power, with an increase in fusion power density seen at weaker NT. Infinite-n ballooning instability models indicate that an NT reactor core can reach fusion powers comparable to leading PT H-mode reactor concepts while remaining ballooning-stable. Seeded krypton is leveraged to further lower scrape-off layer power since NT does not have a requirement to remain in H-mode while still maintaining high confinement. We contextualize the NT reactor operating space by comparing to popular PT H-mode reactor concepts, and find that NT exhibits competitive ELM-free performance with these concepts for a variety of edge conditions while maintaining relatively low scrape-off layer power.
Wireless Operation of a Nuclear Reactor
A two-step cycle was discussed for solar thermochemical energy storage based on aluminum-doped calcium manganite reduction/oxidation reactions for direct integration into Air Brayton cycles. The two steps encompassed 1) the storage of concentrated solar direct irradiation via the thermal reduction of aluminum-doped calcium manganite and 2) the delivery of heat to an Air-Brayton cycle via re-oxidation of oxygen-deficient aluminum-doped calcium manganite. The re-oxidized aluminum-doped calcium manganite was fed back to the first step to complete the cycle. A 5 kWth solar thermochemical reactor operating under vacuum was fabricated and tested to examine the first cycle reduction step. Reactor operating conditions and high-flux solar simulator control were tuned for continuous reactor operation with particle temperatures > 1073 K. Continuous operation was achieved using intermittent, dense granular flows. A maximum absorption efficiency of 64.7% was shown, accounting for both sensible and chemical heat storage.
This work presents fully reproducible multiphysics benchmark models of the Systems for Nuclear Auxiliary Power (SNAP) 8 Experimental Reactor at operating conditions with coolant flow. Wet experiment (with coolant, at power) validation benchmarks are presented using both deterministic (Serpent-Griffin) and Monte-Carlo (OpenMC-Cardinal) multiphysics frameworks coupled with thermal-hydraulic solvers in MOOSE. Reactivity coefficient measurements including fuel temperature, isothermal temperature, and power coefficients show good agreement with experiments, with discrepancies within experimental uncertainty. Reactivity worth experiments for coolant, samarium, and xenon poisoning are reproduced with differences under 200 pcm. Comparison between Serpent-Griffin and OpenMC-Cardinal frameworks reveal multiphysics coupling introduces positive reactivity effects (100-200 pcm) compared to uniform temperature and density fields at nominal operating conditions. Comparison between Serpent-Griffin and reference Serpent solution shows that power distributions maintain consistent radial and axial peaking behavior. All models, assumptions, thermophysical and thermomechanical properties, and material definitions are thoroughly documented with cited references; model inputs and model generating scripts are stored in the snapReactors GitHub repository.
The incorporation of remote operations into reactor operations is a topic of high interest among advanced and small modular reactor (A/SMR) vendors, with some considering it essential to the success of their business models. However, remote operations are a concept novel to the nuclear industry. While various technical aspects of remote operations have been explored, a significant gap remains in understanding the security implications of integrating remote operations into reactor designs, particularly concerning the security requirements for remote-operations facilities and infrastructure. This report aims to address this gap by first defining classes of remote operation based on the extent of remote access to reactor control systems and grounded in the existing regulatory framework with compatible terminology. Secondly, the report outlines the physical and cybersecurity requirements applicable to remote-operations facilities and infrastructure at each defined class. These requirements are based on existing licensing frameworks provided by 10 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 50 and 10 CFR Part 52, as well as the upcoming A/SMR licensing framework in the proposed Part 53. The assessment focuses specifically on security regulations, such as 10 CFR Part 73, which includes provisions for both cybersecurity (§ 73.54) and physical security (§ 73.55). This report proposes five classes of remote reactor operations. Class 1 involves remote monitoring only, with no control over reactor systems. Class 2 allows for the remote issuance of allowlisted commands to the reactor facility. Class 3 extends control to non-safety-significant, non-safety-related, or not important to safety systems and equipment. Class 4 permits remote control of safety-significant systems. Finally, Class 5 allows remote control of safety-related systems. It is important to note that these classes were defined purely with functionality in mind, without considering the practicality or feasibility of implementation for each class under current or upcoming regulatory guidance. The intention behind this approach is to enable an assessment of which security requirements apply to each class, allowing readers to evaluate the implementation possibilities for their specific use cases. Following the definition of remote-operation classes, the report assesses the specific physical and cybersecurity requirements applicable to the remote-operations facility and infrastructure within each defined class. This includes defining the types and locations of operators that are possible at each class of operation and, based on operator type and location, as well as functionality within each class, outlining the physical and cybersecurity requirements. By detailing the security requirements by class, the report provides readers with the information needed to determine the type of security program they may need to implement for their desired concept of operation. The next contribution of this report was to assess the practicality of implementing each proposed class of remote operations based upon the security requirement assessment. In short, three of the five proposed remote-operation classes were found to possibly have a practical path forward to implementation under the U.S. regulatory framework. Class 1 remote operations are currently in use in the U.S. while Class 2 and 3 remote operations may be logistically possible to implement under the U.S. regulatory framework. The final two Classes, 4 and 5, would likely be logistically difficult, if not infeasible to implement within the current U.S. physical- and cybersecurity regulatory framework. Given the results of the feasibility assessment, an example architecture is proposed for both Class 2, remote allowlisted commands, and Class 3, remote control of non-safety systems as well as security implication assessments of each architecture. These example implementations are not meant to be prescriptive in terms of how Class 2 or Class 3 remote operations should be deployed; instead, they are intended to be informative to stakeholders on how Class 2 or Class 3 could potentially be applied in order to inform their system design. An example architecture for Class 1 remote monitoring was not provided as Class 1 in already in use in U.S. nuclear operations. Example architectures for Class 4 and Class 5 were not provided due to their assessment of being likely infeasible to implement. The final contribution is an assessment of the physical- and cybersecurity implications of introducing autonomous operations into an A/SMR. What was found was that the security implications can be separated into two cases. Autonomous operations supported by SSCs located only at the reactor site, and autonomous operations supported by SSCs outside of the reactor site. For the first case, the introduction of autonomous systems will likely not change the facility’s requirement to comply with existing cyber and physical security regulation
Operating experience in pumping coal and coal char slurries at pressures up to 1500 psig is discussed. The design specifications for the mixing tanks, pumps, piping, and slurry heaters are given along with pressure drop and minimum flow velocity data on water-lignite slurries.
The rising interest in molten salts, both as thermal energy storage media and as high-temperature solvents for fissile materials in advanced nuclear reactors, has spurred significant growth in research on structural and functional salt-facing materials. Impurities, such as water, play a significant role in the degradation of materials in molten salt environments. Other impurities, such as fission products, are expected to accumulate in molten salts during normal reactor operation and can affect the properties of the salt and salt-facing materials. During normal reactor operation, rare-earth element species are expected to form as byproducts of fission reactions, potentially degrading or altering the performance of both structural and functional materials exposed to salts. Here, in this work, fission product surrogates, europium metal and EuCl 3 , were added to the KCl-MgCl 2 salt while exposing pure Cr specimens in the melt at 600 and 700 °C for 1000 h. Low reactivity was observed with the baseline salt, while both the Eu and EuCl 3 additions to the salt resulted in increased mass loss of Cr specimens. A capillary electrophoresis technique was developed to enable the detection of low parts-per-million (ppm) concentrations of europium (Eu) in chloride salt both before and after exposure of Cr metal. This technique provides a sensitive and reliable method for monitoring trace levels of Eu, which is critical for understanding the interactions and potential contamination effects in salt-facing materials during reactor operation. This quantification technique can be applied to other cationic and anionic contaminants in halide salts.
A radiation shielding system is needed to protect personnel and equipment from harsh neutron and photon fluxes during: Reactor operations Post shut down operations Disassembly Decommissioning Examples of RSS driving requirements Radiological Controls Operating dose rate: the dose rate during normal reactor operations shall be <0.5 mrem/hr at the exterior wall of DOME containment Outdoor radiation limit: shielding shall provide the dose to a facility worker outside of DOME to <0.05 mrem/hr at 50 ft from the exterior wall of the DOME Temperature Reactors may have operating temperatures up to 800C The RSS shall be capable of removing up to 100 KW of heat during normal operating conditions the concrete structure has an upper temperature limit of 100°C
A variety of dimensionless numbers related to momentum and heat transfer are useful in Chemical Vapor Deposition (CVD) analysis. These numbers are not traditionally calculated by directly using reactor operating parameters, such as temperature and pressure. In this paper, these numbers have been expressed in a form that explicitly shows their dependence upon the carrier gas, reactor geometry, and reactor operation conditions. These expressions were derived for both monatomic and diatomic gases using estimation techniques for viscosity, thermal conductivity, and heat capacity. Values calculated from these expressions compared well to previously published values. These expressions provide a relatively quick method for predicting changes in the flow patterns resulting from changes in the reactor operating conditions.
Information on materials degradations during advanced reactor operations is limited Effects of materials degradations during reactor operations are synergistic, involving: Irradiation, corrosion, elevated temperature exposure and stress (creep-fatigue loading) Establishment of surrogate materials surveillance program for the management of materials degradations would be an important pathway in support of the timely licensing of advanced reactors