Domain-Informed Assessment of Nuclear Reactor Operations.
Abstract not provided.
Reichardt, Thomas A.↗
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Determining Cooling Time to Improve Burnup Estimation for Characterizing Reactor Operations
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Stomps, Jordan↗
The Local Seismoacoustic Wavefield of a Research Nuclear Reactor and Its Response to Reactor Power Level
In this article, we describe the seismoacoustic wavefield recorded outdoors but inside the facility fence of the High Flux Isotope Reactor (HFIR) at Oak Ridge National Laboratory (Tennessee). HFIR is a research nuclear reactor that generates neutrons for scattering, irradiation research, and isotope production. This reactor operates at a nominal power of 85 MW, with a full-power period between 24 and 26 days. This study uses data from a single seismoacoustic station that operated for 60 days and sampled a full operating reactor cycle, that is, full-power operation and end-of-cycle outage. The analysis presented here is based on identifying signals that characterize the steady, that is, full-power operation and end-of-cycle outage, and transitional, that is, start-up and shutdown, states of the reactor. We found that the overall seismoacoustic energy closely follows the main power cycle of the reactor and identified spectral regions excited by specific reactor operational conditions. In particular, we identified a tonal noise sequence with a fundamental frequency around 21.4 Hz and multiple harmonics that emerge as the reactor reaches 90% of nominal power in both seismic and acoustic channels. We also utilized temperature measurements from the monitoring system of the reactor to suggest links between the operation of reactor’s subsystems and seismoacoustic signals. We demonstrate that seismoacoustic monitoring of an industrial facility can identify and track some industrial processes and detect events related to operations that involve energy transport.
21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗
MULTIMARKET CONTROL AND OPERATION OF AN ADVANCED NUCLEAR REACTOR WITHIN AN INTEGRATED ENERGY PARK
Integrated energy systems (IES) are increasing in popularity and relevance given the heightened penetration of variable renewable energy sources. This variability is causing traditional baseload generators to reconsider their business cases as exclusively electrical generation stations and to instead consider ancillary products (e.g., hydrogen) to remain competitive in the current energy market. This work investigates the coupling, control, and overall viability of IES consisting of an advanced nuclear reactor coupled with a high-temperature steam electrolysis (HTSE) plant and hydrogen storage. The goal of such IES is to produce hydrogen without impacting reactor operations during periods of off-peak electricity demand and then sell electricity to the grid during periods of high demand. To accomplish this, a novel heat exchanger, control scheme, and coupling strategy were needed to ensure that the advanced nuclear power plant could make these transitions. Idaho National Laboratory’s open-source Framework for Optimization of Resources and Economics (FORCE) framework was used to develop novel coupling and control schemes that demonstrate the viability of multi-market operation of advanced nuclear reactors to produce both electricity and hydrogen. The results demonstrated the coupled IES could operate without impacting reactor systems while monetizing the electricity market and meeting all contractual hydrogen consumer demands.
08 HYDROGEN↗
Characterizing the negative triangularity reactor core operating space with integrated modeling
Negative triangularity (NT) has received renewed interest as a fusion reactor regime due to its beneficial power-handling properties, including low scrape-off layer power and a larger divertor wetted area that facilitates simple divertor integration. NT experiments have also demonstrated core performance on par with positive triangularity (PT) high confinement mode (H-mode) without edge-localized modes (ELMs), encouraging further study of an NT reactor core. In this work, we use integrated modeling to scope the operating space around two NT reactor strategies. The first is the high-field, compact fusion pilot plant concept Modular, Adjustable, NT ARC (MANTA) and the second is a low field, high aspect ratio concept based on work by Medvedev et al. By integrating equilibrium, core transport, and edge ballooning instability models, we establish a range of operating points with less than 50 MW scrape-off layer power and fusion power comparable to PT H-mode reactor concepts. Heating and seeded impurities are leveraged to accomplish the same fusion performance and scrape-off layer exhaust power for various pressure edge boundary conditions. Scans over these pressure edge conditions accommodate any current uncertainty of the properties of the NT edge and show that the performance of an NT reactor will be extremely dependent on the edge pressure. The high-field case is found to enable lower scrape-off layer power because it is capable of reaching high fusion powers at a relatively compact size, which allows increased separatrix density without exceeding the Greenwald density limit. Adjustments in NT shaping exhibit small changes in fusion power, with an increase in fusion power density seen at weaker NT. Infinite-n ballooning instability models indicate that an NT reactor core can reach fusion powers comparable to leading PT H-mode reactor concepts while remaining ballooning-stable. Seeded krypton is leveraged to further lower scrape-off layer power since NT does not have a requirement to remain in H-mode while still maintaining high confinement. We contextualize the NT reactor operating space by comparing to popular PT H-mode reactor concepts, and find that NT exhibits competitive ELM-free performance with these concepts for a variety of edge conditions while maintaining relatively low scrape-off layer power.
70 PLASMA PHYSICS AND FUSION TECHNOLOGY↗
Wireless Operation of a Nuclear Reactor
Wireless Operation of a Nuclear Reactor
21 - SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLAN↗
Experimental demonstration of a 5 kW th granular-flow reactor for solar thermochemical energy storage with aluminum-doped calcium manganite particles
A two-step cycle was discussed for solar thermochemical energy storage based on aluminum-doped calcium manganite reduction/oxidation reactions for direct integration into Air Brayton cycles. The two steps encompassed 1) the storage of concentrated solar direct irradiation via the thermal reduction of aluminum-doped calcium manganite and 2) the delivery of heat to an Air-Brayton cycle via re-oxidation of oxygen-deficient aluminum-doped calcium manganite. The re-oxidized aluminum-doped calcium manganite was fed back to the first step to complete the cycle. A 5 kWth solar thermochemical reactor operating under vacuum was fabricated and tested to examine the first cycle reduction step. Reactor operating conditions and high-flux solar simulator control were tuned for continuous reactor operation with particle temperatures > 1073 K. Continuous operation was achieved using intermittent, dense granular flows. A maximum absorption efficiency of 64.7% was shown, accounting for both sensible and chemical heat storage.
25 ENERGY STORAGE↗
Reproducible benchmark for the SNAP 8 experimental reactor at operating conditions
This work presents fully reproducible multiphysics benchmark models of the Systems for Nuclear Auxiliary Power (SNAP) 8 Experimental Reactor at operating conditions with coolant flow. Wet experiment (with coolant, at power) validation benchmarks are presented using both deterministic (Serpent-Griffin) and Monte-Carlo (OpenMC-Cardinal) multiphysics frameworks coupled with thermal-hydraulic solvers in MOOSE. Reactivity coefficient measurements including fuel temperature, isothermal temperature, and power coefficients show good agreement with experiments, with discrepancies within experimental uncertainty. Reactivity worth experiments for coolant, samarium, and xenon poisoning are reproduced with differences under 200 pcm. Comparison between Serpent-Griffin and OpenMC-Cardinal frameworks reveal multiphysics coupling introduces positive reactivity effects (100-200 pcm) compared to uniform temperature and density fields at nominal operating conditions. Comparison between Serpent-Griffin and reference Serpent solution shows that power distributions maintain consistent radial and axial peaking behavior. All models, assumptions, thermophysical and thermomechanical properties, and material definitions are thoroughly documented with cited references; model inputs and model generating scripts are stored in the snapReactors GitHub repository.
SNAP↗
Proposed Classifications of Remote Operations for Nuclear Reactors Based on Physical and Cybersecurity Considerations
The incorporation of remote operations into reactor operations is a topic of high interest among advanced and small modular reactor (A/SMR) vendors, with some considering it essential to the success of their business models. However, remote operations are a concept novel to the nuclear industry. While various technical aspects of remote operations have been explored, a significant gap remains in understanding the security implications of integrating remote operations into reactor designs, particularly concerning the security requirements for remote-operations facilities and infrastructure. This report aims to address this gap by first defining classes of remote operation based on the extent of remote access to reactor control systems and grounded in the existing regulatory framework with compatible terminology. Secondly, the report outlines the physical and cybersecurity requirements applicable to remote-operations facilities and infrastructure at each defined class. These requirements are based on existing licensing frameworks provided by 10 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 50 and 10 CFR Part 52, as well as the upcoming A/SMR licensing framework in the proposed Part 53. The assessment focuses specifically on security regulations, such as 10 CFR Part 73, which includes provisions for both cybersecurity (§ 73.54) and physical security (§ 73.55). This report proposes five classes of remote reactor operations. Class 1 involves remote monitoring only, with no control over reactor systems. Class 2 allows for the remote issuance of allowlisted commands to the reactor facility. Class 3 extends control to non-safety-significant, non-safety-related, or not important to safety systems and equipment. Class 4 permits remote control of safety-significant systems. Finally, Class 5 allows remote control of safety-related systems. It is important to note that these classes were defined purely with functionality in mind, without considering the practicality or feasibility of implementation for each class under current or upcoming regulatory guidance. The intention behind this approach is to enable an assessment of which security requirements apply to each class, allowing readers to evaluate the implementation possibilities for their specific use cases. Following the definition of remote-operation classes, the report assesses the specific physical and cybersecurity requirements applicable to the remote-operations facility and infrastructure within each defined class. This includes defining the types and locations of operators that are possible at each class of operation and, based on operator type and location, as well as functionality within each class, outlining the physical and cybersecurity requirements. By detailing the security requirements by class, the report provides readers with the information needed to determine the type of security program they may need to implement for their desired concept of operation. The next contribution of this report was to assess the practicality of implementing each proposed class of remote operations based upon the security requirement assessment. In short, three of the five proposed remote-operation classes were found to possibly have a practical path forward to implementation under the U.S. regulatory framework. Class 1 remote operations are currently in use in the U.S. while Class 2 and 3 remote operations may be logistically possible to implement under the U.S. regulatory framework. The final two Classes, 4 and 5, would likely be logistically difficult, if not infeasible to implement within the current U.S. physical- and cybersecurity regulatory framework. Given the results of the feasibility assessment, an example architecture is proposed for both Class 2, remote allowlisted commands, and Class 3, remote control of non-safety systems as well as security implication assessments of each architecture. These example implementations are not meant to be prescriptive in terms of how Class 2 or Class 3 remote operations should be deployed; instead, they are intended to be informative to stakeholders on how Class 2 or Class 3 could potentially be applied in order to inform their system design. An example architecture for Class 1 remote monitoring was not provided as Class 1 in already in use in U.S. nuclear operations. Example architectures for Class 4 and Class 5 were not provided due to their assessment of being likely infeasible to implement. The final contribution is an assessment of the physical- and cybersecurity implications of introducing autonomous operations into an A/SMR. What was found was that the security implications can be separated into two cases. Autonomous operations supported by SSCs located only at the reactor site, and autonomous operations supported by SSCs outside of the reactor site. For the first case, the introduction of autonomous systems will likely not change the facility’s requirement to comply with existing cyber and physical security regulation
22 - GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
The Impact of Europium as a Fission Product Surrogate on Chromium Corrosion in Molten Chloride Salt
The rising interest in molten salts, both as thermal energy storage media and as high-temperature solvents for fissile materials in advanced nuclear reactors, has spurred significant growth in research on structural and functional salt-facing materials. Impurities, such as water, play a significant role in the degradation of materials in molten salt environments. Other impurities, such as fission products, are expected to accumulate in molten salts during normal reactor operation and can affect the properties of the salt and salt-facing materials. During normal reactor operation, rare-earth element species are expected to form as byproducts of fission reactions, potentially degrading or altering the performance of both structural and functional materials exposed to salts. Here, in this work, fission product surrogates, europium metal and EuCl 3 , were added to the KCl-MgCl 2 salt while exposing pure Cr specimens in the melt at 600 and 700 °C for 1000 h. Low reactivity was observed with the baseline salt, while both the Eu and EuCl 3 additions to the salt resulted in increased mass loss of Cr specimens. A capillary electrophoresis technique was developed to enable the detection of low parts-per-million (ppm) concentrations of europium (Eu) in chloride salt both before and after exposure of Cr metal. This technique provides a sensitive and reliable method for monitoring trace levels of Eu, which is critical for understanding the interactions and potential contamination effects in salt-facing materials during reactor operation. This quantification technique can be applied to other cationic and anionic contaminants in halide salts.
chloride salt↗
01-07 Reactor Supplemental Shielding For the NRIC DOME Test Bed 01-07 Reactor Supplemental Shielding For the NRIC DOME Test Bed 2
A radiation shielding system is needed to protect personnel and equipment from harsh neutron and photon fluxes during: Reactor operations Post shut down operations Disassembly Decommissioning Examples of RSS driving requirements Radiological Controls Operating dose rate: the dose rate during normal reactor operations shall be <0.5 mrem/hr at the exterior wall of DOME containment Outdoor radiation limit: shielding shall provide the dose to a facility worker outside of DOME to <0.05 mrem/hr at 50 ft from the exterior wall of the DOME Temperature Reactors may have operating temperatures up to 800C The RSS shall be capable of removing up to 100 KW of heat during normal operating conditions the concrete structure has an upper temperature limit of 100°C
21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗
Development of Surveillance Test Articles for Materials Degradation Management in MSR Environment
Information on materials degradations during advanced reactor operations is limited Effects of materials degradations during reactor operations are synergistic, involving: Irradiation, corrosion, elevated temperature exposure and stress (creep-fatigue loading) Establishment of surrogate materials surveillance program for the management of materials degradations would be an important pathway in support of the timely licensing of advanced reactors
11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
Evaluation of Changes to the MTR Fuel Dissolution Flowsheet to Increase the Number of L-Bundles Charged to a Dissolver
Material Test Reactor (MTR) fuels are dissolved in the H-Canyon facility using a Hg-catalyzed, HNO₃ dissolution flowsheet. The flowsheet is based on experimental work in which laboratory-scale experiments were used to provide bounding values for both offgas and H₂ generation rates. The generation of H₂ gas, primarily from the dissolution of Al, is controlled by limiting the surface area exposed to the solution. The number of L-Bundles charged and their submergence level defines the exposed surface area which is directly proportional to the H₂ generation rate. For the MTR fuel dissolution flowsheet, the maximum number of L-Bundles which can be charged to a dissolver was specified as a function of the Al concentration in the solution and the submergence level of the bundle. The MTR fuels are currently dissolved in the 6.1D dissolver. To reach the desired terminal Al concentration, a total of 12 L-Bundles of fuel are dissolved per batch. Depending on the submergence level being used in the dissolver, the 12 bundles are dissolved in three charges of four bundles per charge or in a sequence of three, four, and five bundles. However, if six L-Bundles could be dissolved in the initial charge, a dissolver batch could be completed in two dissolutions instead of three. To assess the feasibility of dissolving six bundles in the first charge, the Savannah River National Laboratory evaluated changes to the MTR flowsheet which increase the number of bundles which can be charged to a dissolver. Since the development of the existing MTR fuel dissolution flowsheet, improved offgas measurement methods have been developed to more accurately calculate the offgas composition and generation rate during laboratory-scale dissolutions. In the first part of this study, improvements in the calibration model for the Raman spectrometer (used for offgas characterization) and a more effective data smoothing routine were applied to existing data. The uncertainty in the offgas composition data used to define the MTR fuel dissolution flowsheet were subsequently re-evaluated which resulted in an approximate 50% reduction in the uncertainty of the H₂ gas concentration measurements. The reduced uncertainty was used in new calculations to define the maximum number of L-Bundles which can be charged to either the 6.1D or 6.4D dissolver as a function of the Al concentration. With the reduced uncertainty in the H₂ concentration measurements, a flowsheet was defined which supported initially charging 6 bundles to a dissolver. This flowsheet is based on the use of 0.002 M Hg, an L-Bundle immersion depth of 54 in., an air sparge/purge flowrate of 40 scfm, an iodine reactor operating temperature of 200 °C, and not exceeding 60% of the H₂ LFL in the dissolver offgas. In the second phase of this study, calculations were performed to assess the impact of changing various operating parameters to increase the number of L-Bundles charged to an H-Canyon dissolver. Applying the improved offgas measurement techniques including the reduced uncertainty in the H₂ concentration measurements to the existing data, the number of bundles of MTR fuel which can be charged to either the 6.1D or 6.4D dissolver were calculated based on varying the bundle immersion depth (44-60 in.), air sparge/purge flowrate (40-60 scfm), iodine reactor operating temperature (150-200 °C), and the percentage of the H₂ LFL which must not be exceeded (60-76%). Qualitatively, the percentage of the LFL had the largest influence on the maximum number of bundles which can be charged to a dissolver followed by the air sparge/purge flowrate, L-Bundle immersion depth, and the iodine reactor operating temperature. During the evaluation of each variable, the other variables were held at the baseline flowsheet conditions.
11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
A model to assess Zircaloy’s mechanical property changes following a transient beyond critical heat flux
Maintaining the integrity of nuclear fuel rods is essential for ensuring public health and safety in nuclear power generation. During reactor operation, this integrity is confirmed by demonstrating compliance with established regulatory acceptance criteria. For moderate-frequency events, such as limiting transients and anticipated operational occurrences (AOOs), the current fuel integrity criterion is based on preventing boiling transition. This criterion assumes that prevention of boiling transition will prevent excessive cladding heating and, thus, fuel failure during normal operations. While conservative, this approach places significant constraints on core design, fuel cycle economics, and a plant’s ability to perform major power uprates, leading to suboptimal fuel utilization and inefficient carbon-free energy production. A more efficient approach could be achieved by revising the failure criterion to a material-specific limit rather than strictly preventing the boiling transition, since boiling transition per se is not a cause of fuel cladding failure. Here, as a result, a new licensing framework based on material properties, termed time-at-temperature (t@T), is needed. This approach would allow for brief periods of post–critical heat flux operation during an AOO without compromising safety. Implementing the t@T licensing strategy requires a robust technical foundation in material properties, which must be established through comprehensive data collection on both unirradiated and irradiated fuel and cladding materials. This foundation would enable the development of a safety basis that ensures safe operation while providing greater flexibility and efficiency for reactor operation. This paper documents a thorough review of the available data to establish a baseline knowledge that can inform the development of cladding mechanical models, as well as identify experimental data gaps that need to be addressed in future research. Machine learning and data informatics were utilized to extract the importance of parameters on the t@T parameter. Industry tools were used to perform baseline analyses to define the relevant transient conditions for data analysis. The subsequent review successfully identified applicable experimental data, as well as sufficient data to evaluate changes in cladding mechanical properties following an AOO transient. Rather than developing new models, this work coupled existing irradiation annealing and recrystallization models to calculate changes in hardness, yield stress, and ultimate tensile stress following an AOO event. The findings from this review were summarized to highlight the experimental data needs required to fill remaining gaps and support the development of future t@T licensing methodologies.
Cladding performance↗
Autonomous Operations for Advanced Reactors Utilizing Supervisory Control
Automation is a critical tenet of reactor plant operations as reliance on nuclear energy increases. Nuclear power plants require a large workforce which does not scale with output; that is, the cost per megawatt increases as reactor output becomes smaller. The economic viability of advanced reactors, particularly small modular reactors (SMRs) and microreactors, requires a significantly reduced onsite workforce. The logical solution is establishing a systematic process of elimination of reliance on human operators, and to the extent possible, replacing these actions with automated functions. In this paper, we propose a method for such transformation to establish a robust technical basis to enable transition to autonomy. Our method is based on finite state automata (FSA)—also known as finite state machines (FSMs). Relying on this method allows us to exploit the rich set of mathematical proofs available in the field of regular languages. FSA are one of the mathematical tools to model discrete event systems (DES). These properties are applied to produce an automated startup controller for the Massachusetts Institute of Technology Research Reactor (MITR). The startup procedure is captured in terms of discrete changes from one state to another while an independent supervisory control system directs the sequence of states and alerts a human in the event of an abnormal operation. First, the design and behavior of the MITR rod control system were modeled in Simulink. Then, the startup procedure was applied to the rod control system and the DES performed a startup by procedurally withdrawing rods to the subcritical position. The simulation also stops rod motion in response to an uncontrollable event and restarts rod motion once the event has been cleared.
46 - INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AN↗
Use of Multi-Attribute Utility Analyses to Assess Transportation Routes from ISFSIs - 20535
With two consolidated interim storage facilities for used nuclear fuel (UNF) having applied for storage licenses, there is the potential need to transport UNF in the U.S. from shutdown reactor sites to complete the site cleanup and from operating reactor sites who may be running out of storage options (e.g., spent fuel pools are nearly full and dry storage facilities are reaching licensed capacity). At some of the shutdown reactor sites, only the independent spent fuel storage installation (ISFSI) exists and often there remains a degraded transportation infrastructure for performing shipments from these sites. At other sites (e.g., operating reactor plants), the existing transportation infrastructure on the site is unchanged and sufficient for moving UNF, but the environment around the route may have changed (e.g., what was once a rural setting has transformed into a more urban setting) and/or local stakeholders want their input taken into consideration in UNF transportation activities. So, although preliminary evaluations have been performed to identify viable modes of transport from these sites using rail, barge, and/or heavy haul truck, if multiple options exist for moving the UNF from the site (e.g., multiple truck routes or a truck and a barge route both exist) then an evaluation that takes input from multiple stakeholders should be considered to identified the preference (e.g., ranking) of routes from a site. Orano has supported the development of several studies examining the viable routes for removing UNF from some of these sites and has utilized a multi-attribute utility analysis (MUA) to establish a ranking of routes and associated modes to move the UNF from the ISFSIs to a Class I rail carrier. The ultimate result from the MUA is a list(s) of the most to the least favored/preferred routes from the site. This paper provides an overview of the MUA methodology and provides an example of its application to a site with a shutdown reactor. (authors)
12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
An Autonomous Critical Data Extrapolator for the AGN-201m
Nuclear nonproliferation serves as a key goal, being undertaken by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). To recognize proliferation there are two pathways that states, who intend to use nuclear material for malicious purposes can take, diversion can misuse. Diversion is when fissile nuclear material is declared to the IAEA for non-weapon purposes, but then covertly removed. If the source of nuclear material, that is not declared and not fissionable, is placed inside the reactor core to create fissile material used to create weapons then the state is using the second pathway of proliferation, misuse. With the emerging development in areas of simulation and machine learning the creation of virtual models of reactor systems, digital twins, serve as a potential method to identify proliferation through detecting anomalous behavior in the reactor. A digital twin for a physical nuclear reactor has never been developed, as digital twins serve as an emerging technology. To investigate the process for development and use of a digital twin for a nuclear reactor Idaho State University’s AGN-201m serves as the nuclear reactor used for development of this digital twin. A data acquisition system has been installed to the reactor system allowing for the transfer of collected data from a reactor operation to Idaho National Laboratory’s Deeplynx data warehouse. When utilizing data to train reactor physics and machine learning models, a significant challenge encountered is the initial state of the data. Nuclear proliferation will have the capacity to be detected when the reactor immediately starts up, nor will it occur after the reactor shuts down. Generally, it will be detected when the reactor is operating at some desired power over a sufficient period for that specific reactor design. For the AGN-201m this will be when the reactor is critical (generally 1 mW or above) for a timespan that is within or less than the range of a regular business day. Datasets sent to Deeplynx have had to be manually cut to when the reactor is critical based on plots of power levels. This method is inefficient and laborious, especially when using multiple datasets at once to train a model. To provide a more streamlined approach an automated critical data extrapolator is developed, with capabilities of recognizing when the reactor operation first reaches criticality, and when the reactor undergoes a SCRAM and is shutdown.
99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗
Summary of LWRS Research in Addressing RPV Research Gaps in NRC EMDA Report
Reactor Pressure Vessels (RPVs) are critical components in nuclear reactors, housing the reactor core and coolant under extreme conditions of temperature, pressure, and radiation. These harsh environments contribute to the degradation of RPV materials over time, presenting challenges for extending reactor operations beyond their original design lifespans. The NRC Expanded Materials Degradation Assessment (EMDA) report volume 3 have been instrumental in guiding research to support extending the operational life of light water reactors (LWRs) up to 80 years. It provides a comprehensive framework to address technical challenges related to aging and degradation mechanisms in RPVs. The LWRS program has played a key role in advancing this research, supporting projects such as the UCSB ATR-2 Experiment, material testing from Zion and Palisades reactors, and the development of advanced mini-compact tension testing techniques. These efforts have been crucial in identifying and addressing gaps in our understanding of RPV aging, contributing to the successful subsequent license renewals of eight LWR units in the U.S. The EMDA report volume 3, built on the Phenomena Identification and Ranking Table (PIRT) analysis from earlier versions of the EPRI Materials Degradation Matrix (MDM) and Issue Management Tables (IMTs), provides a detailed assessment of RPV degradation mechanisms. However, as EPRI has updated the MDM and IMT, it is important to revisit research priorities and methodologies to reflect these changes. The revised MDM and IMT may introduce new factors affecting long-term RPV performance and safety, highlighting the need for continued research and updated guidance to ensure the reliable and safe operation of reactors beyond 80 years.
22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗