LANL B61 LEP requirements and verification planning (u)
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The requirements development process for the Advanced Engineering Environment (AEE) is presented. This environment has been developed to allow NASA to perform independent analysis and design of space transportation architectures and technologies. Given the highly collaborative and distributed nature of AEE, a variety of organizations are involved in the development, operations and management of the system. Furthermore, there are additional organizations involved representing external customers and stakeholders. Thorough coordination and effective communication is essential to translate desired expectations of the system into requirements. Functional, verifiable requirements for this (and indeed any) system are necessary to fulfill several roles. Requirements serve as a contractual tool, configuration management tool, and as an engineering tool, sometimes simultaneously. The role of requirements as an engineering tool is particularly important because a stable set of requirements for a system provides a common framework of system scope and characterization among team members. Furthermore, the requirements provide the basis for checking completion of system elements and form the basis for system verification. Requirements are at the core of systems engineering. The AEE Project has undertaken a thorough process to translate the desires and expectations of external customers and stakeholders into functional system-level requirements that are captured with sufficient rigor to allow development planning, resource allocation and system-level design, development, implementation and verification. These requirements are maintained in an integrated, relational database that provides traceability to governing Program requirements and also to verification methods and subsystem-level requirements.
NASA is working toward the first launch of the Space Launch System, a new, unmatched capability for deep space exploration with launch readiness planned for 2019. Since program start in 2011, SLS has passed several major formal design milestones, and every major element of the vehicle has produced test and flight hardware. The SLS approach to systems engineering has been key to the program's success. Key aspects of the SLS SE&I approach include: 1) minimizing the number of requirements, 2) elimination of explicit verification requirements, 3) use of certified models of subsystem capability in lieu of requirements when appropriate and 4) certification of capability beyond minimum required capability.
Applying systems engineering across the life-cycle results in a number of products built from interdependent sources of information using different kinds of system level analysis. This paper focuses on leveraging the Executable System Engineering Method (ESEM) which automates requirements verification (e.g. power and mass budget margins and duration analysis of operational modes) using executable SysML models. The particular value proposition is to integrate requirements, and executable behavior and performance models for certain types of system level analysis. The models are created with modeling patterns that involve structural, behavioral and parametric diagrams, and are managed by an open source Model Based Engineering Environment (named OpenMBEE). This paper demonstrates how the ESEM is applied in conjunction with OpenMBEE to create key engineering products (e.g. operational concept document) for the Alignment and Phasing System (APS) within the Thirty Meter Telescope (TMT) project, which is under development by the TMT International Observatory (TIO).
The SLS Program chose to implement a Model-based Design and Model-based Requirements approach for managing component design information and system requirements. This approach differs from previous large-scale design efforts at Marshall Space Flight Center where design documentation alone conveyed information required for vehicle design and analysis and where extensive requirements sets were used to scope and constrain the design. The SLS Navigation Team has been responsible for the Program-controlled Design Math Models (DMMs) which describe and represent the performance of the Inertial Navigation System (INS) and the Rate Gyro Assemblies (RGAs) used by Guidance, Navigation, and Controls (GN&C). The SLS Navigation Team is also responsible for the navigation algorithms. The navigation algorithms are delivered for implementation on the flight hardware as a DMM. For the SLS Block 1-B design, the additional GPS Receiver hardware is managed as a DMM at the vehicle design level. This paper provides a discussion of the processes and methods used to engineer, design, and coordinate engineering trades and performance assessments using SLS practices as applied to the GN&C system, with a particular focus on the Navigation components. These include composing system requirements, requirements verification, model development, model verification and validation, and modeling and analysis approaches. The Model-based Design and Requirements approach does not reduce the effort associated with the design process versus previous processes used at Marshall Space Flight Center. Instead, the approach takes advantage of overlap between the requirements development and management process, and the design and analysis process by efficiently combining the control (i.e. the requirement) and the design mechanisms. The design mechanism is the representation of the component behavior and performance in design and analysis tools. The focus in the early design process shifts from the development and management of design requirements to the development of usable models, model requirements, and model verification and validation efforts. The models themselves are represented in C/C++ code and accompanying data files. Under the idealized process, potential ambiguity in specification is reduced because the model must be implementable versus a requirement which is not necessarily subject to this constraint. Further, the models are shown to emulate the hardware during validation. For models developed by the Navigation Team, a common interface/standalone environment was developed. The common environment allows for easy implementation in design and analysis tools. Mechanisms such as unit test cases ensure implementation as the developer intended. The model verification and validation process provides a very high level of component design insight. The origin and implementation of the SLS variant of Model-based Design is described from the perspective of the SLS Navigation Team. The format of the models and the requirements are described. The Model-based Design approach has many benefits but is not without potential complications. Key lessons learned associated with the implementation of the Model Based Design approach and process from infancy to verification and certification are discussed
In January 2007, the NASA Administrator and Associate Administrator for the Exploration Systems Mission Directorate chartered the NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC) to design, build, and test a full-scale Composite Crew Module (CCM). For the design and manufacturing of the CCM, the team adopted the building block approach where design and manufacturing risks were mitigated through manufacturing trials and structural testing at various levels of complexity. Following NASA's Structural Design Verification Requirements, a further objective was the verification of design analysis methods and the provision of design data for critical structural features. Test articles increasing in complexity from basic material characterization coupons through structural feature elements and large structural components, to full-scale structures were evaluated. This paper discusses only four elements tests three of which include joints and one that includes a tapering honeycomb core detail. For each test series included are specimen details, instrumentation, test results, a brief analysis description, test analysis correlation and conclusions.
The NASA Docking System (NDS) is NASA's implementation for the emerging International Docking System Standard (IDSS) using low impact docking technology. The NASA Docking System Project (NDSP) is the International Space Station (ISS) Program's project to produce the NDS, Common Docking Adapter (CDA) and Docking Hub. The NDS design evolved from the Low Impact Docking System (LIDS). The acronym international Low Impact Docking System (iLIDS) is also used to describe this system as well as the Government Furnished Equipment (GFE) project designing the NDS for the NDSP. NDS and iLIDS may be used interchangeability. This document will use the acronym iLIDS. Some of the heritage documentation and implementations (e.g., software command names, requirement identification (ID), figures, etc.) used on NDS will continue to use the LIDS acronym. This specification defines the technical requirements for the iLIDS GFE delivered to the NDSP by the iLIDS project. This document contains requirements for two iLIDS configurations, SEZ29101800-301 and SEZ29101800-302. Requirements with the statement, iLIDS shall, are for all configurations. Examples of requirements that are unique to a single configuration may be identified as iLIDS (-301) shall or iLIDS (-302) shall. Furthermore, to allow a requirement to encompass all configurations with an exception, the requirement may be designated as iLIDS (excluding -302) shall. Verification requirements for the iLIDS project are identified in the Verification Matrix (VM) provided in the iLIDS Verification and Validation Document, JSC-63966. The following definitions differentiate between requirements and other statements: Shall: This is the only verb used for the binding requirements. Should/May: These verbs are used for stating non-mandatory goals. Will: This verb is used for stating facts or declaration of purpose. A Definition of Terms table is provided in Appendix B to define those terms with specific tailored uses in this document.
Guidelines and general requirements applicable to the development of instrument flight hardware intended for use on the GSFC Shuttle Scientific Payloads Program are given. Criteria, guidelines, and an organized approach to specifying the appropriate level of requirements for each instrument in order to permit its development at minimum cost while still assuring crew safety, are included. It is recognized that the instruments for these payloads will encompass wide ranges of complexity, cost, development risk, and safety hazards. The flexibility required to adapt the controls, documentation, and verification requirements in accord with the specific instrument is provided.
This document contains the system specifications and requirements verification matrix for the Metroplex and TOS concepts developed during ATD-2 Phase 3. This document was updated in September 2021 for the final Phase 3 tech transfer delivery.
This slide presentation reviews the process of development through the final verification of engineering requirements. The definition of the requirements is driven by basic needs, and should be reviewed by both the supplier and the customer. All involved need to agree upon a formal requirements including changes to the original requirements document. After the requirements have ben developed, the engineering team begins to design the system. The final design is reviewed by other organizations. The final operational system must satisfy the original requirements, though many verifications should be performed during the process. The verification methods that are used are test, inspection, analysis and demonstration. The plan for verification should be created once the system requirements are documented. The plan should include assurances that every requirement is formally verified, that the methods and the responsible organizations are specified, and that the plan is reviewed by all parties. The options of having the engineering team involved in all phases of the development as opposed to having some other organization continue the process once the design has been complete is discussed.
A new launcher has been developed by DSI, that is compatible with the GAS canisters. It has the proven capability to deploy a satellite from an orbiting Shuttle that is 18 inches in diameter, 31 inches long, and weighing 190 pounds. These DSI Launchers were used aboard the Discovery (STS-39) in May 1991 as part of the Infrared Background Signature Survey (IBSS) to deploy three small satellites known as Chemical Release Observation (CRO) satellites A, B, and C. Because the satellites contained hazardous liquids (MMH, UDMH, and MON-10) and were launched from GAS Cylinders without motorized doors, the launchers were required to pass NASA Shuttle Payload safety and verification requirements. Some of the more interesting components of the design were the V-band retention and separation mechanism, the separation springs, and the launcher electronics which provided a properly inhibited release sequence operated through the Small Payload Accommodations Switch Panel (SPASP) on board the Orbiter. The original plan for this launcher was to use a motorized door. The launcher electronics, therefore has the capability to be modified to accommodate the door, if desired.
The goal of this research is to continue the development of a comprehensive approach to software safety and to evaluate the approach with a case study. The case study is a major part of the project, and it involves the analysis of a specific safety-critical system from the medical equipment domain. The particular application being used was selected because of the availability of a suitable candidate system. We consider the results to be generally applicable and in no way particularly limited by the domain. The research is concentrating on issues raised by the specification and verification phases of the software lifecycle since they are central to our previously-developed rigorous definitions of software safety. The theoretical research is based on our framework of definitions for software safety. In the area of specification, the main topics being investigated are the development of techniques for building system fault trees that correctly incorporate software issues and the development of rigorous techniques for the preparation of software safety specifications. The research results are documented. Another area of theoretical investigation is the development of verification methods tailored to the characteristics of safety requirements. Verification of the correct implementation of the safety specification is central to the goal of establishing safe software. The empirical component of this research is focusing on a case study in order to provide detailed characterizations of the issues as they appear in practice, and to provide a testbed for the evaluation of various existing and new theoretical results, tools, and techniques. The Magnetic Stereotaxis System is summarized.
The paper considers STS payload-interface verification requirements and the capability provided by STS to support verification. The intent is to standardize as many interfaces as possible, not only through the design, development, test and evaluation (DDT and E) phase of the major payload carriers but also into the operational phase. The verification process is discussed in terms of its various elements, such as the Space Shuttle DDT and E (including the orbital flight test program) and the major payload carriers DDT and E (including the first flights). Five tools derived from the Space Shuttle DDT and E are available to support the verification process: mathematical (structural and thermal) models, the Shuttle Avionics Integration Laboratory, the Shuttle Manipulator Development Facility, and interface-verification equipment (cargo-integration test equipment).
A system which will provide real-time failure management support to the Space Station Freedom program is described. The system's use of a simplified form of model based reasoning qualifies it as an advanced automation system. However, it differs from most such systems in that it was designed from the outset to meet two sets of requirements. First, it must provide a useful increment to the fault management capabilities of the Johnson Space Center (JSC) Control Center Complex (CCC) Fault Detection Management system. Second, it must satisfy CCC operational environment constraints such as cost, computer resource requirements, verification, and validation, etc. The need to meet both requirement sets presents a much greater design challenge than would have been the case had functionality been the sole design consideration. The choice of technology, discussing aspects of that choice and the process for migrating it into the control center is overviewed.
The NASA Langley 8-Foot High Temperature Tunnel produces true enthalpy environments simulating flight from Mach 4 to Mach 7, primarily for airbreathing propulsion and aerothermal/thermo-structural testing. Flow conditions are achieved through a methane-air heater and nozzles producing aerodynamic Mach numbers of 4, 5 or 7 and have exit diameters of 8 feet or 4.5 feet. The 12-ft long free-jet test section, housed inside a 26-ft vacuum sphere, accommodates large test articles. Recently, the facility underwent significant upgrades to support hydrocarbon fueled scramjet engine testing and to expand flight simulation capability. The upgrades were required to meet engine system development and flight clearance verification requirements originally defined by the joint NASA-Air Force X-43C Hypersonic Flight Demonstrator Project and now the Air Force X-51A Program. Enhancements to the 8-Ft. HTT were made in four areas: 1) hydrocarbon fuel delivery; 2) flight simulation capability; 3) controls and communication; and 4) data acquisition/processing. The upgrades include the addition of systems to supply ethylene and liquid JP-7 to test articles; a Mach 5 nozzle with dynamic pressure simulation capability up to 3200 psf, the addition of a real-time model angle-of-attack system; a new programmable logic controller sub-system to improve process controls and communication with model controls; the addition of MIL-STD-1553B and high speed data acquisition systems and a classified data processing environment. These additions represent a significant increase to the already unique test capability and flexibility of the facility, and complement the existing array of test support hardware such as a model injection system, radiant heaters, six-component force measurement system, and optical flow field visualization hardware. The new systems support complex test programs that require sophisticated test sequences and precise management of process fluids. Furthermore, the new systems, such as the real-time angle of attack system and the new programmable logic controller enhance the test efficiency of the facility. The motivation for the upgrades and the expanded capabilities is described here.
This technical report contains the Higher-Order Logic (HOL) listings of the partial verification of the requirements and design for a commercially developed processor interface unit (PIU). The PIU is an interface chip performing memory interface, bus interface, and additional support services for a commercial microprocessor within a fault tolerant computer system. This system, the Fault Tolerant Embedded Processor (FTEP), is targeted towards applications in avionics and space requiring extremely high levels of mission reliability, extended maintenance-free operation, or both. This report contains the actual HOL listings of the PIU verification as it currently exists. Section two of this report contains general-purpose HOL theories and definitions that support the PIU verification. These include arithmetic theories dealing with inequalities and associativity, and a collection of tactics used in the PIU proofs. Section three contains the HOL listings for the completed PIU design verification. Section 4 contains the HOL listings for the partial requirements verification of the P-Port.
Third in the series of NASA great observatories, the Advanced X-Ray Astrophysics Facility (AXAF) is scheduled for launch from the Space Shuttle in November of 1998. Following in the path of the Hubble Space Telescope and the Compton Gamma Ray Observatory, this observatory will image light at X-ray wavelengths, facilitating the detailed study of such phenomena as supernovae and quasars. The AXAF project is sponsored by the Marshall Space Flight Center in Huntsville, Alabama. Because of exacting requirements on the performance of the AXAF optical system, it was necessary to reduce the transmission of reaction wheel jitter disturbances to the observatory. This reduction was accomplished via use of a passive mechanical isolation system to interface the reaction wheels with the spacecraft central structure. In addition to presenting a description of the spacecraft, the isolation system, and the key image quality requirement flowdown, this paper details the analyses performed in support of system-level imaging performance requirement verification. These analyses include the identification of system-level requirement suballocations, quantification of imaging and pointing performance, and formulation of unit-level isolation system transmissibility requirements. Given in comparison to the non-isolated system imaging performance, the results of these analyses clearly illustrate the effectiveness of an innovative reaction wheel passive isolation system.
Safety limits are required to maintain the integrity of physical barriers designed to prevent the uncontrolled release of radioactive materials in nuclear power plants. The safety analysis establishes two critical constraints that include an analytical limit in terms of a measured or calculated variable, and a specific time after the analytical limit is reached to begin protective action. Keeping with the nuclear regulations and industry standards, satisfying these two requirements will ensure that the safety limit will not be exceeded during the design basis event, either an anticipated operational occurrence or a postulated accident. Various studies on the setpoint determination methodology for the safety-related instrumentation have been actively performed to ensure that the requirement of the analytical limit is satisfied. In particular, the protection setpoint methodology for the advanced power reactor 1400 (APP1400) and the optimized power reactor 1000 (OPR1000) has been recently developed to cover both the design basis event and the beyond design basis event. The developed setpoint methodology has also been quantitatively validated using specific computer programs and setpoint calculations. However, the safety of nuclear power plants cannot be fully guaranteed by satisfying the requirement of the analytical limit. In spite of the response time verification requirements of nuclear regulations and industry standards, it is hard to find the studies on the systematically integrated methodology regarding the response time evaluation. In cases of APR1400 and OPR1000, the response time analysis for the plant protection system is partially included in the setpoint calculation and the response time test is separately performed via the specific plant procedure. The test technique has a drawback which is the difficulty to demonstrate completeness of timing test. The analysis technique has also a demerit of resulting in extreme times that not actually possible. Thus, the establishment of the systematic response time evaluation methodology is needed to justify the conformance to the response time requirement used in the safety analysis. This paper proposes the response time evaluation methodology for APR1400 and OPR1000 using the combined analysis and test technique to confirm that the plant protection system can meet the analytical response time assumed in the safety analysis. In addition, the results of the quantitative evaluation performed for APR1400 and OPR1000 are presented in this paper. The proposed response time analysis technique consists of defining the response time requirement, determining the critical signal path for the trip parameter, allocating individual response time to each component on the signal path, and analyzing the total response time for the trip parameter, and demonstrates that the total analyzed response time does not exceed the response time requirement. The proposed response time test technique is composed of defining the response time requirement, determining the critical signal path for the trip parameter, determining the test method for each component on the signal path, performing the response time test, and demonstrates that the total test result does not exceed the response time requirement. The total response time should be tested in a single test that covers from the sensor to the final actuation device on the instrument channel. When the total channel is not tested in a single test, separate tests on groups of components or single components including the total instrument channel shall be combined to verify the total channel response. For APR1400 and OPR1000, the ramp test technique is used for the pressure and differential pressure transmitters and the step function testing technique is applied to the signal processing equipment and final actuation device. As a result, it can be demonstrated that the response time requirement is satisfied by the combined analysis and test technique. Therefore, the proposed methodology in this paper plays a crucial role in guaranteeing the safety of the nuclear power plants systematically satisfying one of two critical requirements from the safety analysis. (authors)