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NASA NTRS2015

Risk of Performance and Behavioral Health Decrements Due to Inadequate Cooperation, Coordination, Communication, and Psychosocial Adaptation within a Team

A team is defined as: "two or more individuals who interact socially and adaptively, have shared or common goals, and hold meaningful task interdependences; it is hierarchically structured and has a limited life span; in it expertise and roles are distributed; and it is embedded within an organization/environmental context that influences and is influenced by ongoing processes and performance outcomes" (Salas, Stagl, Burke, & Goodwin, 2007, p. 189). From the NASA perspective, a team is commonly understood to be a collection of individuals that is assigned to support and achieve a particular mission. Thus, depending on context, this definition can encompass both the spaceflight crew and the individuals and teams in the larger multi-team system who are assigned to support that crew during a mission. The Team Risk outcomes of interest are predominantly performance related, with a secondary emphasis on long-term health; this is somewhat unique in the NASA HRP in that most Risk areas are medically related and primarily focused on long-term health consequences. In many operational environments (e.g., aviation), performance is assessed as the avoidance of errors. However, the research on performance errors is ambiguous. It implies that actions may be dichotomized into "correct" or "incorrect" responses, where incorrect responses or errors are always undesirable. Researchers have argued that this dichotomy is a harmful oversimplification, and it would be more productive to focus on the variability of human performance and how organizations can manage that variability (Hollnagel, Woods, & Leveson, 2006) (Category III1). Two problems occur when focusing on performance errors: 1) the errors are infrequent and, therefore, difficult to observe and record; and 2) the errors do not directly correspond to failure. Research reveals that humans are fairly adept at correcting or compensating for performance errors before such errors result in recognizable or recordable failures. Astronauts are notably adept high performers. Most failures are recorded only when multiple, small errors occur and humans are unable to recognize and correct or compensate for these errors in time to prevent a failure (Dismukes, Berman, Loukopoulos, 2007) (Category III). More commonly, observers record variability in levels of performance. Some teams commit no observable errors but fail to achieve performance objectives or perform only adequately, while other teams commit some errors but perform spectacularly. Successful performance, therefore, cannot be viewed as simply the absence of errors or the avoidance of failure Johnson Space Center (JSC) Joint Leadership Team, 2008). While failure is commonly attributed to making a major error, focusing solely on the elimination of error(s) does not significantly reduce the risk of failure. Failure may also occur when performance is simply insufficient or an effort is incapable of adjusting sufficiently to a contextual change (e.g., changing levels of autonomy).

Landon, Lauren Blackwell↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

The Current State and Future of the Former Central Nervous System Risk Managed by Space Radiation Element Part of NASA’s Human Research Program

Historically, the Space Radiation Element, as part of the NASA Human Research Program, was responsible for the scientific strategy and funding of research focused on characterizing and mitigating the effects of space radiation exposure on the central nervous system (CNS). During the past few years, there have been two major changes that have affected the management of the science associated with the CNS risk. The first major change was the integration of several related risks: CNS (C), behavioral medicine (B), and sensorimotor (S) to be managed as an integrated effort called CBS. CBS was formed to accelerate research on combined spaceflight stressors, specifically space radiation, microgravity, isolation, and confinement. CBS was managed by Human Factors and Behavioral Performance (HFBP) with support and inputs from Space Radiation as well as Human Health Countermeasures. Secondly, and more recently, the CNS risk was absorbed by the behavioral medicine risk currently also held by HFPB. As a result, the gaps associated with CNS were removed and aspects of them are represented in the BMED gaps (link). However, due to recent changes in element leadership, budget, and timeline, extensive restructuring of CBS is in progress. In addition, in an effort to harmonize datasets to be used in modeling efforts, an Animal Standardization TIM was held in June 2021 to standardize the type of behavioral and cognitive tasks as well as experimental set-ups used in animal models of future funded research. This presentation is an effort to communicate with the radiation research community concerning the strategy, management, and future of the former central nervous system risk and the role of the Space Radiation Element.

Janice A Zawaski↗

DOE OSTI2025

Hungary 908 Event - Risk Based Graded Approach to ITM

This presentation, Risk-Based, Graded Approach to Insider Threat Mitigation: Human Measures, introduces a structured framework for managing insider threat risk using internationally recognized guidance from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Nuclear Security Series No. 8-G (Rev. 1) and the Joint Statement on Mitigating Insider Threats (INFCIRC/908). The presentation emphasizes that effective insider threat mitigation (ITM) depends on both positional controls, which manage inherent risk based on access, authority, and knowledge, and human measures, which address residual risk reflected in behavior, motivation, and reliability. Using a risk-informed and graded approach, the presentation outlines methods for identifying and prioritizing high-risk positions, applying layered organizational controls, and integrating human reliability mechanisms such as the Behavior Observation Program (BOP), Fitness-for-Duty (FFD) evaluations, Employee Assistance Programs (EAP), and Nuclear Security Culture (NSC). The human-focused portion examines behavioral and organizational indicators of opportunity, vulnerability, motivation, and crisis, demonstrating how early detection, deterrence, and response can prevent insider events. The session concludes with a case review of the Millstone Nuclear Power Station incident involving engineer George Galatis. The case illustrates how weak leadership and a poor safety culture can create conditions for failure and how a comprehensive ITM framework could have altered the outcome. The objective of this presentation is to help practitioners apply a risk-based, graded philosophy to human factors and promote a culture of accountability, communication, and resilience within nuclear organizations.

99 - GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

DOE OSTI2020

US Department of Energy, Office of Science High Performance Computing Facility Operational Assessment 2019 Oak Ridge Leadership Computing Facility

Oak Ridge National Laboratory's (ORNL's) Leadership Computing Facility (OLCF) continues to surpass its operational target goals: supporting users; delivering fast, reliable computational ecosystems; creating innovative solutions for high performance computing (HPC) needs; and managing risks, safety, and security associated with operating some of the most powerful computers in the world. The results can be seen in the cutting-edge science conducted by users and the praise from the research community. Calendar year (CY) 2019 was a big year as OLCF staff ran five world-class resources (the leadershipclass computers Titan and Summit, the large analysis cluster called Eos, and the massive parallel filesystems called Atlas and Alpine)) and also began power and cooling upgrades for a 2021 exascale system called Frontier. While continuing exceptional operation of Titan, Eos, and Rhea, the OLCF released the Summit supercomputer for production on January 1, 2019. Summit debuted as the most capable and efficient system in its class and has been recognized as the most powerful system in the world for its performance on both the high performance linpack (HPL) and conjugate gradient (HPCG) benchmark applications since June 2018 according to TOP500. Summit represents the culmination of a multiyear effort between the OLCF, IBM, NVIDIA, and Mellanox to deliver a system that is unmatched for modeling, simulation, data analysis, and learning. To hit the ground running with science-ready applications on day one, application teams worked closely with the OLCF through the Center for Accelerated Application Readiness (CAAR) program for years in advance of the Summit deployment. CY 2019 was filled with outstanding results and accomplishments: a very high rating from users on overall satisfaction for the sixth year in a row; a tremendous amount of core-hours delivered to researchers from two leadership-class systems; and success in delivering on the allocation split of roughly 60%, 30%, and 10% of core-hours offered for the Innovative and Novel Computational Impact on Theory and Experiment (INCITE), Advanced Scientific Computing Research Leadership Computing Challenge (ALCC), and Director's Discretionary (DD) programs, respectively (see Operational Performance section). These accomplishments, coupled with the high utilization rates (overall and capability usage), represent the fulfillment of the promise of both leadership-class machines: efficient facilitation of leadership-class computational applications. Table ES.1 presents a summary of the 2019 OLCF metric targets and the associated results. More information can be found in the Operational Performance section for each OLCF resource. The scientific accomplishments of OLCF users are a strong indication of long-term operational success, with publications this year in such notable journals and publications as Nature, Nature Physics, Nature Plants, Physical Review X, Journal of the American Physical Society, Cell, Nano Letters, and Trends in Biotechnology. Crucial domain-specific discoveries facilitated by resources at the OLCF are described in the High Performance Computing Facility Operational Assessment 2019 Oak Ridge Leadership Computing Facility (OAR) Strategic Results section. For example, researchers used Summit to pinpoint and understand the production of proteins from genetic information, including mutations and the functional expression of disease (Section 8.2).

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

NASA NTRS2003

The Space Shuttle

As missions have become increasingly more challenging over the years, the most adaptable and capable element of space shuttle operations has proven time and again to be human beings. Human space flight provides unique aspects of observation. interaction and intervention that can reduce risk and improve mission success. No other launch vehicle - in development or in operation today - can match the space shuttle's human space flight capabilities. Preserving U.S. leadership in human space flight requires a strategy to meet those challenges. The ongoing development of next generation vehicles, along with upgrades to the space shuttle, is the most effective means for assuring our access to space.

Moffitt, William L.↗

NASA NTRS2006

NASA Exploration Launch Projects Overview: The Crew Launch Vehicle and the Cargo Launch Vehicle Systems

The U.S. Vision for Space Exploration (January 2004) serves as the foundation for the National Aeronautics and Space Administration's (NASA) strategic goals and objectives. As the NASA Administrator outlined during his confirmation hearing in April 2005, these include: 1) Flying the Space Shuttle as safely as possible until its retirement, not later than 2010. 2) Bringing a new Crew Exploration Vehicle (CEV) into service as soon as possible after Shuttle retirement. 3) Developing a balanced overall program of science, exploration, and aeronautics at NASA, consistent with the redirection of the human space flight program to focus on exploration. 4) Completing the International Space Station (ISS) in a manner consistent with international partner commitments and the needs of human exploration. 5) Encouraging the pursuit of appropriate partnerships with the emerging commercial space sector. 6) Establishing a lunar return program having the maximum possible utility for later missions to Mars and other destinations. In spring 2005, the Agency commissioned a team of aerospace subject matter experts to perform the Exploration Systems Architecture Study (ESAS). The ESAS team performed in-depth evaluations of a number of space transportation architectures and provided recommendations based on their findings? The ESAS analysis focused on a human-rated Crew Launch Vehicle (CLV) for astronaut transport and a heavy lift Cargo Launch Vehicle (CaLV) to carry equipment, materials, and supplies for lunar missions and, later, the first human journeys to Mars. After several months of intense study utilizing safety and reliability, technical performance, budget, and schedule figures of merit in relation to design reference missions, the ESAS design options were unveiled in summer 2005. As part of NASA's systems engineering approach, these point of departure architectures have been refined through trade studies during the ongoing design phase leading to the development phase that begins in 2008. Comprehensive reviews of engineering data and business assessments by both internal and independent reviewers serve as decision gates to ensure that systems can fully meet customer and stakeholder requirements. This paper provides the current CLV and CaLV configuration designs and gives examples of the progress being made during the first year of this significant effort. Safe, reliable, cost-effective space transportation systems are a foundational piece of America s future in space and the next step in realizing the plan for revitalizing lunar capabilities on the passageway to the human exploration of Mars. While building on legacy knowledge and heritage hardware for risk reduction, NASA will apply lessons learned from developing these new launch vehicles to the growth path for future missions. The elements for mission success and continued U.S. leadership in space have been assembled over the past year. As NASA designs and develops these two new systems over the next dozen years, visible progress, such as that reported in this paper, may sustain the national will to stay the course across political administrations and weather the inevitable trials that will be experienced during this challenging endeavor.

Snoddy, Jimmy R.↗

DOE OSTI2025

Capability Building Progression of an Insider Threat Mitigation Program at an International Research Reactor

The nuclear industry recognizes the difficulties involved in developing effective managerial and leadership skills in a highly technical and proficient workforce such as that found in nuclear facilities. Implementing an insider threat mitigation program (ITMP) within the nuclear industry is a complex and ongoing process that demands a comprehensive understanding of human behavior, an organization’s security culture, and rigorous regulatory requirements yet also accounts for facility characteristics, physical security, material flow, and activities involving nuclear material. Given the high-consequence nature of research reactor operations, even minor lapses can lead to safety, security, and reputational risks. An effective ITMP requires a defense-in-depth approach that incorporates behavioral analysis, robust vetting procedures, continuous monitoring, and cross-disciplinary coordination. It must also promote a culture of vigilance and accountability at all levels up to and including executive leadership but be flexible enough to adapt to evolving global threats and technological advances. Insider threat mitigation is not a one-time effort but rather a sustained commitment to excellence in safety and security. Establishing a culture in which personnel proactively report incidents and issues that could affect nuclear safety and security is vital to maintaining a safe and secure operational environment. This document was developed to guide senior management and research reactor organizations in creating comprehensive programs to effectively manage and mitigate insider threat behaviors and actions. It focuses on the key pillars of an effective ITMP, including the national legal framework, security culture, preventive and protective measures, cyber security, and performance evaluation. By using a systematic approach during implementation, facilities can foster environments conducive to insider threat detection and support long-term program sustainability. The document also provides strategies for improving communication across all levels of an organization, helping to eliminate barriers that hinder the development of robust ITMPs and enhance overall security culture. In today’s organizations, the concept of leveraging safety and security culture lessons to facilitate knowledge transfer is rapidly evolving to expedite insider threat management and security culture improvements. This document outlines the rationale for evaluating an ITMP based on national customs, culture, and stakeholders. The elements are all germane to reliability and trustworthiness and relate to security concerns that states may encounter. The document focuses not only on individual perceptions regarding security issues and capability building but also on team building and how to resolve concerns. The implementers of a facility’s ITMP may zero in on indicators of insider threats within their enterprise. This material will benefit organizations when it is applied using a systematic and structured approach as demonstrated throughout the document.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

NASA NTRS2012

NASA Space Technology Roadmaps and Priorities: Restoring NASA's Technological Edge and Paving the Way for a New Era in Space

Success in executing future NASA space missions will depend on advanced technology developments that should already be underway. It has been years since NASA has had a vigorous, broad-based program in advanced space technology development, and NASA's technology base is largely depleted. As noted in a recent National Research Council report on the U.S. civil space program: Future U.S. leadership in space requires a foundation of sustained technology advances that can enable the development of more capable, reliable, and lower-cost spacecraft and launch vehicles to achieve space program goals. A strong advanced technology development foundation is needed also to enhance technology readiness of new missions, mitigate their technological risks, improve the quality of cost estimates, and thereby contribute to better overall mission cost management. Yet financial support for this technology base has eroded over the years. The United States is now living on the innovation funded in the past and has an obligation to replenish this foundational element. NASA has developed a draft set of technology roadmaps to guide the development of space technologies under the leadership of the NASA Office of the Chief Technologist. The NRC appointed the Steering Committee for NASA Technology Roadmaps and six panels to evaluate the draft roadmaps, recommend improvements, and prioritize the technologies within each and among all of the technology areas as NASA finalizes the roadmaps. The steering committee is encouraged by the initiative NASA has taken through the Office of the Chief Technologist (OCT) to develop technology roadmaps and to seek input from the aerospace technical community with this study.

Source record↗

NASA NTRS2011

SOFIA Program SE and I Lessons Learned

Once a "Troubled Project" threatened with cancellation, the Stratospheric Observatory for Infrared Astronomy (SOFIA) Program has overcome many difficult challenges and recently achieved its first light images. To achieve success, SOFIA had to overcome significant deficiencies in fundamental Systems Engineering identified during a major Program restructuring. This presentation will summarize the lessons learn in Systems Engineering on the SOFIA Program. After the Program was reformulated, an initial assessment of Systems Engineering established the scope of the problem and helped to set a list of priorities that needed to be work. A revised Systems Engineering Management Plan (SEMP) was written to address the new Program structure and requirements established in the approved NPR7123.1A. An important result of the "Technical Planning" effort was the decision by the Program and Technical Leadership team to re-phasing the lifecycle into increments. The reformed SOFIA Program Office had to quickly develop and establish several new System Engineering core processes including; Requirements Management, Risk Management, Configuration Management and Data Management. Implementing these processes had to consider the physical and cultural diversity of the SOFIA Program team which includes two Projects spanning two NASA Centers, a major German partnership, and sub-contractors located across the United States and Europe. The SOFIA Program experience represents a creative approach to doing "System Engineering in the middle" while a Program is well established. Many challenges were identified and overcome. The SOFIA example demonstrates it is never too late to benefit from fixing deficiencies in the System Engineering processes.

Ray, Ronald J.↗

DOE OSTI2024

FESAC Decadal Study: Clean, multi-purpose fusion power from small field-reversed configuration (FRC) reactors

This paper urges greatly expanded research into scientific and technical areas of aneutronic field-reversed-configuration devices (FRCs), specifically relatively small FRCs whose fusion power is below 50 MW and above 0.5 MW. These properties greatly increase safety, allow rapid exploration of incremental improvements, enable implementation of improved technologies, ameliorate materials issues, reduce financial risk, ease siting and maintenance requirements, simplify incorporation into the electrical grid, reduce need for long-distance transmission lines, expand the potential markets for these reactors, and provide the US and US industry with leadership positions in clean energy. This route to fusion power, first into niche markets not accessible to the mainline (D-T tokamak) approach to fusion, would demonstrate the reliability and safety of fusion and its competitive advantages against established technologies in the electricity-generation market.

70 PLASMA PHYSICS AND FUSION TECHNOLOGY↗

DOE OSTI2026

Adaptable Standards for Discovery, Access, and Usability of Oak Ridge National Laboratory’s Data Portals and Catalogs

Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) is leveraging its established capabilities and subject matter expertise in data curation, governance, management, national security, and risk assessment and mitigation to support the US Department of Energy (DOE) Grid Modernization Initiative. Using standards modeled by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), the Data Curation Network (DCN), the Oak Ridge Leadership Computing Facility (OLCF), and other leading organizations in the fields of energy research, high-performance computing, and national and homeland security, ORNL seeks to provide a federated approach to research data discovery, use, and interoperability.

96 KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT AND PRESERVATION↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

NASA’s Top Human System Research and Technology Needs for Mars

NASA is working with industry and international partners to return humans to the moon and eventually enable a human Mars mission. Within NASA, several organizations work together to identify, prioritize, fund, execute, and operationalize the crew health and performance (CHP) research and technology development (R&D) necessary to enable these future missions. These organizations include flight programs as well as other organizations such as the Health and Medical Technical Authority (HMTA), Human Research Program, Space Technology Mission Directorate, and System Capability Leadership Teams, each of which existed for several years prior to the creation of the Moon-to-Mars (M2M) Program Office in 2023. A variety of constructs, vocabularies, and processes exist for the management of risks and strategic planning across these organizations. For example, M2M objectives, program risks, human system risks, human research gaps, capability gaps, and envisioned futures are all constructs currently used within NASA for identifying and prioritizing R&D needs. Alignment and evolution of these strategic planning constructs is ongoing and will allow for alignment and traceability between M2M objectives and R&D investments at a detailed level. While this reorganization is ongoing, and even after it is established, there is a recognized need among stakeholder organizations to identify and communicate the highest CHP R&D priorities in a unified and digestible way that synthesizes the considerations and perspectives of the CHP community across NASA. To achieve this, the HMTA facilitated a series of group discussions with representatives of NASA’s CHP community, which culminated in a product identifying the eight highest priority mission-enabling CHP capabilities for human missions to Mars, referred to as the “Top Human System Capability Needs for Mars”. The list includes Earth-Independent Human Operations; Mars Duration Food System; Mars Duration Effects on Human Physiology; Risks Mitigations for Vehicle Atmospheres; Computational Injury & Anthropometric Models; Exploration Exercise Countermeasures; Individual Variability in Responses to Spaceflight; and Sensorimotor Countermeasures. Existing strategic planning and risk management tools and processes were considered, as well as practicalities of technical, cost, and schedule feasibility associated with potential R&D risk mitigations and technology solutions. The product is not owned by any one organization and does not replace existing strategic or program planning processes; rather it aims to complement and inform them with a unified set of community generated priorities. It is anticipated that this list will be re-evaluated periodically based on R&D progress and the evolving M2M architecture.

Life Support↗

DOE OSTI2022

Distributed Energy Resource Cybersecurity Standards Development [Final Report]

Currently, the solar industry is operating with little application-specific guidance on how to protect and defend their systems from cyberattacks. This 3-year Department of Energy (DOE) Solar Energy Technologies Office-funded project helped advance the distributed energy resource (DER) cybersecurity state-of-the-art by (a) bolstering industry awareness of cybersecurity concepts, risks, and solutions through a webinar series and (b) developing recommendations for DER cybersecurity standards to improve the security performance of DER products and networks. Drafting DER standards is a lengthy, consensus-based process requiring effective leadership and stakeholder participation. This project was designed to reduce standard and guide writing times by creating well-researched recommendations that could act as a starting place for national and international standards development organizations. Working within the SunSpec/Sandia DER Cybersecurity Workgroup, the team produced guidance for DER cybersecurity certification, communication protocol standards, network architecture s, access control, and patching. The team also led subgroups within the IEEE P 1547.3 Guide for Cybersecurity of Distributed Energy Resources Interconnected with Electric Power Systems committee and pushed a draft to ballot in October 2021.

14 SOLAR ENERGY↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Introduction of an Agile Systems Engineering Process to the NASA Armstrong Flight Research Center

This paper will provide background on the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Aeronautics Research Mission Directorate (ARMD) ARMD Test Data Portal (ATDP) effort along with the rationale that motivated the ATDP team to consider implementing an agile systems engineering (SE) process. The primary motivation for using this new SE process was based on the desire to mitigate a major risk to project success. Since the agile SE process had never been used before at the NASA Armstrong Flight Research Center (AFRC), utilizing this new SE process required a trailblazing effort to introduce it to NASA AFRC leadership. As a result, the ATDP team chose to adhere to the agile SE process in addition to the trusted classical waterfall SE process on ATDP. Through successful execution of this hybrid SE process during Phase I, along with demonstrating the value and rigor of the agile SE process, NASA AFRC leadership ultimately permitted the ATDP project to solely use the agile SE process for developments beyond Phase I. While it is the opinion of the authors that the classical SE process is more effective for most projects at NASA AFRC, some projects may deem that the agile SE process is more advantageous. Although this paper is focused on introducing the agile SE process to NASA AFRC, lessons learned will be valuable to other organizations as well. Details of how the ATDP team implemented the agile SE process during Phase I will be summarized, along with how the team met all required classical SE milestones. Lessons learned throughout Phase I of this effort will also be highlighted.

Daniel S. Jones↗

NASA NTRS2024

NASA’s Top Human System Research and Technology Needs for Mars

NASA is working with industry and international partners to return humans to the Moon and to eventually enable humans to explore Mars. Within NASA, several organizations work together to identify, prioritize, fund, execute, and operationalize the research and technology development (R&TD) that will be necessary to enable crew health and performance (CHP) during these future missions. These organizations include flight programs, the Health and Medical Technical Authority (HMTA), the Human Research Program, the Space Technology Mission Directorate, System Capability Leadership Teams, and other organizations, many of which existed for several years prior to the creation of the Moon-to-Mars (M2M) Program Office in 2023. A variety of constructs, vocabularies, and processes exist for managing risks and supporting strategic planning across these organizations. For example, M2M objectives, program risks, human system risks, human research gaps, capability gaps, and envisioned futures are all constructs currently used within NASA to identify and prioritize R&TD needs. These strategic planning constructs are evolving to allow M2M objectives and R&TD investments to be aligned and traced at a detailed level. A recognized need exists among stakeholder organizations to identify and communicate the highest CHP R&TD priorities in a unified and digestible way that addresses the perspectives of NASA’s CHP community. To achieve this, the HMTA arranged a series of discussions with representatives of NASA’s CHP community, during which the 8 highest priority CHP capabilities that will enable human missions to Mars, referred to as the “top human system capability needs for Mars”, were identified. The list includes Earth-independent human operations; Mars-duration food system; Mars-duration effects on human physiology; risk mitigations for vehicle atmospheres; computational injury and anthropometric models; exploration exercise countermeasures; individual variability in responses to spaceflight; and sensorimotor countermeasures. Existing tools and processes for strategic planning and risk management were evaluated, as well as the technical practicalities, cost, and schedule feasibility associated with potential R&TD investments in different capability need areas. This capability needs report is not owned by any one NASA organization and does not replace existing strategic or program planning processes; rather it aims to complement and inform them with a unified set of community generated priorities. These top capability needs will be re-evaluated periodically based on R&TD progress and the evolving M2M architecture.

technology gaps↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

NASA’s Top Human System Research and Technology Needs for Mars

technology gaps↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Exploration Medical Capability - Advancing Medical System Design and Risk-Informed Decision Making for Deep Space Exploration

BACKGROUND: Within NASA’s Human Research Program, the Exploration Medical Capability (ExMC) Element has three primary focus areas: clinical and scientific research, systems engineering and trade space analysis, and technology development and demonstrations. These focus areas feed into the overarching goal of enabling progressively Earth-Independent Medical Operations (EIMO), a new paradigm that will be necessary for future Artemis and Mars medical and vehicle systems. This EIMO end state aligns with NASA’s Moon to Mars Objectives, which clearly outline the need for NASA deep space exploration missions to reduce their reliance upon Earth and become increasingly autonomous, in preparation for the first human Mars mission. OVERVIEW: To advance exploration medical systems and ultimately, integrated crew health and performance systems, ExMC’s portfolio includes: funding ground development & testing of novel medical capabilities; creation of new approaches for the development of medical protocols and procedures; deployment of innovative technologies into analog environments; technology demonstrations in spaceflight; and eventual transition to operations of new capabilities for deep space exploration missions. The portfolio also includes: pharmaceutical research targeting stability, pharmacokinetics, and pharmacodynamics; integrated data architectures and clinical decision support tools; and systems engineering and trade space analysis tools to assist NASA in the development of future medical system models as well as the medical system requirements that can serve as a foundation for deep space exploration missions. All of these investments are done in a collaborative and coordinated fashion with other NASA stakeholders, such as the Environmental Control and Life Support Systems – Crew Health and Performance System Capability Leadership Team and the Health and Medical Technical Authority. DISCUSSION: In this presentation, ExMC will provide an overview of our work from across our portfolio, all of which will inform future EIMO efforts at NASA. ExMC’s research and development investments are targeted to reduce the human system risks associated with deep space exploration to the Moon and Mars.

Kris Lehnhardt↗

DOE OSTI2024

Project No. 5: Evaluating Dredged Materials for Energy Storage Applications with Economic and Carbon Benefits (CRADA Final Report)

The New York Power Authority (NYPA) is committed to supporting the Climate Leadership and Community Protection Act (CLCPA) through its VISION2030 strategic plan. As a clean energy provider, NYPA is seeking to demonstrate leadership in every aspect of its business by taking a comprehensive approach to sustainability management and integrating sustainability principles into day-to-day decision-making. This effort includes planning for climate resilience through projects that mitigate climate risk in our operations and prioritize climate opportunities in our investments. Canal Corporation, a subsidiary of NYPA, is charged with maintaining minimum water depths for navigation in the Cayuga-Seneca, Champlain, Erie and Oswego Canals. In order to do so, an average volume of 280,000 cubic yards of sediment is dredged annually and held in Upland Disposal Sites (UDS) permitted by the New York Department of Environmental Conservation (NYSDEC). The required on-land storage at UDSes are nearing capacity, and disposal opportunities are costly, both economically and environmentally. Novel energy storage technology developed by NREL provides an opportunity for meeting NYPA's need to find reuse options for dredged materials and commitment to providing clean reliable energy. This would also support NYPA's goal of developing 300 MW of utility scale storage and enabling 150 MW of distributed storage by 2030. NREL will consult NYPA on the environmental and economic impact of reusing dredged materials as useful commodities such as energy storage media, construction sand or industrial uses. Test and material characterization methods will be based on current NREL storage material characterization approaches. NREL worked with NYPA on sample preparation, material testing, test results analysis. Test and material characterization methods were based on current NREL storage material characterization approaches. The team analyzed the environmental and economic impact of reusing dredged materials as useful commodities such as energy storage media, construction sand or industrial uses. The test and analysis works have achieved the project goal in characterizing NYPA dredging materials and verifying their various uses including construction sand and thermal energy storage media. Uses of dredging materials as useful materials will bring economic and environmental benefits and avoid disposal costs.

25 ENERGY STORAGE↗