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NASA NTRS2010

The WISE Satellite Development: Managing the Risks and the Opportunities

NASA's Wide-field Infrared Survey Explorer (WISE) MIDEX mission is surveying the entire sky in four infrared bands from 3.4 to 22 micrometers. The WISE instrument consists of a 40 cm telescope, a solid hydrogen cryostat, a scan mirror mechanism, and four 1K x1K infrared detectors. The WISE spacecraft bus provides communication, data handling, and avionics including instrument pointing. A Delta 7920 successfully launched WISE into a Sun-synchronous polar orbit on December 14, 2009. WISE was competitively selected by NASA as a Medium cost Explorer mission (MIDEX) in 2002. MIDEX missions are led by the Principal Investigator who delegates day-to-day management to the Project Manager. Given the tight cost cap and relatively short development schedule, NASA chose to extend the development period one year with an option to cancel the mission if certain criteria were not met. To meet this and other challenges, the WISE management team had to learn to work seamlessly across institutional lines and to recognize risks and opportunities in order to develop the flight hardware within the project resources. In spite of significant technical issues, the WISE satellite was delivered on budget and on schedule. This paper describes our management approach and risk posture, technical issues, and critical decisions made.

Risk Management↗
NASA NTRS2017

Risk-Significant Adverse Condition Awareness Strengthens Assurance of Fault Management Systems

As spaceflight systems increase in complexity, Fault Management (FM) systems are ranked high in risk-based assessment of software criticality, emphasizing the importance of establishing highly competent domain expertise to provide assurance. Adverse conditions (ACs) and specific vulnerabilities encountered by safety- and mission-critical software systems have been identified through efforts to reduce the risk posture of software-intensive NASA missions. Acknowledgement of potential off-nominal conditions and analysis to determine software system resiliency are important aspects of hazard analysis and FM. A key component of assuring FM is an assessment of how well software addresses susceptibility to failure through consideration of ACs. Focus on significant risk predicted through experienced analysis conducted at the NASA Independent Verification & Validation (IV&V) Program enables the scoping of effective assurance strategies with regard to overall asset protection of complex spaceflight as well as ground systems. Research efforts sponsored by NASAs Office of Safety and Mission Assurance (OSMA) defined terminology, categorized data fields, and designed a baseline repository that centralizes and compiles a comprehensive listing of ACs and correlated data relevant across many NASA missions. This prototype tool helps projects improve analysis by tracking ACs and allowing queries based on project, mission type, domain/component, causal fault, and other key characteristics. Vulnerability in off-nominal situations, architectural design weaknesses, and unexpected or undesirable system behaviors in reaction to faults are curtailed with the awareness of ACs and risk-significant scenarios modeled for analysts through this database. Integration within the Enterprise Architecture at NASA IV&V enables interfacing with other tools and datasets, technical support, and accessibility across the Agency. This paper discusses the development of an improved workflow process utilizing this database for adaptive, risk-informed FM assurance that critical software systems will safely and securely protect against faults and respond to ACs in order to achieve successful missions.

IV&V↗
NASA NTRS2017

Risk-Significant Adverse Condition Awareness Strengthens Assurance of Fault Management Systems

As spaceflight systems increase in complexity, Fault Management (FM) systems are ranked high in risk-based assessment of software criticality, emphasizing the importance of establishing highly competent domain expertise to provide assurance. Adverse conditions (ACs) and specific vulnerabilities encountered by safety- and mission-critical software systems have been identified through efforts to reduce the risk posture of software-intensive NASA missions. Acknowledgement of potential off-nominal conditions and analysis to determine software system resiliency are important aspects of hazard analysis and FM. A key component of assuring FM is an assessment of how well software addresses susceptibility to failure through consideration of ACs. Focus on significant risk predicted through experienced analysis conducted at the NASA Independent Verification Validation (IVV) Program enables the scoping of effective assurance strategies with regard to overall asset protection of complex spaceflight as well as ground systems. Research efforts sponsored by NASA's Office of Safety and Mission Assurance defined terminology, categorized data fields, and designed a baseline repository that centralizes and compiles a comprehensive listing of ACs and correlated data relevant across many NASA missions. This prototype tool helps projects improve analysis by tracking ACs and allowing queries based on project, mission type, domaincomponent, causal fault, and other key characteristics. Vulnerability in off-nominal situations, architectural design weaknesses, and unexpected or undesirable system behaviors in reaction to faults are curtailed with the awareness of ACs and risk-significant scenarios modeled for analysts through this database. Integration within the Enterprise Architecture at NASA IVV enables interfacing with other tools and datasets, technical support, and accessibility across the Agency. This paper discusses the development of an improved workflow process utilizing this database for adaptive, risk-informed FM assurance that critical software systems will safely and securely protect against faults and respond to ACs in order to achieve successful missions.

Fault management↗
NASA NTRS2019

Challenges and Opportunities of International Cooperation for Safety & Mission Assurance (SMA) on the European Service Module (ESM) of the Orion Program

ESA is providing the ESM to NASA for the Orion Program in accordance with the Implementing Arrangement (IA) established between the two Agencies in 2012. This IA is a barter agreement, in which ESA provides Service Module vehicles for the first two flights of Orion in exchange for two servicing missions to the ISS. This arrangement has provided opportunities and challenges to both communities. It represents an important opportunity for ESA to build on its experience in the development and operations of ATV and play an active role in the development and flight of a manned space vehicle. This paper will explore some of the unique aspects of this arrangement as it affects Safety & Mission Assurance (SMA).The assessment of ESM compliance with applicable safety requirements is the responsibility of the Joint Safety and Engineering Review Panel (JSERP). The JSERP has two features that are relatively unique amongst NASA safety panels. First, NASA Engineering and SMA organizations co-chair this Panel. Previously, Safety has chaired, with Engineering as a member of the Panel. Inclusion of Engineering as a co-chair has offered greater leverage within the technical community. Second, the JSERP includes a second set of co-chairs from ESA Engineering and ESA Product Assurance and Safety (PA/S) organizations. This recognizes the international arrangement as one of partnership.Another source of both opportunity and challenge is the differing experience base of ESA and NASA. NASA has decades of experience in manned spaceflight, dating back to the Mercury program and following through Gemini, Apollo, Apollo-Soyuz, Skylab, Shuttle and the International Space Station. The risk posture for manned missions is much more rigorous than for unmanned missions. ESA brings a wealth of knowledge as well, with their flights of Ariane and Automated Transfer Vehicle (ATV), development and operation of the Columbus module on ISS, and satellite programs. The result is that both parties have developed paradigms related to risk and failure that contribute to ESM discussions.Orion represents humanity's first venture beyond Low-Earth Orbit (LEO) in over fifty years. Much of that experience is captured in program documents, but first-hand knowledge is limited to a few spaceflight veterans. Missions to LEO have offered the opportunity of direct, near-instantaneous communications and assistance, and the ability to return to Earth within a matter of hours in case of emergency. Outward-bound missions do not have these features and will require a more autonomous spacecraft with attendant safety-related issues.This paper will explore these and other challenges as we approach the flight of the first Orion vehicle.

Ciancone, Michael L.↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

How Can We Efficiently Build A Spacecraft That Has Longevity? Experiences From the GSFC Perspective to Inform Lunar Exploration and Science Orbiter’s Architecture

Recent successes in NASA planetary science missions has shown that long-lived missions can yield significant science return. These missions, despite their longevity, were not planned to operate beyond their deign life. For example, the Lunar Reconnaissance Orbiter has a design life of 2-3 years, and yet we are entering its 14th year on orbit. Spacecraft longevity in practice has been related to: 1) mission class; 2) did we test it long enough and resolve all the anomalies to be beyond the early failure curve; 3) consumables budgets, and 4) how components are de-signed and tested. Mission class has been perceived as one of the primary ways to drive longevity. But higher mission class is a significant cost and mission driver. Parts selection only from the limited military standard parts and extensive parts qualification adds to development time and cost. Largely redundant (often erroneously interpreted as fully redundant) adds to launch mass and increases testing complexity (which may reduce the amount of testing in the nominal con-figuration). Lower Risk Posture (reflected in a higher mission class) drives significant additional processes and quality assurance analyses. Higher mission class also drives significantly greater sparing and life testing costs. This discussion focuses on whether this is indeed the best way to achieve longevity efficiently or whether there are more efficient ways to achieve longevity. Empirical evidence shows that lower mission classes that implement effective risk reduction and selective redundancy generally results in long life at a lower Spacecraft bus cost. By evaluating redundancy careful-ly, spacecraft cost can be lowered which can enable a more capable payload. Risk of the mission is highly dependent on the complexity of the mission and is only loosely dependent on Class of Mission. High complexity missions can have many single point failures and require the development of new technology, while lower class mission can have lower risk by baselining or incorporating: (selective) redundancy, fault-tolerant design, design for minimum risk, ability to reset, and/or design for graceful degradation. The team met with Goddard Space Flight Center Space Systems Mission Operations leaders to discuss which avionics have proven in flight to be the most reliable and which have had lifetime issues. The paper proposes a list of components to focus on for redundancy for a long-lived lunar mission. Reliability numbers are presented for both single string and dual string missions. The history of life-time performance versus planned mission life according to mission class is presented. A mission with well thought out selective redundancy and effective on the ground test program, can be expected to last well beyond its mission lifetime and provided enhanced return for the community. This approach minimizes project expenditures that do not retire significant risk and allows the project to focus risk mitigation efforts on those risks that will have a significant likelihood of threatening mission success. This is aided by keeping the amount of technology maturation and mission complexity low, while focusing effort on ensuring all component stress-ing parameters well within the bounds of their capabilities.

Lessons Learned↗
NASA NTRS2010

Launch Pad Flame Trench Refractory Materials

The launch complexes at NASA's John F. Kennedy Space Center (KSC) are critical support facilities for the successful launch of space-based vehicles. These facilities include a flame trench that bisects the pad at ground level. This trench includes a flame deflector system that consists of an inverted, V-shaped steel structure covered with a high temperature concrete material five inches thick that extends across the center of the flame trench. One side of the "V11 receives and deflects the flames from the orbiter main engines; the opposite side deflects the flames from the solid rocket boosters. There are also two movable deflectors at the top of the trench to provide additional protection to shuttle hardware from the solid rocket booster flames. These facilities are over 40 years old and are experiencing constant deterioration from launch heat/blast effects and environmental exposure. The refractory material currently used in launch pad flame deflectors has become susceptible to failure, resulting in large sections of the material breaking away from the steel base structure and creating high-speed projectiles during launch. These projectiles jeopardize the safety of the launch complex, crew, and vehicle. Post launch inspections have revealed that the number and frequency of repairs, as well as the area and size of the damage, is increasing with the number of launches. The Space Shuttle Program has accepted the extensive ground processing costs for post launch repair of damaged areas and investigations of future launch related failures for the remainder of the program. There currently are no long term solutions available for Constellation Program ground operations to address the poor performance and subsequent failures of the refractory materials. Over the last three years, significant liberation of refractory material in the flame trench and fire bricks along the adjacent trench walls following Space Shuttle launches have resulted in extensive investigations of failure mechanisms, load response, ejected material impact evaluation, and repair design analysis (environmental and structural assessment, induced environment from solid rocket booster plume, loads summary, and repair integrity), assessment of risk posture for flame trench debris, and justification of flight readiness rationale. Although the configuration of the launch pad, water and exhaust direction, and location of the Mobile Launcher Platform between the flame trench and the flight hardware should protect the Space Vehicle from debris exposure, loss of material could cause damage to a major element of the ground facility (resulting in temporary usage loss); and damage to other facility elements is possible. These are all significant risks that will impact ground operations for Constellation and development of new refractory material systems is necessary to reduce the likelihood of the foreign object debris hazard during launch. KSC is developing an alternate refractory material for the launch pad flame trench protection system, including flame deflector and flame trench walls, that will withstand launch conditions without the need for repair after every launch, as is currently the case. This paper will present a summary of the results from industry surveys, trade studies, life cycle cost analysis, and preliminary testing that have been performed to support and validate the development, testing, and qualification of new refractory materials.

Calle, Luz M.↗
NASA NTRS2016

Assurance of Fault Management: Risk-Significant Adverse Condition Awareness

Fault Management (FM) systems are ranked high in risk-based assessment of criticality within flight software, emphasizing the importance of establishing highly competent domain expertise to provide assurance for NASA projects, especially as spaceflight systems continue to increase in complexity. Insight into specific characteristics of FM architectures seen embedded within safety- and mission-critical software systems analyzed by the NASA Independent Verification Validation (IVV) Program has been enhanced with an FM Technical Reference (TR) suite. Benefits are aimed beyond the IVV community to those that seek ways to efficiently and effectively provide software assurance to reduce the FM risk posture of NASA and other space missions. The identification of particular FM architectures, visibility, and associated IVV techniques provides a TR suite that enables greater assurance that critical software systems will adequately protect against faults and respond to adverse conditions. The role FM has with regard to overall asset protection of flight software systems is being addressed with the development of an adverse condition (AC) database encompassing flight software vulnerabilities.Identification of potential off-nominal conditions and analysis to determine how a system responds to these conditions are important aspects of hazard analysis and fault management. Understanding what ACs the mission may face, and ensuring they are prevented or addressed is the responsibility of the assurance team, which necessarily should have insight into ACs beyond those defined by the project itself. Research efforts sponsored by NASAs Office of Safety and Mission Assurance defined terminology, categorized data fields, and designed a baseline repository that centralizes and compiles a comprehensive listing of ACs and correlated data relevant across many NASA missions. This prototype tool helps projects improve analysis by tracking ACs, and allowing queries based on project, mission type, domain component, causal fault, and other key characteristics. The repository has a firm structure, initial collection of data, and an interface established for informational queries, with plans for integration within the Enterprise Architecture at NASA IVV, enabling support and accessibility across the Agency. The development of an improved workflow process for adaptive, risk-informed FM assurance is currently underway.

Software Verification & Validation↗
NASA NTRS2010

NASA Spacecraft Fault Management Workshop Results

Fault Management is a critical aspect of deep-space missions. For the purposes of this paper, fault management is defined as the ability of a system to detect, isolate, and mitigate events that impact, or have the potential to impact, nominal mission operations. The fault management capabilities are commonly distributed across flight and ground subsystems, impacting hardware, software, and mission operations designs. The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Discovery & New Frontiers (D&NF) Program Office at Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) recently studied cost overruns and schedule delays for 5 missions. The goal was to identify the underlying causes for the overruns and delays, and to develop practical mitigations to assist the D&NF projects in identifying potential risks and controlling the associated impacts to proposed mission costs and schedules. The study found that 4 out of the 5 missions studied had significant overruns due to underestimating the complexity and support requirements for fault management. As a result of this and other recent experiences, the NASA Science Mission Directorate (SMD) Planetary Science Division (PSD) commissioned a workshop to bring together invited participants across government, industry, academia to assess the state of the art in fault management practice and research, identify current and potential issues, and make recommendations for addressing these issues. The workshop was held in New Orleans in April of 2008. The workshop concluded that fault management is not being limited by technology, but rather by a lack of emphasis and discipline in both the engineering and programmatic dimensions. Some of the areas cited in the findings include different, conflicting, and changing institutional goals and risk postures; unclear ownership of end-to-end fault management engineering; inadequate understanding of the impact of mission-level requirements on fault management complexity; and practices, processes, and tools that have not kept pace with the increasing complexity of mission requirements and spacecraft systems. This paper summarizes the findings and recommendations from that workshop, as well as opportunities identified for future investment in tools, processes, and products to facilitate the development of space flight fault management capabilities.

Newhouse, Marilyn↗
NASA NTRS2010

Results from the NASA Spacecraft Fault Management Workshop: Cost Drivers for Deep Space Missions

Fault Management, the detection of and response to in-flight anomalies, is a critical aspect of deep-space missions. Fault management capabilities are commonly distributed across flight and ground subsystems, impacting hardware, software, and mission operations designs. The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Discovery & New Frontiers (D&NF) Program Office at Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) recently studied cost overruns and schedule delays for five missions. The goal was to identify the underlying causes for the overruns and delays, and to develop practical mitigations to assist the D&NF projects in identifying potential risks and controlling the associated impacts to proposed mission costs and schedules. The study found that four out of the five missions studied had significant overruns due to underestimating the complexity and support requirements for fault management. As a result of this and other recent experiences, the NASA Science Mission Directorate (SMD) Planetary Science Division (PSD) commissioned a workshop to bring together invited participants across government, industry, and academia to assess the state of the art in fault management practice and research, identify current and potential issues, and make recommendations for addressing these issues. The workshop was held in New Orleans in April of 2008. The workshop concluded that fault management is not being limited by technology, but rather by a lack of emphasis and discipline in both the engineering and programmatic dimensions. Some of the areas cited in the findings include different, conflicting, and changing institutional goals and risk postures; unclear ownership of end-to-end fault management engineering; inadequate understanding of the impact of mission-level requirements on fault management complexity; and practices, processes, and tools that have not kept pace with the increasing complexity of mission requirements and spacecraft systems. This paper summarizes the findings and recommendations from that workshop, particularly as fault management development issues affect operations and the development of operations capabilities.

Newhouse, Marilyn E.↗
NASA NTRS2010

The Right Stuff: A Look Back at Three Decades of Flight Controller Training for Space Shuttle Mission Operations

This paper will summarize the thirty-year history of Space Shuttle operations from the perspective of training in NASA Johnson Space Center's Mission Control Center. It will focus on training and development of flight controllers and instructors, and how training practices have evolved over the years as flight experience was gained, new technologies developed, and programmatic needs changed. Operations of human spaceflight systems is extremely complex, therefore the training and certification of operations personnel is a critical piece of ensuring mission success. Mission Control Center (MCC-H), at the Lyndon B. Johnson Space Center, in Houston, Texas manages mission operations for the Space Shuttle Program, including the training and certification of the astronauts and flight control teams. This paper will give an overview of a flight control team s makeup and responsibilities during a flight, and details on how those teams are trained and certified. The training methodology for developing flight controllers has evolved significantly over the last thirty years, while the core goals and competencies have remained the same. In addition, the facilities and tools used in the control center have evolved. These changes have been driven by many factors including lessons learned, technology, shuttle accidents, shifts in risk posture, and generational differences. Flight controllers will share their experiences in training and operating the Space Shuttle throughout the Program s history. A primary method used for training Space Shuttle flight control teams is by running mission simulations of the orbit, ascent, and entry phases, to truly "train like you fly." The audience will learn what it is like to perform a simulation as a shuttle flight controller. Finally, we will reflect on the lessons learned in training for the shuttle program, and how those could be applied to future human spaceflight endeavors.

Dittemore, Gary D.↗
NASA NTRS2011

The Right Stuff: A Look Back at Three Decades of Flight Controller Training for Space Shuttle Mission Operations

Operations of human spaceflight systems is extremely complex, therefore the training and certification of operations personnel is a critical piece of ensuring mission success. Mission Control Center (MCC-H), at the Lyndon B. Johnson Space Center, in Houston, Texas manages mission operations for the Space Shuttle Program, including the training and certification of the astronauts and flight control teams. This paper will give an overview of a flight control team s makeup and responsibilities during a flight, and details on how those teams are trained and certified. The training methodology for developing flight controllers has evolved significantly over the last thirty years, while the core goals and competencies have remained the same. In addition, the facilities and tools used in the control center have evolved. These changes have been driven by many factors including lessons learned, technology, shuttle accidents, shifts in risk posture, and generational differences. Flight controllers will share their experiences in training and operating the Space Shuttle throughout the Program s history. A primary method used for training Space Shuttle flight control teams is by running mission simulations of the orbit, ascent, and entry phases, to truly "train like you fly." The reader will learn what it is like to perform a simulation as a shuttle flight controller. Finally, the paper will reflect on the lessons learned in training for the shuttle program, and how those could be applied to future human spaceflight endeavors. These endeavors could range from going to the moon or to Mars. The lessons learned from operating the space shuttle for over thirty years will help the space industry build the next human transport space vehicle and inspire the next generation of space explorers.

Dittemore, Gary D.↗
NASA NTRS2011

The Final Count Down: A Review of Three Decades of Flight Controller Training Methods for Space Shuttle Mission Operations

Operations of human spaceflight systems is extremely complex, therefore the training and certification of operations personnel is a critical piece of ensuring mission success. Mission Control Center (MCC-H), at the Lyndon B. Johnson Space Center, in Houston, Texas manages mission operations for the Space Shuttle Program, including the training and certification of the astronauts and flight control teams. As the space shuttle program ends in 2011, a review of how training for STS-1 was conducted compared to STS-134 will show multiple changes in training of shuttle flight controller over a thirty year period. This paper will additionally give an overview of a flight control team s makeup and responsibilities during a flight, and details on how those teams have been trained certified over the life span of the space shuttle. The training methods for developing flight controllers have evolved significantly over the last thirty years, while the core goals and competencies have remained the same. In addition, the facilities and tools used in the control center have evolved. These changes have been driven by many factors including lessons learned, technology, shuttle accidents, shifts in risk posture, and generational differences. A primary method used for training Space Shuttle flight control teams is by running mission simulations of the orbit, ascent, and entry phases, to truly "train like you fly." The reader will learn what it is like to perform a simulation as a shuttle flight controller. Finally, the paper will reflect on the lessons learned in training for the shuttle program, and how those could be applied to future human spaceflight endeavors.

Dittemore, Gary D.↗
NASA NTRS2010

Managing Fault Management Development

As the complexity of space missions grows, development of Fault Management (FM) capabilities is an increasingly common driver for significant cost overruns late in the development cycle. FM issues and the resulting cost overruns are rarely caused by a lack of technology, but rather by a lack of planning and emphasis by project management. A recent NASA FM Workshop brought together FM practitioners from a broad spectrum of institutions, mission types, and functional roles to identify the drivers underlying FM overruns and recommend solutions. They identified a number of areas in which increased program and project management focus can be used to control FM development cost growth. These include up-front planning for FM as a distinct engineering discipline; managing different, conflicting, and changing institutional goals and risk postures; ensuring the necessary resources for a disciplined, coordinated approach to end-to-end fault management engineering; and monitoring FM coordination across all mission systems.

McDougal, John M.↗
NASA NTRS2011

NASA Space Technology Draft Roadmap Area 13: Ground and Launch Systems Processing

This slide presentation reviews the technology development roadmap for the area of ground and launch systems processing. The scope of this technology area includes: (1) Assembly, integration, and processing of the launch vehicle, spacecraft, and payload hardware (2) Supply chain management (3) Transportation of hardware to the launch site (4) Transportation to and operations at the launch pad (5) Launch processing infrastructure and its ability to support future operations (6) Range, personnel, and facility safety capabilities (7) Launch and landing weather (8) Environmental impact mitigations for ground and launch operations (9) Launch control center operations and infrastructure (10) Mission integration and planning (11) Mission training for both ground and flight crew personnel (12) Mission control center operations and infrastructure (13) Telemetry and command processing and archiving (14) Recovery operations for flight crews, flight hardware, and returned samples. This technology roadmap also identifies ground, launch and mission technologies that will: (1) Dramatically transform future space operations, with significant improvement in life-cycle costs (2) Improve the quality of life on earth, while exploring in co-existence with the environment (3) Increase reliability and mission availability using low/zero maintenance materials and systems, comprehensive capabilities to ascertain and forecast system health/configuration, data integration, and the use of advanced/expert software systems (4) Enhance methods to assess safety and mission risk posture, which would allow for timely and better decision making. Several key technologies are identified, with a couple of slides devoted to one of these technologies (i.e., corrosion detection and prevention). Development of these technologies can enhance life on earth and have a major impact on how we can access space, eventually making routine commercial space access and improve building and manufacturing, and weather forecasting for example for the effect of these process improvements on our daily lives.

Clements, Greg↗
NASA NTRS2011

The Final Count Down: A Review of Three Decades of Flight Controller Training Methods for Space Shuttle Mission Operations

Operations of human spaceflight systems is extremely complex; therefore, the training and certification of operations personnel is a critical piece of ensuring mission success. Mission Control Center (MCC-H), at the Lyndon B. Johnson Space Center in Houston, Texas, manages mission operations for the Space Shuttle Program, including the training and certification of the astronauts and flight control teams. An overview of a flight control team s makeup and responsibilities during a flight, and details on how those teams are trained and certified, reveals that while the training methodology for developing flight controllers has evolved significantly over the last thirty years the core goals and competencies have remained the same. In addition, the facilities and tools used in the control center have evolved. Changes in methodology and tools have been driven by many factors, including lessons learned, technology, shuttle accidents, shifts in risk posture, and generational differences. Flight controllers share their experiences in training and operating the space shuttle. The primary training method throughout the program has been mission simulations of the orbit, ascent, and entry phases, to truly train like you fly. A review of lessons learned from flight controller training suggests how they could be applied to future human spaceflight endeavors, including missions to the moon or to Mars. The lessons learned from operating the space shuttle for over thirty years will help the space industry build the next human transport space vehicle.

Dittermore, Gary↗
NASA NTRS2012

Managing Small Spacecraft Projects: Less is Not Easier

Managing small, low cost missions (class C or D) is not necessarily easier than managing a full flagship mission. Yet, small missions are typically considered easier to manage and used as a training ground for developing the next generation of project managers. While limited resources can be a problem for small missions, in reality most of the issues inherent in managing small projects are not the direct result of limited resources. Instead, problems encountered by managers of small spacecraft missions often derive from 1) the perception that managing small projects is easier if something is easier it needs less rigor and formality in execution, 2) the perception that limited resources necessitate or validate omitting standard management practices, 3) less stringent or unclear guidelines or policies for small projects, and 4) stakeholder expectations that are not consistent with the size and nature of the project. For example, the size of a project is sometimes used to justify not building a full, detailed integrated master schedule. However, while a small schedule slip may not be a problem for a large mission, it can indicate a serious problem for a small mission with a short development phase, highlighting the importance of the schedule for early identification of potential issues. Likewise, stakeholders may accept a higher risk posture early in the definition of a low-cost mission, but as launch approaches this acceptance may change. This presentation discusses these common misconceptions about managing small, low cost missions, the problems that can result, and possible solutions.

Barley, Bryan↗
NASA NTRS2012

Challenges of Sustaining the International Space Station Through 2020 and Beyond: Reassessing Confidence Targets for System Availability

The International Space Station (ISS) was originally designed to operate until 2015 with a plan for deorbiting the ISS in 2016. Currently, the international partnership has agreed to extend the operations until 2020 and discussions are underway to extend the life even further to 2028. Each partner is responsible for the sustaining engineering, sparing, and maintenance of their own segments. National Aeronautics and Space Administration's (NASA's) challenge is to purchase the needed number of spares to maintain the functional availability of the ISS systems necessary for the United States On-Orbit Segment s contribution. This presentation introduces an analytical approach to assessing uncertainty in ISS hardware necessary to extend the life of the vehicle. Some key areas for consideration are: establishing what confidence targets are required to ensure science can be continuously carried out on the ISS, defining what confidence targets are reasonable to ensure vehicle survivability, considering what is required to determine if the confidence targets are too high, and whether sufficient number of spares are purchased. The results of the analysis will provide a methodological basis for reassessing vehicle subsystem confidence targets. This analysis compares the probability of existing spares exceeding the total expected unit demand of the Orbital Replacement Unit (ORU) in functional hierarchies approximating the vehicle subsystems. In cases where the functional hierarchies' availability does not meet subsystem confidence targets, the analysis will further identify which ORUs may require additional spares to extend the life of the ISS. The resulting probability is dependent upon hardware reliability estimates. However, the ISS hardware fleet carries considerable epistemic uncertainty which must be factored into the development and execution of sparing risk postures. In addition, it is also recognized that uncertainty in the assessment is due to disconnects between modeled functions and actual subsystem operations. Perhaps most importantly, it is acknowledged that conservative confidence targets per subsystem are currently accepted. This presentation will also discuss how subsystem confidence targets may be relaxed based on calculating the level of uncertainty for each corresponding ORU-function. The presentation will conclude with the various strengths and limitations for implementing the analytical approach in sustaining the ISS through end of life; 2020 and beyond.

Lutomski, Michael G.↗