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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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At least 55 records · Page 3
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
NASA NTRS2014

Data Mining of Historical Human Data to Assess the Risk of Injury due to Dynamic Loads

The NASA Occupant Protection Group is charged with ensuring crewmembers are protected during all dynamic phases of spaceflight. Previous work with outside experts has led to the development of a definition of acceptable risk (DAR) for space capsule vehicles. The DAR defines allowable probability rates for various categories of injuries. An important question is how to validate these probabilities for a given vehicle. One approach is to impact test human volunteers under projected nominal landing loads. The main drawback is the large number of subject tests required to attain a reasonable level of confidence that the injury probability rates would meet those outlined in the DAR. An alternative is to mine existing databases containing human responses to impact. Testing an anthropomorphic test device (ATD) at the same human‐exposure levels could yield a range of ATD responses that would meet DAR. As one aspect of future vehicle validation, the ATD could be tested in the vehicle's seat and suit configuration at nominal landing loads and compared with the ATD responses supported by the human data set. This approach could reduce the number of human‐volunteer tests NASA would need to conduct to validate that a vehicle meets occupant protection standards. METHODS: The U.S. Air Force has recorded hundreds of human responses to frontal, lateral, and spinal impacts at many acceleration levels and pulse durations. All of this data are stored on the Collaborative Biomechanics Data Network (CBDN), which is maintained by the Wright Patterson Air Force Base (WPAFB). The test device for human occupant restraint (THOR) ATD was impact tested on WPAFB's horizontal impulse accelerator (HIA) matching human‐volunteer exposures on the HIA to 5 frontal and 3 spinal loading conditions. No human injuries occurred as a result of these impact conditions. Peak THOR response variables for neck axial tension and compression, and thoracic‐spine axial compression were collected. Maximal chest deflection was determined from motion capture video of the impact test. HIC‐ 15 and BRIC were calculated from head acceleration responses. Given the number of human subjects for each test condition a confidence interval of injury probability will be obtained. RESULTS: Results will be discussed in terms of injury‐risk probability estimates based on the human data set evaluated. Also, gaps in the data set will be identified. These gaps could be one of two types. One is areas where additional THOR testing would increase the comparable human data set, thereby improving confidence in the injury probability rate. The other is where additional human testing would assist in obtaining information on other acceleration levels or directions. DISCUSSION: The historical human data showed validity of the THOR ATD for supplemental testing. The historical human data are limited in scope, however. Further data are needed to characterize the effects of sex, age, anthropometry, and deconditioning due to spaceflight on risk of injury

Wells, Jesica↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Probabalistic Risk Analysis and Thermal Margin Process for an Inflatable Aeroshell

Uncertainties always exist in atmospheric entry aeroheating environments and the thermal response of thermal protection system (TPS) material. These uncertainties are mitigated in the design by ap-plying margin and factors of safety to the TPS. Entry vehicle TPS is often conservatively over-sized for the heat loads that are experienced along the entry trajectory by stacking worst-case scenarios together. Additionally, the current TPS design and margin process used by NASA offers very little insight into the risk of over-temperature during flight and the reliability of the heat shield performance [1,3]. A probabilistic margin process can be used to calculate the amount of TPS margin necessary to survive a given entry heat load at a specified level of risk [2,3,4]. The vehicle’s initial entry state (entry velocity, flight path angle, and entry mass) determines the expected atmospheric entry environmental conditions and resulting heat load that the entry vehicle will experience. If there is flexibility in the entry state, then this process can be used to select an appropriate combination of entry state parameters and TPS size to target a desired reentry reliability. This probabilistic margin process allows engineers to make informed aeroshell design, entry-trajectory design, and TPS performance risk trades while preventing excessive TPS margin from being applied. The probabilistic TPS margin process has been performed to determine TPS thickness and entry heating constraints given an acceptable risk level for the Low Earth Orbit Flight Experiment of an Inflatable Decelerator (LOFTID) flight project. The process is used in a manner to size the entry heat load for a given flexible TPS (FTPS) thickness so that it meets project reliability standards while allowing the FTPS and the underlying inflatable structure (IS) to be pushed to adequately high temperatures. Since the LOFTID project is an experimental flight demonstration, it is de-sired to drive the FTPS and IS to temperatures that cover a large range of their thermal response models’ applicability. This will allow the thermal response models to be better improved and validated post-flight using LOFTID’s extensive instrumentation embedded within the aeroshell. The presentation demonstrates how uncertainty analysis is carried out using an end-to-end Monte Carlo process where three separate Monte Carlo simulations are run in sequence. The first Monte Carlo simulation operates on the entry trajectory model to generate trajectory parameter dispersions that are fed into the second Monte Carlo simulation. The second Monte Carlo simulation operates on the aerothermodynamics model to generate aeroheating parameter dispersions that are fed into the third Monte Carlo simulation. The third Monte Carlo simulation operates on the FTPS material thermal response model to generate the final FTPS/IS thermal response dispersions. The end-to-end Monte Carlo simulation propagates the uncertainties of each model into the next to quantify the resulting uncertainty of the FTPS/IS thermal response. The fractional contributions of the uncertain parameters in the trajectory, aerothermal, and thermal response models to the variance in the FTPS/IS thermal response is determined as a byproduct of the Monte Carlo analysis. The structural uncertainty of the FTPS thermal response model is evaluated by flight relevant ground testing and model error analysis using test measurements. This probabilistic TPS margin process had never been applied to an entry vehicle and it is one of the LOFTID project’s goals to demonstrate its merits.

Steven A. Tobin↗
NASA NTRS2012

Human Health Countermeasures (HHC) Element Management Plan: Human Research Program

NASA s Human Research Program (HRP) is an applied research and technology program within the Human Exploration and Operations Mission Directorate (HEOMD) that addresses human health and performance risk mitigation strategies in support of exploration missions. The HRP research and technology development is focused on the highest priority risks to crew health and safety with the goal of ensuring mission success and maintaining long-term crew health. Crew health and performance standards, defined by the NASA Chief Health and Medical Officer (CHMO), set the acceptable risk level for exploration missions. The HRP conducts research to inform these standards as well as provide deliverables, such as countermeasures, that ensure standards can be met to maximize human performance and mission success. The Human Health Countermeasures (HHC) Element was formed as part of the HRP to develop a scientifically-based, integrated approach to understanding and mitigating the health risks associated with human spaceflight. These health risks have been organized into four research portfolios that group similar or related risks. A fifth portfolio exists for managing technology developments and infrastructure projects. The HHC Element portfolios consist of: a) Vision and Cardiovascular; b) Exercise and Performance; c) Multisystem; d) Bone; and e) Technology and Infrastructure. The HHC identifies gaps associated with the health risks and plans human physiology research that will result in knowledge required to more fully understand risks and will result in validated countermeasures to mitigate risks.

Norsk, Peter↗
NASA NTRS1993

Thermal performance testing of the Explorer Platform

The Explorer Platform (EP) has been designed to accommodate on-orbit payload and bus module changeout via Space Transportation System (STS) servicing. Such a versatile spacecraft platform designed to experience widely different environmental exposures and operational conditions, coupled with program constraints on schedule and budget, presented a challenge to implementing a technically sound thermal vacuum/thermal balance test program. This paper discusses thermal performance tests implemented at the subsystem and system levels, and the risks accepted resulting from test sequence, configuration. and tests omitted from the program. No thermal cycling or thermal balance tests were performed on the integrated spacecraft level, although both the Payload (EUVE) and Platform (EP) received independent testing. The decision to take this approach is discussed with respect to the thermal design and the associated risks taken to maintain budget and schedule.

Wasson, David↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Analysis and Prediction of VFR Vs IFR Traffic Behavior to Support Uncrewed Aircraft Flight Operations at Regional Airports

Uncrewed Aircraft flight operations at a regional airport will be affected by the uncertainty in the Visual Flight Rules traffic around. This paper analyzes Visual Flight Rules traffic behavior, compares it with Instrument Flight Rules traffic and develops traffic prediction methods to support uncrewed aircraft flight operations. The spatio-temporal distribution of traffic operating under Visual Flight Rules and Instrument Flight Rules was analyzed from one month of historical track data around Fort Worth Alliance airport as a representative regional airport. The traffic behavior was visualized as occupancy maps generated at different altitudes. The Instrument Flight Rules traffic was concentrated in fewer regions of the airspace along structured routes where the risk of interacting with one or more flights reached close to fifty percent in some areas. Visual Flight Rules traffic was spread over more regions, mostly segregated from the Instrument Flight Rules regions, and the risk of interaction was lower reaching up to twenty-five percent on average over the month in some regions. The interaction risk was predicted using predictive occupancy maps over multiple time horizons and conditioned on time and partial observation of traffic in the vicinity. The month-to-month predictability of Visual Flight Rules risk was lower than that of the Instrument Flight Rules traffic, consistently over all the conditions analyzed. However, the prediction and its accuracy were demonstrated to be sensitive to the conditions used. The predictive models generated can be used to support both strategic planning and in-flight decision-making by uncrewed aircraft during flight operations while maintaining an acceptable risk of interacting with other traffic.

VFR↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Analysis and Prediction of VFR Vs IFR Traffic Behavior to Support Uncrewed Aircraft Flight Operations at Regional Airports

Uncrewed Aircraft flight operations at a regional airport will be affected by the uncertainty in the Visual Flight Rules traffic around. This paper analyzes Visual Flight Rules traffic behavior, compares it with Instrument Flight Rules traffic and develops traffic prediction methods to support uncrewed aircraft flight operations. The spatio-temporal distribution of traffic operating under Visual Flight Rules and Instrument Flight Rules was analyzed from one month of historical track data around Fort Worth Alliance airport as a representative regional airport. The traffic behavior was visualized as occupancy maps generated at different altitudes. The Instrument Flight Rules traffic was concentrated in fewer regions of the airspace along structured routes where the risk of interacting with one or more flights reached close to fifty percent in some areas. Visual Flight Rules traffic was spread over more regions, mostly segregated from the Instrument Flight Rules regions, and the risk of interaction was lower reaching up to twenty-five percent on average over the month in some regions. The interaction risk was predicted using predictive occupancy maps over multiple time horizons and conditioned on time and partial observation of traffic in the vicinity. The month-to-month predictability of Visual Flight Rules risk was lower than that of the Instrument Flight Rules traffic, consistently over all the conditions analyzed. However, the prediction and its accuracy were demonstrated to be sensitive to the conditions used. The predictive models generated can be used to support both strategic planning and in-flight decision-making by uncrewed aircraft during flight operations while maintaining an acceptable risk of interacting with other traffic.

VFR↗
NASA NTRS2019

A Proposal for Standardized MMOD Shielding for Robotic Spacecraft

NASA robotic spacecraft are required to assess the potential for small debris induced failure for all disposal-critical components. Additional shielding might then be necessary in order to meet the acceptable risk requirement for the overall mission. Traditionally this requirement had been met with little or no additional shielding. Since the introduction of a high density debris population in ORDEM 3.0, some missions, especially those in higher portions of Low Earth Orbit, have needed additional MMOD-specific shielding in order for the mission to meet the requirement. This is a costly design effort when performed late in the project life cycle, which adds unexpected mass to the spacecraft components during the integration phase, and could disrupt thermal management.A proposal is discussed to develop a more cost-effective approach to MMOD-shielding, which can be employed earlier in the hardware design phase. The development and adoption of standardized shielding assemblies allows early tailoring of the shielding around a component, so that the mass is accounted for, as well as the small particle penetration risk, at a point in the design phase when the cost and schedule impact are more manageable. A set of several assemblies can be developed with a range of protection thresholds, in order to control mass where less shielding is needed. Such shielding assemblies would be developed in collaboration with blanket assembly specialists and thermal control engineers to ensure manufacturability and thermal performance challenges are known and acceptable. One clear benefit of such an approach is that hypervelocity testing can be performed on each of the standard shield assemblies to refine and confirm their performance prior to use.The challenges inherent in designing supplemental MMOD shielding will be discussed, including variations in the orbital debris environment and performance prediction. The benefits of a standardized shielding approach and example applications will also be presented.

Hull, Scott M.↗
NASA NTRS2019

A Proposal for Standardized MMOD Shielding for Robotic Spacecraft

NASA robotic spacecraft are required to assess the potential for small debris induced failure for all disposal-critical components. Additional shielding might then be necessary in order to meet the acceptable risk requirement for the overall mission. Traditionally this requirement had been met with little or no additional shielding. Since the introduction of a high density debris population in ORDEM 3.0, some missions, especially those in higher portions of Low Earth Orbit, have needed additional MMOD-specific shielding in order for the mission to meet the requirement. This is a costly design effort when performed late in the project life cycle, which adds unexpected mass to the spacecraft components during the integration phase, and could disrupt thermal management. A proposal is discussed to develop a more cost-effective approach to MMOD-shielding, which can be employed earlier in the hardware design phase. The development and adoption of standardized shielding assemblies allows early tailoring of the shielding around a component, so that the mass is accounted for, as well as the small particle penetration risk, at a point in the design phase when the cost and schedule impact are more manageable. A set of several assemblies can be developed with a range of protection thresholds, in order to control mass where less shielding is needed. Such shielding assemblies would be developed in collaboration with blanket assembly specialists and thermal control engineers to ensure manufacturability and thermal performance challenges are known and acceptable. One clear benefit of such an approach is that hypervelocity testing can be performed on each of the standard shield assemblies to refine and confirm their performance prior to use.The challenges inherent in designing supplemental MMOD shielding will be discussed, including variations in the orbital debris environment and performance prediction. The benefits of a standardized shielding approach and example applications will also be presented.

Hull, Scott M.↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Gateway Program Safety and Mission Assurance Integration - the Future of Safe Deep Space Human Exploration

As a foundational element of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Artemis Campaign, the Gateway is an incrementally built cislunar spacecraft that will serve as a platform for deep space human exploration, science, and technology demonstration. The Gateway will be a unifying catalyst for international partners around the world to establish sustained deep space scientific investigations, lunar surface access, and missions to Mars. As human exploration moves farther away from Earth, spacecraft designs must prioritize and optimize mass and volume allocations, while minimizing human and spacecraft risk. To accomplish this objective, the Gateway Program Safety and Mission Assurance functions develop, implement, and ensure compliance with requirements, in concert with the accurate characterization and transparent communication of residual hazard risks, for integrated safety, reliability and maintainability and quality assurance. Safety and Mission Assurance was a key contributor during Gateway program pre-formulation and formulation activities where safety and reliability analysis was embedded in the Gateway Systems Engineering and Integration team. During these early program stages, a preliminary Gateway Integrated Hazard Analysis and Preliminary Gateway Probabilistic Risk Assessment assisted in Gateway architectural and operational definition as part of a risk-informed design process. As the deep space architecture has matured, the integrated Safety and Mission Assurance analyses have matured, new safety review processes have been developed, and requirements have been refined to ensure compliance with integrated safety and mission assurance objectives. The Gateway Program is currently concluding the preliminary design review informed milestone, where the primary objectives included: - Ensured completeness and consistency of the preliminary design, including the meeting of all requirements within appropriate margins and acceptable risk posture. - Identification of any major issues moving forward to the Critical Design phase. At this milestone, Safety and Mission Assurance provided numerous products, including Gateway Top Risks and Risk Mitigation Plans, updated integrated hazard analyses, updated probabilistic risk assessment, Crew Survival Analysis Report, and updated Safety and Mission Assurance Requirements and Plans. These products provide a many-faceted perspective on the inherent risk and available mitigations involved in flying the current proposed vehicle design and anticipated stack configurations. In addition, Safety and Mission Assurance identified top technical, process and workforce concerns to be addressed as the program progresses toward the critical design phase. This paper will detail the evolution of the Gateway Program Safety and Mission Assurance integration functions, provide its current status and lessons learned for future human spaceflight programs. Throughout this paper the key tenets of the Gateway Program Safety and Mission Assurance will be discussed: - Application of a risk-informed approach to identify and mitigate areas of highest risk. - Leverage of valuable processes and lessons learned from earlier spaceflight programs. - Development of Safety and Mission Assurance products to inform design risk trades. - Utilization of common Safety and Mission Assurance practices to identify safety risks for multiple perspectives: top-down, bottom-up, and across lines of integration. - Approval of safety hazards at the appropriate level of authority, keeping most deliberation closest to design expertise and elevating risks of greatest concern for program-level consideration. - Championing of Safety and Mission Assurance processes and forums to foster a pervasive safety culture that is transparent, inclusive, and collaborative between all partners. These tenets have allowed the Gateway Safety and Mission Assurance function to play a key role in optimized vehicle design evolution, and early identification and mitigation of Gateway program and Artemis mission risk.

Helen Vaccaro↗
NASA NTRS2012

Does Commercial Space Really Need MOA?

The Mission Operations Assurance (MOA) discipline actively participates as a project member to achieve their common objective of full mission success while also providing an independent risk assessment to the Project Manager. The cornerstone element of MOA is the independent assessment of the risks the project faces in executing its mission. Especially as the project approaches critical mission events, it becomes imperative to clearly identify and assess the risks the project faces. This has been the paradigm for robotic space exploration missions, but does the same apply to commercial space operations? This is the question which is the driver for this year's MOA track at the 18th Annual Improving Space Operations workshop in April at the Jet Propulsion Laboratory, and the question we examine in this paper. Corollaries to this driving question are why shouldn't MOA apply and are there factors beyond mission success with acceptable risk which apply to commercial space operations that are not present in government scientific missions? To address these questions, areas we focus on include risk (both mission and profit) management for commercial space operations and the practical extension of robotic mission MOA to commercial space operations. Another key area to look at is command file errors which are a major concern for deep space robotic missions, but can we worry about them less with manned missions or unmanned supply mission? Further, with the growing concern about space debris, we delve into the role of MOA relative to End-of-Mission activities. This paper examines these topics and in particular the perspectives presented at the workshop to begin charting the appropriate course for MOA in the emerging sector of Commercial Space Operations.

commercial space↗
NASA NTRS2003

Risk-based Classification of Incidents

As the penetration of software into safety-critical systems progresses, accidents and incidents involving software will inevitably become more frequent. Identifying lessons from these occurrences and applying them to existing and future systems is essential if recurrences are to be prevented. Unfortunately, investigative agencies do not have the resources to fully investigate every incident under their jurisdictions and domains of expertise and thus must prioritize certain occurrences when allocating investigative resources. In the aviation community, most investigative agencies prioritize occurrences based on the severity of their associated losses, allocating more resources to accidents resulting in injury to passengers or extensive aircraft damage. We argue that this scheme is inappropriate because it undervalues incidents whose recurrence could have a high potential for loss while overvaluing fairly straightforward accidents involving accepted risks. We then suggest a new strategy for prioritizing occurrences based on the risk arising from incident recurrence.

Greenwell, William S.↗
NASA NTRS2013

Fifteen-minute Extravehicular Activity Prebreathe Protocol Using NASA's Exploration Atmosphere (8.2 psia/ 34% 02)

A TBDM DCS probability model based on an existing biophysical model of inert gas bubble growth provides significant prediction and goodness-of-fit with 84 cases of DCS in 668 human altitude exposures. 2. Model predictions suggest that 15-minute O2 prebreathe protocols used in conjunction with suit ports and an 8.2 psi, 34% O2, 66% N2 atmosphere may enable rapid EVA capability for future exploration missions with the risk of DCS ≤ 12%.  EVA could begin immediately at 6.0 psi, with crewmembers decreasing suit pressure to 4.3 psi after completing the 15-minute in-suit prebreathe. 3. Model predictions suggest that intermittent recompression during exploration EVA may reduce decompression stress by 1.8% to 2.3% for 6 hours of total EVA time. Savings in gas consumables and crew time may be accumulated by abbreviating the EVA suit N2 purge to 2 minutes (20% N2) compared with 8 minutes (5% N2) at the expense of an increase in estimated decompression risk of up to 2.4% for an 8-hour EVA.  Increased DCS risk could be offset by IR or by spending additional time at 6 psi at the beginning of the EVA.  Savings of 0.48 lb of gas and 6 minutes per person per EVA corresponds to more than 31 hours of crew time and 1800 lb of gas and tankage under the Constellation lunar architecture. 6. Further research is needed to characterize and optimize breathing mixtures and intermittent recompression across the range of environments and operational conditions in which astronauts will live and work during future exploration missions. 7. Development of exploration prebreathe protocols will begin with definition of acceptable risk, followed by development of protocols based on models such as ours, and, ultimately, validation of protocols through ground trials before operational implementation.

Abercromby, Andrew F. J.↗
NASA NTRS1973

Summary of the study of disposal of nuclear waste into space

The space shuttle together with expendable and nonexpendable orbital stages such as the space tug or Centaur can safely dispose of waste material by ejecting it from the solar system. The safety problems associated with all phases of launching and operation (normal, emergency, and accident) of such a system are being examined. It appears that solutions can be found that should make the risks acceptable when compared to the benefits to be obtained from the disposal of the nuclear waste. The techniques proposed to make such a system acceptable need to be carefully verified by further study and experiment.

Rom, F. E.↗
NASA NTRS1974

Comparative evaluation of solar, fission, fusion, and fossil energy resources, part 3

The role of nuclear fission reactors in becoming an important power source in the world is discussed. The supply of fissile nuclear fuel will be severely depleted by the year 2000. With breeder reactors the world supply of uranium could last thousands of years. However, breeder reactors have problems of a large radioactive inventory and an accident potential which could present an unacceptable hazard. Although breeder reactors afford a possible solution to the energy shortage, their ultimate role will depend on demonstrated safety and acceptable risks and environmental effects. Fusion power would also be a long range, essentially permanent, solution to the world's energy problem. Fusion appears to compare favorably with breeders in safety and environmental effects. Research comparing a controlled fusion reactor with the breeder reactor in solving our long range energy needs is discussed.

Clement, J. D.↗
NASA NTRS1973

Summary of the study of disposal of nuclear waste into space

NASA, at the request of the AEC, is conducting a preliminary study to determine the feasibility of disposing of nuclear waste material into space. The study has indicated that the Space Shuttle together with expendable and nonexpendable orbital stages such as the Space Tug or Centaur can safety dispose of waste material by ejecting it from the solar system. The safety problems associated with all phases of launching and operation (normal, emergency and accident) of such a system are being examined. From the preliminary study it appears that solutions can be found that should make the risks acceptable when compared to the benefits to be obtained from the disposal of the nuclear waste.

Rom, F. E.↗
NASA NTRS1978

20/30 GHz satellite systems technology needs assessment

The paper surveys the system and market work done at NASA-Lewis with regard to exploring the potential of the 20/30 GHz bands for domestic satellite communications. The 20/30 GHz bands appear attractive economically and, with certain technology advances, appear to offer a virtually unlimited spectrum resource. This attractiveness is especially relevant to high density trunking where there is sufficient traffic to justify dual-station site diversity. Ongoing system and market studies actively involve satellite system suppliers and carriers as well as the government in a cooperative, mutually beneficial effort. It is considered that this is the approach most likely to result in a spectrum-efficient acceptable-risk high-capacity 30/30 GHz satellite system which is relevant to anticipated markets.

Stevens, G.↗
NASA NTRS1981

Materials and structures/ACEE

Light weight composites made from graphite fibers, glass, or man made materials held in an epoxy matrix, and their application to airframe design are reviewed. The Aircraft Energy Efficiency program is discussed. Characteristics of composites, acceptable risks, building parts and confidence, and aeroelastic tailoring are considered.

Source record↗
NASA NTRS1984

Missions/Planning Panel

A panel discussion was held to develop a viewpoint of space power technology needs and state of readiness for future mission scenarios. Among the points made in the discussion, it was agreed that missions, particularly the far term ones, do serve to drive technology; however, as the missions become nearer term, issues of schedule and cost severely limit the willingness to accept risk. There are, in fact, no rewards to a mission manager for introducing new technology. Mission downscaling is the usual response to technology limitations. All panelists agreed that there exists a serious gap between when technologists feel their job is done and what mission managers need for decision. Typically a two to three year engineering development gap exists. It is essential to take technologies to the engineering model level and conduct a flight demonstration to close this gap. All agreed that increased effort should be made to achieve stronger interactions between planners and technologists and that workshops like the present one are a step in the right direction. Technologists need mission credibility and vice versa.

Fordyce, J. S.↗