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NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Radiation Transport Models in Space: from Supernovae to Cells

Humans embarking on deep space exploration missions will encounter persistent exposure to galactic cosmic rays (GCR) - an energetic and highly complex radiation field that is unlike anything found on Earth. Exposure to such radiation fields is attributed to various adverse health effects, including cancer, cardiovascular disease, and cognitive impairment and is identified by NASA as one of the five main hazards of human spaceflight. It is therefore critical to be able to fully characterize the exposure received by humans behind shielding in space and project consequent health risks. A wide variety of computational models have been developed over the years to help meet this requirement. In this talk, an overview of the GCR environment in deep space is provided. Methods of propagating GCR fields through the shielding that protects humans in space are described along with simulation tools used to assess biological damage at the cellular scale. Finally, the NASA cancer risk model is briefly described, and risk projections are provided for various mission scenarios. Radiation transport models and solution methods pervade many aspects of this talk. For example, the GCR spectrum impinging on spacecraft is determined by solving the Fokker-Planck transport equation to propagate cosmic rays (believed to originate from supernovae) from the edge of the heliosphere to the vicinity of Earth. The Boltzmann transport equation is solved to transport this GCR spectrum through shielding and human tissue. Monte Carlo methods are used to simulate the transport of low energy electrons that dominate biological damage at the cellular scale. Progress and challenges in each of these areas will be highlighted.

Tony C. Slaba↗
NASA NTRS2009

Cardiac Atrophy and Diastolic Dysfunction During and After Long Duration Spaceflight: Functional Consequences for Orthostatic Intolerance, Exercise Capability and Risk for Cardiac Arrhythmias

Cardiac Atrophy and Diastolic Dysfunction During and After Long Duration Spaceflight: Functional Consequences for Orthostatic Intolerance, Exercise Capability and Risk for Cardiac Arrhythmias (Integrated Cardiovascular) will quantify the extent of long-duration space flightassociated cardiac atrophy (deterioration) on the International Space Station crewmembers.

Levine, Benjamin D.↗
NASA NTRS2014

Exploration Systems Development (ESD) Approach to Enterprise Risk Management

The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Exploration Systems Development (ESD) Division has implemented an innovative approach to Enterprise Risk Management under a unique governance structure and streamlined integration model. ESD's mission is to design and build the capability to extend human existence to deep space. The Enterprise consists of three Programs: Space Launch System (SLS), Orion, and Ground Systems Development and Operations (GSDO). The SLS is a rocket and launch system that will be capable of powering humans, habitats, and support systems to deep space. Orion will be the first spacecraft in history capable of taking humans to multiple destinations within deep space. GSDO is modernizing Kennedy's spaceport to launch spacecraft built and designed by both NASA and private industry. ESD's approach to Enterprise Risk Management is commensurate with affordability and a streamlined management philosophy. ESD Enterprise Risk Management leverages off of the primary mechanisms for integration within the Enterprise. The Enterprise integration approach emphasizes delegation of authority to manage and execute the majority of cross-program activities and products to the individual Programs, while maintaining the overall responsibility for all cross-program activities at the Division. The intent of the ESD Enterprise Risk Management approach is to improve risk communication, to avoid replication and/or contradictory strategies, and to minimize overhead process burden. This is accomplished by the facilitation and integration of risk information within ESD. The ESD Division risks, Orion risks, SLS risks, and GSDO risks are owned and managed by the applicable Program. When the Programs have shared risks with multiple consequences, they are jointly owned and managed. When a risk is associated with the integrated system that involves more than one Program in condition, consequence, or mitigation plan, it is considered an Exploration Systems Integration (ESI) Risk. An ESI risk may require visibility and risk handling by multiple organizations. The Integrated Risk Working Group (IRWG) is a small team of Risk experts that are responsible for collaborating and communicating best practices. In addition, the forum facilitates proper integration of risks across the Enterprise. The IRWG uses a Continuous Risk Management approach for facilitating the identification, analysis, planning, tracking, and controlling of ESI Risks. The ESD Division, Programs, and Integrated Task Teams identify ESI Risks. The IRWG maintains a set of metrics for understanding Enterprise Risk process and the overall Risk Posture. The team is also actively involved in the modeling of risk for Enterprise Performance Management. With the Enterprise being constrained in Schedule and Budget, and with significant technical complexity, the appropriate use of Risk Management techniques is crucial to the success of the Enterprise. The IRWG achieves this through the modified approach, providing a forum for collaboration on risks that cross boundaries between the separate entities.

Bauder, Stephen P.↗
NASA NTRS2015

Addressing Human System Risks to Future Space Exploration

NASA is contemplating future human exploration missions to destinations beyond low Earth orbit, including the Moon, deep-space asteroids, and Mars. While we have learned much about protecting crew health and performance during orbital space flight over the past half-century, the challenges of these future missions far exceed those within our current experience base. To ensure success in these missions, we have developed a Human System Risk Board (HSRB) to identify, quantify, and develop mitigation plans for the extraordinary risks associated with each potential mission scenario. The HSRB comprises research, technology, and operations experts in medicine, physiology, psychology, human factors, radiation, toxicology, microbiology, pharmacology, and food sciences. Methods: Owing to the wide range of potential mission characteristics, we first identified the hazards to human health and performance common to all exploration missions: altered gravity, isolation/confinement, increased radiation, distance from Earth, and hostile/closed environment. Each hazard leads to a set of risks to crew health and/or performance. For example the radiation hazard leads to risks of acute radiation syndrome, central nervous system dysfunction, soft tissue degeneration, and carcinogenesis. Some of these risks (e.g., acute radiation syndrome) could affect crew health or performance during the mission, while others (e.g., carcinogenesis) would more likely affect the crewmember well after the mission ends. We next defined a set of design reference missions (DRM) that would span the range of exploration missions currently under consideration. In addition to standard (6-month) and long-duration (1-year) missions in low Earth orbit (LEO), these DRM include deep space sortie missions of 1 month duration, lunar orbital and landing missions of 1 year duration, deep space journey and asteroid landing missions of 1 year duration, and Mars orbital and landing missions of 3 years duration. We then assessed the likelihood and consequences of each risk against each DRM, using three levels of likelihood (Low: less than or equal to 0.1%; Medium: 0.1%–1.0%; High: greater than or equal to 1.0%) and four levels of consequence ranging from Very Low (temporary or insignificant) to High (death, loss of mission, or significant reduction to length or quality of life). Quantitative evidence from clinical, operational, and research sources were used whenever available. Qualitative evidence was used when quantitative evidence was unavailable. Expert opinion was used whenever insufficient evidence was available. Results: A set of 30 risks emerged that will require further mitigation efforts before being accepted by the Agency. The likelihood by consequence risk assessment process provided a means of prioritizing among the risks identified. For each of the high priority risks, a plan was developed to perform research, technology, or standards development thought necessary to provide suitable reduction of likelihood or consequence to allow agency acceptance. Conclusion: The HSRB process has successfully identified a complete set of risks to human space travelers on planned exploration missions based on the best evidence available today. Risk mitigation plans have been established for the highest priority risks. Each risk will be reassessed annually to track the progress of our risk mitigation efforts.

Paloski, W. H.↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Lessons Learned With Risk Management: A Systems Engineer's Perspective

Risk management is a communications device that, when executed as an essential task, enables systems engineering to effectively balance risk across the project. Developing and baselining risks is an essential continuous task to ensure top project concerns both from bottom up and top down are being mitigated. Risk management provides the opportunity to avoid the consequence of the risk when mitigation steps start early enough. Just discussing risk with all the project flight elements during development, even if no risks are open, provides an excellent communication opportunity between systems engineering and those elements, ensuring concerns and worries have a platform for discussion. A well-managed risk identification process will identify concerns that are serious but not being clearly communicated, and it will enable mitigation of those potential problems before they cause a failure. Effective risk management requires considerable time and effort, but that effort will save time and money across the development. Risk management must be frequent enough to be useful and in depth enough to bring out emerging issues. It also requires a trusting relationship between the lead systems engineer and element and/or subsystem leads. The discussions need to be with the right number of individuals (typically a handful) and the right duration in time (typically an hour a month). Outside of these risk working groups, there is a formal management process to input, status, and disposition risks, and a monthly Risk Management Board meeting where key project stakeholders are informed. This paper provides good guidance on effective risk management from a systems engineering perspective and provides project lessons learned from the NASA spaceflight missions NICER, Landsat 9, LRO, and OSIRIS-REx to demonstrate the effectiveness of risk management.

Lessons Learned↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Lessons Learned With Risk Management: A Systems Engineer’s Perspective

Risk management is a communications device that, when executed as an essential task, enables systems engineering to effectively balance risk across the project. Developing and baselining risks is an essential continuous task to ensure top project concerns both from bottom up and top down are being mitigated. Risk management provides the opportunity to avoid the consequence of the risk when mitigation steps start early enough. Just discussing risk with all the project flight elements during development, even if no risks are open, provides an excellent communication opportunity between systems engineering and those elements, ensuring concerns and worries have a platform for discussion. A well-managed risk identification process will identify concerns that are serious but not being clearly communicated, and it will enable mitigation of those potential problems before they cause a failure. Effective risk management requires considerable time and effort, but that effort will save time and money across the development. Risk management must be frequent enough to be useful and in depth enough to bring out emerging issues. It also requires a trusting relationship between the lead systems engineer and element and/or subsystem leads. The discussions need to be with the right number of individuals (typically a handful) and the right duration in time (typically an hour a month). Outside of these risk working groups, there is a formal management process to input, status, and disposition risks, and a monthly Risk Management Board meeting where key project stakeholders are informed. This paper provides good guidance on effective risk management from a systems engineering perspective and provides project lessons learned from the NASA spaceflight missions NICER, Landsat 9, LRO, and OSIRIS-REx to demonstrate the effectiveness of risk management.

Lessons Learned↗
NASA NTRS2006

LOX, GOX and Pressure Relief

Oxygen relief systems present a serious fire hazard risk with often severe consequences. This presentation offers a risk management solution strategy which encourages minimizing ignition hazards, maximizing best materials, and utilizing good practices. Additionally, the relief system should be designed for cleanability and ballistic flow. The use of the right metals, softgoods, and lubricants, along with the best assembly techniques, is stressed. Materials should also be tested if data is not available and a full hazard analysis should be conducted in an effort to minimize risk and harm.

McLeod, Ken↗
NASA NTRS2016

NASA and ESA Collaboration on Alternative to Nitric Acid Passivation: Parameter Optimization of Citric Acid Passivation for Stainless Steel Alloys

National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Headquarters chartered the Technology Evaluation for Environmental Risk Mitigation Principal Center (TEERM) to coordinate agency activities affecting pollution prevention issues identified during system and component acquisition and sustainment processes. The primary objectives of NASA TEERM are to: Reduce or eliminate the use of hazardous materials or hazardous processes at manufacturing, remanufacturing, and sustainment locations. Avoid duplication of effort in actions required to reduce or eliminate hazardous materials through joint center cooperation and technology sharing. Corrosion is an extensive problem that affects the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) and the European Space Agency (ESA). The damaging effects of corrosion result in steep costs, asset downtime affecting mission readiness, and safety risks to personnel. Consequently, it is vital to reduce corrosion costs and risks in a sustainable manner. NASA and ESA have numerous structures and equipment that are fabricated from stainless steel. The standard practice for protection of stainless steel is a process called passivation. Passivation is defined by The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language as to treat or coat (a metal) in order to reduce the chemical reactivity of its surface. Passivation works by forming a shielding outer (metal oxide) layer that reduces the impact of destructive environmental factors such as air or water. Consequently, this process necessitates a final product that is very clean and free of iron and other contaminants. Typical passivation procedures call for the use of nitric acid; however, there are a number of environmental, worker safety, and operational issues associated with its use. Citric acid is an alternative to nitric acid for the passivation of stainless steels. Citric acid offers a variety of benefits including increased safety for personnel, reduced environmental impact, and reduced operational cost. The primary objective of this effort is to qualify citric acid as an environmentally-preferable alternative to nitric acid for the passivation of stainless steel alloys. While citric acid use has become more prominent in industry, there is little evidence that citric acid is a technically sound passivation agent, especially for the unique and critical applications encountered by NASA and ESA.

citric acid passivation↗
NASA NTRS2013

Alternative to Nitric Acid for Passivation of Stainless Steel Alloys

Corrosion is an extensive problem that affects the Department of Defense (DoD) and National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA). The deleterious effects of corrosion result in steep costs, asset downtime affecting mission readiness, and safety risks to personnel. Consequently, it is vital to reduce corrosion costs and risks in a sustainable manner. The DoD and NASA have numerous structures and equipment that are fabricated from stainless steel. The standard practice for protection of stainless steel is a process called passivation. Typical passivation procedures call for the use of nitric acid; however, there are a number of environmental, worker safety, and operational issues associated with its use. Citric acid offers a variety of benefits including increased safety for personnel, reduced environmental impact, and reduced operational cost. DoD and NASA agreed to collaborate to validate citric acid as an acceptable passivating agent for stainless steel. This paper details our investigation of prior work developing the citric acid passivation process, development of the test plan, optimization of the process for specific stainless steel alloys, ongoing and planned testing to elucidate the process' resistance to corrosion in comparison to nitric acid, and preliminary results.

Lewis, Pattie L.↗
NASA NTRS2013

NASA Activity Update for the 2013 Unmanned Vehicle Systems International (UVSI) Yearbook

This year s report offers a high level perspective on some of the UAS related activities in which NASA is involved, both internal and external to the agency. Internally, NASA issued UAS operational policy on certification of NASA UAS and aircrew. A team of NASA UAS experts and operators analyzed all current procedures and best practices to design the policy. An update to the agencies Aircraft Operations Management Manual incorporated a new chapter to address UAS planning, preflight operations, flight operations, flight crew requirements, airworthiness and flight safety reviews. NASA UAS are classified into three categories based on weight and airspeed. Aircrews, including observers, are classified by how they interface with the UAS, and the policy defines qualifications, training, and currency. The NASA flight readiness approval process identifies risks and mitigations in order to reduce the likelihood and/or consequence of the risk to an acceptable level. The UAS operations process incorporates all aspects of airworthiness, flight standards and range safety exactly the same processes used for NASA manned aircraft operations. NASA has two internal organizations that routinely operate UAS. The Science Mission Directorate utilizes UAS as part of its Airborne Science Program and is the most frequent operator of NASA UAS in both national and international airspace. The Aeronautics Research Mission Directorate conducts UAS flight operations in addition to conducting research important to the UAS community. This past year the Science Mission Directorate supported the Hurricane and Severe Storm Sentimental (HS3) Mission with two NASA Global Hawk platforms. HS3 is a five-year mission specifically targeted to investigate the processes that underlie hurricane formation. During the 2012 portion of this mission the Global Hawk overflew hurricanes Leslie and Nadine in the Atlantic Ocean completing 6 flights and accumulating more than 148 flight hours. Another multi-year mission was initiated last year when the Sensor Integrated Environmental Remote Research Aircraft (SIERRA) UAS began surveying faults in California s Surprise Valley. A team of scientists and engineers from the United States Geological Survey (USGS), NASA Ames Research Center, Central Washington University, and Carnegie Mellon University will measure magnetic fields using ground surveys and the SIERRA to map the geophysics below the surface of Surprise Valley. The data collected will be used to generate 3D maps of the geophysical data of the area. The Aeronautics Mission Directorate continues its collaboration with Boeing to conduct UAS flight operations of the X-48C, a modified version of the X-48B originally built by Cranfield Aerospace, United Kingdom. The Aeronautics Mission Directorate utilizes vehicles of this size for a wide variety of research studies. Most of these operations are conducted within restricted airspace. The Aeronautics Research Mission Directorate also sponsors the UAS in the National Airspace System (NAS) Project, which is working in close cooperation with the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) to address critical challenges associated with routine UAS operations in civil airspace. The project is focused on separation assurance and collision avoidance systems and algorithms, command and control for non-military operations including spectrum allocation requirements, human system interaction issues, and safety and certification topics.

Bauer, Jeffrey E.↗
NASA NTRS2011

Risk Balance: A Key Tool for Mission Operations Assurance

The Mission Operations Assurance (MOA) discipline actively participates as a project member to achieve their common objective of full mission success while also providing an independent risk assessment to the Project Manager and Office of Safety and Mission Success staff. The cornerstone element of MOA is the independent assessment of the risks the project faces in executing its mission. Especially as the project approaches critical mission events, it becomes imperative to clearly identify and assess the risks the project faces. Quite often there are competing options for the project to select from in deciding how to execute the event. An example includes choices between proven but aging hardware components and unused but unproven components. Timing of the event with respect to visual or telecommunications visibility can be a consideration in the case of Earth reentry or hazardous maneuver events. It is in such situations that MOA is called upon for a risk balance assessment or risk trade study to support their recommendation to the Project Manager for a specific option to select. In the following paragraphs we consider two such assessments, one for the Stardust capsule Earth return and the other for the choice of telecommunications system configuration for the EPOXI flyby of the comet Hartley 2. We discuss the development of the trade space for each project's scenario and characterize the risks of each possible option. The risk characterization we consider includes a determination of the severity or consequence of each risk if realized and the likelihood of its occurrence. We then examine the assessment process to arrive at a MOA recommendation. Finally we review each flight project's decision process and the outcome of their decisions.

operations↗
NASA NTRS2015

Common Cause Failure Modeling in Space Launch Vehicles

Common Cause Failures (CCFs) are a known and documented phenomenon that defeats system redundancy. CCFs are a set of dependent type of failures that can be caused for example by system environments, manufacturing, transportation, storage, maintenance, and assembly. Since there are many factors that contribute to CCFs, they can be reduced, but are difficult to eliminate entirely. Furthermore, failure databases sometimes fail to differentiate between independent and dependent CCF. Because common cause failure data is limited in the aerospace industry, the Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) Team at Bastion Technology Inc. is estimating CCF risk using generic data collected by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). Consequently, common cause risk estimates based on this database, when applied to other industry applications, are highly uncertain. Therefore, it is important to account for a range of values for independent and CCF risk and to communicate the uncertainty to decision makers. There is an existing methodology for reducing CCF risk during design, which includes a checklist of 40+ factors grouped into eight categories. Using this checklist, an approach to produce a beta factor estimate is being investigated that quantitatively relates these factors. In this example, the checklist will be tailored to space launch vehicles, a quantitative approach will be described, and an example of the method will be presented.

Hark, Frank↗
NASA NTRS2008

Silent Aircraft Initiative Concept Risk Assessment

A risk assessment of the Silent Aircraft Initiative's SAX-40 concept design for extremely low noise has been performed. A NASA team developed a list of 27 risk items, and evaluated the level of risk for each item in terms of the likelihood that the risk would occur and the consequences of the occurrence. The following risk items were identified as high risk, meaning that the combination of likelihood and consequence put them into the top one-fourth of the risk matrix: structures and weight prediction; boundary-layer ingestion (BLI) and inlet design; variable-area exhaust and thrust vectoring; displaced-threshold and continuous descent approach (CDA) operational concepts; cost; human factors; and overall noise performance. Several advanced-technology baseline concepts were created to serve as a basis for comparison to the SAX-40 concept. These comparisons indicate that the SAX-40 would have significantly greater research, development, test, and engineering (RDT&E) and production costs than a conventional aircraft with similar technology levels. Therefore, the cost of obtaining the extremely low noise capability that has been estimated for the SAX-40 is significant. The SAX-40 concept design proved successful in focusing attention toward low noise technologies and in raising public awareness of the issue.

Nickol, Craig L.↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

NASA's Identified Risk of Adverse Outcomes due to Inadequate Human Systems Integration Architecture

The NASA Human System Risk Board (HSRB) is responsible for tracking the evolution of the top ~30 human system risks identified to be associated with human spaceflight. As part of this process, the Board is charged with maintaining a consistent, integrated process to evaluate those risks and developing evidence-based risk posture recommendations. Risks are ranked by likelihood and consequence. Intermediate causal relationships between risk contributing factors and countermeasures that link hazards to outcomes are described using Directed Acyclic Graphs (DAGs). The DAGs are also useful for identifying common factors and countermeasures across the top 30 risks as well as communicating how astronaut exposure to spaceflight hazards leads to meaningful mission-level health and performance outcomes. One of the top risks tracked by the HSRB is The Risk of Adverse Outcomes Due to Inadequate Human-Systems Integration Architecture (HSIA). This risk captures the possibility that due to decreasing real-time ground support during missions beyond LEO, crew will be unable to adequately respond to unanticipated critical malfunctions or detect safety-critical procedural errors. The HSIA risk is ranked red (high) for Lunar surface and Mars missions due to the probability of Loss of Crew and Loss of Mission consequences. This paper describes the evidence that supports the HSIA risk ranking and presents the central narrative of the HSIA risk DAG-- i.e., anomaly detection, diagnosis, intervention, and task performance. Characterizations of the current state of practice for each of the DAG’s central nodes and the future tools needed for successful anomaly response are provided.

human-systems integration architecture↗
NASA NTRS2017

Cancer Risk in Astronauts: A Constellation of Uncommon Consequences

Excess cancers resulting from external radiation exposures have been noted since the early 1950s, when a rise in leukemia rates was first reported in young atomic bomb survivors [1]. Further studies in atomic bomb survivors, cancer patients treated with radiotherapy, and nuclear power plant workers have confirmed that radiation exposure increases the risk of not only leukemia, but also a wide array of solid cancers [2,3]. NASA has long been aware of this risk and limits astronauts' risk of exposure-induced death (REID) from cancer by specifying permissible mission durations (PMD) for astronauts on an individual basis. While cancer is present among astronauts, current data does not suggest any excess of known radiation-induced cancers relative to a comparable population of U.S. adults; however, very uncommon cancers have been diagnosed in astronauts including nasopharyngeal cancer, lymphoma of the brain, and acral myxoinflammatory fibroblastic sarcoma. In order to study cancer risk in astronauts, a number of obstacles must be overcome. Firstly, several factors make the astronaut cohort considerably different from the cohorts that have previously been studied for effects resulting from radiation exposure. The high rate of accidents and the much healthier lifestyle of astronauts compared to the U.S. population make finding a suitable comparison population a problematic task. Space radiation differs substantially from terrestrial radiation exposures studied in the past; therefore, analyses of galactic cosmic radiation (GCR) in animal models must be conducted and correctly applied to the human experience. Secondly, a large enough population of exposed astronauts must exist in order to obtain the data necessary to see any potential statistically significant differences between the astronauts and the control population. Thirdly, confounders and effect modifiers, such as smoking, diet, and other space stressors, must be correctly identified and controlled for in those analyses. In order to begin work assessing the astronaut population, the earliest groups of astronauts (selection groups 1-7) provide a unique model. These astronauts were relatively homogenous, white males whose lifestyle characteristics were similar to an average U.S. citizen of the same birth cohort. This work reviews radiation exposure levels, age, and causes of mortality among these early NASA astronauts and discusses the benefits and limitations of assessing such a cohort for radiation-induced cancer risk.

Milder, Caitlin M.↗
NASA NTRS2020

The Spaceport Command and Control System Security Assessor Project

This Summer, I worked as a National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Internships and Fellowships (NIF) intern under my mentor, Jill Giles within the Software Engineering Branch. Within this project, I worked alongside the Cyber Security branch to identify a list of Commercial Off the Shelf (COTS) software to analyze, research, and gain insight about potential vulnerabilities within the software that could become a threat of attack. After identifying the list of COTS software, my team and I used Microsoft Excel to create a worksheet to easily organize and design a questionnaire about the software. Security reports weregiven to us to identify the software used on the machines in the firing rooms. With these reports, we created a script that would populate the database with the software information to identify potential security weaknesses of COTS software.The goal of the project was to produce a final report, summarizing the most vulnerable launch control system servers and configurations and document vulnerabilities, residual risk, likelihood, and consequence. This project is important for the Cyber Security and Information Technology branches because it will identify security weaknesses and help to mitigate risk. From the Spaceport Command and Control System Security Assessor Project, I learned how to properly identify weaknesses and vulnerabilities within software and how to mitigate the risks within the software. This project also taught me how to create databases using scripts and input files.

Destani Satora Van Arsdalen↗
NASA NTRS2009

Developing a Gap Taxonomy to Address Crew Health Risks in NASA's Human Research Program

The mission of NASA's Human Research Program (HRP) is to understand and reduce the risk to crew health and performance in exploration missions. The HRP addresses 27 specific risks by identifying and then filling gaps in understanding the risks and in the ability to disposition the risks. The primary bases for identifying gaps have been past experience and requirements definition. This approach has been very effective in identifying some important, relevant gaps, but may be inadequate for identifying gaps outside the past experience base. We are exploring the use of a gap taxonomy as a comprehensive, underlying conceptual framework that allows a more systematic identification of gaps. The taxonomy is based on these stages in medical care: prediction, prevention, detection/diagnosis, treatment, monitoring, rehabilitation, and lifetime surveillance. This gap taxonomy approach identifies new gaps in HRP health risks. Many of the new gaps suggest risk reduction approaches that are more cost effective than present approaches. A major benefit of the gap taxonomy approach is to identify new, economical approaches that reduce the likelihood and/or consequence of a risk.

Kundrot, Craig E.↗