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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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At least 55 records · Page 3

All sources NASA NTRS DOE OSTI

NASA NTRS2010

Integral Battery Power Limiting Circuit for Intrinsically Safe Applications

A circuit topology has been designed to guarantee the output of intrinsically safe power for the operation of electrical devices in a hazardous environment. This design uses a MOSFET (metal oxide semiconductor field-effect transistor) as a switch to connect and disconnect power to a load. A test current is provided through a separate path to the load for monitoring by a comparator against a preset threshold level. The circuit is configured so that the test current will detect a fault in the load and open the switch before the main current can respond. The main current passes through the switch and then an inductor. When a fault occurs in the load, the current through the inductor cannot change immediately, but the voltage drops immediately to safe levels. The comparator detects this drop and opens the switch before the current in the inductor has a chance to respond. This circuit protects both the current and voltage from exceeding safe levels. Typically, this type of protection is accomplished by a fuse or a circuit breaker, but in order for a fuse or a circuit breaker to blow or trip, the current must exceed the safe levels momentarily, which may be just enough time to ignite anything in a hazardous environment. To prevent this from happening, a fuse is typically current-limited by the addition of the resistor to keep the current within safe levels while the fuse reacts. The use of a resistor is acceptable for non-battery applications where the wasted energy and voltage drop across the resistor can be tolerated. The use of the switch and inductor minimizes the wasted energy. For example, a circuit runs from a 3.6-V battery that must be current-limited to 200 mA. If the circuit normally draws 10 mA, then an 18-ohm resistor would drop 180 mV during normal operation, while a typical switch (0.02 ohm) and inductor (0.97 ohm) would only drop 9.9 mV. From a power standpoint, the current-limiting resistor protection circuit wastes about 18 times more power than the switch and the inductor configuration. In the fault condition, both the resistor and the inductor react immediately. The resistor reacts by allowing more current to flow and dropping the voltage. Initially, the inductor reacts by dropping the voltage, and then by not allowing the current to change. When the comparator detects the drop in voltage, it opens the switch, thus preventing any further current flow. The inductor alone is not sufficient protection, because after the voltage drop has settled, the inductor would then allow the current to change, in this example, the current would be 3.7 A. In the fault condition, the resistor is flowing 200 mA until the fuse blows (anywhere from 1 ms to 100 s), while the switch and inductor combination is flowing about 2 A test current while monitoring for the fault to be corrected. Finally, as an additional safety feature, the circuit can be configured to hold the switch opened until both the load and source are disconnected.

Burns, Bradley M.↗

NASA NTRS2017

Safe Haven Configurations for Deep Space Transit Habitats

Throughout the human space flight program there have been instances where systems failures resulting in smoke, fire, and pressure loss have occurred onboard space vehicles, putting crews at risk for loss of mission and loss of life. In most instances the missions have been in Low-Earth-Orbit (LEO) or Earth-Moon vicinity, with access to multiple volumes that could be used to quickly seal off the damaged module or access escape vehicles for return to Earth. For long duration missions beyond LEO, including Mars transit missions of about 1100 days, the mass penalty for multiple volumes and operating in an environment where a quick return will not be possible have been concerns. In 2016, a study was done to investigate a variety of dual pressure vessel configurations for habitats that could protect the crew from these hazards. It was found that with a modest increase in total mass it should be possible to provide significant protection for the crew. Several configurations were considered that either had a small safe haven to provide 30-days to recover, or a full duration safe haven using two equal size pressure vessel volumes. The 30-day safe haven was found to be the simplest, yielding the least total mass impact but still with some risk if recovery is not possible during that timeframe. The full duration safe haven was the most massive option but provided the most robust solution. This paper provides information on the various layouts developed during the study and provides a discussion of the findings for implementing a safe haven in future habitat designs.

Smitherman, David↗

NASA NTRS2017

Safe Haven Configurations for Deep Space Transit Habitats

Throughout the human space flight program there have been instances where smoke, fire, and pressure loss have occurred onboard space vehicles, putting crews at risk for loss of mission and loss of life. In every instance the mission has been in Low-Earth-Orbit (LEO) with access to multiple volumes that could be used to quickly seal off the damaged module or escape vehicles for a quick return to Earth. For long duration space missions beyond LEO, including Mars transit missions of about 1000 days, the mass penalty for multiple volumes has been a concern as has operating in an environment where a quick return will not be possible. In 2016 a study was done to investigate a variety of dual pressure vessel configurations for habitats that could protect the crew from these hazards. It was found that for a modest increase in total mass it should be possible to provide significant protection for the crew. Several configurations were developed that either had a small safe haven to provide 30-days to recover, or a full duration safe haven using two equal size pressure vessel volumes. The 30-day safe haven was found to be the simplest, yielding the least total mass impact but still with some risk if recovery is not possible during that timeframe. The full duration safe haven was the most massive option but provided the most robust solution. This paper provides information on the various layouts considered in the study and provides a discussion of the findings for implementing a safe haven in future habitat designs.

Smitherman, David↗

NASA NTRS2018

Modeling Spacecraft Safe Mode Events

Spacecraft enter a ‘safe mode’ to protect the vehicle when a potentially harmful anomaly occurs. This minimally functioning state isolates faults, establishes contact with Earth, and orients the vehicle into a power positive attitude until operators intervene. Though ‘safings’ are inherently unpredictable, mission teams build in time margin during operations to determine root causes and restore functionality. Planning and managing this margin is both critical and enabling on mission architectures dependent on near-continuous operability – such as a low-thrust electric propulsion mission. To better quantify the occurrences and severity of safe mode anomalies, the Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL) has assembled a database of safings from past and active missions. Currently nearly 240 records are captured from 21 beyond-Earth missions, stemming from a collaboration between teams at JPL, Ames Research Center, Goddard Space Flight Center, and the Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory. This paper discusses the event database, explores a statistical approach in modeling the occurrences and severity of safing events, presents a simulation technique, and details recommendations and future work to benefit future concepts.

Nicholas, Austin↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Hazard Boresight Relative Navigation for Safe Lunar Landing

In the area of planetary landing, hazard detection and avoidance is the act of driving a vehicle to a safe landing area using onboard resources. A hazard detection sensor is used to scan the terrain and these measurements are evaluated to determine where the safe landing sites are located. The selected site is generally not the same as the nominal target, so the vehicle must divert to the new site. This activity involves the interaction between several components, including a suite of onboard GNC algorithms that work together to efficiently choose and divert to a new site. This paper presents the Hazard Boresight Relative Navigation concept, which is a method that provides a common interface between the hazard scan, safe-site selection algorithm, size of the target-relative landing ellipse, divert offset distance and guidance targeting algorithm. After the safe-site is selected from the hazard scan, the original inertial target is replaced with a vehicle-relative target, which is initialized by a measurement from the hazard scan. The new target-relative position state is estimated over time in the navigation filter, and is fed to the guidance algorithm to perform the divert maneuver. In addition to detailing the Hazard Boresight Relative Navigation concept, this paper also presents some general landing terms that can be used in the greater discussion, as well as analysis on how to estimate and predict the vehicle footprint dispersion ellipse during flight, which is used in the safe-site selection algorithm.

Stephen R. Steffes↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Hazard Boresight Relative Navigation for Safe Lunar Landing

Stephen Steffes↗

DOE OSTI2017

Integrated Solutions for Interim Used Fuel Management: From Pool Unloading to Safe Delivery to Recycling or Repository Facilities - 17235

Safe management of used nuclear fuel (UNF) is key to the survival of the nuclear industry. That is why it is more important than ever to have a consent-based, practical, credible, and sustainable roadmap for managing the back-end of the nuclear cycle. Worldwide UNF Light Water Reactors (LWR) inventories are currently around 200,000 tons and are estimated to grow to more than 350,000 tons by 2030, and operating nuclear reactors in the U.S. continue to discharge UNF every 18 to 24 months. International experience has demonstrated that the development of a permanent geological repository can be a multi-decade process, especially in the face of public acceptance challenges. Meanwhile, the solution for permanent disposal of UNF in the U.S. is moving at a glacial pace. As a result, industrial stakeholders have been forced to find practical interim UNF storage solutions in order to continue safely operating their reactors. Among those interim solutions are the cask- or canister-based dry storage systems that have dramatically increased in the last 10 years as they provide flexibility for expansion with a low up-front investment. With interim dry storage in place for more than 30 years, our industry is entering a new phase as we are forced to prepare for a few more decades before geological repositories begin operating. Consequently, interim dry storage has to be extended for 80 years or more. Thus, new considerations have to be taken into account to ensure the safety of this stored used fuel: - Interim storage systems are aging; - High burn-up fuel behavior overtime is uncertain; - Used fuel is losing its self-protection; - The number of shutdown sites without a fuel transfer facility, such as a pool, is increasing; - Some owners of Independent Spent Fuel Storage installation (ISFSI) at shutdown sites are not nuclear operators anymore. With increasing uncertainties, AREVA TN -- based on its long expertise with used fuel transportation and interim storage systems -- is adapting its portfolio to develop integrated and flexible solutions that will remove the burden of interim used fuel management from nuclear operators. AREVA TN is developing comprehensive solutions to reduce risks including the continued supply of proven safe high-performance dry storage systems; on-site services to safely transfer used fuel from pool to pad; the optimization of fuel heat load in the storage pool and pad; innovative aging management services including inspection, monitoring and repair; a realistic solution for consolidated interim storage with a priority to remove Used Nuclear Fuel stored in dry storage systems from shutdown sites; world-class transport and logistics services to safely move the used fuel from nuclear reactor sites to consolidated storage and repository or recycling as applicable, and turnkey management of shutdown ISFSIs. Due to the lack of an available path for transporting used fuel away from reactors, nuclear operators are faced with many challenges and growing uncertainties. Our presentation will describe the practical solutions developed and being developed in order to manage used fuel on behalf of nuclear operators and allows them to continue focusing on the important job of producing carbon-free clean energy. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

DOE OSTI2015

Guidance for decommissioning plants entering safe storage - 15280

Although a number of plants worldwide have been placed into safe storage after permanent shutdown, there is no generic guidance for establishment of safe storage conditions. To address this need, EPRI is conducting a project to document the best practices to reduce risk, maintenance and monitoring requirements during safe storage, as well as practices that optimize decommissioning following the safe storage period. This project additionally evaluates potential options for establishment of safe storage conditions, such as performance of chemical decontamination, completion of environmental remediation activities, early removal of highly activated components, dismantlement of non-power block structures and partial site release in advance of completion of decommissioning of the nuclear island. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

DOE OSTI2024

Trends in the administration of COVID-19 vaccines with other vaccines in the United States reported to V-safe during December 14, 2020—May 19, 2023

Introduction COVID-19 vaccines may be administered with other vaccines during the same healthcare visit. COVID-19 monovalent (Fall 2021) and bivalent (Fall 2022) vaccine recommendations coincided with annual seasonal influenza vaccination. Data describing the frequency of the co-administration of COVID-19 vaccines with other vaccines are limited. Methods We used V-safe, a voluntary smartphone-based U.S. safety surveillance system established by the CDC, to describe trends in the administration of COVID-19 vaccines with other vaccines reported to V-safe during December 14, 2020 – May 19, 2023. Results Of the 21 million COVID-19 vaccinations reported to V-safe, 2.2% (459,817) were administered with at least 1 other vaccine. Co-administration most frequently occurred during the first week of October 2023 (27,092; 44.1%). Most reports of co-administration included influenza vaccine (393,003; 85.5%). Co-administration was most frequently reported for registrants aged 6 months-6 years (4,872; 4.4%). Conclusion Reports of co-administration to V-safe peaked during October 2023, when influenza vaccination most often occurs, possibly reflecting increased opportunities for multiple vaccinations and greater acceptability of the co-administration of COVID-19 vaccine with other vaccines, especially influenza vaccine.

60 APPLIED LIFE SCIENCES↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

A Safe Haven Concept for the Common Habitat in Moon, Mars, and Transit Environments

The safe haven for the Common Habitat architectures, both the Deep Space Exploration Vehicle and the Moon/Mars surface basecamps, consists of the airlock, logistics modules, and in-space or surface pressurized rovers. These elements are repositioned to dock together and form a secondary habitable environment. The multiple elements that compose the safe haven and its ability to share utilities across docking ports give it multiple subsystem options to sustain the crew. In the safe haven configuration, the two logistics modules dock to the side hatches of the airlock outer chamber, one pressurized rover docks to the outermost airlock hatch, and the second pressurized rover docks to the first. This configuration provides no less than thirty days of habitation for the eight-person crew. It also allows the airlock inner chamber to be used for EVAs to both the exterior surface and the Common Habitat interior, which may have lost pressure during the event that triggered the need for a safe haven. These EVAs enable the crew to work to repair the habitat and restore habitation capability.

Base camp↗

DOE OSTI2022

SAFE-OCC: A novelty detection framework for Convolutional Neural Network sensors and its application in process control

Herein we present a novelty detection framework for Convolutional Neural Network (CNN) sensors that we call Sensor-Activated Feature Extraction One-Class Classification (SAFE-OCC). We show that this framework enables the safe use of computer vision sensors in process control architectures. Emergent control applications use CNN models to map visual data to a state signal that can be interpreted by the controller. Incorporating such sensors introduces a significant system operation vulnerability because CNN sensors can exhibit high prediction errors when exposed to novel (abnormal) visual data. Unfortunately, identifying such novelties in real-time is nontrivial. To address this issue, the SAFE-OCC framework leverages the convolutional blocks of the CNN to create an effective feature space to conduct novelty detection using a desired one-class classification technique. This approach engenders a feature space that directly corresponds to that used by the CNN sensor and avoids the need to derive an independent latent space. We demonstrate the effectiveness of SAFE-OCC via simulated control environments.

37 INORGANIC, ORGANIC, PHYSICAL, AND ANALYTICAL CH↗

DOE OSTI2016

Safe and Durable High-Temperature Lithium–Sulfur Batteries via Molecular Layer Deposited Coating

Here, Lithium-sulfur (Li-S) battery is a promising high energy storage candidate in electric vehicles. However, the commonly employed ether based electrolyte does not enable to realize safe high-temperature Li-S batteries due to the low boiling and flash temperatures. Traditional carbonate based electrolyte obtains safe physical properties at high temperature but does not complete reversible electrochemical reaction for most Li-S batteries. Here we realize safe high temperature Li-S batteries on universal carbon-sulfur electrodes by molecular layer deposited (MLD) alucone coating. Sulfur cathodes with MLD coating complete the reversible electrochemical process in carbonate electrolyte and exhibit a safe and ultrastable cycle life at high temperature, which promise practicable Li-S batteries for electric vehicles and other large-scale energy storage systems.

25 ENERGY STORAGE↗

DOE OSTI2012

Concept of an inherently-safe high temperature gas-cooled reactor

As the challenge to ensure no harmful release of radioactive materials at the accidents by deterministic approach instead to satisfy acceptance criteria or safety goal for risk by probabilistic approach, new concept of advanced reactor, an inherently-safe high temperature gas-cooled reactor, is proposed based on the experience of the operation of the actual High Temperature Gas-cooled Reactor (HTGR) in Japan, High Temperature Engineering Test Reactor (HTTR), and the design of the commercial plant (GTHTR300), utilizing the inherent safety features of the HTGR (i.e., safety features based on physical phenomena). The safety design philosophy of the inherently-safe HTGR for the safety analysis of the radiological consequences is determined as the confinement of radioactive materials is assured by only inherent safety features without engineered safety features, AC power or prompt actions by plant personnel if the design extension conditions occur. Inherent safety features to prevent the loss or degradation of the confinement function are identified. It is proposed not to apply the probabilistic approach for the evaluation of the radiological consequences of the accidents in the safety analysis because no inherent safety features fail for the mitigation of the consequences of the accidents. Consequently, there are no event sequences to harmful release of radioactive materials if the design extension conditions occur in the inherently-safe HTGR concept. The concept and future R and D items for the inherently-safe HTGR are described in this paper.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

DOE OSTI2021

Toward active disruption avoidance via real-time estimation of the safe operating region and disruption proximity in tokamaks

This paper describes a real-time capable algorithm for identifying the safe operating region around a tokamak operating point. The region is defined by a convex set of linear constraints, from which the distance of a point from a disruptive boundary can be calculated. The disruptivity of points is calculated from an empirical machine learning predictor that generates the likelihood of disruption. While the likelihood generated by such empirical models can be compared to a threshold to trigger a disruption mitigation system, the safe operating region calculation enables active optimization of the operating point to maintain a safe margin from disruptive boundaries. The proposed algorithm is tested using a random forest disruption predictor fit on data from DIII-D. The safe operating region identification algorithm is applied to historical data from DIII-D showing the evolution of disruptive boundaries and the potential impact of optimization of the operating point. Real-time relevant execution times are made possible by parallelizing many of the calculation steps and implementing the algorithm on a graphics processing unit. Lastly, a real-time capable algorithm for optimizing the target operating point within the identified constraints is also proposed and simulated.

70 PLASMA PHYSICS AND FUSION TECHNOLOGY↗

DOE OSTI2013

Unique and massive Chernobyl cranes for deconstruction activities in the new safe confinement

On 26 April 1986, the worst nuclear power plant accident in history occurred at the Chernobyl plant in Ukraine (then part of the Soviet Union). The destruction of Unit 4 sent highly radioactive fallout over Belarus, Russia, Ukraine, and Europe. The object shelter-a containment sarcophagus-was built in November 1986 to limit exposure to radiation. However, it has only a planned 25-year lifespan and would probably not survive even a moderate seismic event in a region that has more than its share of such events. It was time to take action. One of the largest tasks that are in progress is the design and construction of the New Safe Confinement (NSC). The NSC is an engineered enclosure for the entire object shelter that includes a suite of process equipment. The process equipment will be used for the dismantling of the destroyed Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant Unit. One of the major mechanical handling systems to be installed in the new safe confinement is the Main Cranes System. The planned decontamination and decommissioning or dismantling activities will require the handling of heavily shielded waste disposal casks containing nuclear fuel as well as lifting and transporting extremely large structural elements. These activities, to be performed within the new safe confinement, will require large and sophisticated cranes. The article will focus on the current progress of the new safe confinement and of the main cranes system for the decommissioning or dismantling activities. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

NASA NTRS1997

A Statistical Simulation Approach to Safe Life Fatigue Analysis of Redundant Metallic Components

This paper introduces a dual active load path fail-safe fatigue design concept analyzed by Monte Carlo simulation. The concept utilizes the inherent fatigue life differences between selected pairs of components for an active dual path system, enhanced by a stress level bias in one component. The design is applied to a baseline design; a safe life fatigue problem studied in an American Helicopter Society (AHS) round robin. The dual active path design is compared with a two-element standby fail-safe system and the baseline design for life at specified reliability levels and weight. The sensitivity of life estimates for both the baseline and fail-safe designs was examined by considering normal and Weibull distribution laws and coefficient of variation levels. Results showed that the biased dual path system lifetimes, for both the first element failure and residual life, were much greater than for standby systems. The sensitivity of the residual life-weight relationship was not excessive at reliability levels up to R = 0.9999 and the weight penalty was small. The sensitivity of life estimates increases dramatically at higher reliability levels.

Matthews, William T.↗

NASA NTRS2008

Safe Upper-Bounds Inference of Energy Consumption for Java Bytecode Applications

Many space applications such as sensor networks, on-board satellite-based platforms, on-board vehicle monitoring systems, etc. handle large amounts of data and analysis of such data is often critical for the scientific mission. Transmitting such large amounts of data to the remote control station for analysis is usually too expensive for time-critical applications. Instead, modern space applications are increasingly relying on autonomous on-board data analysis. All these applications face many resource constraints. A key requirement is to minimize energy consumption. Several approaches have been developed for estimating the energy consumption of such applications (e.g. [3, 1]) based on measuring actual consumption at run-time for large sets of random inputs. However, this approach has the limitation that it is in general not possible to cover all possible inputs. Using formal techniques offers the potential for inferring safe energy consumption bounds, thus being specially interesting for space exploration and safety-critical systems. We have proposed and implemented a general frame- work for resource usage analysis of Java bytecode [2]. The user defines a set of resource(s) of interest to be tracked and some annotations that describe the cost of some elementary elements of the program for those resources. These values can be constants or, more generally, functions of the input data sizes. The analysis then statically derives an upper bound on the amount of those resources that the program as a whole will consume or provide, also as functions of the input data sizes. This article develops a novel application of the analysis of [2] to inferring safe upper bounds on the energy consumption of Java bytecode applications. We first use a resource model that describes the cost of each bytecode instruction in terms of the joules it consumes. With this resource model, we then generate energy consumption cost relations, which are then used to infer safe upper bounds. How energy consumption for each bytecode instruction is measured is beyond the scope of this paper. Instead, this paper is about how to infer safe energy consumption estimations assuming that those energy consumption costs are provided. For concreteness, we use a simplified version of an existing resource model [1] in which an energy consumption cost for individual Java opcodes is defined.

Navas, Jorge↗

NASA NTRS2008

Safe Manual Jettison

In space, the controlled release of certain cargoes is no less useful than the maritime jettisons from which they take their name but is also much more dangerous. Experience has shown that jettisons can be performed safely, but the process is complicated with the path to performing a jettison taking months or even years. In the background, time is also required to write procedures, train the crew, configure the vehicle, and many other activities. This paper outlines the current process used by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) for manual jettisons, detailing the methods used to assure that the jettisons and the jettisoned objects are as safe as achievable and that the crew is adequately trained to be able to affect the safe jettison. The goal of this paper is not only to capture what it takes to perform safe jettisons in the near Earth environment but to extrapolate this knowledge to future space exploration scenarios that will likely have Extravehicular Activity (EVA) and International Partner (IP) interfaces.

Barton, Jay↗