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Results for “SAFETY DEVICE”

Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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At least 55 records · Page 3
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
NASA NTRS1987

Investigation of the reaction of liquid hydrogen with liquid air in a pressure tube

A pressure tube should protect the FR-2 reactor from the consequences of a hydrogen-air reaction, which is conceivable in the breakdown of several safety devices of the planned cold neutron source Project FR-2/16. The magnitudes and time pattern of the pressures to be expected were investigated. In the geometry used and the ignition mechanism selected, which is comparable to the strongest ignition process conceivable in the reactor, the reaction proceeds with greater probability than combustion. The combustion is possibly smaller if local limited partial detonations are superimposed. The magnitude of the pressure was determined by the masses of the reaction partners, liquid H2 and liquid air, and determines their ratio to each other.

Karb, Erich H.↗
NASA NTRS1986

Evaluation of advanced high rate Li-SOCl2 cells

Under NASA sponsorship, JPL is developing advanced, high rate Li-SOCl2 cells for future space missions. As part of this effort, Li-SOCl2 cells of various designs were examined for performance and safety. The cells differed from one another in several aspects, such as: nature of carbon cathode, catalysts, cell configuration, case polarity, and safety devices. Performance evaluation included constant-current discharge over a range of currents and temperatures. Abuse-testing consisted of shortcircuiting, charging, and over-discharge. Energy densities greater than 300 Wh/Kg at the C/2 rate were found for some designs. A cell design featuring a high-surface-area carbon cathode was found to deliver nearly 500 Wh/Kg at moderate discharge rates. Temperature influenced the performance significantly.

Deligiannis, F.↗
NASA NTRS1922

The prospects of the helicopter

The advantages of helicopters are listed along with a discussion of safety devices, the problems of control, and the need for horizontal flight.

HELICOPTERS↗
NASA NTRS2001

Creep-Fatigue Interaction Testing

Fatigue fives in metals are nominally time independent below 0.5 T(sub Melt). At higher temperatures, fatigue lives are altered due to time-dependent, thermally activated creep. Conversely, creep rates are altered by super. imposed fatigue loading. Creep and fatigue generally interact synergistically to reduce material lifetime. Their interaction, therefore, is of importance to structural durability of high-temperature structures such as nuclear reactors, reusable rocket engines, gas turbine engines, terrestrial steam turbines, pressure vessel and piping components, casting dies, molds for plastics, and pollution control devices. Safety and lifecycle costs force designers to quantify these interactions. Analytical and experimental approaches to creep-fatigue began in the era following World War II. In this article experimental and life prediction approaches are reviewed for assessing creep-fatigue interactions of metallic materials. Mechanistic models are also discussed briefly.

Halford, Gary R.↗
NASA NTRS2001

Lithium Ion Battery Design and Safety

This viewgraph presentation makes several recommendations to ensure the safe and effective design of Lithium ion cell batteries. Large lithium ion cells require pressure switches and small cells require pressure disconnects and other safety devices with the ability to instantly interrupt flow. Other suggestions include specifications for batteries and battery chargers.

Au, George↗
NASA NTRS1982

Shock Absorbing System

A lightweight, inexpensive shock-absorbing system, developed by Langley Research Center 20 years ago, is now in service as safety device for an automated railway at Duke University Medical Center. The transportation system travels at about 25 miles per hour, carrying patients, visitors, staff and cargo. At the end of each guideway of the system are "frangible," (breakable) tube "buffers." If a slowing car fails to make a complete stop at the terminal, it would bump and shatter the tubes, absorbing energy that might otherwise jolt the passengers or damage the vehicle.

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NASA NTRS2003

Putting Safety First in the Sky

As a result of technology developed at NASA s Kennedy Space Center, pilots now have a hand-held personal safety device to warn them of potentially dangerous or deteriorating cabin pressure altitude conditions before hypoxia becomes a threat. The Personal Cabin Pressure Altitude Monitor and Warning System monitors cabin pressure to determine when supplemental oxygen should be used according to Federal Aviation Regulations. The device benefits both pressurized and nonpressurized aircraft operations - warning pressurized aircraft when the required safe cabin pressure altitude is compromised, and reminding nonpressurized aircraft when supplemental oxygen is needed.

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NASA NTRS2003

Smoke Mask

Smoke inhalation injury from the noxious products of fire combustion accounts for as much as 80 percent of fire-related deaths in the United States. Many of these deaths are preventable. Smoke Mask, Inc. (SMI), of Myrtle Beach, South Carolina, is working to decrease these casualties with its line of life safety devices. The SMI personal escape hood and the Guardian Filtration System provide respiratory protection that enables people to escape from hazardous and unsafe conditions. The breathing filter technology utilized in the products is specifically designed to supply breathable air for 20 minutes. In emergencies, 20 minutes can mean the difference between life and death.

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NASA NTRS2010

Portable Diagnostics Technology Assessment for Space Missions: Market Survey - Part 2

A mission to Mars of several years duration requires more demanding standards for all onboard instruments than a 6-month mission to the Moon or the International Space Station. In Part 1, we evaluated generic technologies and suitability to NASA needs. This prior work considered crew safety, device maturity and flightworthiness, resource consumption, and medical value. In Part 2, we continue the study by assessing the current marketplace for reliable Point-of-Care diagnostics. The ultimate goal of this project is to provide a set of objective analytical tools to suggest efficient strategies for reaching specific medical targets for any given space mission as program needs, technological development, and scientific understanding evolve.

Nelson, Emily S.↗
NASA NTRS2010

Risk Presentation Using the Three Dimensions of Likelihood, Severity, and Level of Control

Traditional hazard analysis techniques utilize a two-dimensional representation of the results determined by relative likelihood and severity of the residual risk. These matrices present a quick-look at the Likelihood (Y-axis) and Severity (X-axis) of the probable outcome of a hazardous event. A three-dimensional method, described herein, utilizes the traditional X and Y axes, while adding a new, third dimension, shown as the Z-axis, and referred to as the Level of Control. The elements of the Z-axis are modifications of the Hazard Elimination and Control steps (also known as the Hazard Reduction Precedence Sequence). These steps are: 1. Eliminate risk through design. 2. Substitute less risky materials for more hazardous materials. 3. Install safety devices. 4. Install caution and warning devices. 5. Develop administrative controls (to include special procedures and training.) 6. Provide protective clothing and equipment. When added to the two-dimensional models, the level of control adds a visual representation of the risk associated with the hazardous condition, creating a tall-pole for the leastwell-controlled failure while establishing the relative likelihood and severity of all causes and effects for an identified hazard. Computer modeling of the analytical results, using spreadsheets and three-dimensional charting gives a visual confirmation of the relationship between causes and their controls.

Watson, Clifford↗
NASA NTRS2010

Risk Assessment Using the Three Dimensions of Probability (Likelihood), Severity, and Level of Control

Traditional hazard analysis techniques utilize a two-dimensional representation of the results determined by relative likelihood and severity of the residual risk. These matrices present a quick-look at the Likelihood (Y-axis) and Severity (X-axis) of the probable outcome of a hazardous event. A three-dimensional method, described herein, utilizes the traditional X and Y axes, while adding a new, third dimension, shown as the Z-axis, and referred to as the Level of Control. The elements of the Z-axis are modifications of the Hazard Elimination and Control steps (also known as the Hazard Reduction Precedence Sequence). These steps are: 1. Eliminate risk through design. 2. Substitute less risky materials for more hazardous materials. 3. Install safety devices. 4. Install caution and warning devices. 5. Develop administrative controls (to include special procedures and training.) 6. Provide protective clothing and equipment. When added to the twodimensional models, the level of control adds a visual representation of the risk associated with the hazardous condition, creating a tall-pole for the least-well-controlled failure while establishing the relative likelihood and severity of all causes and effects for an identified hazard. Computer modeling of the analytical results, using spreadsheets and threedimensional charting gives a visual confirmation of the relationship between causes and their controls

Watson, Clifford↗
NASA NTRS2011

Risk Assessment Using the Three Dimensions of Probability (Likelihood), Severity, and Level of Control

Traditional hazard analysis techniques utilize a two-dimensional representation of the results determined by relative likelihood and severity of the residual risk. These matrices present a quick-look at the Likelihood (Y-axis) and Severity (X-axis) of the probable outcome of a hazardous event. A three-dimensional method, described herein, utilizes the traditional X and Y axes, while adding a new, third dimension, shown as the Z-axis, and referred to as the Level of Control. The elements of the Z-axis are modifications of the Hazard Elimination and Control steps (also known as the Hazard Reduction Precedence Sequence). These steps are: 1. Eliminate risk through design. 2. Substitute less risky materials for more hazardous materials. 3. Install safety devices. 4. Install caution and warning devices. 5. Develop administrative controls (to include special procedures and training.) 6. Provide protective clothing and equipment. When added to the two-dimensional models, the level of control adds a visual representation of the risk associated with the hazardous condition, creating a tall-pole for the least-well-controlled failure while establishing the relative likelihood and severity of all causes and effects for an identified hazard. Computer modeling of the analytical results, using spreadsheets and three-dimensional charting gives a visual confirmation of the relationship between causes and their controls.

Watson, Clifford C.↗
NASA NTRS2005

Preventing Accidental Ignition of Upper-Stage Rocket Motors

A report presents a proposal to reduce the risk of accidental ignition of certain upper-stage rocket motors or other high energy hazardous systems. At present, mechanically in-line initiators are used for initiation of many rocket motors and/or other high-energy hazardous systems. Electrical shorts and/or mechanical barriers, which are the basic safety devices in such systems, are typically removed as part of final arming or pad preparations while personnel are present. At this time, static discharge, test equipment malfunction, or incorrect arming techniques can cause premature firing. The proposal calls for a modular out-of-line ignition system incorporating detonating-cord elements, identified as the donor and the acceptor, separated by an air gap. In the safe configuration, the gap would be sealed with two shields, which would prevent an accidental firing of the donor from igniting the system. The shields would be removed to enable normal firing, in which shrapnel generated by the donor would reliably ignite the acceptor to continue the ordnance train. The acceptor would then ignite a through bulkhead initiator (or other similar device), which would ignite the motor or high-energy system. One shield would be remotely operated and would be moved to the armed position when a launch was imminent or conversely returned to the safe position if the launch were postponed. In the event of failure of the remotely operated shield, the other shield could be inserted manually to safe the system.

Hickman, John↗
NASA NTRS1990

NASA safety standard for lifting devices and equipment

NASA's minimum safety requirements are established for the design, testing, inspection, maintenance, certification, and use of overhead and gantry cranes (including top running monorail, underhung, and jib cranes), mobile cranes, derrick hoists, and special hoist supported personnel lifting devices (these do not include elevators, ground supported personnel lifts, or powered platforms). Minimum requirements are also addressed for the testing, inspection, and use of Hydra-sets, hooks, and slings. Safety standards are thoroughly detailed.

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