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The New NASA Orbital Debris Mitigation Procedural Requirements and Standards

NASA has issued major updates to its principal orbital debris mitigation policy directive and standards. The new NASA Procedural Requirements for Limiting Orbital Debris (NPR 8715.6), with its supporting NASA Standard 8719.14, both refine earlier orbital debris mitigation documents and in some areas expand their applicability. Organizational and individual responsibilities along with general directives are set forth in NPR 8715.6. New requirements include routine conjunction assessments for all maneuverable NASA spacecraft in LEO and GEO, prompt notifications of intended or unintended debris generation, preparation and maintenance of formal end-of-mission plans, and disposal of vehicles in operation around the Moon and Mars and at the Earth-Sun Lagrangian points. NASA Standard 8719.14 replaces the 1995 NASA Safety Standard 1740.14 with no major new requirements but with several refinements and additions, some of which had already been adopted. Compliance with human casualty risk limitations from reentering debris will be calculated explicitly and not be expressed in terms of average debris casualty area. Moreover, the minimum kinetic energy threshold for potentially injurious reentering debris is set at 15 Joules. The overarching requirement for the disposal of GEO spacecraft and launch vehicle orbital stages is to ensure that the vehicles do not come within GEO + 200 km for at least 100 km after end of mission, rather than setting specific requirements for the disposal orbit. Spacecraft operating in or routinely transiting LEO must remain in the region for no more than 25 years after end of mission or 30 years after launch, whichever occurs sooner. A comprehensive new NASA handbook on orbital debris has also been prepared to provide background on the orbital debris environment and the related NASA mitigation requirements and standards.

Johnson, Nicholas L.↗

Autonomous Real Time Requirements Tracing

One of the more challenging aspects of software development is the ability to verify and validate the functional software requirements dictated by the Software Requirements Specification (SRS) and the Software Detail Design (SDD). Insuring the software has achieved the intended requirements is the responsibility of the Software Quality team and the Software Test team. The utilization of Timeliner-TLX(sup TM) Auto- Procedures for relocating ground operations positions to ISS automated on-board operations has begun the transition that would be required for manned deep space missions with minimal crew requirements. This transition also moves the auto-procedures from the procedure realm into the flight software arena and as such the operational requirements and testing will be more structured and rigorous. The autoprocedures would be required to meet NASA software standards as specified in the Software Safety Standard (NASASTD- 8719), the Software Engineering Requirements (NPR 7150), the Software Assurance Standard (NASA-STD-8739) and also the Human Rating Requirements (NPR-8705). The Autonomous Fluid Transfer System (AFTS) test-bed utilizes the Timeliner-TLX(sup TM) Language for development of autonomous command and control software. The Timeliner-TLX(sup TM) system has the unique feature of providing the current line of the statement in execution during real-time execution of the software. The feature of execution line number internal reporting unlocks the capability of monitoring the execution autonomously by use of a companion Timeliner-TLX(sup TM) sequence as the line number reporting is embedded inside the Timeliner-TLX(sup TM) execution engine. This negates I/O processing of this type data as the line number status of executing sequences is built-in as a function reference. This paper will outline the design and capabilities of the AFTS Autonomous Requirements Tracker, which traces and logs SRS requirements as they are being met during real-time execution of the targeted system. It is envisioned that real time requirements tracing will greatly assist the movement of autoprocedures to flight software enhancing the software assurance of auto-procedures and also their acceptance as reliable commanders.

Plattsmier, George↗

Autonomous Real Time Requirements Tracing

One of the more challenging aspects of software development is the ability to verify and validate the functional software requirements dictated by the Software Requirements Specification (SRS) and the Software Detail Design (SDD). Insuring the software has achieved the intended requirements is the responsibility of the Software Quality team and the Software Test team. The utilization of Timeliner-TLX(sup TM) Auto-Procedures for relocating ground operations positions to ISS automated on-board operations has begun the transition that would be required for manned deep space missions with minimal crew requirements. This transition also moves the auto-procedures from the procedure realm into the flight software arena and as such the operational requirements and testing will be more structured and rigorous. The autoprocedures would be required to meet NASA software standards as specified in the Software Safety Standard (NASASTD- 8719), the Software Engineering Requirements (NPR 7150), the Software Assurance Standard (NASA-STD-8739) and also the Human Rating Requirements (NPR-8705). The Autonomous Fluid Transfer System (AFTS) test-bed utilizes the Timeliner-TLX(sup TM) Language for development of autonomous command and control software. The Timeliner- TLX(sup TM) system has the unique feature of providing the current line of the statement in execution during real-time execution of the software. The feature of execution line number internal reporting unlocks the capability of monitoring the execution autonomously by use of a companion Timeliner-TLX(sup TM) sequence as the line number reporting is embedded inside the Timeliner-TLX(sup TM) execution engine. This negates I/O processing of this type data as the line number status of executing sequences is built-in as a function reference. This paper will outline the design and capabilities of the AFTS Autonomous Requirements Tracker, which traces and logs SRS requirements as they are being met during real-time execution of the targeted system. It is envisioned that real time requirements tracing will greatly assist the movement of autoprocedures to flight software enhancing the software assurance of auto-procedures and also their acceptance as reliable commanders

Plattsmier, George I.↗

Industry Initiated Core Safety Attributes for Human Spaceflight for the 7th IAASS Conference

Now that the NASA Commercial Crew Program (CCP) is beginning its full certification contract for crew transportation to the International Space Station (ISS), is it time for industry to embrace a minimum set of core safety attributes? Those attributes can then be evolved into an industry-led set of basic safety standards and requirements. After 50 years of human space travel sponsored by governments, there are two basic conditions that now exist within the international space industry. The first, there is enough of a space-faring history to encourage the space industry to design, develop and operate human spaceflight systems without government contracts for anything other than services. Second, industry is capable of defining and enforcing a set of industry-based safety attributes and standards for human spaceflight to low-Earth orbit (LEO). This paper will explore both of these basic conditions with a focus on the safety attributes and standards. In the United States, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) is now starting to dialogue with industry about the basic safety principles and attributes needed for potential future regulatory oversight. This process is not yet formalized and will take a number of years once approval is given to move forward. Therefore, throughout the next few years, it is an excellent time and opportunity for industry to collaborate together and develop the core set of attributes and standards. As industry engages and embraces a common set of safety attributes, then government agencies, like the FAA and NASA can use that industry-based product to strengthen their efforts on a safe commercial spaceflight foundation for the future. As the commercial space industry takes the lead role in establishing core safety attributes, and then enforcing those attributes, the entire planet can move away from governmental control of design and development and let industry expand safe and successful space operations in LEO. At that point the governmental agencies can focus on oversight of the industries' defined standards and enforcement for common welfare of the space-faring populous and overall public safety.

crew transportation↗

Panel Session 132: Risk-Informed Approach for Decision Making in WM, D and D and SNF Management: Reasonable Assurance for Safety

Mr. Larry Camper organized a panel of experts to discuss approaches to better make risk-informed decisions in waste management, decommissioning, and the management of Spent Nuclear Fuel (SNF). The audience heard the perspectives from four panelists that addressed issues ranging from the technical basis used to make risk-informed decisions to for developing cleanup criteria and promulgating regulations and safety standards both domestically and abroad. A summary of each of the presentations given by the panelists is provided herein. This WMS BOD featured panel focused on the Risk-Informed Approach for Decision Making in WM, D and D and SNF Management and the Reasonable Assurance for Safety. The panelists addressed and discussed with the audience different approaches used for decision-making, summarizing ongoing probabilistic vs. deterministic approaches, including IAEA graded approach, and discussed policies/approaches to achieve reasonable assurance for safety rather than using absolute assurance. Panelists with presentations: Risk-Informed Decision Making - More than a Motto? (Paul Black); NRC Staff Perspective on Risk-Informed Approach and Reasonable Safety Assurance in D and D and LLW (Rateb (Boby) Abu Eid); Risk-Informed Decision-Making and Illustrative National Academies Studies (Charles Ferguson); IAEA's Revised Safety Guidance on Remediation (Michelle Roberts); NDA Radioactive Waste Strategy - A Risk Informed Approach (James McKinney)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Update on Development of a U.S. Rail Transport Capability for Spent Nuclear Fuel and High-Level Waste - 20466

This paper provides an overview of the progress to date, and discussion of the path forward, related to designing, fabricating and testing prototype railcars that will comply with the safety standard S-2043. This standard was developed by the Association of American Railroads (AAR) specifically for railcars used to transport High-Level Radioactive Material (HLRM). AAR defines the term HLRM to include both spent nuclear fuel (SNF) and high-level radioactive waste (HLW). DOE is in the process of developing and testing prototype railcars that will satisfy Standard S-2043. This is a technical paper that does not take into account contractual limitations or obligations under the Standard Contract for Disposal of Spent Nuclear Fuel and/or High-Level Radioactive Waste (Standard Contract) (10 CFR Part 961). For example, under the provisions of the Standard Contract, spent nuclear fuel in multi-assembly canisters is not an acceptable waste form, absent a mutually agreed to contract amendment. To the extent discussions or recommendations in this paper conflict with the provisions of the Standard Contract, the Standard Contract governs the obligations of the parties, and this paper in no manner supersedes, overrides, or amends the Standard Contract. This paper reflects technical work which could support future decision making by the Department of Energy (DOE or Department). No inferences should be drawn from this paper regarding future actions by DOE, which are limited both by the terms of the Standard Contract and a lack of Congressional appropriations for the Department to fulfill its obligations under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act including licensing and construction of a spent nuclear fuel repository. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

An Interim Set of TNT Curves for LOX/LNG Explosions

Space launch companies are actively developing, or in some cases have already developed, new vehicles that use large quantities of liquid oxygen (LOX) and liquid natural gas (LNG) propellants. This propellant mixture currently lacks sound/verified LOX/LNG explosive safety standards for use in explosive siting and flight safety analysis. In the U.S., multiple government and commercial organizations have conducted limited testing, or are preparing to conduct tests, intended to provide a sound technical basis for explosive standards applicable to space launch vehicle ground and flight operations. The limited testing and analysis conducted so far indicates the potential to produce extremely energetic explosions due to the miscibility of LOX/LNG (methane), a unique feature relative to previously used propellant mixtures such as hydrogen/oxygen or kerosene/oxygen. MOX is a homogenous mixture of methane and oxygen that is possible because of methane’s 100% miscibility in LOX. Preliminary testing by N2L, Inc. described in this paper shows that it is possible to form MOX with a variety of mixing methods, and that MOX is a sensitive high explosive capable of producing overpressures greater than comparable masses of C-4. The limited amount and quality of large-scale LOX/LNG explosive test data, and the potential formation of high-explosive MOX, create significant unknowns in the determination of hazard areas (cleared of the public) for ground operations (such as a static fire test) and flights of launch vehicles with LOX/LNG propellant. This paper will review the methods used by NASA to develop and validate the LOX/LH2 blast model using large-scale explosive test programs such as Project PYRO, the Hydrogen-Oxygen Vertical Impact (HOVI), and the Large-Scale Hydrogen-Oxygen Explosion (LSHOE) tests. This paper will describe how the same process was used to prepare an interim LOX/LNG blast model that applies to various LV failure scenarios and conservatively accounts for potential MOX formation. This paper also summarizes past and future testing and modeling efforts funded by a consortium of NASA, the US Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), and the US Space Force (USSF). These test programs should be concluded within the next 3 years and are intended to provide empirical data for model verification and validation.

Liquid Oxygen↗

An Interim Set of TNT Curves for LOX/LNG Explosions

Space launch companies are actively developing, or in some cases have already developed, new vehicles that use large quantities of liquid oxygen (LOX) and liquid natural gas (LNG) propellants. This propellant mixture currently lacks sound/verified explosive safety standards for use in explosive siting and flight safety analysis. In the U.S., multiple government and commercial organizations have conducted limited testing, or are preparing to conduct tests, intended to provide a sound technical basis for LOX/LNG explosive standards applicable to space launch vehicle ground and flight operations. The limited testing and analysis conducted so far indicates the potential to produce extremely energetic explosions due to the miscibility of LOX/LNG (methane), a unique feature relative to previously used propellant mixtures such as hydrogen/oxygen or kerosene/oxygen. MOX is a homogenous mixture of methane and oxygen that is possible because of methane’s 100% miscibility in LOX. Preliminary testing by N2L, Inc. described in this paper shows that it is possible to form MOX with a variety of mixing methods, and that MOX is a sensitive high explosive capable of producing overpressures greater than comparable masses of C-4. The limited amount and quality of large-scale LOX/LNG explosive test data, and the potential formation of high-explosive MOX, create significant unknowns in the determination of hazard areas (cleared of the public) for ground operations (such as a static fire test) and flights of launch vehicles with LOX/LNG propellant. This paper will review the methods used by NASA to develop and validate the LOX/LH2 blast model using large-scale explosive test programs such as Project PYRO, the Hydrogen-Oxygen Vertical Impact (HOVI), and the Large-Scale Hydrogen-Oxygen Explosion (LSHOE) tests. This paper will describe how the same process was used to prepare an interim LOX/LNG blast model that applies to various LV failure scenarios and conservatively accounts for potential MOX formation. This paper also summarizes past and future testing and modeling efforts funded by a consortium of NASA, the US Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), and the US Space Force (USSF). These test programs should be concluded within the next 3 years and are intended to provide empirical data for model verification and validation.

Liquid Oxygen↗

Risk Model for EM Decision Support Toolsets

The Government Office of Accountability (GAO) has published several reports identifying the need for the Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Environmental Management (EM) to address mounting costs for DoE's cleanup program. DOEEM could greatly benefit from independent decision tool-sets/models that would allow them to evaluate options and inform business decision at the enterprise level considering site-specific life cycle costs and system plans. Program goals: Develop a tool-set that enables EM to independently evaluate alternatives, assess outcomes from different contracting strategies, and inform critical decisions for the enterprise. Project goals: Adaption of a Risk Model for integration with complimentary tool-sets for project level decision making. Operational Events: Discrete event model that evaluates operational variables (e.g. capacity, throughput, maintenance constraints) and identify bottlenecks. Identifying and Bounding Project Risk: Identify risks that impact confidence in meeting goals (e.g. production). Life cycle Cost: Evaluate impacts of staffing levels, inventory, and capital investments on life cycle costs. Methods and approach: Monte Carlo Analysis is being executed to generate results: Input derives from Risk Register Data; Tied to Projected and Target Schedules; Incorporates float duration within the model. Assumes associated risk mitigation actions being completed within a timeline of five fiscal years. Metrics include: Confidence in Meeting Production Goal; Confidence in Safety Standards; Confidence in Continuous Operation; Other Metrics can be added as appropriate regarding specific site needs. The adapted risk model can be used as a stand alone decision tool or can be integrated complementary tool-sets (i.e. process and cost models) for project-specific decisions. These support tool-sets can then be integrated with others for site- and complex- level evaluations. Future work includes designing an adaptable and modular framework that would allow integration of multiple tool-sets for holistic and/or targeted evaluation of alternative strategies for decision making that could lead to risk and cost reduction across the enterprise.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

The Application of Software Safety to the Constellation Program Launch Control System

The application of software safety practices on the LCS project resulted in the successful implementation of the NASA Software Safety Standard NASA-STD-8719.138 and CxP software safety requirements. The GOP-GEN-GSW-011 Hazard Report was the first report developed at KSC to identify software hazard causes and their controls. This approach can be applied to similar large software - intensive systems where loss of control can lead to a hazard.

Kania, James↗

A Full-scale Demonstration of Pressurized Water Reactor Core Design Optimization using Multi-Cycle Optimization Methodology

The U.S. nuclear sector encounters a difficulty in upholding essential safety standards while also securing economic viability for continued operation. Safety stands as a pivotal factor across all facets of operations within light-water reactor nuclear power plants. Achieving economic feasibility alongside safety can be facilitated through the utilization of a risk-informed framework, exemplified by the ongoing development within the Risk-Informed Systems Analysis Pathway under the auspices of the U.S. Department of Energy's LWRS Program. This initiative advocates for a diverse array of research and development endeavors aimed at optimizing both safety and economic efficacy within nuclear power plants, particularly pertinent as many plants contemplate second license renewals. The Risk-Informed Systems Analysis Pathway has two main goals: deploy methodologies and technologies that better represent safety margins and cost and safety factors and develop advanced applications that enable cost-effective plant operation. This report assesses the potential for resolving multi-cycle plant reload challenges through real-world scenarios utilizing the Plant ReLoad Optimization (PRLO) framework. This framework offers reactor core design developers analytic tools of reactor safety and fuel performance with the assistance of artificial intelligence (AI) to enhance core design solutions. Multi-objective genetic algorithm alongside acceleration techniques is explored as an enabling technology for improving fuel efficiency while upholding safety thresholds. The demonstration of multi-cycle core design optimization is performed. This report investigates the practical application of the PRLO platform in addressing real-world core design challenges, supporting AI efforts, and contrasting outcomes with those derived from heuristic or conventional algorithms.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Lidar performance analysis

Section 1 details the theory used to build the lidar model, provides results of using the model to evaluate AEOLUS design instrument designs, and provides snapshots of the visual appearance of the coded model. Appendix A contains a Fortran program to calculate various forms of the refractive index structure function. This program was used to determine the refractive index structure function used in the main lidar simulation code. Appendix B contains a memo on the optimization of the lidar telescope geometry for a line-scan geometry. Appendix C contains the code for the main lidar simulation and brief instruction on running the code. Appendix D contains a Fortran code to calculate the maximum permissible exposure for the eye from the ANSI Z136.1-1992 eye safety standards. Appendix E contains a paper on the eye safety analysis of a space-based coherent lidar presented at the 7th Coherent Laser Radar Applications and Technology Conference, Paris, France, 19-23 July 1993.

Spiers, Gary D.↗

NASA’s Safety, Reliability, and Mission Assurance Digital Future

The evolution from “document-centric” to “data-centric” and “model-centric” information leveraging structured data and model-based approaches is at the heart of digital engineering transformational efforts underway across industry and government. It is these approaches that pave the way for data lakes, Authoritative Sources of Truth (ASOTs), and systems- of-systems interoperability and the corresponding transformational benefits thereof. Such benefits include increased data availability, data access equity, data traceability, real-time analytics, batch analytics, and (most importantly) acceleration of the time-to-value and time-to-insights associated with engineering products and analyses. The longer-term benefits of reusability, customization and traceability are even more promising. For Safety and Mission Assurance (SMA), and Mission Success (SMS) activities; realization of such benefits is essential to provide engineers and analysts alike vital information when needed to support critical decision making throughout the entire life cycle. The SMA community often operate in parallel with engineering activities, for which information exchange with relevant context is paramount. Far too often, such information lags key decision points and/or is absent of the robust, integrated, knowledge needed, given inherent barriers associated with traditional document-centric means to data sharing, analysis, and reporting. This paper provides an overview of how NASA’s Office of Safety and Mission Assurance (OSMA) is evolving its policies, standards, guidance, and training to transform to eliminate such barriers, thus realizing the benefits emerging in this new digital era. A roadmap for achieving this digital future is presented along with key building blocks involving use and implementation of concepts such as: Objectives-Hierarchies, Objective-Driven Requirements, Accepted Standards, Safety and Assurance Cases, data digitization (i.e., ontologies, structured data, and model-centric data), FAIR (Findable, Accessible, Interoperable, & Reusable) and/or FAIRUST (Findable, Accessible, Interoperable, Reusable, Understandable, Secure, and Trusted) principles [1]. This paper also describes how OSMA, leveraging the Agency’s overall commitment to Digital Transformation (DT), is using the power of Policy, “Digital” Domain representation, Product Evolution, and Community Outreach and Engagement as part of a strategic vision and roadmap to evolve and transform its SMA organizations to become better able to serve its stakeholders and customers. Future publications will elaborate on these building blocks and deeper concepts.

Authoritative Source of Truth (ASOT),↗

Reduced Order Model to Predict Dispersion of Flammable Refrigerant into a Space

As the HVAC&R industry mobilizes to deploy more low-GWP refrigerants, relevant standards are being continually reviewed and updated. Those include the general safety standards ISO 5149 and ASHRAE 15, and the equipment standards IEC and UL. The standards systematically set the allowable maximum amount of refrigerant that should be used in different equipment types and different applications. To do so, they rely on predictions of how a leaked refrigerant mass will disperse into a space. Dispersion characteristics, such as total flammable volume and its residence time, determine the risk associated with the presence of the flammable refrigerant. The standards have included provisions for the use of flammable refrigerants for approximately two decades. They relied on limited analytical analyses and test cases in their development. Dispersion of a refrigerant into a space is complex. Computational fluid dynamics (CFD) are the most accurate in predicting a given problem. However, CFD is computationally expensive and requires specialized expertise and resources and is not suitable for use by standards development working group as prediction tool. This paper presents the development of a reduced order model (ROM) that predicts the key dispersion characteristics relevant to the dispersion of a leaked refrigerant into a space for any combination of input variables. The inputs are the refrigerant release height, the total released refrigerant mass and its release flow rate, the refrigerant molecular weight, the ventilation flow rate, the floor area and height of the space, recirculation air flow rate, and the tightness of the space. The outputs are histograms of volume fraction of the room in prescribed concentration bins and the total mass of the refrigerant in each bin normalized by the total refrigerant charge at 13 prescribed simulation time stamps between 1 and 900 seconds. The ROM is constructed from a set of CFD simulations with carefully chosen combinations of input parameters. The selection if done using a multidimensional sparse grid which is a generalization of the classical tensor approach but offers additional flexibility and thus can be more carefully tuned towards a specific model. The tuning is done to improve the accuracy, measured in the difference between the output values of the ROM and the CFD model, while minimizing the computational cost, measured in number of CFD simulations which is orders of magnitude more expensive than the processing the training data.

Edwards, Dean↗

Electrical safety requirements: Implications for the module designer

Commercial photovoltaic array installations, which include residential and intermediate applications, are subject to building and electrical codes and to product safety standards. The National Electrical Code (NEC) Article 690, titled Solar Photovoltaic Systems, contains provisions defining acceptable levels of system safety and emphasizes the system design and its installation. The Underwriters Laboratories, Inc. (UL), document titled: Proposed First Edition of the Standard for Flat Plate Photovoltaic Modules and Panels, UL-1703, identifies module and panel construction requirements that ensure product safety. Together these documents describe requirements intended to minimize hazards such as shock and fire. Although initial focus of these requirements is on single crystal silicon modules, they are generic in nature, and are equally applicable to high voltage ( 30 Vdc), multikilowatt, thin film systems. A major safety concern is insulation breakdown within the module or array wiring system, or discontinuities within the electrical conductors. These failures can result in ground faults, in circuit arcs, or exposure to hazardous electrical parts. Safeguards are discussed.

Sugimura, R. S.↗

Safety Codes and Standards Review and Gap Analysis for Applicability to Hydrogen Rail Refueling, Defueling, Maintenance, and Storage

Hydrogen-powered locomotives may present an alternative to diesel for achieving transportation-related decarbonization, energy security, and resilience goals. As an emerging technology, hydrogen locomotives may not have adequate representation in current safety codes and standards. NFPA 2 and other appropriate codes and standards were reviewed to identify technical gaps in the code for hydrogen rail defueling, refueling, maintenance, and storage. Several technical gaps pertaining to setback distances, allowable quantities, ventilation rates, and grounding have been identified. Fueling requirements can be informed by road vehicle standards but may need to be revised for larger quantity hydrogen locomotive systems. Since there are no hydrogen-specific locomotive design and safety standards, some aspects of diesel-based locomotive standards may apply. CGA G- 5.5 currently provides the most guidance on height, placement, orientation, and design of vent systems, while other standards emphasize the importance of shielding vent stacks and provide requirements for orientation of their discharge.

08 HYDROGEN↗