Medical Response/Search/Recovery and Lessons Learned from the Space Shuttle Columbia Accident Investigation
No abstract available
Stepaniak, Philip C.↗
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Materials and Processes Engineering's Role in the Reconstruction and Failure Analysis of The Space Shuttle Columbia
Conclusions: The hot gases, having flooded the wing interior, quickly heated the upper and lower wing surfaces allowing the aluminum honeycomb facesheets and the wing tiles to debond. The thin-wall aluminum truss tubes would soon collapse and the aerodynamic and structural integrity of the left wing would be effectively destroyed. The forensic evidence is consistent with the observed External Tank foam impact 81 seconds into launch. This is the most probable cause of the damage to the Reinforced Carbon-Carbon. (RCC) leading edge.
Russell, Richard↗
The Space Shuttle Columbia Accident Investigation: Forensic Tools, Techniques, and Results
No abstract available
McDaniels, Steve↗
Nondestructive Testing As a Tool in the Space Shuttle Columbia Accident Investigation
Nondestructive testing (NDT) played a crucial role in determining the Columbia tragedy's cause. Over 84,000 pieces of debris were recovered; hundreds were subsequently subjected to NDT and materials analysis. Visual NDT of the debris revealed localized areas of damage such as erosion, excessive heating, knife edging and mechanical damage. Three-dimensional reconstructions were made of the left wing leading edge, utilizing a tripod-mounted laser scanning head and focused laser beam, and an advanced topometric optical scanner (ATOS) with digital white light to scan complex-shaped debris, producing monochrome 3-D models. Texture mapping provided a means to capture true colors of the debris and superimpose them on the scanned images. Uniform deposits were found over large portions of debris, obscuring underlying materials. To determine what was beneath, inverse radiography was enlisted. The radiographs guided investigators to where samples should be taken. To ascertain compositions, these samples were subjected to analytical testing, including energy dispersive X-ray spectroscopy and electron microprobe analysis. This combination of visual evidence, radiography, virtual reconstruction, and materials analysis allowed the forensic scientists to verify that a breach occurred in the leading edge of the left wing, the path the plasma followed, and the sequence of events that led to the loss.
McDanels, Steve↗
CSA/ASC Press Briefing
Nicole Gignac, Senior Communications Advisor Canadian Space Agency (CSA), introduces the panel for this CSA/ASC press briefing. The panel consist of: Dr. Steve Maclean, CSA astronaut; Dr. Paul Cooper, Deputy General Manager, MacDonald, Dettwiler and Associates Ltd. (MDA); and Dr. Iain Christie, Director of Research and Development from NEPTEC. Maclean will fly on the STS-115 Mission in February of 2006. He presents pictures and talks about the crewmembers of the Space Shuttle Columbia and Space Shuttle Discovery. Maclean also discusses entry risks as it pertains to the leading edge wing of Discovery. Paul Cooper explains and shows a video presentation of Canadarm robotics. The briefing ends with Dr Christie explaining the sensitive three dimensional inspections are performed in space that looks for cracks in the leading edge wing of the Space Shuttle Discovery.
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Characterization of Space Shuttle Thermal Protection System (TPS) Materials for Return-to-Flight following the Shuttle Columbia Accident Investigation
During the Space Shuttle Columbia Accident Investigation, it was determined that a large chunk of polyurethane insulating foam (= 1.67 lbs) on the External Tank (ET) came loose during Columbia's ascent on 2-1-03. The foam piece struck some of the protective Reinforced Carbon-Carbon (RCC) panels on the leading edge of Columbia's left wing in the mid-wing area. This impact damaged Columbia to the extent that upon re-entry to Earth, superheGed air approaching 3,000 F caused the vehicle to break up, killing all seven astronauts on board. A paper after the Columbia Accident Investigation highlighted thermal analysis testing performed on External Tank TPS materials (1). These materials included BX-250 (now BX-265) rigid polyurethane foam and SLA-561 Super Lightweight Ablator (highly-filled silicone rubber). The large chunk of foam from Columbia originated fiom the left bipod ramp of the ET. The foam in this ramp area was hand-sprayed over the SLA material and various fittings, allowed to dry, and manually shaved into a ramp shape. In Return-to-Flight (RTF) efforts following Columbia, the decision was made to remove the foam in the bipod ramp areas. During RTF efforts, further thermal analysis testing was performed on BX-265 foam by DSC and DMA. Flat panels of foam about 2-in. thick were sprayed on ET tank material (aluminum alloys). The DSC testing showed that foam material very close to the metal substrate cured more slowly than bulk foam material. All of the foam used on the ET is considered fully cured about 21 days after it is sprayed. The RTF culminated in the successful launch of Space Shuttle Discovery on 7-26-05. Although the flight was a success, there was another serious incident of foam loss fiom the ET during Shuttle ascent. This time, a rather large chunk of BX-265 foam (= 0.9 lbs) came loose from the liquid hydrogen (LH2) PAL ramp, although the foam did not strike the Shuttle Orbiter containing the crew. DMA testing was performed on foam samples taken fiom a simulated PAL ramp panel. It was found that the smooth rind on the foam facing the cable tray did significantly affect the properties of foam at the PAL ramp surface. The smooth rind increased the storage modulus E' of the foam as much as 20- 40% over a temperature range of -145 to 95 C. Because of foam loss fiom the PAL ramp, future Shuttle flights were grounded indefinitely to allow further testing to better understand foam properties. The decision was also made to remove foam from the LH2 PAL, ramp. Other RTF efforts prior to the launch of Discovery included
Wingard, Doug↗
Columbia Accident Investigation Board. Volume One
The Columbia Accident Investigation Board's independent investigation into the February 1, 2003, loss of the Space Shuttle Columbia and its seven-member crew lasted nearly seven months. A staff of more than 120, along with some 400 NASA engineers, supported the Board's 13 members. Investigators examined more than 30,000 documents, conducted more than 200 formal interviews, heard testimony from dozens of expert witnesses, and reviewed more than 3,000 inputs from the general public. In addition, more than 25,000 searchers combed vast stretches of the Western United States to retrieve the spacecraft's debris. In the process, Columbia's tragedy was compounded when two debris searchers with the U.S. Forest Service perished in a helicopter accident. This report concludes with recommendations, some of which are specifically identified and prefaced as 'before return to flight.' These recommendations are largely related to the physical cause of the accident, and include preventing the loss of foam, improved imaging of the Space Shuttle stack from liftoff through separation of the External Tank, and on-orbit inspection and repair of the Thermal Protection System. The remaining recommendations, for the most part, stem from the Board's findings on organizational cause factors. While they are not 'before return to flight' recommendations, they can be viewed as 'continuing to fly' recommendations, as they capture the Board's thinking on what changes are necessary to operate the Shuttle and future spacecraft safely in the mid- to long-term. These recommendations reflect both the Board's strong support for return to flight at the earliest date consistent with the overriding objective of safety, and the Board's conviction that operation of the Space Shuttle, and all human space-flight, is a developmental activity with high inherent risks.
SPACE SHUTTLE COLUMBIA↗
STS 87: Meal - Suit Up - Depart O&C - Launch Columbia On Orbit - Landing - Crew Egress
The STS-87 Space Shuttle Columbia mission begins with the introduction of the seven crew members. The seven crew members include: Commander Kevin R. Kregel, pilot Steven W. Lindsey, mission specialists: Winston E. Scott, Kalpana Chawla and Takao Doi and payload specialist Leonid K. Kadenyuk. The United States Microgravity Payload (USMP-4), Orbital Acceleration Research Experiment (OARE), the EVA Demonstration Flight Test 5 (EDFT-05), Shuttle Ozone Limb Sending Experiment (SOLSE), Loop Heat Pump (LHP), and Sodium Sulfur Battery Experiment (NaSBE) were all shown during this video presentation. The launch of the STS-87 from different Kennedy Space Flight Center (KSFC) areas and Pre-flight training at the Johnson Space Center is presented. The retrieve and recovery spot satellite are also shown. Also, the landing of the Space Shuttle Columbia is presented from different areas at Kennedy Space Flight Center.
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STS-107 Crew Choice Television Highlights
The STS-107 flight day highlights begin with a shot inside the flight deck of the Space Shuttle Columbia where Commander Rick Husband, Pilot William McCool, and Mission Specialists David Brown and Kalpana Chawla are seated. The actual liftoff of the Space Shuttle Columbia is shown with Mission Specialists Michael Anderson and Laurel Clark, and Payload Specialist Ilan Ramon seated on the middeck of the spacecraft. Mission Specialist David Brown exits his seat to take pictures of the external tank while Michael Anderson also prepares to take photographs. A beautiful shot of the orbiter flying over Egypt is presented. A view of the Spacehab Research Double Module is shown where crystals are growing in microgravity. Laurel Clark is also shown working on the Bioreactor experiment. Michael Anderson is shown performing various breathing experiments in space. This video shows the last flight of STS-107 during ascent as the crew is seated in the flight deck and middeck of the Space Shuttle Columbia.
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The Columbia Debris Loan Program; Examples of Microscopic Analysis
Following the tragic loss of the Space Shuttle Columbia NASA formed The Columbia Recovery Office (CRO). The CRO was initially formed at the Johnson Space Center after the conclusion of recovery operations on May 1,2003 and then transferred .to the Kennedy Space Center on October 6,2003 and renamed The Columbia Recovery Office and Preservation. An integral part of the preservation project was the development of a process to loan Columbia debris to qualified researchers and technical educators. The purposes of this program include aiding in the advancement of advanced spacecraft design and flight safety development, the advancement of the study of hypersonic re-entry to enhance ground safety, to train and instruct accident investigators and to establish an enduring legacy for Space Shuttle Columbia and her crew. Along with a summary of the debris loan process examples of microscopic analysis of Columbia debris items will be presented. The first example will be from the reconstruction following the STS- 107 accident and how the Materials and Pro~es~steesa m used microscopic analysis to confirm the accident scenario. Additionally, three examples of microstructural results from the debris loan process from NASA internal, academia and private industry will be presented.
Russell, Rick↗
Columbia Accident Investigation Board Report. Volume Six
In the course of its inquiry into the February 1, 2003 destruction of the Space Shuttle Columbia, the Columbia Accident Investigation Board conducted a series of public hearings at Houston, Texas; Cape Canaveral, Florida; and Washington, DC. Testimony from these hearings was recorded and then transcribed. This appendix, Volume VI of the Report, is a compilation of those transcripts. Contents: Transcripts of Board Public Hearings; Appendix H.1 March 6, 2003 Houston, Texas; Appendix H.2 March 17, 2003 Houston, Texas; Appendix H.3 March 18, 2003 Houston, Texas; Appendix H. 4 March 25, 2003 Cape Canaveral, Florida; Appendix H.5 March 26, 2003 Cape Canaveral, Florida; Appendix H.6 April 7, 2003 Houston, Texas; Appendix H.7 April 8, 2003 Houston, Texas; Appendix H.8 April 23, 2003 Houston, Texas; Appendix H.9 May 6, 2003 Houston, Texas; Appendix H.10 June 12, 2003 Washington, DC.
CAIB (COLUMBIA ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION BOARD)↗
Probabilistic Modeling of Space Shuttle Debris Impact
On Feb 1, 2003, the Shuttle Columbia was lost during its return to Earth. As a result of the conclusion that debris impact caused the damage to the left wing of the Columbia Space Shuttle Vehicle (SSV) during ascent, the Columbia Accident Investigation Board recommended that an assessment be performed of the debris environment experienced by the SSV during ascent. A flight rationale based on probabilistic assessment is used for the SSV return-to-flight. The assessment entails identifying all potential debris sources, their probable geometric and aerodynamic characteristics, and their potential for impacting and damaging critical Shuttle components. A probabilistic analysis tool, based on the SwRI-developed NESSUS probabilistic analysis software, predicts the probability of impact and damage to the space shuttle wing leading edge and thermal protection system components. Among other parameters, the likelihood of unacceptable damage depends on the time of release (Mach number of the orbiter) and the divot mass as well as the impact velocity and impact angle. A typical result is visualized in the figures below. Probability of impact and damage, as well as the sensitivities thereof with respect to the distribution assumptions, can be computed and visualized at each point on the orbiter or summarized per wing panel or tile zone.
Huyse, Luc J.↗
The Use of LS-DYNA in the Columbia Accident Investigation and Return to Flight Activities
During the launch of the Space Shuttle Columbia on January 16, 2003, foam originating from the external tank impacted the shuttle's left wing 81 seconds after lift-off. Then on February 1st, Space Shuttle Columbia broke-up during re-entry. In the weeks that followed, the Columbia Accident Investigation Board had formed various teams to investigate every aspect of the tragedy. One of these teams was the Impact Analysis Team, which was asked to investigate the foam impact on the wing leading edge. This paper will describe the approach and methodology used by the team to support the accident investigation, and more specifically the use of LS-DYNA for analyzing the foam impact event. Due to the success of the analytical predictions, the impact analysis team has also been asked to support Return to Flight activities. These activities will analyze a far broader range of impact events, but not with just foam and not only on the wing leading edge. The debris list has expanded and so have the possible impact locations. This paper will discuss the Return to Flight activities and the use of LS-DYNA to support them.
Gabrys, Jonathan↗
STS-109 Post Flight Presentation
The STS-109 Post Flight presentation begins with Mission Specialists Nancy J. Currie, Michael J. Massimino, James H. Newman, and Richard M. Linnehan shown getting suited on launch day. Actual footage of the liftoff of the Space Shuttle Columbia is shown. Five spacewalks are performed to service the Hubble Space Telescope. Richard Linnehan and John Grunsfield are replacing solar arrays, connectors and power control units on the Hubble Space Telescope. Mission Specialist Nancy Currie will use Space Shuttle Columbia's robotic arm to grab the telescope, move it away from the orbiter and release it. A look at the coast of South America is also presented.
Source record↗
Nonproliferation Legacy Technology and Artifact Collection: NASA Space Shuttle Tiles
The NASA Space Shuttle Tiles were used by Sandia in the process of developing the Laser Dynamic Range Imager (LDRI) in support of NASA's Return to Flight following the 2003 Space Shuttle Columbia disaster. The heat shield tiles, provided to Sandia by NASA, are identical to those that were located on the underbelly of the Space Shuttle Columbia's orbiter. Sandia used the tiles to test the efficacy of the LDRI's imaging capabilities. The LDRI was utilized during every space shuttle mission between 2005 and 2011. The tiles are currently located in Building 891 and need to be moved to free up space for operational use. Given their technical significance, Sandia would like to archive them as historically significant items in long-term storage until such time as they can be appropriately displayed or employed as a demonstration artifact. This document provides basic information about the provenance of this artifact.
42 ENGINEERING↗
The Isothermal Dendritic Growth Experiment (IDGE)
The Isothermal Dendritic Growth Experiment (IDGE) constituted a series of three NASA-supported microgravity experiments, all of which flew aboard the space shuttle, Columbia. This experimental space flight series was designed and operated to grow and record dendrite solidification in the absence of gravity-induced convective heat transfer, and thereby produce a wealth of benchmark-quality data for testing solidification scaling laws. The data and analysis performed on the dendritic growth speed and tip size in Succinontrie (SCN) demonstrates that although the theory yields predictions that are reasonably in agreement with experiment, there are significant discrepancies. However, some of these discrepancies can be explained by accurately describing the diffusion of heat. The key finding involves recognition that the actual three-dimensional shape of dendrites includes time-dependent side-branching and a tip region that is not a paraboloid of revolution. Thus, the role of heat transfer in dendritic growth is validated, with the caveat that a more realistic model of the dendrite then a paraboloid is needed to account for heat flow in an experimentally observed dendrite. We are currently conducting additional analysis to further confirm and demonstrate these conclusions. The data and analyses for the growth selection physics remain much less definitive. From the first flight, the data indicated that the selection parameter, sigma*, is not exactly a constant, but exhibits a slight dependence on the supercooling. Additional data from the second flight are being examined to investigate the selection of a unique dendrite speed, tip size and shape. The IDGE flight series is now complete. We are currently completing analyses and moving towards final data archiving. It is gratifying to see that the IDGE published results and archived data sets are being used actively by other scientists and engineers. In addition, we are also pleased to report that the techniques and IDGE hardware system that the authors developed with NASA, are being currently employed on both designated flight experiments, like EDSE, and on flight definition experiments, like TDSE.
Glicksman, Martin E.↗