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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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At least 55 records · Page 3
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2022

Embedded acoustic sensing and monitoring techniques for small modular reactors

The goal of this project was to study the applicability of specific innovative instrumentation techniques for assessing parameters needed for safe small modular reactor operation and safeguarding of nuclear material. Small modular reactor core designs are currently being developed to provide energy more effectively and efficiently than in the past because they can be built as modules at fabrication sites and then transported to a power-producing facility. However, these modules and/or the final core will often be sealed and not accessible again until disposal. Instead of instruments that access the core directly, during and after operation, to monitor flux/dose and structural integrity, as current power plants use, new sensors need to be designed that can be built into the reactor initially to determine operating history, structural integrity through operation of the system, and nuclear material accountancy after shutdown and before disposition of the core. Embedded sensors already exist that can provide neutron flux, gamma dose, and temperatures, but techniques to expand upon these for assessing structural health and material inventory in the system over time need to be developed. Structural health assessments include the detection and imaging of cracks in the components that could eventually cause radioactive fission products to be released.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI2020

Validation of ORIGEN for VVER-440 Spent Fuel with Application to Fork Detector Safeguards Measurements

The US Department of Energy National Nuclear Security Administration and the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) are collaborating with the Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority in Finland to assess spent fuel verification methods for potential application to measurements at the planned spent fuel encapsulation plant and geological repository prior to final disposal in Finland. The fork detector (FDET) used to measure the neutron and gamma radiation from a given spent fuel assembly is an existing technology widely used by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and Euratom for the safeguards verification of spent fuel operator declaration. Recently, an FDET data analysis software, referred to as the ORIGEN module, was developed and incorporated into the IAEA/Euratom Integrated Review and Analysis Program. This module uses the ORIGEN burnup code to calculate the nuclide concentrations and the neutron and gamma source terms in the spent fuel based on operator declarations. Then, to predict the expected FDET signals for a given fuel assembly, the module combines the source terms calculated by ORIGEN with FDET response functions that were pre-generated using MCNP models. The inspector can compare the calculated signals to the measured values in real time to identify possible anomalies in fuel assembly’s operator declaration, integrity, or measurement. In this work, the capability of the ORIGEN module was extended from application to typical light water reactor fuels to use for VVER-440 assembly types. The accuracy of ORIGEN for this type of fuel assembly calculations was assessed by comparing calculated nuclide concentrations against destructive assay measurements for VVER-440 spent fuel. The performance of the ORIGEN module for FDET safeguards verification in routine inspections was assessed using FDET measurement data for 13 spent VVER-440 assemblies that were measured at the Loviisa Nuclear Power Plant in Finland, by comparing the calculated signals to the measured quantities. The results show that the calculated FDET neutron and gamma detector signals are generally within 12% of the measurements except for one assembly. Thus, these results are applicable to future safeguards verification in the planned Finland encapsulation plant, such as for passive neutron albedo reactivity safeguards measurements.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2024

The Meaning of Risk for Safety, Security, and Safeguards in the Design of Advanced Nuclear Reactors

What is the meaning of risk as it applies to the design of advanced reactors in the disciplines of safety, security, and safeguards? How can we find common terminology for the concept of risk and how can we find interfaces between these disciplines? These are important questions that should be explored in order that they may be applied in an integrated manner for the most effective and efficient design approaches. Eliminating or minimizing risks is a key design driver that motivates and informs the development of nuclear reactors. For safety, risk is well understood and applied in Probabilistic Risk Assessments. For security, the risk-based concepts of vulnerability assessments and vital areas are all considered in designing security systems. For safeguards, the concept of risk is not formally defined, as it relates to the design and operation of nuclear reactors. International nuclear safeguards seek to reduce the risk of proliferation in the nuclear fuel cycle and as such the concept of risk does exist. Therefore, the current understanding of the “3S’ approach, which seeks to find the interfaces and conflicts between safety, security, and safeguards requires a thorough understanding of the role that the reduction of risk plays in all three disciplines. The intersection of risk for safety and security is now being developed as there is a strong correlation between reactor design and operations and their vulnerability to sabotage. The intersection of risk for security and safeguards has to date chiefly been focused on the nuclear material control and accounting systems, which are relied on by both the operator (State) and the IAEA. This paper explores the concept of risk in each of the three disciplines, how they interact, potential conflicts and interfaces , how these might be addressed and leveraged, and a notional framework for how this could be achieved.

Kovacic, Donald N↗
DOE OSTI2021

Airport Risk Assessment Model Stakeholder Symposium Event Report

On June 22-23, 2021, the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory hosted a two-day virtual stakeholder symposium to share how the Airport Risk Assessment Model (ARAM) is putting security resource allocation planning into the hands of our airport’s front lines of defense. This report highlights the key takeaways from the discussions.

42 ENGINEERING↗
DOE OSTI2022

Development of a leading simulator/trailing simulator methodology as part of an integrated safety-security analysis for nuclear power plants

Nuclear power plant (NPP) risk assessment is broadly separated into disciplines of nuclear safety, security, and safeguards. Different analysis methods and computer models have been constructed to analyze each of these as separate disciplines. However, due to the complexity of NPP systems, there are risks that can span all these disciplines and require consideration of safety-security (2S) interactions which allows a more complete understanding of the relationship among these risks. In this work, a novel leading simulator/trailing simulator (LS/TS) method is introduced to integrate multiple generic safety and security computer models into a single, holistic 2S analysis. A case study is performed using this novel method to determine its effectiveness. The case study shows that the LS/TS method avoided introducing errors in simulation, compared to the same scenario performed without the LS/TS method. A second case study is then used to illustrate an integrated 2S analysis which shows that different levels of damage to vital equipment from sabotage at a NPP can affect accident evolution by several hours.

42 ENGINEERING↗
DOE OSTI2022

Low Enriched Fuel Fabrication Safeguards Modeling

The Material Protection, Accounting, and Control Technologies (MPACT) program utilizes modeling and simulation to assess Material Control and Accountability (MC&A) concerns for a variety of nuclear facilities. Single analyst tools allow for rapid design and evaluation of advanced approaches for new and existing nuclear facilities. A low enriched uranium (LEU) fuel conversion and fabrication facility simulator has been developed to assist with MC&A for existing LEU fuel fabrication for light water reactors. Simulated measurement blocks were added to the model (consistent with current best practices). Material balance calculations and statistical tests have also been added to the model.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI2021

Optimization of In-Field Alpha Spectrometry for Uranium Enrichment Determination in Uranium Hexafluoride

In response to needs identified by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) research is underway to develop In-Field Alpha Spectrometry (IFAS) as a method to allow IAEA safeguards inspectors to collect samples of uranium hexafluoride (UF6) at processing facilities to assess and verify uranium enrichment. For sample collection, the IFAS method uses Single-Use Destructive Assay (SUDA) samplers, which contain thin zeolite coatings that trap UF6 gas and convert it to the safer, more stable form uranyl fluoride (UO2F2). For alpha spectrometry, the IFAS instrument employs a large area silicon semiconductor transducer to detect and record alpha particle energy-deposition events. Over the past year optimization work has significantly increased the diameter of useful SUDA samples (from 12.7 mm to 48 mm), improved the manufacturability and reproducibility of SUDA samples, increased the area of the IFAS alpha spectrometer sensor from 1.2 cm to 3.1 cm, and improved source positioning within the IFAS. This paper will report on this optimization work, its impacts on IFAS performance, and future plans for IFAS miniaturization, improvements, and testing.

46 - INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AN↗
DOE OSTI2024

Conceptual Design of Passive Neutron Albedo Reactivity and Active Neutron Albedo Reactivity Instruments for Various Arrangements of Pebble Bed Reactor Pebbles

MCNP6 simulations were performed to assess the anticipated capability of the Passive Neutron Albedo Reactivity technique for nuclear safeguards measurements of irradiated pebble/pebbles. Two physical setups were examined. One with a single pebble of three different burnups and one with 27 pebbles in a cube. For all cases the sensitivity to removing all the fissile material was examined. For both of the physical setups, 4 assay cases were examined: (a) singles count rates for which the only source neutrons were the inherent neutrons in the fuel, (b) singles count rates again except this time two relatively weak AmLi sources were placed above and below the top central pebble and the combined effect of both neutron source terms were examined, (c) doubles count rates for which the only source neutrons were the inherent neutrons in the fuel, and (d) doubles count rates again except this time two relatively weak AmLi sources were placed above and below the top central pebble and the combined effect of both neutron source terms were examined. Finally, a few parameters such as Cd near the 3 He tubes were perturbed to see if the results could be improved.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗
DOE OSTI2021

Optimization Of In-field Alpha Spectrometry For Uranium Enrichment Determination In Uranium Hexafluoride

In response to needs identified by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) research is underway to develop In-Field Alpha Spectrometry (IFAS) as a method to allow IAEA safeguards inspectors to collect samples of uranium hexafluoride (UF6) at processing facilities to assess and verify uranium enrichment. For sample collection, the IFAS method uses Single-Use Destructive Assay (SUDA) samplers, which contain thin zeolite coatings that trap UF6 gas and convert it to the safer, more stable form uranyl fluoride (as a dihydrate, UO2F2·2H2O). For alpha spectrometry, the IFAS instrument employs a large area silicon semiconductor transducer to detect and record alpha particle energy-deposition events. Over the past year optimization work has significantly increased the diameter of useful SUDA samples (from 12.7 mm to 48 mm), improved the manufacturability and reproducibility of SUDA samples, increased the area of the IFAS alpha spectrometer sensor from 1.2 cm to 3.1 cm, and improved source positioning within the IFAS. This paper will report on this optimization work, its impacts on IFAS performance, and future plans for IFAS miniaturization, improvements, and testing.

Chichester, David↗
DOE OSTI2022

A Tool Kit for Generating Simulated Radiation Measurements for Advanced Reactor Safeguards and Security

A tool kit was developed to simulate and analyze passive radiation measurements of molten salt reactor (MSR) operations to support development of nuclear safeguards approaches for this emerging reactor technology. A Transient Simulation Framework of Reconfigurable Modules (TRANSFORM) multiphysics simulation of an MSR produces time-dependent isotopic inventories at user-selected locations within the model. The tool kit implements the Gamma Detector Response and Analysis Software (GADRAS) application programming interface to inject the TRANSFORM isotopic inventories extracted/processed by a Python pipeline into GADRAS models of user-defined geometries. The TRANSFORM inventories are the source terms used to obtain synthetic measurements from GADRAS-defined detectors. The speed of TRANSFORM and GADRAS simulations enables surveying the large design space of MSRs (e.g., fuel type, fuel salt composition, number of loops) and the plethora of measurements (e.g., location, detector type, and collimation) within the reactor. This has enabled timely assessment of the various measurement locations and detectors to identify the most effective and efficient safeguards approach for a specific MSR design. Lastly, the tool kit also simulates extracted samples that can be aged to a desired dose, enabling stakeholders to optimize a measurement plan to use sample analysis as an element within a broader material accountancy plan.

Westphal, Greg↗
DOE OSTI2021

Fork Experiments in the Hot Cell Using Spent Fuel Rods for International Nuclear Safeguards

This work leveraged the rare availability of 25 full-length pressurized water reactor spent fuel rods and 1 irradiated mixed-oxide rod at an Oak Ridge National Laboratory hot cell. This was done to collect measurement data with two Fork detectors to assess the detectors’ capability of verifying operator declaration data and detecting partial defects in spent fuel, which are the two primary goals of international safeguards on spent nuclear fuel. The data can also be used to benchmark the ORIGEN module, which has been adopted in the International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA’s)/European Atomic Energy Community’s (Euratom’s) Integrated Review and Analysis Program to predict the Fork detector count rates in real time. In this project, the authors first calibrated two Fork detectors—a standard one and a modified one—by using known strong neutron and gamma sources. Then, the authors measured all 26 fuel rods at multiple locations along the length. The fuel rods were then assembled into three arrays—2 × 2, 3 × 3, and 5 × 5—by using specially designed support grids to mimic fuel assemblies and measure the arrays with both detectors. For the 5 × 5 array, 4 and 8 fuel rods of the array were replaced in two separate cases with short stainless-steel rods to mimic two partial defect scenarios, and the arrays were measured before and after the replacements. Polyethylene blocks were used in this experiment to mimic water. The results show that the Fork detectors were able to verify operator declarations and detect partial defects in spent fuel, and the authors were the first to demonstrate this through experiments. A discovery was also made that determined the root cause of the nonlinear response to gamma dose in the ion chambers used in IAEA and Euratom’s Fork detectors. After the experiments, both detectors were retrieved from the hot cell for future use. The data collected in this project will be used in a parallel International Nuclear Safeguards Engagement Program (INSEP) project to enhance the safeguards in the Finnish spent fuel encapsulation plant, and the data will be useful to other projects in the future given the increased safeguards needs due to spent fuel transfer and disposal activities worldwide.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI2021

Treatment of uncertainties for security-related design aspects of advanced reactors when using a risk-informed licensing approach

Sabotage of nuclear plants and theft of special nuclear material are different from many other issues potentially affecting public health and safety, and some of those differences drive the content of the present report. A high-level indication of these differences is provided in the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s Safety Goal Policy. Promulgated in the mid-1980’s, when it had become reasonably clear that risk analysis had improved to the point where it was possible to understand the risks associated with plant operation, the Safety Goal Policy articulates qualitative safety goals and quantitative health objectives that are meant to guide regulatory and risk management activities, with the following key exceptions noted in the original policy statement: The possible effects of sabotage or diversion of nuclear material are also not presently included in the safety goals. At present there is no basis on which to provide a measure of risk on these matters. It is the Commission’s intention that everything that is needed will be done to keep these types of risks at their present very low level; and it is the Commission’s expectation that efforts on this point will continue to be successful. With these exceptions, it is the Commission’s intent that the risks from all the various initiating mechanisms be considered to the best of the capability of current evaluation techniques. The present report discusses extensions of classical risk management to address some of the special issues that arise in the context of security. Although the present emphasis is on physical security, some attention will be paid to cyber security. A particular focus of the report is on quantitative framework to manage and address uncertainties. This framework is demonstrated via a couple of hypothetical examples.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2022

A Review on the State of the Art of Machine Learning and Satellite Imaging: Detecting Scene Changes in Selected Nuclear Fuel Cycle Datasets

The timely detection of clandestine nuclear facilities is one of the greatest challenges faced by the International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA). Idaho National Laboratory is currently applying machine learning (ML) to existing satellite imagery (SI) datasets to find facilities within the nuclear fuel life cycle, with primary focus placed on identifying critical predecessor (i.e., fuel fabrication and fuel enrichment) and successor (i.e., nuclear power plants) facilities. This could provide a satellite image methodology that the IAEA could leverage to discover clandestine facilities. The work presented in this paper describes the evolution of a workflow developed by this team for object detection related to critical infrastructure by expanding that workflow for the purpose of identifying nuclear fuel cycle components and automating dependency assessments. This will be done using two methods housed within a single pipeline. The first method involves implementing a DenseNet161 convolutional neural network to classify the images and explain the results using Local Interpretable Model-Agnostic Explanations (LIME). The second method implements You Only Look Once version 5 (YoloV5), to detect objects within images, provide a probability for the detection, and provide a bounding box that corresponds to the object of interest. The results of this work are anticipated to provide a clear picture of this portion of the nuclear fuel cycle and perform as a stand-alone tool for image assessment that can be expanded to additional fuel cycle components and implemented in international safeguards and national security domains. This capability addresses the IAEA’s need to detect undeclared nuclear materials and activities within a state while encompassing the entire nuclear fuel cycle.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
DOE OSTI2024

Evaluation of material accountancy techniques for 233 Pa from thorium nuclear fuels

Thorium is a promising alternative to uranium as nuclear fuel with advantages such as higher abundance, lower production of long-lived transuranic elements, and potentially better proliferation resistance. However, thorium presents a potential pathway for proliferation where produced 233 Pa can be diverted for the clandestine production of safeguarded 233 U. To prevent this, the ability to detect and measure 233 Pa must be assessed. This paper reviews several nuclear material accountancy techniques to determine their suitability for detecting 233 Pa extracted from irradiated thorium fuel. Hybrid K-edge densitometry and passive gamma spectroscopy have been found to be the best options based on technology maturity, cost, accuracy, and acquisition time. Thorium can be used in various reactor designs such as pressurized water reactors (PWRs), Canada deuterium uranium (CANDU) reactors, and molten salt reactors (MSRs). Therefore, thorium-uranium oxide fueling was modeled for three representative reactors (PWR, CANDU, MSR), burning the fuel to 47 GWd/MTHM for PWR, 19 GWd/MTHM for CANDU, and at a steady power of 52.711 MW/MTHM for MSR. Within each model, the protactinium element in the used fuel was extracted and its isotopic content analyzed. Simulated results indicated that 233 Pa can be detected using passive gamma spectroscopy in each fuel type at all decay times (0–300 days) following separation.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI2023

The research challenges in security and safeguards for nuclear fission batteries

This paper discusses the nuclear security and safeguards research challenges presented by the development and deployment of nuclear fission batteries. These are defined as easily transportable and deployable nuclear systems which are designed to operate either unattended or autonomously. We start by defining the current landscape of domestic and international safeguards and security and discuss how it can be affected by the introduction these new nuclear systems. We then specifically discuss the technology gaps and technologies to be developed to facilitate their practical deployment. We find that, as expected, we can leverage conclusions from existing security and safeguards studies for small modular rectors and develop bespoke target set analyses to inform security postures based on probabilistic risk assessment. We find also that specific fission battery security economic analysis tools are needed and security by design must be applied early. However, the most important finding is that these new systems will require a new comprehensive set of cyber tools covering transportation, installation, operation, maintenance security of the fission battery systems. Altogether, we find that the development of the necessary security and safeguards requirements at the design phase of such a technology will be of great benefit in the smooth deployment of this modern nuclear energy system.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗
DOE OSTI2021

Security Self-Assessment Toolkit for Nuclear Materials Facilities: Focus on Insider Threat Mitigation

Theft or sabotage of weapons-usable nuclear materials is a global concern. To minimize this threat, establishing and maintaining an effective nuclear security regime is required to protect against criminal or other negligent acts. Use of a formalized insider threat mitigation program is one such security measure. Individuals who have or held authorized access to an organization's critical assets, such as nuclear materials, are considered "insiders." Insider threats, or insider adversaries, are motivated individuals who possess access, authority, and knowledge to conduct a malicious act or facilitate that of an external party. To thwart insider threats (both intentional and unintentional), organizations can formalize an enterprise-wide approach to identify and mitigate the unique risks presented by insiders. This report provides an approach to evaluate an insider threat mitigation program at facilities with nuclear materials. Formal program evaluations serve many purposes and can be designed using several different methods and techniques. This report presents a self-assessment approach to program evaluation whereby an organization can assess its strengths, identify key gaps, and set priorities for ongoing improvement efforts to mitigate insider threats. Results of the self-assessment can provide critical information to contribute to the continuous improvement of an organization’s insider threat mitigation program within eight specific domain areas.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2022

In-Field Alpha Spectrometer Development FY2022 Mid-Year Report

In response to needs identified by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Idaho National Laboratory (INL) has developed an In-Field Alpha Spectrometer (IFAS) to allow IAEA safeguards inspectors to collect samples of uranium hexafluoride (UF 6 ) at processing facilities, to perform field assessments to verify uranium enrichment. For sample collection, the IFAS method uses Single-Use Destructive Assay (SUDA) samplers, developed at Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL), which contain thin zeolite coatings that trap UF6 gas and convert it to the safer, more stable form uranyl fluoride (as a dihydrate, UO 2 F 2 ·2H 2 O). For alpha spectrometry, the IFAS instrument employs a large area silicon semiconductor transducer to detect and record alpha particle energy-deposition events. Over the course of this project INL, PNNL, Oak Ridge National Laboratory worked to optimize the SUDA sample design for alpha spectrometry, to optimize processes for manufacturing, loading, and shipping SUDA samples, and to allow the measurement of loaded SUDA samples. In fiscal year (FY) 2022 INL has bene investigating the reproducibility and measurement precision of IFAS measurements and the associated determination of uranium enrichment.

46 - INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AN↗