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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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TBD(exp 3)

When asked by the Aeronautical Engineering staff to design a viable supersonic commercial transport, most of the students were well aware that Boeing, McDonnell Douglas, and other aircraft companies had been studying a cadre of transports for more than 30 years and had yet to present a viable aircraft. In the spirit of aviation progress and with much creative license, the TBD design team spearheaded the problem with the full intention of presenting a marketable high speed civil transport in spring of 1992. The project commenced with various studies of future market demands. With the market expansion of American business overseas, the airline industry projects a boom of over 200 million passengers by the year 2000. This will create a much higher demand for time efficient and cost effective inter-continental travel; this is the challenge of the high speed civil transport. The TBD(exp 3), a 269 passenger, long-range civil transport was designed to cruise at Mach 3.0 utilizing technology predicted to be available in 2005. Unlike other contemporary commercial airplane designs, the TBD(exp 3) incorporates a variable geometry wing for optimum performance. This design characteristic enabled the TBD(exp 3) to be efficient in both subsonic and supersonic flight. The TBD(exp 3) was designed to be economically viable for commercial airline purchase, be comfortable for passengers, meet FAR Part 25, and the current FAR 36 Stage 3 noise requirements. The TBD(exp 3) was designed to exhibit a long service life, maximize safety, ease of maintenance, as well as be fully compatible with all current high-traffic density airport facilities.

Baughan, Jim↗

Image Analysis via Fuzzy-Reasoning Approach: Prototype Applications at NASA

A set of imaging techniques based on Fuzzy Reasoning (FR) approach was built for NASA at Kennedy Space Center (KSC) to perform complex real-time visual-related safety prototype tasks, such as detection and tracking of moving Foreign Objects Debris (FOD) during the NASA Space Shuttle liftoff and visual anomaly detection on slidewires used in the emergency egress system for Space Shuttle at the launch pad. The system has also proved its prospective in enhancing X-ray images used to screen hard-covered items leading to a better visualization. The system capability was used as well during the imaging analysis of the Space Shuttle Columbia accident. These FR-based imaging techniques include novel proprietary adaptive image segmentation, image edge extraction, and image enhancement. Probabilistic Neural Network (PNN) scheme available from NeuroShell(TM) Classifier and optimized via Genetic Algorithm (GA) was also used along with this set of novel imaging techniques to add powerful learning and image classification capabilities. Prototype applications built using these techniques have received NASA Space Awards, including a Board Action Award, and are currently being filed for patents by NASA; they are being offered for commercialization through the Research Triangle Institute (RTI), an internationally recognized corporation in scientific research and technology development. Companies from different fields, including security, medical, text digitalization, and aerospace, are currently in the process of licensing these technologies from NASA.

Dominguez, Jesus A.↗

NASA Software Engineering Benchmarking Study

To identify best practices for the improvement of software engineering on projects, NASA's Offices of Chief Engineer (OCE) and Safety and Mission Assurance (OSMA) formed a team led by Heather Rarick and Sally Godfrey to conduct this benchmarking study. The primary goals of the study are to identify best practices that: Improve the management and technical development of software intensive systems; Have a track record of successful deployment by aerospace industries, universities [including research and development (R&D) laboratories], and defense services, as well as NASA's own component Centers; and Identify candidate solutions for NASA's software issues. Beginning in the late fall of 2010, focus topics were chosen and interview questions were developed, based on the NASA top software challenges. Between February 2011 and November 2011, the Benchmark Team interviewed a total of 18 organizations, consisting of five NASA Centers, five industry organizations, four defense services organizations, and four university or university R and D laboratory organizations. A software assurance representative also participated in each of the interviews to focus on assurance and software safety best practices. Interviewees provided a wealth of information on each topic area that included: software policy, software acquisition, software assurance, testing, training, maintaining rigor in small projects, metrics, and use of the Capability Maturity Model Integration (CMMI) framework, as well as a number of special topics that came up in the discussions. NASA's software engineering practices compared favorably with the external organizations in most benchmark areas, but in every topic, there were ways in which NASA could improve its practices. Compared to defense services organizations and some of the industry organizations, one of NASA's notable weaknesses involved communication with contractors regarding its policies and requirements for acquired software. One of NASA's strengths was its software assurance practices, which seemed to rate well in comparison to the other organizational groups and also seemed to include a larger scope of activities. An unexpected benefit of the software benchmarking study was the identification of many opportunities for collaboration in areas including metrics, training, sharing of CMMI experiences and resources such as instructors and CMMI Lead Appraisers, and even sharing of assets such as documented processes. A further unexpected benefit of the study was the feedback on NASA practices that was received from some of the organizations interviewed. From that feedback, other potential areas where NASA could improve were highlighted, such as accuracy of software cost estimation and budgetary practices. The detailed report contains discussion of the practices noted in each of the topic areas, as well as a summary of observations and recommendations from each of the topic areas. The resulting 24 recommendations from the topic areas were then consolidated to eliminate duplication and culled into a set of 14 suggested actionable recommendations. This final set of actionable recommendations, listed below, are items that can be implemented to improve NASA's software engineering practices and to help address many of the items that were listed in the NASA top software engineering issues. 1. Develop and implement standard contract language for software procurements. 2. Advance accurate and trusted software cost estimates for both procured and in-house software and improve the capture of actual cost data to facilitate further improvements. 3. Establish a consistent set of objectives and expectations, specifically types of metrics at the Agency level, so key trends and models can be identified and used to continuously improve software processes and each software development effort. 4. Maintain the CMMI Maturity Level requirement for critical NASA projects and use CMMI to measure organizations developing software for NASA. 5.onsolidate, collect and, if needed, develop common processes principles and other assets across the Agency in order to provide more consistency in software development and acquisition practices and to reduce the overall cost of maintaining or increasing current NASA CMMI maturity levels. 6. Provide additional support for small projects that includes: (a) guidance for appropriate tailoring of requirements for small projects, (b) availability of suitable tools, including support tool set-up and training, and (c) training for small project personnel, assurance personnel and technical authorities on the acceptable options for tailoring requirements and performing assurance on small projects. 7. Develop software training classes for the more experienced software engineers using on-line training, videos, or small separate modules of training that can be accommodated as needed throughout a project. 8. Create guidelines to structure non-classroom training opportunities such as mentoring, peer reviews, lessons learned sessions, and on-the-job training. 9. Develop a set of predictive software defect data and a process for assessing software testing metric data against it. 10. Assess Agency-wide licenses for commonly used software tools. 11. Fill the knowledge gap in common software engineering practices for new hires and co-ops.12. Work through the Science, Technology, Engineering and Mathematics (STEM) program with universities in strengthening education in the use of common software engineering practices and standards. 13. Follow up this benchmark study with a deeper look into what both internal and external organizations perceive as the scope of software assurance, the value they expect to obtain from it, and the shortcomings they experience in the current practice. 14. Continue interactions with external software engineering environment through collaborations, knowledge sharing, and benchmarking.

Rarick, Heather L.↗